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To Run the World: The Kremlin's Cold War Bid for Global Power
What would it feel like To Run the World? The Soviet rulers spent the Cold War trying desperately to find out.
In this panoramic new history of the conflict that defined the postwar era, Sergey Radchenko provides an unprecedented deep dive into the psychology of the Kremlin's decision-making. He reveals how the Soviet struggle with the United States and China reflected its irreconcilable ambitions as a self-proclaimed superpower and the leader of global revolution. This tension drove Soviet policies from Stalin's postwar scramble for territory to Khrushchev's reckless overseas adventurism and nuclear brinksmanship, Brezhnev's jockeying for influence in the third world, and Gorbachev's failed attempts to reinvent Moscow's claims to greatness.
Perennial insecurities, delusions of grandeur, and desire for recognition propelled Moscow on a headlong quest for global power, with dire consequences and painful legacies that continue to shape our world.
In this panoramic new history of the conflict that defined the postwar era, Sergey Radchenko provides an unprecedented deep dive into the psychology of the Kremlin's decision-making. He reveals how the Soviet struggle with the United States and China reflected its irreconcilable ambitions as a self-proclaimed superpower and the leader of global revolution. This tension drove Soviet policies from Stalin's postwar scramble for territory to Khrushchev's reckless overseas adventurism and nuclear brinksmanship, Brezhnev's jockeying for influence in the third world, and Gorbachev's failed attempts to reinvent Moscow's claims to greatness.
Perennial insecurities, delusions of grandeur, and desire for recognition propelled Moscow on a headlong quest for global power, with dire consequences and painful legacies that continue to shape our world.
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First published May 31, 2024
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June 1, 2025
“Putin’s war against Ukraine drew the line under thirty years of post-Cold War efforts to find Russia a place in the Western order, which it would deem legitimate enough to avoid disrupting. This was mainly Russia’s failure: it proved unwilling or unable to overcome its toxic resentments and imperialist impulses. But there was another factor at play. Stalin’s belligerent foreign policy, whatever his motivations, helped forge the West on an anti-Soviet basis. Throughout the Cold War, the Soviets tried hard to undermine Western unity even as they craved Western recognition. They never managed. Post-Soviet Russia, eyeing jealously the West’s formidable power, sought a seat at the table without understanding the price that it would have to pay for admission…Russia would have to change itself, recognize its own flaws, attempt to tackle them. It was just too difficult, perhaps even humiliating. It was easier to slam the door and, like Brezhnev once promised in a letter home to his mom, to spit on Europe from the Eiffel Tower. This was Putin’s chosen course…”
- Sergey Radchenko, To Run the World: The Kremlin’s Cold War Bid for Global Power
The Cold War is a blanket term given to a huge chunk of twentieth century history. Generally speaking, people think of the Cold War as the faceoff between the United States and the Soviet Union in Europe. But it also encompassed hot wars in places like Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan; the difficult process of decolonization in Africa and Asia; and the dangerous geopolitical games played in hotspots like Egypt or Cuba, where the superpowers often learned too well the phrase “the tail wags the dog.”
In the past few years, I’ve really dived into the subject of the Cold War, hoping to glean some understanding of our present world through the lens of the past. As I did, I realized that the topic was much richer than I’d previously thought. Soon, I found myself collecting Cold War-themed titles that go far beyond a divided Berlin, to touch on experiences around the globe. However, until picking up Sergey Radchenko’s To Run the World, I have not yet read about a seemingly obvious angle: the Cold War as seen through Soviet eyes.
***
At first glance, To Run the World has the feel of a standard one-volume history of a big event. It begins in 1945, with the fracturing of the Second World War alliance that included Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union. It ends in 1991, with the Soviet Union’s collapse.
Nevertheless, this has a bit of an interesting structure, despite the overarching chronology. For one, it is not a narrative history, which relies on the novelist’s tools to depict real-life events. Instead, it is focused more on analysis of said events, deriving from them their larger meaning in relation to Soviet geopolitical goals. To that end, each chapter begins with an introduction, and then is divided into sub-headed discussions. There is even a conclusion at the end, giving this a whiff of textbook.
