The Russian war effort to defeat invading Axis powers, an effort that assembled the largest military force in recorded history and that cost the lives of more than twenty-five million Soviet soldiers and civilians, was the decisive factor for securing an Allied victory. Now with access to the wealth of film archives and interview material from Russia used to produce the ten-hour television documentary Russia's War, Richard Overy tackles the many persuasive questions surrounding this conflict. Was Stalin a military genius? Was the defense of Mother Russia a product of something greater than numbers of tanks and planes-of something deep within the Russian soul?
Richard James Overy is a British historian who has published extensively on the history of World War II and the Third Reich.
Educated at Caius College, Cambridge and awarded a research fellowship at Churchill College, Professor Overy taught history at Cambridge from 1972 to 1979, as a fellow of Queens' College and from 1976 as a university assistant lecturer. In 1980 he moved to King's College London, where he became professor of modern history in 1994. He was appointed to a professorship at the University of Exeter in 2004.
His work on World War II has been praised as "highly effective in the ruthless dispelling of myths" (A. J. P. Taylor), "original and important" (New York Review of Books) and "at the cutting edge" (Times Literary Supplement.)[
A quick little review: It turns out that this book is based on a brilliant World War II documentary that I watched some years ago. Somehow I never made the connection: the documentary is called Russia's War: Blood Upon the Snow, whereas the book is only Russia's War.
Now, what I did while reading this book was to read one chapter (they are each around 30-50 pages long), and then to watch the corresponding documentary episode. This made for a fantastic reading and learning experience. How in the world did a despotic, paranoid madman end up ruling the Soviet Union? How did the Soviet Union manage to make such a gigantic war effort with this madman in charge (perhaps the answer lies within the question: because he was a madman)? A man who was dismissed by Trotsky as a political simpleton and condemned in Lenin's testament. With an army that, at the beginning of 1928, only had 92 tanks. An army that suffered the sadistic political intervention of the notorious NKVD; an army that was mostly a disorganised army without particularly modern equipment, where everything had to be controlled and approved by Stalin.
Overy examines the Russian war effort, and it makes for illuminating and fascinating reading. I recommend both this book and the documentary on which it is based to anyone interested in WWII or history at all. This is a brilliant and detailed read.
Richard Overy wrote this not long after the Russian archives were made more accessible to western historians, and before they were closed off again. This allows him to shed what was new light on the eastern front, challenging myths pedalled by former Nazi generals and the communist party.
Russia’s War is a high level overview of the whole war, covering the main battles, and political movements in Russia as the war progressed. A great introduction to this part of the war, but for detail on any area the reader will need to look to other more specific works.
Recommended to anyone looking for an accessible introduction to the eastern front.
Richard Overy's history of the USSR's World War II experience revealed a lot that is lacking in typical American history courses concerning WWII. For one, it shows with a great deal of evidence how the USSR was able to recover from an initial German push that led the Nazis to within 40 miles of Moscow by its own accord. Stalin's reign was terrible, but it also allowed for a highly centralized industry that produced superior tanks at an astonishing rate. By the time the Allies landed at Normandy, the USSR had already reconquered its entire southern territory and was quickly pushing through Ukraine and Poland. The second front alleviated some of the Soviet troop's burdon, but by then it was clear who was dominating the war.
Perhaps more importantly, Overy never gets too caught up in the minute details of the economics and strategy of the war. Instead, he gives a well-argued overview with relevant tables that represent a consensus view of production. This allows him to also focus on the social aspects of the war, and how the average Russian was affected by it. In all, over 20 million Russians died, a demographic disaster for the country that makes victory all the more impressive. Overall, the book is a surprisingly enjoyable war history that gives a multifaceted view of a war rarely seen from the other side.
