And Reality Bites Back
In this well argued compilation of essays on the modern Middle East, Karsh upends the conventional orientalist themes of Western colonialism and imperialism. Western nations, propelled by their own expectations, have been well played by their purported clients.
Karsh begins, naturally enough, with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Portrayed as the "sick man of Europe", Karsh shows that rather than being Europe's victim, the other Great Powers were more concerned with keeping their southern neighbour alive as part of their own interests in maintaining a balance of power. The common force that destroyed all of them in quick succession was nationalism, and through Paris 1919 and the Wilson doctrine embraced and accelerated the process, the ideal of empires as a regional solution continued to resurface, either as pan-Arabism, pan-Turanism or pan-Islamism.
As a particular example, Karsh contends that the British were scammed by the Emir Hussein and his son Faisal, Hashemite sheikhs propped up by the efforts of T. E. Lawrence, Hubert Young and others, whom they hoped would be the figureheads of a new Arabized Ottoman Empire. He dismisses the Hussein-McMahon correspondence, often seized upon as if it were a treaty, as an incomplete and somewhat vague in process negotiation. Keeping his options open, Faisal also negotiated with Enver Pasha, the Ottoman Minister of War, for similar powers and didn't join the Allies until the winter of 1917, "the vast majority of the 8-10 million Arabic speaking Ottoman subjects remained loyal to their suzerain to the bitter end and between 100,000 and 300,000 even fought in the Ottoman army" (pp14) In retrospect the idea that Hussein or his sons deserved vast territories as a result of their meagre service of a few thousand men to the war effort seems foolish. Faisal proved unable to hold on to his position in Syria and was moved to a newly constituted Iraq cobbled together from the Ottoman provinces of Mosul, Basra and Baghdad. Hussein's other son Abdullah proved to be more capable.
Particularly interesting was Karsh's assessment of Russia which is very different from the usual American view of an aggressive hegemon. The Russians saw the Middle East as the bordering nations of Iran, Turkey and Afghanistan (glossing over the 'stans as constructs of the Russian/Soviet empire) that the they saw as buffer states with the west, particularly India and Pakistan which were first in the British then American spheres. Reluctantly and with grave misgivings they were dragged into propping up the Afghan communist regime and viewed with alarm what they saw as an American attempt to create a "new Great Ottoman Empire" that would include the Islamic Soviet 'stans. (pp100). Other than the desire for warm water ports, they were slow to develop any Arab policy at all and counter to American fears,, their prevailing POV was that the peoples of the ME were not yet near the historical stage of development where Marxist-Leninist theory would warrant such a transition.
Karsh, also skewers the Arabists of the British Foreign Office and the US State Department as WASPish upper class elitists prone to group think and consistently at odds with public opinion and the policy of their elected officials, and nowhere is this clearer than WRT to Zionism and Israel. Some, such as Wilson's Secretary of State Robert Lansing who in Dec 1917 said he opposed "turning the Holy Land over to the absolute control of the race credited with the death of Christ" (pp53), were at least partly motivated by anti-Semitism. Karsh describes the political intrigues of 1947-49 in some detail Some ascribed Truman's support for a Jewish State was based on pandering to the Jewish vote.. The main arguments of the State Department were that the Jewish State would be a Soviet bridgehead and that nothing should be done to push the Arab countries into an alliance with the Soviet Union as the West needed Arab oil in order to fuel the post war European recovery. None of these turned out to be true. Truman lost New York, Illinois and Pennsylvania, the 3 states with the largest Jewish population. The Soviets voted for Partition as a strategic vote against the British Empire, and had no plans for the Arab ME. Further, the Arabs needed to sell and develop their oil fields and needed western markets and expertise too badly for this to be a credible threat. Cosying up to Arab leadership leadership may have seemed important, but as Karsh notes that within 3 years most of the Arab principals had left the stage - president of Syria was overthrown in a coup, King Farouk followed in 1952, Jordan's King Abdullah was assassinated as were the prime ministers of Egypt and Lebanon.
In addition to the above Karsh takes a good look at the relationship between America and the Shah, President Carter's mistaken notions that nearly derailed the Sadat-Begin peace talks and in the last two chapters the failure of the Arab Spring. While not a home run, Karsh delivers a solid triple, a valuable contribution the study of political cause and effect in the Middle East.