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Putin and the Return of History: How the Kremlin Rekindled the Cold War
Bloomsbury presents Putin and the Return of History by Martin Sixsmith, read by Jonathan Keeble.
An original history of Russia's thousand-year past, tracing the forces and the myths that have shaped Putin's politics and rekindled the Cold War.
Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has reshaped history. In the decades after the collapse of Soviet communism, the West convinced itself that liberal democracy would henceforth be the dominant, ultimately unique, system of governance – a hubris that shaped how the West would treat Russia for the next two decades. But history wasn’t over.
Putin is a paradox. In the early years of his presidency, he appeared to commit himself to friendship with the West, suggesting that Russia could join the European Union or even NATO. He said he supported free-market democracy and civil rights. But the Putin of those years is unrecognisable today. The Putin of the 2020s is an autocratic nationalist, dedicated to repression at home and anti-Western militarism abroad. So, what happened? Was he lying when he proclaimed his support for freedom, democracy and friendship with the West? Or, was he sincere? Did he change his views at some stage between then and now? And if that is the case, what happened to change him?
Putin and the Return of History examines these questions in the context of Russia’s thousand-year past, tracing the forces and the myths that have shaped Putin’s politics of the enduring terror of encirclement by outsiders, the subjugation of the individual to the cause of the state, the collectivist values that allow the sacrifice of human lives in battle, the willingness to lie and deceive, the co-opting of religion and the belief in Great Russia’s mission to change the world.
An original history of Russia's thousand-year past, tracing the forces and the myths that have shaped Putin's politics and rekindled the Cold War.
Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has reshaped history. In the decades after the collapse of Soviet communism, the West convinced itself that liberal democracy would henceforth be the dominant, ultimately unique, system of governance – a hubris that shaped how the West would treat Russia for the next two decades. But history wasn’t over.
Putin is a paradox. In the early years of his presidency, he appeared to commit himself to friendship with the West, suggesting that Russia could join the European Union or even NATO. He said he supported free-market democracy and civil rights. But the Putin of those years is unrecognisable today. The Putin of the 2020s is an autocratic nationalist, dedicated to repression at home and anti-Western militarism abroad. So, what happened? Was he lying when he proclaimed his support for freedom, democracy and friendship with the West? Or, was he sincere? Did he change his views at some stage between then and now? And if that is the case, what happened to change him?
Putin and the Return of History examines these questions in the context of Russia’s thousand-year past, tracing the forces and the myths that have shaped Putin’s politics of the enduring terror of encirclement by outsiders, the subjugation of the individual to the cause of the state, the collectivist values that allow the sacrifice of human lives in battle, the willingness to lie and deceive, the co-opting of religion and the belief in Great Russia’s mission to change the world.
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Published January 18, 2024
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About the author
Martin Sixsmith
28 books103 followersGeorge Martin Sixsmith, British author and journalist.
Sixsmith joined the BBC in 1980 where he worked as a foreign correspondent, most notably reporting from Moscow during the end of the Cold War. He also reported from Poland during the Solidarity uprising and was the BBC's Washington correspondent during the election and first presidency of Bill Clinton. He was based in Russia for five years, the US for four, Brussels for four and Poland for three.
Sixsmith left the BBC in 1997 to work for the newly elected government of Tony Blair. He became Director of Communications (a civil service post), working first with Harriet Harman and Frank Field, then with Alistair Darling. His next position was as a Director of GEC plc, where he oversaw the rebranding of the company as Marconi plc.
In December 2001, he returned to the Civil Service to join the Department for Transport, Local Government and the Regions as Director of Communications in time to become embroiled in the second act of the scandal over Jo Moore. Moore was special adviser to the transport secretary Stephen Byers and had been the subject of much public condemnation for suggesting that a controversial announcement should be "buried" during the media coverage of the September 11, 2001 attacks.[1]
Sixsmith incurred the displeasure of Downing Street when his email advising Byers and Moore not to bury more bad news was leaked to the press. Number Ten attempted to "resign him", but had later to issue an apology and pay him compensation. Sixsmith was widely expected to write a memoir or autobiography in the wake of his civil service departure, but was gagged by the government[citation needed] Instead, he produced a novel about near-future politics called Spin, published in 2004.
His second novel, I Heard Lenin Laugh, was published in 2005. In 2006 he was commissioned by BBC Radio 4 to present a series of programmes on Russian poetry, literature and art.
In 2007 he wrote The Litvinenko File, an examination of the feud between the Kremlin and Russia's émigré oligarchs.
In 2008 Sixsmith worked on two BBC documentaries exploring the legacy of the KGB in today's Russia and also presented a BBC documentary, The Snowy Streets of St. Petersburg, about artists and writers who fled the former Eastern bloc.
In 2009 he wrote The Lost Child of Philomena Lee, about the forcible separation of a mother and child by the nuns of an Irish convent during the 1950s, and the subsequent attempts of the mother and child to contact one another.[2] The book was adapted into the film Philomena, directed by Stephen Frears, starring Dame Judi Dench and Steve Coogan (as Sixsmith), and written by Coogan and Jeff Pope; it premiered at the Venice Film Festival and was released in the UK on November 1 2013.
In February 2010 Sixsmith wrote Putin's Oil, about Russia's energy wars and their consequences for Moscow and the world.
He worked as an adviser to the BBC political sitcom The Thick of It, and the Oscar-nominated film, In the Loop.
In 2011, he presented Russia: The Wild East, a 50-part history of Russia for BBC Radio 4, the last episode of which was broadcast on 12 August.[3] His book Russia, a 1,000 Year Chronicle of the Wild East was published by Random House.
In 2014 Sixsmith will present a 25 part programme about the history of psychology and psychiatry for the BBC radio.
Sixsmith joined the BBC in 1980 where he worked as a foreign correspondent, most notably reporting from Moscow during the end of the Cold War. He also reported from Poland during the Solidarity uprising and was the BBC's Washington correspondent during the election and first presidency of Bill Clinton. He was based in Russia for five years, the US for four, Brussels for four and Poland for three.