In addition, Radchenko makes no attempt at comprehensiveness, focusing instead on particular moments of interest. For example, the opening section is interested in the origins of the Cold War, and teasing out the question important to all middle-schoolers on the playground: Who started it? With this question – as in many others in this book, and in life – it’s complicated.
***
Despite the title, Radchenko’s thesis is not that the Soviet Union literally wanted to run the whole world. Rather, Radchenko argues that much of what they did was an attempt at legitimacy. They wanted to be seen as a global superpower by the West, by the socialist bloc, and by nonaligned nations. Thus, the Cuban Missile Crisis is something like a cry for attention, on top of a strategic move to counter American missiles in Turkey, and an offshoot of Nikita Khruschev’s erratic nature.
One of the difficulties encountered by the Soviets is that each of their audiences was very different. In particular, attempted reproachments with the West often caused difficulties within the Warsaw Pact, and vice-versa. Eventually – as in the case with China – the West stopped viewing communism as a Moscow-controlled monolith, and began exploiting the seams of Russia’s strained relationships.
***
For me, To Run the World falls into the “respect” category, rather than “love” or even “like.” As a person who gravitates toward storytelling, I found Radchenko’s style to be a bit dry, even though his characterizations of the Soviet Union’s various leaders can be quite perceptive, and occasionally witty. Radchenko has a strong reputation in this field, and the book is well cited. He is also a great weigher of evidence, and embraces the reality that little in human affairs is tidy or certain.
One of the big things that jumped out to me is that Radchenko is not big on context or backgrounding the topics he covers. Instead, he sort of jumps right in. When I was already familiar with something, this didn’t matter; when I didn’t, I felt a bit of out of depth. For instance, Radchenko has a chapter on the Yom Kippur War between Egypt, Syria, and Israel that assumes you already know the basic outlines of the conflict. Since I did, I got a lot out of it. However, when Radchenko ventures into Angola, I was lost.
***
As I mentioned up top, my main purpose in tackling a book like this was to discover what the Old Cold War might tell us about the New Cold War. Unfortunately, the way things are shaking out right now, the past really isn’t going to be much of a guide.
Back in the Old Cold War, we had a bipolar world that – in its odd way – maintained a kind of balance. The balance was occasionally threatened, and did not come without fear and bloodshed, yet we avoided an out-and-out globe-destroying conflagration. Now, we have a multipolar world of nuclear-armed nations with great power aspirations, such as China, the United States, Russia, and India. This creates more zones of interest, which creates correspondingly more points of potentially war-starting contact. It’s a bit like the early 20th century, and we all know how that turned out. On top of all that, America’s foreign policy has entered the weirdest timeline. It wouldn’t surprise me to wake up tomorrow and find that we gave Alaska back to Russia, because it asked nicely.
This is all to say that my hope for some present-and-future insight went mostly unfulfilled. Still, on the bright side, To Run the World helpfully complements what I’ve already learned about the Cold War, and will likely stay in my mind as I read about it going forward. On the downside, this is really dense, a six-hundred-page behemoth that felt even longer.
- Sergey Radchenko, To Run the World: The Kremlin’s Cold War Bid for Global Power
The Cold War is a blanket term given to a huge chunk of twentieth century history. Generally speaking, people think of the Cold War as the faceoff between the United States and the Soviet Union in Europe. But it also encompassed hot wars in places like Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan; the difficult process of decolonization in Africa and Asia; and the dangerous geopolitical games played in hotspots like Egypt or Cuba, where the superpowers often learned too well the phrase “the tail wags the dog.”
In the past few years, I’ve really dived into the subject of the Cold War, hoping to glean some understanding of our present world through the lens of the past. As I did, I realized that the topic was much richer than I’d previously thought. Soon, I found myself collecting Cold War-themed titles that go far beyond a divided Berlin, to touch on experiences around the globe. However, until picking up Sergey Radchenko’s To Run the World, I have not yet read about a seemingly obvious angle: the Cold War as seen through Soviet eyes.
***
At first glance, To Run the World has the feel of a standard one-volume history of a big event. It begins in 1945, with the fracturing of the Second World War alliance that included Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union. It ends in 1991, with the Soviet Union’s collapse.