This book is a nice introduction to the war on the Eastern Front. It starts with an explanation of the pre-war years, by dealing with the purges and war doctrine. After that, it tells about the struggle on the eastern front from year to year, roughly divided by 1942, 1943 and 1944 and onwards. It doesn't go into very deep tactical details, which makes it a nice introduction to this theater of war. One remarkable subject is the Polish uprising in Warsaw, with the Red Army waiting and not coming to help. The author more or less explains (and defends) the Russian point of view, in the case that at that point the Red Army was stressed to the end of its limits after the succesfull Operation Bagration in 1944 and not able to assist the Polish resistance. The book doesn't end at the end of the war, but also tells us about the aftermath, the demoting of the Russian Marshall's like Zjoekov and Vasilevsky until the death of Stalin in 1953.
4,5 stele. O monografie excelentă nu numai a Marelui Război pentru Apărarea Patriei și a armatei sovietice, ci a regimului Stalin în ansamblu. Concepută de autor ca un suport pentru un documentar în zece părți (pe care nu l-am vizionat) realizat în 1995, cartea ne prezintă principalele evenimente ce s-au desfășurat în Rusia (iar, începând din 1922, URSS) începând cu Războiul Civil ce a urmat Revoluţiei Bolșevice și terminând cu epoca recentă. Principalul punct forte al cărții este faptul că descrierea Marelui Război pentru Apărarea Patriei nu se rezumă la dimensiunea militară și strategică, ci și la cea simbolică; mai exact, războiul împotriva Germaniei naziste nu reflectă doar punctul de vedere comunist, ci își extrage vitalitatea din trecutul Rusiei, este o expresie a instinctelor ancestrale rusești de a apăra pământul de toți invadatorii care s-au succedat de-a lungul timpului: "Războiul Uniunii Sovietice din anii 1941-1945 a fost un amalgam complex de vechi şi nou, iar Stalin a decis să poarte războiul nu doar ca o simplă expresie a patriotismului socialist. Propaganda de război s-a folosit de eroii trecutului, văzuţi prin ochelari roșii. Lui Aleksandr Nevski, cneazul moscovit din secolul al XIII-lea care a înfrânt invazia Cavalerilor Teutoni, regizorul Serghei Eisenstein i-a pus în gură, la sfârșitul filmului, cuvintele repetate la nesfârşit pe toată durata războiului: "Cine vine la noi cu sabia, de sabie va pieri. Așa s-a păstrat pământul rusesc și așa se va păstra în veci." În acest program de revenire la tradițiile seculare a fost implicată și Biserica Ortodoxă Rusă, o instituție puternic marginalizată și oprimată în deceniile anterioare (din 50000 de preoți înainte de Revoluţie, acum mai erau doar 100), dar care acum trebuia să mobilizeze oamenii să dea totul pentru a susține armata sovietică. Pentru a înțelege cel mai bine acest război cu adevărat unic, este necesară o trecere în revistă a principalelor evenimente care au marcat regimul stalinist înainte de declanșarea operațiunii Barbarossa. Mai întâi, schimbarea de la politica lui Lenin, ce era ferm convins că socialismul bolșevic se va extinde la nivel internațional, prin intermediul Cominternului, la teoria lui Stalin privind "construirea socialismului într-o singură țară", dat fiind faptul că progresele anticipate de Lenin s-au dovedit a fi speranțe deșarte. Consolidarea puterii lui Stalin în cadrul partidului constituie în sine un proces remarcabil, în condițiile în care Lenin l-a considerat un adevărat pericol și a avertizat ca nu cumva conducerea să-i revină lui Stalin, în timp ce Troțki s-a înșelat enorm în privința lui, considerându-l "un ageamiu în politică". O gravă eroare de apreciere, ce, în final, avea să-i fie fatală autorului teoriei "revoluției permanente": "Judecându-l după aparenţele exterioare, Stalin se arăta îndatoritor, se purta la fel cu toată lumea şi era modest, un demnitar deloc special. Secretarul său îşi va aminti că Stalin şedea adesea ore în șir, la sedințe, lipit de peretele încăperii, fuma întruna