Sixsmith left the BBC in 1997 to work for the newly elected government of Tony Blair. He became Director of Communications (a civil service post), working first with Harriet Harman and Frank Field, then with Alistair Darling. His next position was as a Director of GEC plc, where he oversaw the rebranding of the company as Marconi plc.
In December 2001, he returned to the Civil Service to join the Department for Transport, Local Government and the Regions as Director of Communications in time to become embroiled in the second act of the scandal over Jo Moore. Moore was special adviser to the transport secretary Stephen Byers and had been the subject of much public condemnation for suggesting that a controversial announcement should be "buried" during the media coverage of the September 11, 2001 attacks.[1]
Sixsmith incurred the displeasure of Downing Street when his email advising Byers and Moore not to bury more bad news was leaked to the press. Number Ten attempted to "resign him", but had later to issue an apology and pay him compensation. Sixsmith was widely expected to write a memoir or autobiography in the wake of his civil service departure, but was gagged by the government[citation needed] Instead, he produced a novel about near-future politics called Spin, published in 2004.
His second novel, I Heard Lenin Laugh, was published in 2005. In 2006 he was commissioned by BBC Radio 4 to present a series of programmes on Russian poetry, literature and art.
In 2007 he wrote The Litvinenko File, an examination of the feud between the Kremlin and Russia's émigré oligarchs.
In 2008 Sixsmith worked on two BBC documentaries exploring the legacy of the KGB in today's Russia and also presented a BBC documentary, The Snowy Streets of St. Petersburg, about artists and writers who fled the former Eastern bloc.
In 2009 he wrote The Lost Child of Philomena Lee, about the forcible separation of a mother and child by the nuns of an Irish convent during the 1950s, and the subsequent attempts of the mother and child to contact one another.[2] The book was adapted into the film Philomena, directed by Stephen Frears, starring Dame Judi Dench and Steve Coogan (as Sixsmith), and written by Coogan and Jeff Pope; it premiered at the Venice Film Festival and was released in the UK on November 1 2013.
In February 2010 Sixsmith wrote Putin's Oil, about Russia's energy wars and their consequences for Moscow and the world.
He worked as an adviser to the BBC political sitcom The Thick of It, and the Oscar-nominated film, In the Loop.
In 2011, he presented Russia: The Wild East, a 50-part history of Russia for BBC Radio 4, the last episode of which was broadcast on 12 August.[3] His book Russia, a 1,000 Year Chronicle of the Wild East was published by Random House.
In 2014 Sixsmith will present a 25 part programme about the history of psychology and psychiatry for the BBC radio.
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Displaying 1 - 12 of 12 reviews
March 13, 2024
(The English review is placed beneath the Russian one)
Воспитатели пугали детей в саду -
«Если уйдёте за калитку, то вас украдут»
И дети верили, вживались в эту игру
Ведь когда такое было, что взрослые соврут?
Но по итогу нам открывался лайфхак -
Выдуманный ад для ребёнка и лоха
И даже воронье летало и мучалось
Когда на поле возвышалось добротное чучело
Во-первых, эта книга напомнила мне книгу «Russia's Road to War with Ukraine: Invasion amidst the ashes of empires». Оба автора не разрисовывают мир чёрно-белыми красками, а пытаются дать непредвзятую оценку, а такая оценка всегда имеет вид оттенков.
Во-вторых, прочитав половину книги, я думал поставить книге высокую оценку, но ближе к концу понял, что в книге нет авторского анализа. Книга представляет из себя хорошую компиляцию из других книг, но не собственный взгляда автора.
Книга начинается с 1991 года и образования новой России, суть которого лучше всего передала Лилия Шевцова.
Our country is building an imitation democracy… The external wrappings of democracy are present: elections, parliament and so on, but the essence is absolutely different. In the Russian case, we are dealing with … the deliberate use of democratic institutions as Potemkin villages in order to conceal traditional power arrangements … The political regime that has consolidated itself resembles the ‘bureaucratic authoritarianism’ of Latin American regimes in the 1960s and 1970s. It has all the characteristics: personalized power, bureaucratization of society, political exclusion of the populace and an active role for the secret services.
Эти слова были актуальны как для описания ельцинского правления, так они подходят для описания и путинского правления. Автор посвящает четверть книги тому, как автократизм зарождался сначала при Ельцине, а при Путине встал во весь рост. Тем не менее, как пишет автор, политика Путина была направлена на то, чтобы публично отмежеваться от Ельцина и его системы (те самые «лихие 90-ые», которые и помогли стать Путину и его друзьям тем, кем они стали и что в итоге получили). Не знаю, пишет ли это автор или нет, но с моей точки зрения Путин не может отмежеваться от Ельцина в принципе, ибо он является политическим наследником Ельцина и проводит такую же политику, которую проводил Ельцин, но в более крупном масштабе. Вспомнить хотя бы начало СВО в Приднестровье, Абхазии и Чечне, которые начались при Ельцине, а также знаменитый разворот самолёта Примакова над Атлантикой с которого и начались портиться отношения между Россией и Западными странами. Путин лишь углубил конфликт, но начал явно не он.
Однако центральной темой книги является вовсе не обзор ельцинско-путинской политики, а как можно догадаться, международные отношения через призму российско-украинского конфликта. Как я отметил ранее, книга является компиляцией других ресурсов и вот то, что автор выбрал в качестве источников, вызывает у меня противоречивые чувства. Впрочем, претензии могут возникнуть не только у меня одного, но и у других жителей бывшего СССР.
While Yushchenko’s memory politics contained much historical truth, the claim that Ukraine had been specially singled-out for victimization by the Soviet state was an oversimplification. Ukrainians suffered from the collectivization of agriculture, the purges of the 1930s and the forced deportations before and after the war, but that was a fate shared by nearly all national groups.
<…>
Nationalists in the Baltic states and in Poland also instrumentalized their victim status, using the suffering inflicted on them by their Soviet occupiers as a unifying national myth, while declining to offer an honest historical assessment of their own troubled past, most notably their complicity in the Holocaust.
