“Putin’s war against Ukraine drew the line under thirty years of post-Cold War efforts to find Russia a place in the Western order, which it would deem legitimate enough to avoid disrupting. This was mainly Russia’s failure: it proved unwilling or unable to overcome its toxic resentments and imperialist impulses. But there was another factor at play. Stalin’s belligerent foreign policy, whatever his motivations, helped forge the West on an anti-Soviet basis. Throughout the Cold War, the Soviets tried hard to undermine Western unity even as they craved Western recognition. They never managed. Post-Soviet Russia, eyeing jealously the West’s formidable power, sought a seat at the table without understanding the price that it would have to pay for admission…Russia would have to change itself, recognize its own flaws, attempt to tackle them. It was just too difficult, perhaps even humiliating. It was easier to slam the door and, like Brezhnev once promised in a letter home to his mom, to spit on Europe from the Eiffel Tower. This was Putin’s chosen course…”
- Sergey Radchenko, To Run the World: The Kremlin’s Cold War Bid for Global Power
The Cold War is a blanket term given to a huge chunk of twentieth century history. Generally speaking, people think of the Cold War as the faceoff between the United States and the Soviet Union in Europe. But it also encompassed hot wars in places like Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan; the difficult process of decolonization in Africa and Asia; and the dangerous geopolitical games played in hotspots like Egypt or Cuba, where the superpowers often learned too well the phrase “the tail wags the dog.”
In the past few years, I’ve really dived into the subject of the Cold War, hoping to glean some understanding of our present world through the lens of the past. As I did, I realized that the topic was much richer than I’d previously thought. Soon, I found myself collecting Cold War-themed titles that go far beyond a divided Berlin, to touch on experiences around the globe. However, until picking up Sergey Radchenko’s To Run the World, I have not yet read about a seemingly obvious angle: the Cold War as seen through Soviet eyes.
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At first glance, To Run the World has the feel of a standard one-volume history of a big event. It begins in 1945, with the fracturing of the Second World War alliance that included Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union. It ends in 1991, with the Soviet Union’s collapse.
Nevertheless, this has a bit of an interesting structure, despite the overarching chronology. For one, it is not a narrative history, which relies on the novelist’s tools to depict real-life events. Instead, it is focused more on analysis of said events, deriving from them their larger meaning in relation to Soviet geopolitical goals. To that end, each chapter begins with an introduction, and then is divided into sub-headed discussions. There is even a conclusion at the end, giving this a whiff of textbook.
In addition, Radchenko makes no attempt at comprehensiveness, focusing instead on particular moments of interest. For example, the opening section is interested in the origins of the Cold War, and teasing out the question important to all middle-schoolers on the playground: Who started it? With this question – as in many others in this book, and in life – it’s complicated.
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Despite the title, Radchenko’s thesis is not that the Soviet Union literally wanted to run the whole world. Rather, Radchenko argues that much of what they did was an attempt at legitimacy. They wanted to be seen as a global superpower by the West, by the socialist bloc, and by nonaligned nations. Thus, the Cuban Missile Crisis is something like a cry for attention, on top of a strategic move to counter American missiles in Turkey, and an offshoot of Nikita Khruschev’s erratic nature.
One of the difficulties encountered by the Soviets is that each of their audiences was very different. In particular, attempted reproachments with the West often caused difficulties within the Warsaw Pact, and vice-versa. Eventually – as in the case with China – the West stopped viewing communism as a Moscow-controlled monolith, and began exploiting the seams of Russia’s strained relationships.
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For me, To Run the World falls into the “respect” category, rather than “love” or even “like.” As a person who gravitates toward storytelling, I found Radchenko’s style to be a bit dry, even though his characterizations of the Soviet Union’s various leaders can be quite perceptive, and occasionally witty. Radchenko has a strong reputation in this field, and the book is well cited. He is also a great weigher of evidence, and embraces the reality that little in human affairs is tidy or certain.
One of the big things that jumped out to me is that Radchenko is not big on context or backgrounding the topics he covers. Instead, he sort of jumps right in. When I was already familiar with something, this didn’t matter; when I didn’t, I felt a bit of out of depth. For instance, Radchenko has a chapter on the Yom Kippur War between Egypt, Syria, and Israel that assumes you already know the basic outlines of the conflict. Since I did, I got a lot out of it. However, when Radchenko ventures into Angola, I was lost.
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As I mentioned up top, my main purpose in tackling a book like this was to discover what the Old Cold War might tell us about the New Cold War. Unfortunately, the way things are shaking out right now, the past really isn’t going to be much of a guide.
Back in the Old Cold War, we had a bipolar world that – in its odd way – maintained a kind of balance. The balance was occasionally threatened, and did not come without fear and bloodshed, yet we avoided an out-and-out globe-destroying conflagration. Now, we have a multipolar world of nuclear-armed nations with great power aspirations, such as China, the United States, Russia, and India. This creates more zones of interest, which creates correspondingly more points of potentially war-starting contact. It’s a bit like the early 20th century, and we all know how that turned out. On top of all that, America’s foreign policy has entered the weirdest timeline. It wouldn’t surprise me to wake up tomorrow and find that we gave Alaska back to Russia, because it asked nicely.
This is all to say that my hope for some present-and-future insight went mostly unfulfilled. Still, on the bright side, To Run the World helpfully complements what I’ve already learned about the Cold War, and will likely stay in my mind as I read about it going forward. On the downside, this is really dense, a six-hundred-page behemoth that felt even longer.