din pipă, rareori ridica vreo problemă și mult mai rar își afirma părerile. Acest ,,dar al tăcerii" îl făcea unic într-o tară în care toată lumea vorbea prea mult". În plan militar, principala contribuție a lui Stalin la consolidarea armatei sovietice în perioada premergătoare războiului a constat, așa cum este bine cunoscut, în epurarea marii majorități a conducătorilor militari, totul culminând cu arestarea, condamnarea la moarte și executarea mareșalului Tuhacevski, principalul strateg militar al armatei. Bineînțeles, corpul principal al cărții este alcătuit din descrierea foarte bine documentată a acestui război total, ce nu are precedent în istorie în ceea ce privește amploarea. Însă, chiar de la început, din 1941, Marele Război pentru Apărarea Patriei avea să aibă o încărcătură simbolică aparte: "Stalin s-a adesat trupelor, dar nu personal, ci de pe ecranul pe care se proiecta un film realizat la Kremlin. De data aceasta a fost și mai clar în a declara că luptau pentru cauza care era cea a Rusiei de-a lungul secolelor: Fie ca în acest război să ne fie modele figurile eroice ale marilor noștri strămoşi: Aleksandr Nevski, Dmitri Donskoi, Minin și Pojarski, Aleksandr Suvorov și Mihail Kutuzov!" Aceste personalităţi îi înfruntaseră și-i învinseseră pe cavalerii teutoni, pe tătari, pe invadatorii polonezi din secolul al XVII-lea și, în final, pe Napoleon. Stalin nu mai făcea apel la elanul revoluţionar, ci la semnificaţia profundă a istoriei ruse și la conceptul de natiune". Un detaliu foarte interesant are legătură cu prezența femeilor în armata sovietică: "În 1945 pe front erau 246000 de femei în uniformă. Nu prea li se făceau concesii... Camarazii lor bărbaţi și ofiţerii considerau că femeile trebuie să suporte aceleasi vicisitudini ca ei, în vreme ce femeile însele se ofereau deseori voluntare în acțiuni mult mai riscante ca să se afirme, în felul acesta, în faţa bărbaţilor". Spre comparație, în armata germană soldaţii erau exclusiv bărbați. Cu siguranță, prezența femeilor sovietice pe front a avut o contribuție la creșterea motivației soldaților. Din nou, este evident faptul că Hitler nu a fost deloc un bun psiholog, așa cum nu a excelat nici la strategia militară. Din fericire. În final, doresc să remarc faptul că Richard Overy este nu numai un bun istoric (deși uneori se strecoară anumite erori menționate și corectate conștiincios de traducătorul cărții), dar și un scriitor talentat, astfel încât lectura devine foarte palpitantă în unele momente. Într-un cuvânt, lucrarea istoricului britanic este una mai mult decât recomandabilă cititorilor pasionați de cel de-al Doilea Război Mondial. Lectură plăcută!
In their war to defeat the Axis powers, Russia built the largest military force in history. They suffered more than 25 million deaths and, yet, drove the enemy from their soil and became one of the "Big Three" victors of World War II. This book, published in 1997, covers the highlights of the Russo-German war and also provides what I think is a balanced appraisal of the Soviet war effort. I will try to write a more complete review later. A solid 4/5 stars.
This book offers the reader a decent and non-bias account of Russia's wartime effort during the Second World War. Although not as detailed as John Erickson's two volume account of the Soviet military effort its a lot more easier to understand and follow. Also you aren't left with the impression that the book was full of Russian propaganda. It tells the story as it really was, showing both the good and the bad side of the Russian leadership and its role in trying to stem the German onslaught into Mother Russia. I think that we tend to forget the effort and loss of life that Russia bore during WW2 although the author does not dismiss the West's aid to Russia during the War. The book offers a nice balance between two the camps (East & West).It was a nice compliment to the TV series which is currently showing in Australia. Well worth the time to sit down and read.
