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Television, Democracy and Elections in Russia
Sarah Oates gives a detailed examination on a central theme in political the relationship between democracy and the mass media. This significant book contains a wealth of information and data, public opinion surveys, content analysis of television news, focus groups and in-depth interviews to examine why political parties and the mass media failed so spectacularly to aid in the construction of a democratic system in Russia. The analysis presents compelling evidence that television helped to tune out democracy as it served as a tool for leaders rather than a conduit of information in the service of the electorate or parties. In addition, focus groups and surveys show that the Russian audience are often more comfortable with authority rather than truth in television coverage. Within this framework, this fascinating work presents the colourful history of parties, elections and television during one of the most critical eras in Russian history and captures a particularly significant epoch in contemporary Russian politics.
240 pages, Hardcover
First published April 30, 2006
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January 17, 2025
(The English review is placed beneath the Russian one)
Данная книга несёт в себе ту же проблему, которая свойственная почти всем политическим книгам, которые были изданы преимущественно в конце 90-ых-начале 2000-ых. Конечно, с точки зрения исторического анализа, книга является отличным материалом. Однако для широкой аудитории, книги, написанные о каком-то конкретном вопросе из эпохи 90-ых, не выглядят в качестве актуального чтива. Да, эта книга как раз и попадает в категорию "устаревшей" политической литературы, которая будет интересна очень узкой категории читателей. Книга рассказывает о российских СМИ эпохи Ельцина и самое главное, почему в эпоху Ельцина нельзя было говорить о свободных и независимых СМИ. Как видим, книга скорее подтверждает нынче популярную идею об авторитарных тенденциях Ельцина.
The 1993 Russian constitution pays careful attention to the protection of free speech. Article 29 promises that “everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought and speech.” Censorship is prohibited and “no one may be coerced into expressing one’s views and convictions or into renouncing them.” The constitution does mention limits to the notion of free speech, however, saying “propaganda or campaigning inciting social, racial, national or religious hatred and strife is impermissible.” Overall, however, the “freedom of the mass media shall be guaranteed.” Yet this freedom of the mass media is not really guaranteed under the legal system of Russia. Rather, the legal system is habitually used to limit rather than protect both the ability of journalists to disseminate information and the rights of citizens to receive it. Despite the sweeping promise of freedom of speech and free media in Article 29 of the constitution, there is no practical, day-to-day legal protection.
<…>
Not only are the media regulated by laws passed by the parliament and signed by the president, but they are subject to presidential decree as well. Thus, while the president cannot unilaterally repeal the media law or issue one that completely contradicts the existing law, he can quite effectively limit freedom of speech with edicts that address specific issues. In addition, all 89 subjects of the Russian Federation have the constitutional right to issue statutes on media in their jurisdiction, ranging from awarding additional subsidies to changing campaign regulations to the control of cable television.
Абсолютно точное замечание. Хотя конституция и гарантирует свободу слова, но по факту любой федеральный закон выше конституции. К примеру, обвинения Путина в установлении диктатуры может трактоваться федеральным законом в качестве клеветы государственного лица исполняющего свои полномочия, а любая критика российского государства, как попытка подрыва конституционного строя (да, выглядит это смешно, но не для тех людей кто попал в тюрьму именно за критику путинского режима). То же самое касается и иностранных фильмов, игр и музыки, которые могут трактоваться в качестве подрыва традиционных ценностей, нарушение которых также преследуется по закону (примеры можно легко найти в новостных каналах в Телеграмме, к примеру). Получается забавная вещь, когда конституция просто игнорируется, ибо она перекрывается любым федеральным, а возможно и региональным законом. И как итог, конституция становится декоративным элементом совершенно не влияющий ни на жизнь граждан, ни на развитие страны. Что-то подобное можно было наблюдать и в отношении сталинской конституции.
Most journalists appear to accept this, continuing with the notion of the internal censor from the Soviet era. They either do not seek out or merely ignore stories that would disturb their sponsors, such as atrocities com-mitted by Russian troops in the Chechen war or misappropriation of state funds in the privatization of Russian industry. In addition, all editorial content will be filtered to reflect a particular worldview. Thus, it is not only avoiding tackling important issues in society, but it is ordering the news in such a way that frames it in the best possible light for the political and financial masters. As a result, the news becomes more slanted and even sycophantic in a disturbing echo of the Soviet style, even while professional standards appear to have improved in terms of news-gathering and presentation.
