A fun, illuminating book once it gets going. If you read this book because, like me, you were hoping for a brief, digestible run-down of Parfit’s philosophical/intellectual ideas and contributions, you’ll have to slog through a bunch of chapters about his personal life before actually getting to his ideas. In the first few chapters, we learn that Parfit was always a top student, strangely underestimated his mathematical ability despite being top of his classes, and appeared to be rather eccentric from the start.
In the next few chapters, we learn a little bit about Parfit’s philosophical influences (Sidgewick was a paramount influence). It isn’t until chapter 8 where Edmonds dives into Parfit’s famous Teletransporter thought experiment about personal identity. Edmonds discusses Parfit’s unorthodox idea that what makes us us is not some entity that exists or resides within us, but the presence (or absence) of psychological continuity.
We learn of Parfit’s near-zealous obsession with philosophy to the point where he had less and less patience for engaging in small talk or even in discussion with non-philosophers. When well-known historian Adrian Wooldridge was contemplating how to structure his PhD, Parfit’s response was reportedly, “It’s pointless. Philosophy is much more important” (p. 168). His philosopher contemporaries cited Parfit’s perfectionism as one reason for his scant publishing record, and another reason being his inordinate time spent commenting on other philosophers’ work, which was highly valued.
Parfit was also a man of principle, in which he apparently lived up to certain philosophical standards that most of us would find difficult. For example, Parfit did not believe in moral deserts or in retribution, so he apparently harboured no animus towards people who slighted him. When shown (doctored) footage of Hitler celebrating France’s surrender to Germany, Parfit thought that, all else being equal, it’s better that Hitler was happy than unhappy, believing that a world with more happiness is better than less happiness.
Chapter 12, almost two-thirds of the way into the book, we finally get to Reasons and Persons, Parfit’s first of two tomes divided into four rather disparate parts, which has had enormous influence on modern philosophy. Edmonds discusses many of Parfit’s major contributions from Reasons and Persons, starting with “self-defeating theories”: theories that seem to fail based on their own internal logic, like selfishness. Parfit appealed to game theory to show how self-interest theories are irrational and self-defeating via the famous Prisoner’s Dilemma scenario. Parfit also regarded consequentialism as indirectly self-defeating because, for example, it (supposedly) leads one to abandon one’s own children’s needs to help more impoverished children elsewhere. (I always thought this conceived of consequentialism in too narrow a sense.)
Next up is a discussion of time biases, which Parfit explored through a series of intriguing thought experiments, and concluded that it’s irrational to have a preference for happiness or pain in the past vs the future. I was never fully persuaded by Parfit’s conclusions here (nor by Meghan Sullivan’s more recent book, Time Biases, that explores similar themes), but it makes for thought-provoking reading and contemplation. Perhaps most impactfully, Part IV of Reasons and Persons presents the Non-Identity Problem (that an act may be wrong even if it’s not wrong for someone), and the famous thought experiment that led to the Repugnant Conclusion, each of which are still central to population ethics today, and which don’t have agreed upon solutions. Parfit states his Repugnant Conclusion as follows, “For any possible population of at least ten billion people, all with a very high quality of life, there must be some much larger imaginable population whose existence, if other things are equal, would be better even though its members have lives that are barely worth living” (p. 210). Parfit imagined that there could be a “Theory X” that solved the Non-Identity Problem but avoided the Repugnant Conclusion (as well as the Mere Addition Paradox), but never found it. For me, this chapter should have been 50% of the book given how central this material was to Parfit’s academic legacy. It could have also covered the best counter-arguments to Parfit’s arguments and Parfit’s rebuttals. Oh well.
The next chapter (13) takes a detour to explore Parfit’s passion for photography and aesthetic sensibilities, which were not very interesting to me, nor what I read the book for. If you’re reading this primarily to get more insight into Parfit’s philosophical career, you can safely skip or skim this chapter.
We then learn of some of Parfit’s idiosyncrasies in how he thought and worked. For example, Parfit had a phobia of using formal logic and eschewed arguments that contained such notation, preferring to read and communicate in plain English. He mostly dismissed the importance of human relationships, never quite seeming to grasp social cues or recognize emotional needs in others, suggesting that he was autistic (a hypothesis Edmonds explores in the final few pages of the book). At the same time, Parfit was also well-known for being unfailingly kind in dealing with students. Even if he doled out criticism, he never belittled their abilities or “silly” questions; instead, he approached students with compassion and often produced reams of feedback praising the positive and pointing out the flaws.
The last part of the book tells the story of On What Matters, Parfit’s even-more-massive second tome, which attempted to defend moral realism. As Parfit saw it, if morality is not objective, then nothing matters. Parfit attempted to bind the disparate normal ethical theories of consequentialism, Kantianism (more commonly known as deontology now), and contractualism, arguing that these theories are really getting at the same underlying truths, such that even if they disagree, this does not pose a problem for the objectivity of morality. Having never read the book, I can’t exactly comment on Edmonds’ summary, but he does a good job synthesizing the ~1,400 pages of often unrelated content. Edmonds then discusses the mostly unimpressed reactions from the philosophical community and how Parfit’s project did not seem to be a success in most people’s books.
I don’t want to blame the book for being something it didn’t intend to be. I hoped for more focus on Parfit’s intellectual contributions and less on his personal life, the latter of which I was less interested in. For what it aimed to do, Edmonds succeeded in giving a well-rounded view of Parfit’s highly unusual life and lasting intellectual contributions. An enjoyable read.