This text was published as a companion book to a 10 episode television series produce by IBP Films London. It covers the rise of Stalin and his endless suspicions and purges from which few were safe, and Stalin's joining alliances with the west who he was highly suspicious of which led to his non-aggression pact with Germany after Germany invaded Czechoslovakia. The bulk of the book covers the actual war once Germany turns on Russia and attacks in June 1941 to its defeat when the Russians roll into Berlin in 45. The book closes after Stalin's death and the de-Stalinization of the USSR. This book is a grand overview, which shows some sympathy for the Russian ethos while addressing the tremendous cost the ordinary Russian paid in mass arrests, executions and internment due to Stalin's paranoia seeing enemies both within and without...yet it does not cover the fact that Stalin and the NKVD basically ate their own, killing as many civilians and members of their own military and party as fell victim to the Nazis. With each text that covers any aspect of the Second World War each author will mention something another writer will have felt too obscure to cover. For me it was the treatment of the tiny Republic of Chechnya in February of 1944. The Chechens were invited to join the celebrations of Red Army Day and the growing victories over the German occupation. They Chechens showed up in their town squares prepared to celebrate and each town square was surrounded by NKVD and a Russian official stepped forward and announced that they were to be deported as the NKVD moved in to contain them, those who dared to try to escape were shot on the spot and they were rounded up and transported to the camps in the Gulag where they were held until 1956 where those who had managed to survive were allowed to return home. This is a story I was not familiar with and will have to track down as there is sure to be some books which cover the Chechen's plight. Having read several books on certain battles on the Eastern front from both the German and Russian perspective, the very best book I have read was the fiction of Vasily Grossman, whose books were confiscated by the State. Sometimes you can find more truth in fiction about what the Russian commanders and soldiers faced than the mere fact that political commissars were assigned to make sure that no one exhibited the slightest incorrect idea while fighting the Germans. The very fact that all commanders were subject to torture and/or execution for failing to execute an order even if it was impossible to carry out, or for uttering a word that a commissar found inappropriate, and for those who were victorious in battle were at risk of the same treatment if Stalin felt that they were becoming too well regarded by their troops or the civilians and might be thought of as more heroic than he was. A good overview of the utter insanity of Stalin's policies and how in spite of all of the suffering imposed on the military and civilian population that they at great sacrifice managed to push the Germans out of the Motherland and pursue them to Berlin and their defeat. Only to at wars end to have to suffer further as millions were rounded up as being suspect and executed and sent off to slave labor and prison camps where survival was as difficult as their chances were during the desperate battles against their occupying enemy.
Having read about the Western front and the war in the Pacific, I was looking for a strategic overview of the war in the east. Overy's work proves to be immensely informative and interesting coverage of the Soviet war in '41-45. It also covers the Soviet government's policy of Collectivization, the Great Purge of the 30s, the post war developments up to Stalin's demise, and the de-stalinization that followed. It contains rich character studies of various key figures, especially Stalin, Zhukov, and Tukhachevsky. The singular defining aspect of Stalin's entity- and of the union that he forged- that stands out is the man's paranoia. Perhaps it was Stalin's paranoia, his fear of his own mortality, that fueled his cruelty and his disregard for human life. Of course it can all be contextualized within the larger Russian history and experience but nonetheless, to a large degree Stalin appears very remote, almost an enigma to my modern sensibilities. Having read Beevor's seminal work on 'Stalingrad', Overy's book appears to be a little light on narrative but it does accomplish what it sets out to do, i.e. provide a concise history of the Soviet Effort in the Great Patriotic war. It had me hooked. I'll be reading about Ike next. Will perhaps pick up Sylvia Plath's and 'Chips' Channon's diaries too.
I read a chapter of the book and then watched the corresponding documentary, ‘Russia’s War: Blood upon the Snow’ that it was based on. It’s an event by event account of the war on the eastern front covering the military battles and the war as experienced by those unfortunate enough to be caught up in it. It was both revealing and devastating! It was less satisfying, however, on the reasons underpinning decisions made or not made. It is a military history, to some extent including a social history, that stops short of any deeper understanding of events or the people involved. A strong recommendation, especially for watching the documentary.