Этот факт я тоже отмечал во множестве своих рецензиях. Это особенно заметно у профессора Serhii Plokhy, который упоминая голод в Украине, почему-то «забыл» упомянуть голод в тоже время и в советской России и Казахстане. По поводу стран Балтии тоже всё ясно, ибо политики и там любят использовать образ внешнего врага в противостоянии которому можно консолидировать страну (ведь РФ действительно является грозой для стран бывшего СССР).
Хотя автор и пишет про радикальных украинских националистов и про их негативную роль во всём этом, однако верно он подметил про украинское общество:
They use its symbols to express defiance of the invaders who have seized their territory. But it does not mean they sympathize with the extremist ideology that lay behind it; it does not make them a nation of fascists, still less one in the grip of neo Nazis.
Об этом тоже забывают многие авторы, пишущие о российско-украинском конфликте либо намеренно акцентируются на украинском национализме тем самым отрабатывая кремлёвский нарратив.
В чём я с автором не согласен это с тем, что как он предполагает, думают россияне об украинцах.
Ukrainians have historically been the butt of Russian jokes for their alleged stupidity and ‘funny-sounding’ language, similar to the way in which the French ridicule the Belgians or the English mock the Irish.
<…>
Ridiculing Ukrainians and the Ukrainian language, which many Russians regard as little more than a dialect used by peasants, was common in the Soviet Union.
<…>
Russians accept Moldovan, Tajik, even Belarusian independence perfectly calmly; but they won’t accept Ukrainian independence.
Во-первых, украинский язык действительно звучит забавно для русского, впрочем, как и японский язык. Но с чего автор взял, что это как-то умаляет украинский язык? Во-вторых, в России никогда не считали украинский язык диалектом российского. Это просто дичайший бред человека, который ничего не понимает ни в русских, ни в украинцах. Достаточно посмотреть на то, что и при царях и при генеральных секретарях, Украина всегда была отдельным государством, хотя и входящим в состав Российской империи и СССР. Т.е. в отличие от Новгородской области, Украина никогда не была таким вот аналогом российской губернии. Украинский язык, как и культура, всегда был аутентичным, особым. Это всегда признавали в России, и только очень необразованные люди могут считать, что украинский язык или культура, есть продолжение русского. В общем, тут автор несёт бред.
Тем не менее, я согласен с замечанием автора, что Россия подавляла другие культуры и языки. Действительно удивительно, что в одно и тоже время Россия заявляет о себе как о стране которая объединяет несколько народов, но при этом в самой России нет того многообразия языков и культур которые есть в Германии, Бельгии, США и пр. странах, т.е. странах в которых проживает несколько народов, а не один. Я давно задаюсь вопросом, почему в России нет украинского, белорусского, армянского и прочих телевизионных телеканалов, а также газет, журналов и книг, если Россия постоянно говорит о каком-то там братстве народов? Это особенно актуально учитывая, что в России проживает около 2 миллионов украинцев. Почему же в России нет ничего украинского и белорусского, если мы типа как «братья»? Вон, в Германии есть ТВ не только на немецком, но и на турецком, английском, французском и пр. Почему в России такой тотальный запрет на другие языки и культуры?
Girzhov said it became impossible to study Ukrainian in Russia: ‘In Ukraine [at that time], there were very many schools where Russian was taught. But in Russia, there wasn’t a single school, not even a single Ukrainian class, for the two-million-person Ukrainian diaspora. In Russia, there are no places where you can speak Ukrainian; there are neither schools nor libraries [of Ukrainian literature].’
Компьютерные игры и современные российские авторы, явно могли бы переводить свои книги и игры на языки своих братьев – украинский и белорусский. Почему же это не делается? И нет, дело не в малом спросе.
Автор много времени посвящает вопросу: как же так получилось, что вначале Путин вёл себя как либерал, а потом стал законченным консерватором? Да очень просто: он всегда таким был. Только он не был консерватором, а он был человеком, которым управляет жажда денег, роскоши и власти. Все те сказки, которые он рассказывал зарубежным лидерам о важности демократии и приверженность демократическим ценностям, которые он изрекал в начале 2000-х, были сказаны только с одной целью: усыпить бдительность запада, т.е. чтобы Запад не стал вводить санкции в ответ на постепенную ликвидацию демократии в России. Если посмотреть не что говорил Путин, начиная с 2000 года, а что он делал, то можно отчётливо увидеть, что он уничтожал последние остатки свободы и ограничений президентской власти, т.е. с начала 2000-х, к уже и так суперпрезидентской конституции, он добавлял абсолютную власть монарха. Но чтобы ему в этом не помешали лидеры Западного мира, он врал им о своём приверженстве демократическим ценностям. Это была КГБэшная разводка, спецоперация. Сегодня, когда в России де-факто абсолютная монархия, уже никакие санкции её не сломают (точнее, сделать это стало намного сложнее, хотя всё ещё возможно). Но в 2000 года, был шанс, хоть и не большой.
First, this book reminded me of "Russia's Road to War with Ukraine: Invasion amidst the ashes of empires." Both authors do not paint the world in black and white colors but try to give an unbiased assessment, and such an assessment always has a kind of shade.
Secondly, after reading half of the book, I thought of giving the book a high rating, but towards the end, I realized that the book lacks the author's analysis: the book is a good compilation of other books, but not the author's own view.
The book begins with 1991 and the formation of a new Russia, the essence of which is best conveyed by Lilia Shevtsova.
Our country is building an imitation democracy… The external wrappings of democracy are present: elections, parliament and so on, but the essence is absolutely different. In the Russian case, we are dealing with … the deliberate use of democratic institutions as Potemkin villages in order to conceal traditional power arrangements … The political regime that has consolidated itself resembles the ‘bureaucratic authoritarianism’ of Latin American regimes in the 1960s and 1970s. It has all the characteristics: personalized power, bureaucratization of society, political exclusion of the populace and an active role for the secret services.