Nevertheless, this has a bit of an interesting structure, despite the overarching chronology. For one, it is not a narrative history, which relies on the novelist’s tools to depict real-life events. Instead, it is focused more on analysis of said events, deriving from them their larger meaning in relation to Soviet geopolitical goals. To that end, each chapter begins with an introduction, and then is divided into sub-headed discussions. There is even a conclusion at the end, giving this a whiff of textbook.
In addition, Radchenko makes no attempt at comprehensiveness, focusing instead on particular moments of interest. For example, the opening section is interested in the origins of the Cold War, and teasing out the question important to all middle-schoolers on the playground: Who started it? With this question – as in many others in this book, and in life – it’s complicated.
***
Despite the title, Radchenko’s thesis is not that the Soviet Union literally wanted to run the whole world. Rather, Radchenko argues that much of what they did was an attempt at legitimacy. They wanted to be seen as a global superpower by the West, by the socialist bloc, and by nonaligned nations. Thus, the Cuban Missile Crisis is something like a cry for attention, on top of a strategic move to counter American missiles in Turkey, and an offshoot of Nikita Khruschev’s erratic nature.
One of the difficulties encountered by the Soviets is that each of their audiences was very different. In particular, attempted reproachments with the West often caused difficulties within the Warsaw Pact, and vice-versa. Eventually – as in the case with China – the West stopped viewing communism as a Moscow-controlled monolith, and began exploiting the seams of Russia’s strained relationships.
***
For me, To Run the World falls into the “respect” category, rather than “love” or even “like.” As a person who gravitates toward storytelling, I found Radchenko’s style to be a bit dry, even though his characterizations of the Soviet Union’s various leaders can be quite perceptive, and occasionally witty. Radchenko has a strong reputation in this field, and the book is well cited. He is also a great weigher of evidence, and embraces the reality that little in human affairs is tidy or certain.
One of the big things that jumped out to me is that Radchenko is not big on context or backgrounding the topics he covers. Instead, he sort of jumps right in. When I was already familiar with something, this didn’t matter; when I didn’t, I felt a bit of out of depth. For instance, Radchenko has a chapter on the Yom Kippur War between Egypt, Syria, and Israel that assumes you already know the basic outlines of the conflict. Since I did, I got a lot out of it. However, when Radchenko ventures into Angola, I was lost.
***
As I mentioned up top, my main purpose in tackling a book like this was to discover what the Old Cold War might tell us about the New Cold War. Unfortunately, the way things are shaking out right now, the past really isn’t going to be much of a guide.
Back in the Old Cold War, we had a bipolar world that – in its odd way – maintained a kind of balance. The balance was occasionally threatened, and did not come without fear and bloodshed, yet we avoided an out-and-out globe-destroying conflagration. Now, we have a multipolar world of nuclear-armed nations with great power aspirations, such as China, the United States, Russia, and India. This creates more zones of interest, which creates correspondingly more points of potentially war-starting contact. It’s a bit like the early 20th century, and we all know how that turned out. On top of all that, America’s foreign policy has entered the weirdest timeline. It wouldn’t surprise me to wake up tomorrow and find that we gave Alaska back to Russia, because it asked nicely.
This is all to say that my hope for some present-and-future insight went mostly unfulfilled. Still, on the bright side, To Run the World helpfully complements what I’ve already learned about the Cold War, and will likely stay in my mind as I read about it going forward. On the downside, this is really dense, a six-hundred-page behemoth that felt even longer.
April 9, 2024
Meticulously researched, scrupulously even handed, one of the best history books I’ve read recently.
July 15, 2024
TO RUN THE WORLD offers a radical new interpretation of the motivations of Soviet foreign policy from the end of World War Il to the dissolution of the USSR. Author Sergey Radchenko, the Wilson E. Schmidt Distinguished Professor at the Henry A. Kissinger Center for Global Affairs at Johns Hopkins, retells the story of the "making and breaking" of Soviet power politics, including its unsatiable and self-destructive quest to run the world. Mastering an exhaustive and unparalleled array of Soviet and Chinese archival sources, Radchenko provides the definitive history of the postwar Soviet period while incisively identifying the seeds of its own collapse.