When you think of World War II, especially the end of the war, you are likely to think of the allied war efforts from El Alamein to Normandy, and all the way to the toppling of the Third Reich. What is missed out, primarily thanks to quality western film making and history writing, is the critical role that the USSR played in bringing down the Nazis, at a massive cost to itself and its citizens. The USSR’s role in facilitating the rise of the Nazis initially, and their enablement of the blitzkrieg through the Molotov Ribbentrop pact is also partly responsible for the framing of WW2 as primarily between the western liberal democracies and Nazi Germany. Yet Russia paid back ‘the iron price’ through blood and tears, and without red army hacking away the Germans in Stalingrad, Kursk, etc. the western powers might not have stood a chance against Hitler’s armies.
This is the story Richard Overy seeks to tell in Russia’s war – how the USSR went from the pact to fighting Hitler’s armies, from there on until peace treaties which marked the end of the war, all the way up until the death of Stalin.
I found only two weaknesses in the narrative – one Overy is not an economic historian, so the economic history side of the story, the turning around of an entire economy into a war economy, is best found in other works (such as those by Adam Tooze). Second, this also was not a military history per se – there was no discussion of tactics, of strategies, of weapons and so on. It was a history of the eastern front of World War II, from the perspective of the Russians. Those limitations aside, the narrative is thoroughly engaging, and there is a lot of information even those who have read a bit about World War II might discover. One important thing that comes out is the role of Stalin, and how he was henceforth forever seen by Russians as the father figure who saved Russia from the Nazis. Another is Overy’s questioning and hypothesizing regarding the figures of Russian dead, and what that said about the military’s professionalism.
Overy argues that Russia lost as many men as it did because it got caught in the war when it was not prepared, just after when a purge had taken place, and the fresh of the boat soldiers and field leaders suffered high casualties initially – and these numbers only piled up because to replace every soldier or general, even younger, fresher and more inexperienced troops were sent in. this tide was only reversed post Stalingrad, when the survivors of different fronts became battle hardened, and were better able to execute both tactical and strategic maneuvers whilst facing heavy fire. Overy argues this is where the high casualty rates start to drop. The argument seems believable, however Overy does not present much data to back the claims – likely because data from Soviet archives is hard to come by to begin with.
The end of the narrative though, like any history of Russia, is bound to leave you a little sad, the way the heroic generals of USSR were treated by Stalin and his paranoid regime. That unfortunately, has been the story of Russia for a long time.
Reads very smoothly. Excellent general account of the war from the Russian perspective that tries to cover all aspects off the war. For more purely military accounts, you will need to find another book. Overy had earned his spurs in Russian sources before he wrote this account, so his grasp of the subject is very good.
It starts out with establishing the revolutionary roots of the army and its attempts to both modernise and find a balance between ideological purity and military professionalism. It then moves to the countdown to war, where it records frantic Russian attempts to keep out of the conflict and grave insecurity of the Soviet state from within and without. This leads to sudden shifts in power between ideology and professionalism in the years before Barbarossa. This is what leads to Russia still being halfway preopared for the conflict but with its deployment based on outdated concept of war, which leads to the destruction of the Red Army on the borders.
There's continuous attention for Stalin's difficult relationship with the military and the top generals. He wasn't a very good soldier and made many stupid mistakes. On the other hand he steadied quite a few crises with determination and ruthlessness. He played a central role in the handling of the war. That would also affect his postwar stature.
Within the largely chronological account, a whole chapter is devoted to the holocaust, German treatment of occupied terrotories, the moral mobilisation of Russian resistance, the partisans and the relocation of Russian population and industry to the east. A good way to focus on this important part of the war (it was an ideological as much as a military contest) instead of diluting it over the course of the book.
Although published 15 years ago it is still quite in tow with current scholarship on the subject, using the flood of new material coming out of Russian archives and memoirs in the early 1990s. Large parts of this book deal with old myths (e.g. run up to Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, Stalin's supposed inactivity in June 1941, the effect of the 1930s purges).
This was exactly what I was after. An excellent and clear account of the Second World War from the Soviet perspective. It doesn't go into deep military or tactical details, which I was relieved about personally and made it easier to follow. Other than that it covers all major aspects of the war on the Eastern Front, from the build up, the war itself, to the aftermath. Published in 1999, it makes use of documents and evidence that was only finally made available after the fall of Communism. There may be more up-to-date sources now, but as far as I can tell this is still in line with the current academic view on the subject and a fantastic overview.