Мне кажется, такая характеристика оправдана как в отношении времени Ельцина, так и в отношении Путина. Проблема российских журналистов при Ельцине была именно в том, что все СМИ принадлежали очень небольшому числу олигархов, которые рассматривали СМИ как инструмент влияния, а не как необходимый институт функционирования любой демократии.
Most journalists are poorly paid, making them both vulnerable to bribes and worried about keeping their jobs.
Думаю, сей факт наряду с развитием силового предпринимательства сыграл дурную шутку с журналистским цехом из-за чего очень многие, если не все журналисты стали ассоциироваться в глазах общества с обслугой тех или иных политических групп, а не в качестве "защитников демократии" (более подробно на эту тему можно прочитать в книге How Russia Really Works: The Informal Practices That Shaped Post-Soviet Politics and Business). Продажный журналист, как и продажный милицейский, стал тем образом, по которому сегодня мы узнаём эпоху 90-ых. Конечно, всегда можно сказать, что "не мы такие, а жизнь такая" и будет в этих словах правда, но всё же, кто виноват в этом? Только ли одна ельцинская власть, которая и создала ту атмосферу, в которой приходилось оперировать журналистам или и журналисты в том числе?
Despite initial optimism on the part of Western and some Russian analysts, the Russian mass media failed to develop as a tool for the masses. Rather, after a brief period of plurality, it remains firmly entrenched as a tool for the elites, as in Soviet times.
Горькая правда того, к чему пришла страна за всё правление "демократа" Ельцина. Пожалуй, лучшее и точное определение российским СМИ.
The Duma elections remain a testing ground for new political movements in Russia, even though the Duma is relatively powerless to effect real change. After Y eltsin dissolved a politically unfriendly parliament in September 1993 by force, Russia’s new constitution was voted in by a narrow margin to give preference to the executive over the legislative body in Russia. Technically, the parliament has the power to approve the budget, initiate legislation and check presidential power.
Realistically, strong presidential powers in the 1993 Russian Constitution make direct confrontation with the executive branch problematic, as the president can dissolve an uncooperative parliament and call for new elections.
Даже европейцы понимали, что Ельцин никаким демократом не был, но российские псевдолибералы и такие же демократы продолжают с невиданным упорством с лупой выискивать признаки демократизации в ельцинской России. В общем, точная формулировка ельцинскому проекту по постройке нового авторитаризма. Если парламент в России не имел реальной власти, то о какой власти независимых СМИ может идти речь?
The end of a rather colorful era of Russian political parties is perhaps best marked by the passage of a restrictive Law on Political Parties in June 2001.
<…>
The key restrictions are in the requirements that political parties have branches in at least half of the 89 subjects of the Russian Federation and at least 10,000 members with a minimum of 100 members in each branch.
<…>
Nor can some existing power bases be transformed into political power, as the law bans the creation of parties on a “professional, racial, national or religious basis” (Article 9, Section 3). In addition, a political party can no longer consist of people from a single profession (Article 9, Section 3).
Читая цитаты выше, я вдруг подумал, как это Путин так быстро всё успел организовать (фактически, конституционный переворот)? И тут я подумал, а может план был готов задолго до 2001 года? Может быть, элиты уже в 1996 году решили, что пора заканчивать со всей той вольницей (очень ограниченной вольницей) что была с 1991 по 1996? Впрочем, возможно написать такие вот законы, и продумать их можно было за несколько месяцев.
The 1999 and 2000 campaigns were the continuation of trends in post-Communist campaigning that have been traced throughout this book, with an added element of high levels of kompromat and black PR. An initial euphoria with an enormous flood of information, as well as reliance as an “Americanized” method of political advertising, quickly gave way to a more Soviet style. This style is more Soviet in both content and control and the advertisements themselves often owe more to classic Communist Party propaganda than modern political images.
Отличный эпилог тому, какая на самом деле страна была построена в конце 1999 года. Островки свободы и были, но их конец был спланирован ещё до всякого путинского авторитарного поворота.