These words were relevant for describing Yeltsin's rule, and they are also relevant for describing Putin's rule. The author devotes a quarter of the book to how autocratism first emerged under Yeltsin and then rose to its full height under Putin. However, as the author writes, Putin's policy was to publicly disassociate himself from Yeltsin and his system (the same "dashing 90s" that helped make Putin and his friends what they became and what they eventually got). I do not know whether the author is writing this or not, but from my point of view, Putin cannot disassociate himself from Yeltsin in principle because he is Yeltsin's political heir and pursues the same policy that Yeltsin pursued, but on a larger scale. Let's recall at least the beginning of the SWOs in Transnistria, Abkhazia, and Chechnya, which started under Yeltsin, as well as the famous turn of Primakov's plane over the Atlantic, which started the deterioration of relations between Russia and Western countries. Putin has only deepened the conflict, but he did not start it.
However, the central theme of the book is not a review of Yeltsin-Putin politics, but, as one might guess, international relations through the prism of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. As I noted earlier, the book is a compilation of other resources, and what the author has chosen as a sources gives me conflicting feelings. However, the claims may arise not only for me alone but also for other residents of the former USSR.
While Yushchenko’s memory politics contained much historical truth, the claim that Ukraine had been specially singled-out for victimization by the Soviet state was an oversimplification. Ukrainians suffered from the collectivization of agriculture, the purges of the 1930s and the forced deportations before and after the war, but that was a fate shared by nearly all national groups.
<…>
Nationalists in the Baltic states and in Poland also instrumentalized their victim status, using the suffering inflicted on them by their Soviet occupiers as a unifying national myth, while declining to offer an honest historical assessment of their own troubled past, most notably their complicity in the Holocaust.
I have also noted this fact in many of my reviews. This is especially noticeable in the case of Prof. Serhii Plokhy, who, while mentioning the famine in Ukraine, for some reason, "forgot" to mention the famine at the same time in Soviet Russia and Kazakhstan. As for the Baltic States, everything is also clear, because politicians there like to use the image of an external enemy in opposition to which the country can be consolidated (after all, the Russian Federation is indeed a threat to the former Soviet Union).
Although the author writes about radical Ukrainian nationalists and their negative role in all this, he is correct about Ukrainian society:
They use its symbols to express defiance of the invaders who have seized their territory. But it does not mean they sympathize with the extremist ideology that lay behind it; it does not make them a nation of fascists, still less one in the grip of neo Nazis.
Many authors who write about the Russian-Ukrainian conflict also forget this, or deliberately emphasize Ukrainian nationalism, thereby practicing the Kremlin narrative.
What I don't agree with the author on is what he suggests Russians think about Ukrainians.
Ukrainians have historically been the butt of Russian jokes for their alleged stupidity and ‘funny-sounding’ language, similar to the way in which the French ridicule the Belgians or the English mock the Irish.
<…>
Ridiculing Ukrainians and the Ukrainian language, which many Russians regard as little more than a dialect used by peasants, was common in the Soviet Union.
<…>
Russians accept Moldovan, Tajik, even Belarusian independence perfectly calmly; but they won’t accept Ukrainian independence.
First of all, Ukrainian does sound funny to a Russian, as does Japanese, but what makes the author think that this somehow diminishes the Ukrainian language? Secondly, Russia has never considered the Ukrainian language to be a dialect of the Russian language. This is just the wildest nonsense of a person who understands nothing about either Russians or Ukrainians. Suffice it to look at the fact that both under tsars and secretaries-general, Ukraine has always been a separate state, although part of the Russian Empire and the USSR. That is, unlike the Novgorod region, Ukraine has never been such an analog of the Russian province. Ukrainian language, as well as its culture, has always been authentic and special. This has always been recognized in Russia, and only very uneducated people can think that the Ukrainian language or culture is a continuation of Russian. In general, the author is talking nonsense here.
Nevertheless, I agree with the author's comment that Russia suppressed other cultures and languages. It is really surprising that, at the same time, Russia claims to be a country that unites several nations, but Russia itself does not have the diversity of languages and cultures found in Germany, Belgium, the USA, etc., i.e., countries with several nations rather than one. I have long wondered why Russia has no Ukrainian, Belarusian, Armenian, and other TV channels, as well as newspapers, magazines, and books if Russia is always talking about some kind of brotherhood of nations. This is especially true considering that about 2 million Ukrainians are living in Russia. Why is there nothing Ukrainian and Belarusian in Russia, if we are "brothers"? In Germany, there is TV not only in German but also in Turkish, English, French, and so on. Why is there such a total ban on other languages and cultures in Russia?
Girzhov said it became impossible to study Ukrainian in Russia: ‘In Ukraine [at that time], there were very many schools where Russian was taught. But in Russia, there wasn’t a single school, not even a single Ukrainian class, for the two-million-person Ukrainian diaspora. In Russia, there are no places where you can speak Ukrainian; there are neither schools nor libraries [of Ukrainian literature].’
Computer games and modern Russian authors clearly could translate their books and games into the languages of their brothers - Ukrainian and Belarusian. So why isn't it being done? And no, it is not because of low demand.
The author devotes a lot of time to the question: how is it that in the beginning, Putin behaved like a liberal and then became a complete conservative? It's very simple: he has always been like that. Only he was not a conservative - he was a man ruled by the lust for money, luxury, and power. All those fairy tales he told foreign leaders about the importance of democracy and commitment to democratic values in the early 2000s were told for one purpose only: to put the West's guard down, i.e., to prevent the West from imposing sanctions in response to the gradual elimination of democracy in Russia. If you look not at what Putin has been saying since 2000, but at what he has been doing, you can clearly see that he has been destroying the last vestiges of freedom and limitations of presidential power, i.e. since the early 2000s, he has been adding the absolute power of a monarch to an already super-presidential constitution. But in order not to be thwarted in this by the leaders of the Western world, he lied to them about his commitment to democratic values. It was a KGB special operation. Today, when Russia is a de facto absolute monarchy, no sanctions can break it (or rather, it has become much harder to do so, though still possible). But, in 2000, there was a chance, though not a big one.
Воспитатели пугали детей в саду -
«Если уйдёте за калитку, то вас украдут»
И дети верили, вживались в эту игру
Ведь когда такое было, что взрослые соврут?