There was a lot of focus on the motivations and decisions made by Stalin and Zhukov in particular. Stalin is shown to be a product of history and his Russian Imperialist predecessors; just as the Soviet Union relied on the gulags for war time production, the tsars had also exploited forced labour; the myths, legends and heroes of Russian history, as well as the Orthodox Church, were brought back into the public eye during to the war to galvanise the population, despite all these ideas being oppressed in the early years after the Revolution; finally, there has always been the idea of collectivism vs individualism in Russian history and this was used to encourage the gigantic sacrifice made by the Soviet people ("for the greater good"). The later chapters were also fascinating to me, detailing anti-Semitic politics of the regime, the beginnings of the Cold War, de-Stalinization and the myths surrounding WWII that would later be exploited by the state.
Russia's War was an illuminating read, and surprisingly readable considering the difficult subject matter. I'd recommend it to anyone who is interested in WWII history, especially if you never really considered it from a Russian/Soviet perspective.
Excellent book that covers the most important but often forgotten aspect of the Second World War, the Russian participation in WWII. Esteemed historian Richard Overy has done a fantastic job in portraying the Eastern Front with as much neutrality as possible. The German invasion, the Soviet fightback, Stalin's role in the conflict, and the ultimate result of the war are covered in great detail. The famous battles of Stalingrad, Leningrad, Moscow, and Berlin are also described very well. Highly recommended if you are fascinated by military history in general and by WWII history in particular.
The very bleak story of a people that fought their way in and out of hell. Richard Overy tells the story of the Soviet Union during WWII, with information that at that time had just been opened to the public. The main stress of the book falls in-between the military realities and the cruel fate of those who stood in the way. The massacres done by the soviets agains their own people are absolutely debilitating and it did for me, as a reader, create a blackened mental atmosphere that will haunt my perception of this conflict for as long as my memory will still be intact. In the Epilogue, the author does justice to this fact. From the fall of the Soviet Union, most histories of the conflict - of this new wave, this work being part of it - have dealt with the sufferings of the population, the memory of whom will forever scream against any similar violence, possible or impossible.
Russia's War gives a general (but adequately detailed when need be) introduction to the Soviet military perspective on WWII. As someone with basically no prior knowledge specifically regarding Russia's side of the conflict, it was useful to me. It was also required reading for my class so I did not have a choice but I did like it. But also it is a very dense book. You will probably need to stop and rub your temples a few times while reading this but if anything that is a plus because everyone around you will think that your brain is so full of complex thoughts. If you're looking for that sort of attention then this novel is for you
A short yet very comprehensive account of the Soviet Union's bloody struggle to defeat Nazi Germany after the initial rout which followed Operation Barbarossa. The Nazis' initial success wasn't as clear cut as many believe. From the beginning and throughout the war, the bravery and resilience of the Red Army surprised the German generals who had been taught to regard the peoples of Eastern Europe as "Untermenschen" (i.e. subhuman). According to Heinrich Himmler, the war in the East was to be one of "decimation" of the Slavic people.
It was the battle skills of the entire Red Army, from generals down to the ordinary soldier and the incredible economic revival of the Soviet Union's military-industrial complex (aided by the USA's Lend-Lease policy - the latter grudgingly admitted by Stalin) which were the main reasons for the Allied victory against Hitler - but at a monumental cost in human lives and suffering.
Overy does not shirk from detailing the atrocities perpetrated by the Soviet authorities against satellite states such as the Ukraine, due to deliberate starvation, resettlement and official incompetence. He includes a history of Stalin's rise to power and his many vindictive campaigns of persecution - scores of purges and pogroms - against his own people, which saw millions starved to death, murdered, imprisoned or sent to the gulags and work camps, where they died in their hundreds of thousands over 3 decades. Nor does he ignore the rapes and needless killings of tens of thousands of German civilians during the Red Army's march through Germany during and immediately after the final battles.