Herein, Radchenko's command of Soviet history is masterfully put on display. Radchenko unravels convoluted historical developments over nearly five decades of Soviet history to distill the naked motivations of Soviet ambition. Radchenko finds that Soviet foreign policy was rooted in what he calls an "ontological insecurity" that framed its hubristic and aggressive foreign policy posture. This quest for legitimation could only be achieved through recognition (specifically by the West), and that recognition would then affirm the legality and righteousness of their place in the global pecking order. As Radchenko argues, this ambition catalyzed the Cold War and a zero-sum race to build competing spheres of influence around the globe.
Radchenko's scope is ambitious. He begins with the postwar race to control Europe, and the transition from great power collaboration to confrontation. He argues that Stalin's craving for power without legitimacy was reckless, leading to repression on unwilling Eastern Europeans and the beginning of a standoff with the West. Confrontation escalated during the 1950s under Khruschev, a boisterous opportunist who sought recognition and legitimacy wherever an opening occurred, including in Europe, Africa, and the Caribbean. The Soviet bid for global hegemony, Radchenko argues, is not complete without understanding its two-sided relationship with China, its largest competitor in the socialist camp.
Leveraging a multitude of Chinese archival sources, Radchenko discerns how both emerging powers vied for the mantle of Marxism by playing for credibility. As the author shows, this race often created tensions between the two powers, and detracted from Khruschev's (and later Brezhnev's) bid for unrivaled hegemony.
As the instability of the Khruschev years matured into the more tepid and conservative Brezhnev years, Radchenko finds that the Soviet need for legitimacy remained strong. The 1970s witnessed the emergence of a more geopolitically involved Soviet empire that leveraged détente to build its own spheres of power around the world. This period soon proved to be equally unstable, and the USSR, foundering on the shoals of its own economic mismanagement, foreign misadventures, and increasing power rivalries in its own backyard, needed reform. Gorbachev's New Thinking doctrine, which paired domestic liberalization with foreign nonintervention, proven insufficient. By the late 1980s, the writing was on the wall.
After 1991, the Empire was spoken of only in the past tense.
In this sweeping history, Radchenko argues that multiple successive Soviet leaders shared the common craving for legitimacy and admission into the camp of great powers. However, Radchenko also shows that this bid for hegemony often birthed misguided adventures and heightened the tension during the Cold War. Despite the rise and fall of the Soviet Empire, Radchenko argues that self-destructive strain of toxic nationalism is still latent in the post-Soviet psyche, ready to be weaponized again for another misguided adventure in its bid to "run the world."
Herein, Radchenko's command of Soviet history is masterfully put on display. Radchenko unravels convoluted historical developments over nearly five decades of Soviet history to distill the naked motivations of Soviet ambition. Radchenko finds that Soviet foreign policy was rooted in what he calls an "ontological insecurity" that framed its hubristic and aggressive foreign policy posture. This quest for legitimation could only be achieved through recognition (specifically by the West), and that recognition would then affirm the legality and righteousness of their place in the global pecking order. As Radchenko argues, this ambition catalyzed the Cold War and a zero-sum race to build competing spheres of influence around the globe.
Radchenko's scope is ambitious. He begins with the postwar race to control Europe, and the transition from great power collaboration to confrontation. He argues that Stalin's craving for power without legitimacy was reckless, leading to repression on unwilling Eastern Europeans and the beginning of a standoff with the West. Confrontation escalated during the 1950s under Khruschev, a boisterous opportunist who sought recognition and legitimacy wherever an opening occurred, including in Europe, Africa, and the Caribbean. The Soviet bid for global hegemony, Radchenko argues, is not complete without understanding its two-sided relationship with China, its largest competitor in the socialist camp.
Leveraging a multitude of Chinese archival sources, Radchenko discerns how both emerging powers vied for the mantle of Marxism by playing for credibility. As the author shows, this race often created tensions between the two powers, and detracted from Khruschev's (and later Brezhnev's) bid for unrivaled hegemony.