***
This book carries the same problem that is inherent in almost all political books that were published mostly in the late 90s/early 2000s. Certainly, in terms of historical analysis, the book is a great read. However, for a general audience, books written about a specific issue from the 90s era don't seem like a relevant read. Yes, this book falls into the category of outdated political literature that will be of interest to a very narrow category of readers. The book talks about the Russian media of the Yeltsin era and, most importantly, why it was impossible to talk about free and independent media in the Yeltsin era. As we can see, the book rather confirms the currently popular idea about Yeltsin's authoritarian tendencies.
The 1993 Russian constitution pays careful attention to the protection of free speech. Article 29 promises that “everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought and speech.” Censorship is prohibited and “no one may be coerced into expressing one’s views and convictions or into renouncing them.” The constitution does mention limits to the notion of free speech, however, saying “propaganda or campaigning inciting social, racial, national or religious hatred and strife is impermissible.” Overall, however, the “freedom of the mass media shall be guaranteed.” Yet this freedom of the mass media is not really guaranteed under the legal system of Russia. Rather, the legal system is habitually used to limit rather than protect both the ability of journalists to disseminate information and the rights of citizens to receive it. Despite the sweeping promise of freedom of speech and free media in Article 29 of the constitution, there is no practical, day-to-day legal protection.
<…>
Not only are the media regulated by laws passed by the parliament and signed by the president, but they are subject to presidential decree as well. Thus, while the president cannot unilaterally repeal the media law or issue one that completely contradicts the existing law, he can quite effectively limit freedom of speech with edicts that address specific issues. In addition, all 89 subjects of the Russian Federation have the constitutional right to issue statutes on media in their jurisdiction, ranging from awarding additional subsidies to changing campaign regulations to the control of cable television.
That's an accurate observation. Although the Constitution guarantees freedom of speech, any federal law is above the Constitution. For example, Putin's accusations of establishing a dictatorship can be interpreted by federal law as slander of a state official, and any criticism of the Russian state as an attempt to undermine the constitutional order (yes, it looks ridiculous, but not for those people who went to prison just for criticizing Putin's regime). The same goes for foreign movies, games, and music, which can be interpreted as undermining traditional values, the violation of which is also prosecuted (examples can be easily found in news channels in Telegram, for example). Funny, but in reality, the constitution is simply ignored, overridden by any federal and perhaps even local law. As a result, the Constitution becomes a decorative element that has no impact on the lives of citizens or the development of the country. Something similar could be observed with regard to Stalin's constitution.
Most journalists appear to accept this, continuing with the notion of the internal censor from the Soviet era. They either do not seek out or merely ignore stories that would disturb their sponsors, such as atrocities com-mitted by Russian troops in the Chechen war or misappropriation of state funds in the privatization of Russian industry. In addition, all editorial content will be filtered to reflect a particular worldview. Thus, it is not only avoiding tackling important issues in society, but it is ordering the news in such a way that frames it in the best possible light for the political and financial masters. As a result, the news becomes more slanted and even sycophantic in a disturbing echo of the Soviet style, even while professional standards appear to have improved in terms of news-gathering and presentation.
It seems to me that such a characterization is justified with respect to both Yeltsin's and Putin's time. The problem for Russian journalists under Yeltsin was that all the media were owned by a very small number of oligarchs who saw the media as an instrument of influence rather than a necessary institution for the functioning of a democracy.
Most journalists are poorly paid, making them both vulnerable to bribes and worried about keeping their jobs.
I think this fact, along with the development of Violent Entrepreneurs, has played a bad joke on the journalistic profession, because of which many, if not all, journalists have come to be associated in the eyes of society with being servants of certain political groups, rather than as defenders of democracy (for more on this topic, see How Russia Really Works: The Informal Practices That Shaped Post-Soviet Politics and Business). The corrupt journalist, like the corrupt policeman, became the image by which we recognize the era of the 90s today. Of course, one can say that “it's not us, but life is like that” and there will be truth in these words, but still, who is to blame for this? Was it the Yeltsin government alone, which created the atmosphere in which journalists had to operate, or was it the journalists themselves?