Overall though, this is the history of the massive suffering endured by the Russian people and the other peoples of Eastern Europe from 1941 to 1945 and how an almost miraculous turn around in Soviet industrial output and military planning finally turned the tide against the (until then) all conquering German military and eventually destroyed the might of Nazi Germany.
The book followed a miniseries, which might explain its strengths and weaknesses.
The good: the Oxford don who wrote this history proved his erudition by sharing relatively fine details of the Soviet war effort, and by offering occasional rebuttal of what he perceived as commonly-held-but-erroneous-beliefs about Stalin or the larger history.
The bad: having said that, I estimate that he wrote 80% in the passive voice. Further, paragraphs are frequently too long and often lack topic sentences. I skipped chapters seven and eight out of sheer misery. Either he never learned to write well, or, because this history accompanied a documentary miniseries, he hastily assembled it.
I do take interest in the argument that Allied success - according to Mr. Overy - depended significantly upon Stalin's brutal modernization campaign of the 1930s, without which the Soviets and entire Alliance would likely have perished. History is rather messy and morally ambivalent sometimes. Machiavelli anyone?
Hard to put down, this book is so engrossing and well-written. Richard Overy has a gift for letting facts speak for themselves by an effective use of data, e.g. his two simple tables of military and overall production figures of Soviet Union and Nazi Germany in each year of the conflict. Nor does him shy away from putting his foot down stating what he thinks, e.g. the apportioning of guilt to Nazis versus to the Ukrainian, Belarusian and Baltic anti-semites who were more than eager to denounce their Jewish neighbours (page 142). If you've ever been captivated by the largest warfare in the history of this planet, or enjoyed Dan Carlin's telling (considered the 5th best Podcast in the first 10 years of podcasting by Slate), this book is a must-read.
An interesting account of Russian side of the eastern front war and some intriguing claims about Russia's foreign policy leading to and during early war years. The authors benefits from new documents recently declassified from the Russian archives, and sheds light on previously unknown and heavily speculated aspects of Russian policy. Book is relatively small and doesnt go in too much of details about fine aspects of battalion movement. What it does is provide a good mix of strategic and tactical aspect. The book also provides a small view into some of the biggest names on Russian sides such as Stalin, Zhukov, Beria, Molotov and many others. Interesting read for someone looking for a nice read on eastern front. Rating:- ****
The narrative is very captivating and lively as the testimonies claim. I didn't watch the 10-hour documentary to which the book's supposed to be a thorough companion but the book itself made me want to watch it. Overall, it's a nice general and OBJECTIVE look at the history of the Soviet WW2 effort, taking it all the way back from Stalin's rise to power up to his death. It's fairly short and makes a good intro for anyone who wants to dive into the Operation Barbarossa. My reason in picking it up was I felt I knew very little about the Soviet view of the war, and even less about the Soviet generals. It was a crash course on them for me. So I wouldn't really recommend it to anyone who already has a good grasp of WW2 in general.
Professor Richard Overy in this eye opener, details the gargantuan Soviet effort in amassing men and material, which on hindsight turned out to be the most colossal feat of World War II. From the very brink of humiliating defeat after being taken unawares of the German Blitzkrieg - courtesy Operation Barbarossa - to hoisting the Communist Flag at the Reich stag in Berlin, Russia overcame obstacles of every sort, both natural and man made; posed by friend and foe alike to emerge triumphant in some of the bloodiest battles of attrition. When the fighters and bombers finally stopped their savage sorties and the lumbering monstrous tanks ground to a halt, signaling the end of the greatest incursion of mankind into the depths of folly, the casualties suffered by Stalin's countrymen were mind numbing. Out of a total mobilized manpower of 34,476,700, 11,444,100 were either dead or were captured as Prisoners Of War or were missing in action. The total number killed in action, or who perished on account of their injuries was 6,885,100. The death toll from 1941-1945 amounted to 8,668,400. An unspeakable price to pay for securing freedom.