As the instability of the Khruschev years matured into the more tepid and conservative Brezhnev years, Radchenko finds that the Soviet need for legitimacy remained strong. The 1970s witnessed the emergence of a more geopolitically involved Soviet empire that leveraged détente to build its own spheres of power around the world. This period soon proved to be equally unstable, and the USSR, foundering on the shoals of its own economic mismanagement, foreign misadventures, and increasing power rivalries in its own backyard, needed reform. Gorbachev's New Thinking doctrine, which paired domestic liberalization with foreign nonintervention, proven insufficient. By the late 1980s, the writing was on the wall.
After 1991, the Empire was spoken of only in the past tense.
In this sweeping history, Radchenko argues that multiple successive Soviet leaders shared the common craving for legitimacy and admission into the camp of great powers. However, Radchenko also shows that this bid for hegemony often birthed misguided adventures and heightened the tension during the Cold War. Despite the rise and fall of the Soviet Empire, Radchenko argues that self-destructive strain of toxic nationalism is still latent in the post-Soviet psyche, ready to be weaponized again for another misguided adventure in its bid to "run the world."
August 7, 2025
great foreign policy/ psychoanalysis/ history book about my favorite subject (cold war)
but then i will say that the last third is a bit less suited to the style of analysis than the earlier stuff
but then i will say that the last third is a bit less suited to the style of analysis than the earlier stuff
November 25, 2025
Exceptional. Really does cast large parts of the cold war in a new light. Radchenko draws on recent archival declassifications to give the best treatment I’ve ever encountered of the Cold War from the Soviet perspective.
August 5, 2024
I read this book to gain some understanding on what is happening between Russia and the Ukraine in 2024. It did that job very well. Perhaps too well? I would have gone with 4 stars if the author hadn't been fixated on the idea of legitimacy. But it is an excellent overview of post-war USSR foreign policy nonetheless.
The author covers each era of post WWII Soviet history, as defined by each era’s leader of the USSR: Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev and Gorbachev. First off, it is pretty amazing that there were really only four. Andropov was really a puppet master for senile Brezhnev and didn’t have a separate agenda. Chernenko, also a close Brezhnev man, was probably chosen because everyone knew he didn’t have long to live anyway.
The author has a specific overriding thesis that the main motivator of USSR foreign policy has always been to seek legitimacy on the world stage; in particular, to gain recognition from the USA as an equal world power. Brezhnev came the closest to accomplishing this for a brief period during the era of détente. It went downhill from there since the Soviet Union and its clients were falling farther and farther behind the west. The communist experiment finally collapsed in the end.
Ultimately it’s just too much to believe that all things USSR are explainable by this quest for legitimacy. In fact, the author was probably motivated by the current Russian quest for legitimacy and then worked backwards. But this does serve to shine a light on the current Russian/Ukraine situation nonetheless. Because in a bizarre way, the Ukraine war is really not fundamentally about Ukraine as much as it’s about Russia’s ability to influence world events. Putin sent out his list of demands in December of 2021. Like a return to the NATO borders of 1997 and removal of short and intermediate range missiles from Europe. Russia wants to negotiate these terms directly with the USA, leaving out western Europe allies. Clearly Russia wants to regain its status as a “decider” with the same authority as the USA. Putin talks about terms for a cease fire that includes negotiation with the USA over these same conditions. This shows that the plan is to use a war in Ukraine to force the USA to the bargaining table. As if Ukraine is actually an important US client. Man, that is delusional right there. I don’t see how any good will come from this.
The author covers each era of post WWII Soviet history, as defined by each era’s leader of the USSR: Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev and Gorbachev. First off, it is pretty amazing that there were really only four. Andropov was really a puppet master for senile Brezhnev and didn’t have a separate agenda. Chernenko, also a close Brezhnev man, was probably chosen because everyone knew he didn’t have long to live anyway.
The author has a specific overriding thesis that the main motivator of USSR foreign policy has always been to seek legitimacy on the world stage; in particular, to gain recognition from the USA as an equal world power. Brezhnev came the closest to accomplishing this for a brief period during the era of détente. It went downhill from there since the Soviet Union and its clients were falling farther and farther behind the west. The communist experiment finally collapsed in the end.