Despite initial optimism on the part of Western and some Russian analysts, the Russian mass media failed to develop as a tool for the masses. Rather, after a brief period of plurality, it remains firmly entrenched as a tool for the elites, as in Soviet times.
The bitter truth of what the country has come to during the entire reign of the “democrat” Yeltsin. Perhaps the best and most accurate definition of the Russian media.
The Duma elections remain a testing ground for new political movements in Russia, even though the Duma is relatively powerless to effect real change. After Y eltsin dissolved a politically unfriendly parliament in September 1993 by force, Russia’s new constitution was voted in by a narrow margin to give preference to the executive over the legislative body in Russia. Technically, the parliament has the power to approve the budget, initiate legislation and check presidential power.
Realistically, strong presidential powers in the 1993 Russian Constitution make direct confrontation with the executive branch problematic, as the president can dissolve an uncooperative parliament and call for new elections.
Even Europeans understood that Yeltsin was not a democrat, but Russian pseudo-liberals and democrats continued to search for signs of democratization in Yeltsin's Russia with unprecedented persistence. In general, the exact formulation of Yeltsin's project to build a new authoritarianism. If the parliament in Russia had no real power, what kind of power of independent media can we talk about?
The end of a rather colorful era of Russian political parties is perhaps best marked by the passage of a restrictive Law on Political Parties in June 2001.
<…>
The key restrictions are in the requirements that political parties have branches in at least half of the 89 subjects of the Russian Federation and at least 10,000 members with a minimum of 100 members in each branch.
<…>
Nor can some existing power bases be transformed into political power, as the law bans the creation of parties on a “professional, racial, national or religious basis” (Article 9, Section 3). In addition, a political party can no longer consist of people from a single profession (Article 9, Section 3).
Reading the quotes above, I suddenly thought, how did Putin manage to organize everything so quickly (in fact, a constitutional coup)? And then I thought, maybe the plan was ready long before 2001. Maybe, the elites had already decided in 1996 that it was time to finish with all the freedom (very limited freedom) that they had from 1991 to 1996. However, it is possible that such laws could have been written and thought out in a few months.
The 1999 and 2000 campaigns were the continuation of trends in post-Communist campaigning that have been traced throughout this book, with an added element of high levels of kompromat and black PR. An initial euphoria with an enormous flood of information, as well as reliance as an “Americanized” method of political advertising, quickly gave way to a more Soviet style. This style is more Soviet in both content and control and the advertisements themselves often owe more to classic Communist Party propaganda than modern political images.
It's a great epilogue to what the country was really built up to be at the end of 1999. There were islands of freedom, but their end was planned even before Putin's authoritarian turn.
Данная книга несёт в себе ту же проблему, которая свойственная почти всем политическим книгам, которые были изданы преимущественно в конце 90-ых-начале 2000-ых. Конечно, с точки зрения исторического анализа, книга является отличным материалом. Однако для широкой аудитории, книги, написанные о каком-то конкретном вопросе из эпохи 90-ых, не выглядят в качестве актуального чтива. Да, эта книга как раз и попадает в категорию "устаревшей" политической литературы, которая будет интересна очень узкой категории читателей. Книга рассказывает о российских СМИ эпохи Ельцина и самое главное, почему в эпоху Ельцина нельзя было говорить о свободных и независимых СМИ. Как видим, книга скорее подтверждает нынче популярную идею об авторитарных тенденциях Ельцина.
The 1993 Russian constitution pays careful attention to the protection of free speech. Article 29 promises that “everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought and speech.” Censorship is prohibited and “no one may be coerced into expressing one’s views and convictions or into renouncing them.” The constitution does mention limits to the notion of free speech, however, saying “propaganda or campaigning inciting social, racial, national or religious hatred and strife is impermissible.” Overall, however, the “freedom of the mass media shall be guaranteed.” Yet this freedom of the mass media is not really guaranteed under the legal system of Russia. Rather, the legal system is habitually used to limit rather than protect both the ability of journalists to disseminate information and the rights of citizens to receive it. Despite the sweeping promise of freedom of speech and free media in Article 29 of the constitution, there is no practical, day-to-day legal protection.