Но по итогу нам открывался лайфхак -
Выдуманный ад для ребёнка и лоха
И даже воронье летало и мучалось
Когда на поле возвышалось добротное чучело
Во-первых, эта книга напомнила мне книгу «Russia's Road to War with Ukraine: Invasion amidst the ashes of empires». Оба автора не разрисовывают мир чёрно-белыми красками, а пытаются дать непредвзятую оценку, а такая оценка всегда имеет вид оттенков.
Во-вторых, прочитав половину книги, я думал поставить книге высокую оценку, но ближе к концу понял, что в книге нет авторского анализа. Книга представляет из себя хорошую компиляцию из других книг, но не собственный взгляда автора.
Книга начинается с 1991 года и образования новой России, суть которого лучше всего передала Лилия Шевцова.
Our country is building an imitation democracy… The external wrappings of democracy are present: elections, parliament and so on, but the essence is absolutely different. In the Russian case, we are dealing with … the deliberate use of democratic institutions as Potemkin villages in order to conceal traditional power arrangements … The political regime that has consolidated itself resembles the ‘bureaucratic authoritarianism’ of Latin American regimes in the 1960s and 1970s. It has all the characteristics: personalized power, bureaucratization of society, political exclusion of the populace and an active role for the secret services.
Эти слова были актуальны как для описания ельцинского правления, так они подходят для описания и путинского правления. Автор посвящает четверть книги тому, как автократизм зарождался сначала при Ельцине, а при Путине встал во весь рост. Тем не менее, как пишет автор, политика Путина была направлена на то, чтобы публично отмежеваться от Ельцина и его системы (те самые «лихие 90-ые», которые и помогли стать Путину и его друзьям тем, кем они стали и что в итоге получили). Не знаю, пишет ли это автор или нет, но с моей точки зрения Путин не может отмежеваться от Ельцина в принципе, ибо он является политическим наследником Ельцина и проводит такую же политику, которую проводил Ельцин, но в более крупном масштабе. Вспомнить хотя бы начало СВО в Приднестровье, Абхазии и Чечне, которые начались при Ельцине, а также знаменитый разворот самолёта Примакова над Атлантикой с которого и начались портиться отношения между Россией и Западными странами. Путин лишь углубил конфликт, но начал явно не он.
Однако центральной темой книги является вовсе не обзор ельцинско-путинской политики, а как можно догадаться, международные отношения через призму российско-украинского конфликта. Как я отметил ранее, книга является компиляцией других ресурсов и вот то, что автор выбрал в качестве источников, вызывает у меня противоречивые чувства. Впрочем, претензии могут возникнуть не только у меня одного, но и у других жителей бывшего СССР.
While Yushchenko’s memory politics contained much historical truth, the claim that Ukraine had been specially singled-out for victimization by the Soviet state was an oversimplification. Ukrainians suffered from the collectivization of agriculture, the purges of the 1930s and the forced deportations before and after the war, but that was a fate shared by nearly all national groups.
<…>
Nationalists in the Baltic states and in Poland also instrumentalized their victim status, using the suffering inflicted on them by their Soviet occupiers as a unifying national myth, while declining to offer an honest historical assessment of their own troubled past, most notably their complicity in the Holocaust.
Этот факт я тоже отмечал во множестве своих рецензиях. Это особенно заметно у профессора Serhii Plokhy, который упоминая голод в Украине, почему-то «забыл» упомянуть голод в тоже время и в советской России и Казахстане. По поводу стран Балтии тоже всё ясно, ибо политики и там любят использовать образ внешнего врага в противостоянии которому можно консолидировать страну (ведь РФ действительно является грозой для стран бывшего СССР).
Хотя автор и пишет про радикальных украинских националистов и про их негативную роль во всём этом, однако верно он подметил про украинское общество:
They use its symbols to express defiance of the invaders who have seized their territory. But it does not mean they sympathize with the extremist ideology that lay behind it; it does not make them a nation of fascists, still less one in the grip of neo Nazis.
Об этом тоже забывают многие авторы, пишущие о российско-украинском конфликте либо намеренно акцентируются на украинском национализме тем самым отрабатывая кремлёвский нарратив.
В чём я с автором не согласен это с тем, что как он предполагает, думают россияне об украинцах.
Ukrainians have historically been the butt of Russian jokes for their alleged stupidity and ‘funny-sounding’ language, similar to the way in which the French ridicule the Belgians or the English mock the Irish.
<…>
Ridiculing Ukrainians and the Ukrainian language, which many Russians regard as little more than a dialect used by peasants, was common in the Soviet Union.
<…>
Russians accept Moldovan, Tajik, even Belarusian independence perfectly calmly; but they won’t accept Ukrainian independence.
Во-первых, украинский язык действительно звучит забавно для русского, впрочем, как и японский язык. Но с чего автор взял, что это как-то умаляет украинский язык? Во-вторых, в России никогда не считали украинский язык диалектом российского. Это просто дичайший бред человека, который ничего не понимает ни в русских, ни в украинцах. Достаточно посмотреть на то, что и при царях и при генеральных секретарях, Украина всегда была отдельным государством, хотя и входящим в состав Российской империи и СССР. Т.е. в отличие от Новгородской области, Украина никогда не была таким вот аналогом российской губернии. Украинский язык, как и культура, всегда был аутентичным, особым. Это всегда признавали в России, и только очень необразованные люди могут считать, что украинский язык или культура, есть продолжение русского. В общем, тут автор несёт бред.
Тем не менее, я согласен с замечанием автора, что Россия подавляла другие культуры и языки. Действительно удивительно, что в одно и тоже время Россия заявляет о себе как о стране которая объединяет несколько народов, но при этом в самой России нет того многообразия языков и культур которые есть в Германии, Бельгии, США и пр. странах, т.е. странах в которых проживает несколько народов, а не один. Я давно задаюсь вопросом, почему в России нет украинского, белорусского, армянского и прочих телевизионных телеканалов, а также газет, журналов и книг, если Россия постоянно говорит о каком-то там братстве народов? Это особенно актуально учитывая, что в России проживает около 2 миллионов украинцев. Почему же в России нет ничего украинского и белорусского, если мы типа как «братья»? Вон, в Германии есть ТВ не только на немецком, но и на турецком, английском, французском и пр. Почему в России такой тотальный запрет на другие языки и культуры?