Ultimately it’s just too much to believe that all things USSR are explainable by this quest for legitimacy. In fact, the author was probably motivated by the current Russian quest for legitimacy and then worked backwards. But this does serve to shine a light on the current Russian/Ukraine situation nonetheless. Because in a bizarre way, the Ukraine war is really not fundamentally about Ukraine as much as it’s about Russia’s ability to influence world events. Putin sent out his list of demands in December of 2021. Like a return to the NATO borders of 1997 and removal of short and intermediate range missiles from Europe. Russia wants to negotiate these terms directly with the USA, leaving out western Europe allies. Clearly Russia wants to regain its status as a “decider” with the same authority as the USA. Putin talks about terms for a cease fire that includes negotiation with the USA over these same conditions. This shows that the plan is to use a war in Ukraine to force the USA to the bargaining table. As if Ukraine is actually an important US client. Man, that is delusional right there. I don’t see how any good will come from this.
March 20, 2025
The book is a well-written account of Soviet foreign policy since 1945. It serves as a solid guide to the most important events and provides an interesting archival record of policy discussions, illuminating Soviet leaders' thinking and concerns. Because of its focus on high politics, the book gives relatively little attention to the economic and military aspects of Soviet diplomacy and does not explore in depth its interactions with client states focusing mostly on triangle of US, USSR and China.
The book reinterprets Soviet diplomacy by shifting the focus away from communist ideology or “security” expansionism. Instead, it highlights the Soviet leadership’s persistent efforts to achieve recognition of the USSR as a superpower equal to the United States, with its own legitimate sphere of influence. This quest of Soviet leadership and their obsession with “equal” treatment serves to explain twist and turns of soviet diplomacy.
At the height of these aspirations, Soviet leaders saw themselves, alongside the U.S., as the ultimate arbiters of other nations' fates. However, this ambition carried an inherent tension: the USSR’s claim to global power—its right to a seat at the table—was built on its leadership of the "anti-imperialist" movement. This, in turn, placed it on a collision course with the U.S. In the end, American recognition never materialized, and as the Soviet empire weakened, the U.S. pressed its advantage isolating USSR.
One of the book’s most compelling subplots is the centrality of the “China question” in Soviet diplomacy after Stalin’s death. As Mao increasingly sought to undermine the USSR’s revolutionary credentials, positioning himself as the true leader of the global "anti-imperialist" movement, Soviet leaders in the 1950s and 1960s responded with increasingly assertive policies to maintain their dominance. This, however, weakened their ability to reach an understanding with the West. Later, when China pivoted toward the U.S., the USSR found itself increasingly isolated and more willing to embrace détente.
The book reinterprets Soviet diplomacy by shifting the focus away from communist ideology or “security” expansionism. Instead, it highlights the Soviet leadership’s persistent efforts to achieve recognition of the USSR as a superpower equal to the United States, with its own legitimate sphere of influence. This quest of Soviet leadership and their obsession with “equal” treatment serves to explain twist and turns of soviet diplomacy.
At the height of these aspirations, Soviet leaders saw themselves, alongside the U.S., as the ultimate arbiters of other nations' fates. However, this ambition carried an inherent tension: the USSR’s claim to global power—its right to a seat at the table—was built on its leadership of the "anti-imperialist" movement. This, in turn, placed it on a collision course with the U.S. In the end, American recognition never materialized, and as the Soviet empire weakened, the U.S. pressed its advantage isolating USSR.
One of the book’s most compelling subplots is the centrality of the “China question” in Soviet diplomacy after Stalin’s death. As Mao increasingly sought to undermine the USSR’s revolutionary credentials, positioning himself as the true leader of the global "anti-imperialist" movement, Soviet leaders in the 1950s and 1960s responded with increasingly assertive policies to maintain their dominance. This, however, weakened their ability to reach an understanding with the West. Later, when China pivoted toward the U.S., the USSR found itself increasingly isolated and more willing to embrace détente.
August 4, 2025
Really impressive history of Soviet foreign policy from 1945-1990. Radchenko does a good job of comparing various explanations for Soviet interventions, mainly the two dominant approaches of “ideology” (Marxism-Leninism) vs “realism” using primary sources from the Soviet archives. Ultimately Soviet policy was determined by both ideology and pragmatic/security considerations, in different phases of the Cold War. From the early Cold War to detente to the “second Cold War” under Reagan and finally the dissolution of the USSR, Radchenko carefully uses these documents to tell the stories of Cold War conflicts around the world in Europe, Africa, Asia, and Latin America.