<…>
Not only are the media regulated by laws passed by the parliament and signed by the president, but they are subject to presidential decree as well. Thus, while the president cannot unilaterally repeal the media law or issue one that completely contradicts the existing law, he can quite effectively limit freedom of speech with edicts that address specific issues. In addition, all 89 subjects of the Russian Federation have the constitutional right to issue statutes on media in their jurisdiction, ranging from awarding additional subsidies to changing campaign regulations to the control of cable television.
Абсолютно точное замечание. Хотя конституция и гарантирует свободу слова, но по факту любой федеральный закон выше конституции. К примеру, обвинения Путина в установлении диктатуры может трактоваться федеральным законом в качестве клеветы государственного лица исполняющего свои полномочия, а любая критика российского государства, как попытка подрыва конституционного строя (да, выглядит это смешно, но не для тех людей кто попал в тюрьму именно за критику путинского режима). То же самое касается и иностранных фильмов, игр и музыки, которые могут трактоваться в качестве подрыва традиционных ценностей, нарушение которых также преследуется по закону (примеры можно легко найти в новостных каналах в Телеграмме, к примеру). Получается забавная вещь, когда конституция просто игнорируется, ибо она перекрывается любым федеральным, а возможно и региональным законом. И как итог, конституция становится декоративным элементом совершенно не влияющий ни на жизнь граждан, ни на развитие страны. Что-то подобное можно было наблюдать и в отношении сталинской конституции.
Most journalists appear to accept this, continuing with the notion of the internal censor from the Soviet era. They either do not seek out or merely ignore stories that would disturb their sponsors, such as atrocities com-mitted by Russian troops in the Chechen war or misappropriation of state funds in the privatization of Russian industry. In addition, all editorial content will be filtered to reflect a particular worldview. Thus, it is not only avoiding tackling important issues in society, but it is ordering the news in such a way that frames it in the best possible light for the political and financial masters. As a result, the news becomes more slanted and even sycophantic in a disturbing echo of the Soviet style, even while professional standards appear to have improved in terms of news-gathering and presentation.
Мне кажется, такая характеристика оправдана как в отношении времени Ельцина, так и в отношении Путина. Проблема российских журналистов при Ельцине была именно в том, что все СМИ принадлежали очень небольшому числу олигархов, которые рассматривали СМИ как инструмент влияния, а не как необходимый институт функционирования любой демократии.
Most journalists are poorly paid, making them both vulnerable to bribes and worried about keeping their jobs.
Думаю, сей факт наряду с развитием силового предпринимательства сыграл дурную шутку с журналистским цехом из-за чего очень многие, если не все журналисты стали ассоциироваться в глазах общества с обслугой тех или иных политических групп, а не в качестве "защитников демократии" (более подробно на эту тему можно прочитать в книге How Russia Really Works: The Informal Practices That Shaped Post-Soviet Politics and Business). Продажный журналист, как и продажный милицейский, стал тем образом, по которому сегодня мы узнаём эпоху 90-ых. Конечно, всегда можно сказать, что "не мы такие, а жизнь такая" и будет в этих словах правда, но всё же, кто виноват в этом? Только ли одна ельцинская власть, которая и создала ту атмосферу, в которой приходилось оперировать журналистам или и журналисты в том числе?
Despite initial optimism on the part of Western and some Russian analysts, the Russian mass media failed to develop as a tool for the masses. Rather, after a brief period of plurality, it remains firmly entrenched as a tool for the elites, as in Soviet times.
Горькая правда того, к чему пришла страна за всё правление "демократа" Ельцина. Пожалуй, лучшее и точное определение российским СМИ.
The Duma elections remain a testing ground for new political movements in Russia, even though the Duma is relatively powerless to effect real change. After Y eltsin dissolved a politically unfriendly parliament in September 1993 by force, Russia’s new constitution was voted in by a narrow margin to give preference to the executive over the legislative body in Russia. Technically, the parliament has the power to approve the budget, initiate legislation and check presidential power.
Realistically, strong presidential powers in the 1993 Russian Constitution make direct confrontation with the executive branch problematic, as the president can dissolve an uncooperative parliament and call for new elections.
Даже европейцы понимали, что Ельцин никаким демократом не был, но российские псевдолибералы и такие же демократы продолжают с невиданным упорством с лупой выискивать признаки демократизации в ельцинской России. В общем, точная формулировка ельцинскому проекту по постройке нового авторитаризма. Если парламент в России не имел реальной власти, то о какой власти независимых СМИ может идти речь?
