What Good Is Grand Strategy?: Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush

by Hal Brands

Grand strategy is one of the most widely used and abused concepts in the foreign policy lexicon. In this important book, Hal Brands explains why grand strategy is a concept that is so alluring—and so elusive—to those who make American statecraft. He explores what grand strategy is, why it is so essential, and why it is so hard to get right amid the turbulence of global affairs and the chaos of domestic politics. At a time when "grand strategy" is very much in vogue, Brands critically appraises just how feasible that endeavor really is.Brands takes a historical approach to this subject, examining how four presidential administrations, from that of Harry S. Truman to that of George W. Bush, sought to "do" grand strategy at key inflection points in the history of modern U.S. foreign policy. As examples ranging from the early Cold War to the Reagan years to the War on Terror demonstrate, grand strategy can be an immensely rewarding undertaking—but also one that is full of potential pitfalls on the long road between conception and implementation. Brands concludes by offering valuable suggestions for how American leaders might approach the challenges of grand strategy in the years to come.

Genres: History, Politics, International Relations, Nonfiction, Political Science, American History, American

393 pages, Kindle Edition

First published December 1, 2013

Reviews

[James Murphy · Rating 5 out of 5]

I finished the book unsure whether the subject is grand strategy or the historical study of the statecraft of 4 administrations used to illustrate it. The answer is probably both.

I've always liked the definition of grand strategy, that level of planning and maneuver above that of the military, as the means used to win the peace. Brands defines it "as the intellectual architecture that gives form and structure to foreign policy." He presents the grand strategies of Truman, Nixon/Kissinger, Reagan, and George W. Bush to show its proper and improper applications. Truman and Reagan, in Brands's analysis, were successful. Truman formulated a means of confronting the west's ideological opposite and competitor for power, the Soviet Union, through containment, a policy which endured for 40 years. Reagan's policies, developed partly through good instincts, are credited with ending the Cold War in the west's favor. The prime occupation of Nixon and Kissinger was how to get America out of Vietnam. Of the 4, Brands sees only George W. Bush's policies in the Middle East as failed grand strategy.

Brands doesn't judge the policies he analyzes. He presents them and their results in the light of contemporary perspectives rather than historical evaluation. He remains above emotions which might be generated by some of the events he writes about, discussing them solely in terms of their appropriateness and effectiveness at the time. In this way such controversial subjects as the bombing of Cambodia or the defense of Korea can be examined as load-bearing components of the "architecture" of foreign policy, not as part of the public debate.

The only policies studied which get poor marks is Bush's grand strategy in the Middle East. Here Brands's even-handed treatment of his subject allows him to deliver a savage critique on the arrogant, incompetent management of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars which undid the balance of power in the region thereby validating the rise of Iran and which embroiled us in the region at a time we should have been preparing for the Chinese drive for primacy in East Asia. Of the 4 legacies left to us by these grand strategies, only that of George W. Bush can be viewed as harmful to the interests of America, and those interests are the focus of grand strategy itself

[Chad Manske · Rating 4 out of 5]

No stranger to Brands’ work, I was eager to read this 2014 volume and accompanying cases where he grades 4 presidential administrations—Truman, Nixon, Reagan and Bush 43—on their grand strategy (or lack of) planning and forethought. Some stumbled along while others imparted modest flashes of brilliance. A great read from one of the foremost national security scholars.

[W · Rating 5 out of 5]

Amazing. A pure historical approach that continuously makes compelling points about the present. Covers Truman, Kissinger/Nixon, Reagan, and Bush and their respective grand strategies.

[Joseph Stieb · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is the kind of balanced, thorough work on foreign policy I've been missing lately. Brands approaches this book as a scholar of public policy and history. He makes the case that presidents must do grand strategic thinking in order to have coherence, cost-effectiveness, and direction. He case studies 4 administrations' attempts at formulating and executing grand strategies. I particularly enjoyed his account of the Truman administration's shift from a politically-economically focused grand strategy to a more military oriented approach in 1949-1950. He convincingly argues that the Truman administration kept a consistent view of the threat's long term vulnerabilities and American goals while also adjusting for the need for military strength to shore up the Marshall Plan and the reconstruction of Western Europe. Brands' more critical accounts of the Nixon and Bush II grand strategies are fair to the challenges these presidents faced but also tough on their errors, blind spots, and miscalculations. He shows that the Bush administration, in particular, failed to balance ends and means and focused too much attention on two disastrous conflicts at the expense of other important parts of the world. He also shows that Reagan did have a grand strategy and was actually quite flexible in its execution, taking advantage of global trends moving in America's favor and bringing the Cold War to a peaceful resolution.