Girzhov said it became impossible to study Ukrainian in Russia: ‘In Ukraine [at that time], there were very many schools where Russian was taught. But in Russia, there wasn’t a single school, not even a single Ukrainian class, for the two-million-person Ukrainian diaspora. In Russia, there are no places where you can speak Ukrainian; there are neither schools nor libraries [of Ukrainian literature].’
Компьютерные игры и современные российские авторы, явно могли бы переводить свои книги и игры на языки своих братьев – украинский и белорусский. Почему же это не делается? И нет, дело не в малом спросе.
Автор много времени посвящает вопросу: как же так получилось, что вначале Путин вёл себя как либерал, а потом стал законченным консерватором? Да очень просто: он всегда таким был. Только он не был консерватором, а он был человеком, которым управляет жажда денег, роскоши и власти. Все те сказки, которые он рассказывал зарубежным лидерам о важности демократии и приверженность демократическим ценностям, которые он изрекал в начале 2000-х, были сказаны только с одной целью: усыпить бдительность запада, т.е. чтобы Запад не стал вводить санкции в ответ на постепенную ликвидацию демократии в России. Если посмотреть не что говорил Путин, начиная с 2000 года, а что он делал, то можно отчётливо увидеть, что он уничтожал последние остатки свободы и ограничений президентской власти, т.е. с начала 2000-х, к уже и так суперпрезидентской конституции, он добавлял абсолютную власть монарха. Но чтобы ему в этом не помешали лидеры Западного мира, он врал им о своём приверженстве демократическим ценностям. Это была КГБэшная разводка, спецоперация. Сегодня, когда в России де-факто абсолютная монархия, уже никакие санкции её не сломают (точнее, сделать это стало намного сложнее, хотя всё ещё возможно). Но в 2000 года, был шанс, хоть и не большой.
First, this book reminded me of "Russia's Road to War with Ukraine: Invasion amidst the ashes of empires." Both authors do not paint the world in black and white colors but try to give an unbiased assessment, and such an assessment always has a kind of shade.
Secondly, after reading half of the book, I thought of giving the book a high rating, but towards the end, I realized that the book lacks the author's analysis: the book is a good compilation of other books, but not the author's own view.
The book begins with 1991 and the formation of a new Russia, the essence of which is best conveyed by Lilia Shevtsova.
Our country is building an imitation democracy… The external wrappings of democracy are present: elections, parliament and so on, but the essence is absolutely different. In the Russian case, we are dealing with … the deliberate use of democratic institutions as Potemkin villages in order to conceal traditional power arrangements … The political regime that has consolidated itself resembles the ‘bureaucratic authoritarianism’ of Latin American regimes in the 1960s and 1970s. It has all the characteristics: personalized power, bureaucratization of society, political exclusion of the populace and an active role for the secret services.
These words were relevant for describing Yeltsin's rule, and they are also relevant for describing Putin's rule. The author devotes a quarter of the book to how autocratism first emerged under Yeltsin and then rose to its full height under Putin. However, as the author writes, Putin's policy was to publicly disassociate himself from Yeltsin and his system (the same "dashing 90s" that helped make Putin and his friends what they became and what they eventually got). I do not know whether the author is writing this or not, but from my point of view, Putin cannot disassociate himself from Yeltsin in principle because he is Yeltsin's political heir and pursues the same policy that Yeltsin pursued, but on a larger scale. Let's recall at least the beginning of the SWOs in Transnistria, Abkhazia, and Chechnya, which started under Yeltsin, as well as the famous turn of Primakov's plane over the Atlantic, which started the deterioration of relations between Russia and Western countries. Putin has only deepened the conflict, but he did not start it.
However, the central theme of the book is not a review of Yeltsin-Putin politics, but, as one might guess, international relations through the prism of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. As I noted earlier, the book is a compilation of other resources, and what the author has chosen as a sources gives me conflicting feelings. However, the claims may arise not only for me alone but also for other residents of the former USSR.
While Yushchenko’s memory politics contained much historical truth, the claim that Ukraine had been specially singled-out for victimization by the Soviet state was an oversimplification. Ukrainians suffered from the collectivization of agriculture, the purges of the 1930s and the forced deportations before and after the war, but that was a fate shared by nearly all national groups.
<…>
Nationalists in the Baltic states and in Poland also instrumentalized their victim status, using the suffering inflicted on them by their Soviet occupiers as a unifying national myth, while declining to offer an honest historical assessment of their own troubled past, most notably their complicity in the Holocaust.
I have also noted this fact in many of my reviews. This is especially noticeable in the case of Prof. Serhii Plokhy, who, while mentioning the famine in Ukraine, for some reason, "forgot" to mention the famine at the same time in Soviet Russia and Kazakhstan. As for the Baltic States, everything is also clear, because politicians there like to use the image of an external enemy in opposition to which the country can be consolidated (after all, the Russian Federation is indeed a threat to the former Soviet Union).
Although the author writes about radical Ukrainian nationalists and their negative role in all this, he is correct about Ukrainian society:
They use its symbols to express defiance of the invaders who have seized their territory. But it does not mean they sympathize with the extremist ideology that lay behind it; it does not make them a nation of fascists, still less one in the grip of neo Nazis.
Many authors who write about the Russian-Ukrainian conflict also forget this, or deliberately emphasize Ukrainian nationalism, thereby practicing the Kremlin narrative.
What I don't agree with the author on is what he suggests Russians think about Ukrainians.
Ukrainians have historically been the butt of Russian jokes for their alleged stupidity and ‘funny-sounding’ language, similar to the way in which the French ridicule the Belgians or the English mock the Irish.
<…>
Ridiculing Ukrainians and the Ukrainian language, which many Russians regard as little more than a dialect used by peasants, was common in the Soviet Union.