Overy by concentrating on the physical as well as the psychological factors motivating the Russian War efforts provides various astounding insights which when read together, brings the reader to the startling and sickening realization that the Russian victory could have been achieved at a much lower loss of life, limb and livelihood. For example the atrocious 'purges' following the internal civil war in 1919, where a paranoid administration went about culling 'suspected' traitors from the officer corps - not before subjecting them to unspeakable bouts of torture with a view to forcing out 'confessions' - ensured that by the time Hitler mounted his rampaging attack on June 22, 1941, the Soviet army was in virtual disarray with a grievous lack of leadership capabilities. These abominable purges continued well into the war and even after the World War itself came to an excruciating end. Having a morbid fear of dying, the despotic Stalin not only had himself surrounded by the dreaded NKVD Security guards, but also had a phalanx of cronies and lackeys, who with an objective of scaling great heights of power, committed treachery and treason against their own brethren.
Professor Overy also highlights the alarming situation of the Soviet ground and air troops itself at the height of the German invasion. Forced to fight behind feeble emplacements and substandard fortifications, the Russian soldier - or 'Ivan' as the Germans were wont to term him - was equipped with outdated rifles and inferior weaponry. Against the clockwork precision of the German army equipped with the dreaded Panzer tanks, these pitiful soldiers had only prayers as their best chance of survival. The Russian Air Force was in an even greater mess. Lacking radio communications and trained/experienced pilots, the Soviet air attacks were literally suicidal missions with their planes seeking to ram into the dreaded Luftwaffe when the former ran out of fuel!
From a position of dire disadvantage, the Soviet Union through a process of remarkable political, economic and military transformation, worked a veritable miracle by bringing forth a level of discipline and sophistication hitherto seen in any Armed forces. Even as Germany was bombing the living daylights out of Russian villages and cities, workers transported entire factories over railroads (or what remained of them) to isolated places in Kazakhstan and Siberia and embarked on a mass production initiative of military stockpile. However the most back breaking labour was extracted at an unfair cost. Most of the toil formed the exclusive preserve of the unfortunate prisoners sentenced to a long tenures at the 'gulags' or the despicable labour camps. Sleeping on straw beds or even at times, in holes carved out from earth, these prisoners were driven to work in appalling conditions. Braving temperatures of minus thirty degrees and minuscule food rations, hundreds of thousands of brave men and women literally worked themselves to death. By 1945 the Soviet Armed and Air forces boasted technological prowess that was equal to or in some cases even superior to those possessed by their enemy.
The top political echelons also underwent a positive paradigm shift in mindset. Stalin left the dynamics of strategy in the hands of extraordinarily brave and capable generals such as Zhukov (the hero of both Stalingrad and Leningrad); Chuikov, the indomitable general who was wounded four times (each time on the 20th of a month) and yet refused to back down an inch, and Rossokovsky. Even though Stalin insisted on being the ultimate Generalissimo, he rarely interfered in the carefully chalked out battle strategies formulated by his generals. This was in direct contrast to the workings of the sociopath Hitler, who insisted on micro managing every front, a disastrous decision which as psychotic as the man's ambitions, and which ultimately led to the decimation of the Third Reich.
"Russia's War" is an essential accompaniment for understanding not only the noble sacrifices made by millions of patriotic men and women who uncomplainingly charged the enemy and laid down their lives for their Motherland, but also to fathom the very depths of human blunders which have the capability of triggering a damning catastrophe! Russia's War was indeed a consequence of a monumental catastrophe!
Als Hörerin des ARD/MDR Podcasts „Was tun, Herr General?“, der auf sehr sachliche und detaillierte Weise Hintergundinformationen und Einordnungen zum russischen Angriffskrieg auf die Ukraine zu geben sucht, ist dieses Werk des britischen Hitsorikers ein bisschen wie ein Prequel. Das Buch ist bereits 1998 erschienen und wahrscheinlich gibt es inzwischen nich ganz andere Erkenntnisse. Mit dieser Einschränkung trotzdem vier Sterne.
Amazing book! The author included lots of interesting facts and statistics, would recommend this book if your interested in russian history and the Second World War.