My only complaint about this book is that there was hardly any mention of the Sandinistas or of U.S.-led counterinsurgency in Central America, or the dictatorships of Latin America. I would think that the Monroe Doctrine would be major part of this story, and I do wish there was more attention paid to Latin America-Soviet relations. If there is room in this book to discuss the Cold War in Central Asia and the Horn of Africa, there could be some discussion of Cold War Latin America. That being said, overall it is an exhaustive and carefully researched history that adds a lot to the literature of the Cold War. The discussion of the Cuban missile crisis and Cuba’s interventions in South Africa and Ethiopia was good.
My only complaint about this book is that there was hardly any mention of the Sandinistas or of U.S.-led counterinsurgency in Central America, or the dictatorships of Latin America. I would think that the Monroe Doctrine would be major part of this story, and I do wish there was more attention paid to Latin America-Soviet relations. If there is room in this book to discuss the Cold War in Central Asia and the Horn of Africa, there could be some discussion of Cold War Latin America. That being said, overall it is an exhaustive and carefully researched history that adds a lot to the literature of the Cold War. The discussion of the Cuban missile crisis and Cuba’s interventions in South Africa and Ethiopia was good.
December 29, 2024
Radchenko's book might well be the best book on the Cold War published this decade. The approach, which focuses squarely on Soviet foreign policy, is conceptually excellent, giving space to understand the interlinkages between the Soviet policy towards relations with the Americans, Chinese, Arabs, and Europeans not just within the periods of "Cold War crisis", but also within periods of calm. This is backed by an absolutely exquisite sourcebase that includes official Russian and Chinese sources.
Some valuable insights include - Stalin's desires for post-war empire, including a Libyan colony; the vital role of Sino-Soviet competition behind Soviet support for Communist Vietnam; Brezhnev's desire for a Soviet-US global condominium.
Ultimately, To Run the World makes me question some pretty fundamental assumptions. What was the Cold War, again? Was there even a Cold War? Or can the latter half of the twentieth century be understood more simply as a nuclear extension of the prestige-based imperial superpower drama that defined previous eras, driving Soviet-China relations just as much as US-Soviet relations?
Some valuable insights include - Stalin's desires for post-war empire, including a Libyan colony; the vital role of Sino-Soviet competition behind Soviet support for Communist Vietnam; Brezhnev's desire for a Soviet-US global condominium.
Ultimately, To Run the World makes me question some pretty fundamental assumptions. What was the Cold War, again? Was there even a Cold War? Or can the latter half of the twentieth century be understood more simply as a nuclear extension of the prestige-based imperial superpower drama that defined previous eras, driving Soviet-China relations just as much as US-Soviet relations?
May 16, 2025
A good book, providing a chronological history of the Cold War from the Russian perspective. The author, British-Russian historian Sergey Radchenko, argues that prestige was more important to Russian leaders than power. He shows that the quest for international prestige shaped the USSR’s strategic decisions, especially vis-a-vis China. Radchenko explores how Soviet policymakers considered global influence and diplomatic stature, rather than purely military or economic strength, in their Cold War calculations. The book highlights many key moments where this pursuit of prestige influenced international relations and Cold War dynamics much more than pure military power equations. Radchenko emphasizes the importance of understanding an adversary’s motivations by illustrating how misinterpretations, especially by America, led to missed opportunities and heightened tensions. A great book for those interested in Cold War history. Highly recommended for readers seeking a nuanced view of Soviet decision-making and the broader implications of prestige in global politics.