<…>
Russians accept Moldovan, Tajik, even Belarusian independence perfectly calmly; but they won’t accept Ukrainian independence.
First of all, Ukrainian does sound funny to a Russian, as does Japanese, but what makes the author think that this somehow diminishes the Ukrainian language? Secondly, Russia has never considered the Ukrainian language to be a dialect of the Russian language. This is just the wildest nonsense of a person who understands nothing about either Russians or Ukrainians. Suffice it to look at the fact that both under tsars and secretaries-general, Ukraine has always been a separate state, although part of the Russian Empire and the USSR. That is, unlike the Novgorod region, Ukraine has never been such an analog of the Russian province. Ukrainian language, as well as its culture, has always been authentic and special. This has always been recognized in Russia, and only very uneducated people can think that the Ukrainian language or culture is a continuation of Russian. In general, the author is talking nonsense here.
Nevertheless, I agree with the author's comment that Russia suppressed other cultures and languages. It is really surprising that, at the same time, Russia claims to be a country that unites several nations, but Russia itself does not have the diversity of languages and cultures found in Germany, Belgium, the USA, etc., i.e., countries with several nations rather than one. I have long wondered why Russia has no Ukrainian, Belarusian, Armenian, and other TV channels, as well as newspapers, magazines, and books if Russia is always talking about some kind of brotherhood of nations. This is especially true considering that about 2 million Ukrainians are living in Russia. Why is there nothing Ukrainian and Belarusian in Russia, if we are "brothers"? In Germany, there is TV not only in German but also in Turkish, English, French, and so on. Why is there such a total ban on other languages and cultures in Russia?
Girzhov said it became impossible to study Ukrainian in Russia: ‘In Ukraine [at that time], there were very many schools where Russian was taught. But in Russia, there wasn’t a single school, not even a single Ukrainian class, for the two-million-person Ukrainian diaspora. In Russia, there are no places where you can speak Ukrainian; there are neither schools nor libraries [of Ukrainian literature].’
Computer games and modern Russian authors clearly could translate their books and games into the languages of their brothers - Ukrainian and Belarusian. So why isn't it being done? And no, it is not because of low demand.
The author devotes a lot of time to the question: how is it that in the beginning, Putin behaved like a liberal and then became a complete conservative? It's very simple: he has always been like that. Only he was not a conservative - he was a man ruled by the lust for money, luxury, and power. All those fairy tales he told foreign leaders about the importance of democracy and commitment to democratic values in the early 2000s were told for one purpose only: to put the West's guard down, i.e., to prevent the West from imposing sanctions in response to the gradual elimination of democracy in Russia. If you look not at what Putin has been saying since 2000, but at what he has been doing, you can clearly see that he has been destroying the last vestiges of freedom and limitations of presidential power, i.e. since the early 2000s, he has been adding the absolute power of a monarch to an already super-presidential constitution. But in order not to be thwarted in this by the leaders of the Western world, he lied to them about his commitment to democratic values. It was a KGB special operation. Today, when Russia is a de facto absolute monarchy, no sanctions can break it (or rather, it has become much harder to do so, though still possible). But, in 2000, there was a chance, though not a big one.
March 2, 2024
An extremely detailed historical analysis of Putin and the context of his decision making in regard to Russia's relations with Ukraine. Incredibly well researched and presented in a logical fashion, the book dissects the historical and contextual basis for Putin's mentality and centres around how 'the end of history' was a flawed philosophy. The book explains (not to be confused with justifying) the 'rationale' of Russia's claims to Ukraine's sovereign land and the Russian state's repeated accusations of Nazism in Ukraine. Well worth a read, if you want to under why Putin invaded Ukraine and to some extent, why it was always inevitable.
May 11, 2025
For the past 15 years, the Western world has seen Russia take a more aggressive stance toward it. For the average individual living in Europe, Russia's actions are incomprehensible, and the Russian mindset is even more mysterious. After all, had we not reached the end of history with the triumph of liberal democracy as the unquestionable model to follow?
To understand what led Russia to invade Ukraine, why Putin does what he does, why Russians seem to support him, and, more essentially, how Russia's actions are part of a deeper shift in the world, I would say there is no better book to tackle these questions. Written extremely well, each chapter is fascinating and provides a comprehensive overview of the topic it explores. The reader can then understand all the elements that make up the history between Russia and the West.
To start with, the authors explain the catastrophic 1990s that followed the downfall of the USSR. As Russia was hoping to take full advantage of the benefits of liberal democracies, it was sorely disappointed. Russia quickly returned to its millennial autocracy and became more and more defensive as more countries joined NATO. There was clearly a problem coming from the West as they tended to humiliate Russia, but the reality is that it was a very complex situation to manage. Yes, the West should have been more careful, but at the same time, how could Russia be fully trusted considering its history?
Regardless, Putin established his power and became increasingly autocratic while being more aggressive toward the West.
The authors explain how he uses tools such as propaganda or media controls to ensure his point of view is widely disseminated in public opinion. Anybody who disagrees is labeled a traitor and punished severely. Many Russians oppose him, but many others also support him. The majority are mostly silent, trying to live their lives like normal human beings. People in the West often wonder why they don't rise up, and this book offers a perfect explanation.
Regarding Putin's propaganda, the authors explore how he uses the memory of the Great Patriotic War to gather support for his regime and to prevent any criticism. The reader also gets to understand Russo-Ukrainian relations and how, prior to 2014, a Ukrainian president had done much harm due to the ethno-nationalist policies he implemented, which played right into Putin's propaganda that Russians outside of Russia were being persecuted. This provides valuable insight regarding the reasons that led to Ukraine's invasion by Russia.
Finally, the authors place the war in Ukraine into a bigger underlying issue, which is the rise of autocratic regimes in the world, while Western democracies seem to be in decline. They explain that Russia is but one player in the world who are weary of American dominance and see Western values as being inherently threatening to their societies. The authors point out that even in Europe, populism is on the rise, demonstrating an overall disenchantment with globalization, immigration, and decline. This creates severe concerns as to the direction the world is heading into. At the time of this review, Trump has shaken the global order, and the future is now more uncertain than ever. It may look like the parenthesis of liberal democracies sweeping over the world is now on the verge of being closed, and the world will revert to its old ways.