The end of a rather colorful era of Russian political parties is perhaps best marked by the passage of a restrictive Law on Political Parties in June 2001.
<…>
The key restrictions are in the requirements that political parties have branches in at least half of the 89 subjects of the Russian Federation and at least 10,000 members with a minimum of 100 members in each branch.
<…>
Nor can some existing power bases be transformed into political power, as the law bans the creation of parties on a “professional, racial, national or religious basis” (Article 9, Section 3). In addition, a political party can no longer consist of people from a single profession (Article 9, Section 3).
Читая цитаты выше, я вдруг подумал, как это Путин так быстро всё успел организовать (фактически, конституционный переворот)? И тут я подумал, а может план был готов задолго до 2001 года? Может быть, элиты уже в 1996 году решили, что пора заканчивать со всей той вольницей (очень ограниченной вольницей) что была с 1991 по 1996? Впрочем, возможно написать такие вот законы, и продумать их можно было за несколько месяцев.
The 1999 and 2000 campaigns were the continuation of trends in post-Communist campaigning that have been traced throughout this book, with an added element of high levels of kompromat and black PR. An initial euphoria with an enormous flood of information, as well as reliance as an “Americanized” method of political advertising, quickly gave way to a more Soviet style. This style is more Soviet in both content and control and the advertisements themselves often owe more to classic Communist Party propaganda than modern political images.
Отличный эпилог тому, какая на самом деле страна была построена в конце 1999 года. Островки свободы и были, но их конец был спланирован ещё до всякого путинского авторитарного поворота.
***
This book carries the same problem that is inherent in almost all political books that were published mostly in the late 90s/early 2000s. Certainly, in terms of historical analysis, the book is a great read. However, for a general audience, books written about a specific issue from the 90s era don't seem like a relevant read. Yes, this book falls into the category of outdated political literature that will be of interest to a very narrow category of readers. The book talks about the Russian media of the Yeltsin era and, most importantly, why it was impossible to talk about free and independent media in the Yeltsin era. As we can see, the book rather confirms the currently popular idea about Yeltsin's authoritarian tendencies.
The 1993 Russian constitution pays careful attention to the protection of free speech. Article 29 promises that “everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought and speech.” Censorship is prohibited and “no one may be coerced into expressing one’s views and convictions or into renouncing them.” The constitution does mention limits to the notion of free speech, however, saying “propaganda or campaigning inciting social, racial, national or religious hatred and strife is impermissible.” Overall, however, the “freedom of the mass media shall be guaranteed.” Yet this freedom of the mass media is not really guaranteed under the legal system of Russia. Rather, the legal system is habitually used to limit rather than protect both the ability of journalists to disseminate information and the rights of citizens to receive it. Despite the sweeping promise of freedom of speech and free media in Article 29 of the constitution, there is no practical, day-to-day legal protection.
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Not only are the media regulated by laws passed by the parliament and signed by the president, but they are subject to presidential decree as well. Thus, while the president cannot unilaterally repeal the media law or issue one that completely contradicts the existing law, he can quite effectively limit freedom of speech with edicts that address specific issues. In addition, all 89 subjects of the Russian Federation have the constitutional right to issue statutes on media in their jurisdiction, ranging from awarding additional subsidies to changing campaign regulations to the control of cable television.
That's an accurate observation. Although the Constitution guarantees freedom of speech, any federal law is above the Constitution. For example, Putin's accusations of establishing a dictatorship can be interpreted by federal law as slander of a state official, and any criticism of the Russian state as an attempt to undermine the constitutional order (yes, it looks ridiculous, but not for those people who went to prison just for criticizing Putin's regime). The same goes for foreign movies, games, and music, which can be interpreted as undermining traditional values, the violation of which is also prosecuted (examples can be easily found in news channels in Telegram, for example). Funny, but in reality, the constitution is simply ignored, overridden by any federal and perhaps even local law. As a result, the Constitution becomes a decorative element that has no impact on the lives of citizens or the development of the country. Something similar could be observed with regard to Stalin's constitution.