So what is grand strategy? A grand strategy is the logic by which a state defines its objectives and the threats to those objectives, prioritizes among them, chooses the resources it will deploy to achieve those goals, and decides how to use those resources. It is the highest level of strategic thinking. A good grand strategy provides a guide or rubric for dealing with individual crises, bilateral relations, and other decisions. It involves thinking about the goals of a society at large and developing means that meet those goals without exhausting or undermining the society. A state pursues grand strategy both in and out of times of war, in the Clausewitzean tradition.

Brands defines this term very clearly in this book. His discussion of grand strategy is useful in a policy sense and his historical case studies should impress any historian. I recommend this book for US historians, foreign policy students, political scientists, and anyone who needs to put together a lesson or lecture on the foreign policies of these administrations or of grand strategy more broadly. I'm not just praising this book because Hal Brands is on my dissertation committee (full disclosure). I'm genuinely impressed with it and I'll be referring to it in the future.

[Paul D. Miller · Rating 4 out of 5]

Chapter 1 is pretty much the best discussion of what grand strategy is and why it is necessary. The penultimate chapter is probably the most even handed assessment of the Bush administration that I've read. The rest of the book is pretty good too.

[CHAD FOSTER · Rating 4 out of 5]

I read excerpts of Hal Brand’s book for class at the National War College, and following graduation I wanted to circle back and read it in its entirety. I was not disappointed.

Brands offers several historical case studies to illustrate both the promise and pitfalls of “grand strategy.” When confronting the question of whether or not grand strategy is even possible, Brands concludes that it is - but he cautions that it is a daunting task that has frustrated even the best minds in the history of American government. The four case studies are all extremely interesting and informative, although I would have liked to see an examination of the George H.W. Bush administration because the elder Bush’s foreign policy team was, by far, the most competent and functional in the history of the United States. One of Brands’ key points is that implementation of policy is as important as conceptualization. The H.W. Bush administration is the standard bearer in balancing these two imperatives. Of course, the fact that H.W. Bush only served one term possibly factored into the decision to leave it out.

In the 7th of his eight recommendations offered at the end of the book, Brands suggests that presidents avoid treating bureaucracy as an enemy of policy. As a devoted opponent of bureaucracy, I appreciate his point that the “machine” of government is essential for implementation of policy. However, bureaucracy always trends toward self-preservation at all costs, regardless of the original purpose for which that bureaucracy was formed. In my view, one must distinguish between the necessary governmental machinery and the malignant scourge of bureaucracy - they are intricately linked but not the same thing. What we must guard against is the insidious tendency of bureaucracies to either ignore guidance from higher or to just “slow role” things in favor of its own agenda.

Another point that comes out in this book is that some, including Bill Clinton, feel that grand strategy is impossible and, therefore, leaders should just deal with each crisis as they emerge. A more absurd notion is not possible. Rigid consistency and an unchanging plan from beginning to end is certainly not possible, but to abandon the attempt at long term vision and coherence is reckless and dangerous. Doing so would be a recipe for a feckless and directionless foreign policy. Clinton’s mindset probably explains in part why the United States under his leadership failed miserably during the 1990s to formulate a new strategic paradigm after the end of the Cold War. Many of the intractable strategic threats and problems of the early 2000s until today are the direct results of the lack of vision and ad hoc policies of the 1990s.

Overall, this is a fine book. I am very glad that I circled back and read the whole thing. I look forward to reading more of Brands work.

[Mitch Watson · Rating 5 out of 5]

An explanation and endorsement of the concept of ‘grand strategy’. The author uses four US Presidents as case studies to demonstrate the utility and pitfalls of grand strategy. Highly recommended.

[Alex · Rating 4 out of 5]

Decent introduction and historical account of grand strategy after WWII. There are better books on the topic, however.

[Sam Harbst · Rating 3 out of 5]

3.5

[Mick · Rating 4 out of 5]

A good explanation of American grand strategy using four post WW2 presidential terms as examples. Short and worth your time.

[Fox Walker · Rating 4 out of 5]

4.5/5. The critique of the W. Bush administration was excellent, as was the conclusion with its takeaway principles.