This is an eye-opener and a very informative book. I strongly recommend it to understand relations with Russia and the crisis that the world is crossing at the moment.
To understand what led Russia to invade Ukraine, why Putin does what he does, why Russians seem to support him, and, more essentially, how Russia's actions are part of a deeper shift in the world, I would say there is no better book to tackle these questions. Written extremely well, each chapter is fascinating and provides a comprehensive overview of the topic it explores. The reader can then understand all the elements that make up the history between Russia and the West.
To start with, the authors explain the catastrophic 1990s that followed the downfall of the USSR. As Russia was hoping to take full advantage of the benefits of liberal democracies, it was sorely disappointed. Russia quickly returned to its millennial autocracy and became more and more defensive as more countries joined NATO. There was clearly a problem coming from the West as they tended to humiliate Russia, but the reality is that it was a very complex situation to manage. Yes, the West should have been more careful, but at the same time, how could Russia be fully trusted considering its history?
Regardless, Putin established his power and became increasingly autocratic while being more aggressive toward the West.
The authors explain how he uses tools such as propaganda or media controls to ensure his point of view is widely disseminated in public opinion. Anybody who disagrees is labeled a traitor and punished severely. Many Russians oppose him, but many others also support him. The majority are mostly silent, trying to live their lives like normal human beings. People in the West often wonder why they don't rise up, and this book offers a perfect explanation.
Regarding Putin's propaganda, the authors explore how he uses the memory of the Great Patriotic War to gather support for his regime and to prevent any criticism. The reader also gets to understand Russo-Ukrainian relations and how, prior to 2014, a Ukrainian president had done much harm due to the ethno-nationalist policies he implemented, which played right into Putin's propaganda that Russians outside of Russia were being persecuted. This provides valuable insight regarding the reasons that led to Ukraine's invasion by Russia.
Finally, the authors place the war in Ukraine into a bigger underlying issue, which is the rise of autocratic regimes in the world, while Western democracies seem to be in decline. They explain that Russia is but one player in the world who are weary of American dominance and see Western values as being inherently threatening to their societies. The authors point out that even in Europe, populism is on the rise, demonstrating an overall disenchantment with globalization, immigration, and decline. This creates severe concerns as to the direction the world is heading into. At the time of this review, Trump has shaken the global order, and the future is now more uncertain than ever. It may look like the parenthesis of liberal democracies sweeping over the world is now on the verge of being closed, and the world will revert to its old ways.
This is an eye-opener and a very informative book. I strongly recommend it to understand relations with Russia and the crisis that the world is crossing at the moment.
May 18, 2024
A very important and useful book which never exceed Russia’s bloody war against Ukraine but does unpick the broader context and the missteps on all sides of the modern conflict as well as the long historical trajectory of the close but often fractious relationship between Russia and Ukraine. The book is heavy on quotations from other scholars and, most usefully, speeches and declarations by Putin and other actors, so that this will be a useful reference source. Perhaps most chilling was the reflection that Putin is the principal victim of his own dictatorship, trapped and with nowhere to go but onwards down the path he has forged. While the factual basis of the book is excellent and the broad coverage of perspectives very welcome, it is perhaps a little baggy in places, the individual chapters not always very tightly focused, and a clear analytical trajectory slightly overshadowed by the very extensive quotes. Even so, a very useful read which takes us far deeper than the current day to day horrors of the ongoing war of aggression.
May 22, 2024
This brilliant book is a must read for anyone who wants to understand why Russia invaded Ukraine. While the book is balanced in its assessment recognizing judgmental errors committed by the West after the collapse of the Soviet Union becoming arrogant in claiming that it was the end of history, it focuses on the corruption of Putin and his entourage and how he has never looked at the present or the future but kept looking at Russia’s history to justify his actions. The book mentions that the foreign minister of Russia, Lavrov, felt that Putin had three main advisors : Ivan the terrible, Peter the great and Catherine the great.
April 11, 2024
This book is a follow up to Martin Sixsmith’s very readable “Russia: A thousand year history of the wild east” which takes us up to 2011.
“Putin and the return of history” is about Putin’s rise to power, eventually becoming President in 1999. It was Putin who as prime minister was responsible for the destruction of Grozny in the war against Chechnya. But upon becoming President, he showed every sign of taking Russia down a path to liberal democracy. However at some point he changed his mind. This book discusses where the new Putin is taking Russia.
“Putin and the return of history” is about Putin’s rise to power, eventually becoming President in 1999. It was Putin who as prime minister was responsible for the destruction of Grozny in the war against Chechnya. But upon becoming President, he showed every sign of taking Russia down a path to liberal democracy. However at some point he changed his mind. This book discusses where the new Putin is taking Russia.
March 29, 2024
The part on Russia was actually interesting... But then I got to part about Ukraine.. And when at first it seemed that I must be misunderstanding the nuances, it soon became disturbing. Having followed the events very closely I find it strange to hear how they were not the Russian forces in Donbass since 2014 but the "unheard people of Donbass etc". After several this kind of inaccurate intrepretations of history I stopped reading.
Was expecting more from Martin Sixsmith
Was expecting more from Martin Sixsmith
February 9, 2024
Really enjoyed this. One of the few books I've read which highlighted the mistakes the Global North made in its policies towards Russia since the fall of the USSR that doesn't try to make excuses for Putin or Russia's aggression on Ukraine.
March 3, 2024
Good and salutary. What mistakes ALL our countries make, almost without exception
March 29, 2024
Published in 2023, this book gives the background to Putin’s journey from 1991 leading up to the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022
September 11, 2024
Not the most readable thing, but very good in giving a good overview of the Russian mindset and history and how it led into and relates to what is going on today, especially in Ukraine.
April 20, 2025
This was such an informative read. I learned much about the perspective of Putin and other Russians. Sixsmith (I guess there are two of them) is a very talented writer and this was always engaging.
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