Most journalists appear to accept this, continuing with the notion of the internal censor from the Soviet era. They either do not seek out or merely ignore stories that would disturb their sponsors, such as atrocities com-mitted by Russian troops in the Chechen war or misappropriation of state funds in the privatization of Russian industry. In addition, all editorial content will be filtered to reflect a particular worldview. Thus, it is not only avoiding tackling important issues in society, but it is ordering the news in such a way that frames it in the best possible light for the political and financial masters. As a result, the news becomes more slanted and even sycophantic in a disturbing echo of the Soviet style, even while professional standards appear to have improved in terms of news-gathering and presentation.
It seems to me that such a characterization is justified with respect to both Yeltsin's and Putin's time. The problem for Russian journalists under Yeltsin was that all the media were owned by a very small number of oligarchs who saw the media as an instrument of influence rather than a necessary institution for the functioning of a democracy.
Most journalists are poorly paid, making them both vulnerable to bribes and worried about keeping their jobs.
I think this fact, along with the development of Violent Entrepreneurs, has played a bad joke on the journalistic profession, because of which many, if not all, journalists have come to be associated in the eyes of society with being servants of certain political groups, rather than as defenders of democracy (for more on this topic, see How Russia Really Works: The Informal Practices That Shaped Post-Soviet Politics and Business). The corrupt journalist, like the corrupt policeman, became the image by which we recognize the era of the 90s today. Of course, one can say that “it's not us, but life is like that” and there will be truth in these words, but still, who is to blame for this? Was it the Yeltsin government alone, which created the atmosphere in which journalists had to operate, or was it the journalists themselves?
Despite initial optimism on the part of Western and some Russian analysts, the Russian mass media failed to develop as a tool for the masses. Rather, after a brief period of plurality, it remains firmly entrenched as a tool for the elites, as in Soviet times.
The bitter truth of what the country has come to during the entire reign of the “democrat” Yeltsin. Perhaps the best and most accurate definition of the Russian media.
The Duma elections remain a testing ground for new political movements in Russia, even though the Duma is relatively powerless to effect real change. After Y eltsin dissolved a politically unfriendly parliament in September 1993 by force, Russia’s new constitution was voted in by a narrow margin to give preference to the executive over the legislative body in Russia. Technically, the parliament has the power to approve the budget, initiate legislation and check presidential power.
Realistically, strong presidential powers in the 1993 Russian Constitution make direct confrontation with the executive branch problematic, as the president can dissolve an uncooperative parliament and call for new elections.
Even Europeans understood that Yeltsin was not a democrat, but Russian pseudo-liberals and democrats continued to search for signs of democratization in Yeltsin's Russia with unprecedented persistence. In general, the exact formulation of Yeltsin's project to build a new authoritarianism. If the parliament in Russia had no real power, what kind of power of independent media can we talk about?
The end of a rather colorful era of Russian political parties is perhaps best marked by the passage of a restrictive Law on Political Parties in June 2001.
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The key restrictions are in the requirements that political parties have branches in at least half of the 89 subjects of the Russian Federation and at least 10,000 members with a minimum of 100 members in each branch.
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Nor can some existing power bases be transformed into political power, as the law bans the creation of parties on a “professional, racial, national or religious basis” (Article 9, Section 3). In addition, a political party can no longer consist of people from a single profession (Article 9, Section 3).
Reading the quotes above, I suddenly thought, how did Putin manage to organize everything so quickly (in fact, a constitutional coup)? And then I thought, maybe the plan was ready long before 2001. Maybe, the elites had already decided in 1996 that it was time to finish with all the freedom (very limited freedom) that they had from 1991 to 1996. However, it is possible that such laws could have been written and thought out in a few months.
The 1999 and 2000 campaigns were the continuation of trends in post-Communist campaigning that have been traced throughout this book, with an added element of high levels of kompromat and black PR. An initial euphoria with an enormous flood of information, as well as reliance as an “Americanized” method of political advertising, quickly gave way to a more Soviet style. This style is more Soviet in both content and control and the advertisements themselves often owe more to classic Communist Party propaganda than modern political images.
It's a great epilogue to what the country was really built up to be at the end of 1999. There were islands of freedom, but their end was planned even before Putin's authoritarian turn.
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