June 29, 2025
Just an absolutely enormous gap between the title/cover and the book itself. Like the author acknowledges, it’s pretty bold to write a comprehensive history of the Cold War these days, especially if you’re trying to contribute something original. But I thought that this was really well done for two reasons:
1. He does a great job of constantly looping back to his thesis on how internationally-derived legitimacy influenced Soviet decision-making
2. There’s just so many fun tidbits in the book because of his great handling of sources and willingness to explore nuance and ambiguity, especially when it comes to the role the PRC played in the Cold War
Not a perfect book, but pretty darn close — I was shocked how much I enjoyed this
1. He does a great job of constantly looping back to his thesis on how internationally-derived legitimacy influenced Soviet decision-making
2. There’s just so many fun tidbits in the book because of his great handling of sources and willingness to explore nuance and ambiguity, especially when it comes to the role the PRC played in the Cold War
Not a perfect book, but pretty darn close — I was shocked how much I enjoyed this
July 9, 2024
Based on the review by John Lewis Gaddis
July/August, 2024 issue of Foreign Affairs
The USSR, the hope for worldwide communism under Stalin, could not manage the "Three-Body Problem" instability without brutal repression. 1) a solid external reputation, 2) Internal Control/Cohesion, and 3) Internal & External Legitimacy.
Do our US political processes reliably produce agile, adaptive leadership that can balance Reputation, Cohesion, and Legitimacy? Respect and consensus of those involved reduce this to a two-body problem.
Are we foolish enough to believe that our title entitles us to an agenda for action without the consent and support of others?
July/August, 2024 issue of Foreign Affairs
The USSR, the hope for worldwide communism under Stalin, could not manage the "Three-Body Problem" instability without brutal repression. 1) a solid external reputation, 2) Internal Control/Cohesion, and 3) Internal & External Legitimacy.
Do our US political processes reliably produce agile, adaptive leadership that can balance Reputation, Cohesion, and Legitimacy? Respect and consensus of those involved reduce this to a two-body problem.
Are we foolish enough to believe that our title entitles us to an agenda for action without the consent and support of others?
June 19, 2025
If you want to gain a profound knowledge of what happend in the period of the world history called the Cold War and understand why it happened – as seen from the Soviet point of view –, this book is a good place to start and maybe even to end. As a bonus, by reading this book you can achieve an expert status on interpreting and predicting Russian steps in the war in Ukraine, at least until somebody replaces Putin at the helm.;)
December 11, 2025
pretty great (maybe more like 4 1/2 stars) account of russian / us history going all the back done in chunks. Necessarily breezy due to its wide scope, nonetheless we get well reasoned accounts of Russia coming out of WWII and the subtle ambiguities of that time, the comings and maybe goings of Stalin's mind and i found myself buying the author's takes even if they contradict what i had come in with. Further great analysis of Khrushchev and his wandering priorities and muddled messages.
April 15, 2025
This book is essential reading for anyone wishing to understand the big international policy issues.
It is also very entertaining in its evocation of the various 20th century eras and especially the Russian political personalities.
It is also very useful background to the current world political situation and the war in Ukraine.
It is also very entertaining in its evocation of the various 20th century eras and especially the Russian political personalities.
It is also very useful background to the current world political situation and the war in Ukraine.
August 22, 2024
A good overview of the dynamics of the Cold War with an emphasis on Soviet leaders' goals, perceptions, and actions. This is a great companion to the study of the Cold War, great power competition, and diplomacy.
May 30, 2025
Radchenko continues to impress with his work. Filled to the brim with new research and a very engaging thesis. Dense at times but overall very engaging (especially the second half). An essential addition to Cold War studies.
August 26, 2025
I've just thoroughly enjoyed reading this book. So many information, insights and explenations. Kudos to the author for bringing this story and taking us for the ride all the way from post WW2 to the collapse of USSR.
October 5, 2024
Very well researched.
A must read for all interested in modern history.
A must read for all interested in modern history.
January 28, 2025
A pretty good run down of negotiations during the Cold War using transcripts and notes. The author offers some analysis and conclusions for each engagement.
Want to read
June 24, 202423/603, 23/6
22/603—4% 21/6/24
22/603—4% 21/6/24
August 3, 2024
A provocative and exhaustive study of Soviet foreign policy from 1945.
Review: https://open.substack.com/pub/martind...
Interview with author:
http://historyasithappens.radio.washi...
Review: https://open.substack.com/pub/martind...
Interview with author:
http://historyasithappens.radio.washi...
Displaying 1 - 22 of 22 reviews