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On the Psychology of Military Incompetence
The indisputable classic of military history that uncovers the shortcomings of military leadership and explains why generals fail
The Crimea, the Boer War, the Somme, Tobruk, Pearl Harbor, the Bay of these are just some of the milestones in a century of military incompetence, of costly mishaps and tragic blunders. Are these simple accidents—as the "bloody fool" theory has it—or are they inevitable?
The psychologist Norman F. Dixon argues that there is a pattern to inept generalship, and he locates this pattern within the very act of creating armies in the first place, which in his view produces a levelling down of human capability that encourages the mediocre and limits the gifted. In this light, successful generals achieve what they do despite the stultifying features of the organization to which they belong.
On the Psychology of Military Incompetence is at once an original exploration of the battles that have defined the last two centuries of human civilization and an essential guide for the next generation of military leaders.
The Crimea, the Boer War, the Somme, Tobruk, Pearl Harbor, the Bay of these are just some of the milestones in a century of military incompetence, of costly mishaps and tragic blunders. Are these simple accidents—as the "bloody fool" theory has it—or are they inevitable?
The psychologist Norman F. Dixon argues that there is a pattern to inept generalship, and he locates this pattern within the very act of creating armies in the first place, which in his view produces a levelling down of human capability that encourages the mediocre and limits the gifted. In this light, successful generals achieve what they do despite the stultifying features of the organization to which they belong.
On the Psychology of Military Incompetence is at once an original exploration of the battles that have defined the last two centuries of human civilization and an essential guide for the next generation of military leaders.
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First published January 1, 1976
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About the author
Norman F. Dixon
6 books11 followersNorman F. Dixon, M.B.E., Fellow of the British Psychological Society, is Professor Emeritus of Psychology at University College, London.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 85 reviews
May 5, 2023
As a career military officer with an academic background in psychology (bachelors & masters, no doctorate), I was excited to pick this book up. This seemed like something that was right up my alley. I was very disappointed.
A small point I want to make right off the bat—The author was a notable psychologist in his time. He was also a World War II veteran—a fact which I’ve seen some reviewers point to as evidence of the infallibility of his conclusions on all things war, military, and leadership. That is a faulty assumption. Many, I’d even say most people who are in the military do not become experts in much of anything aside from their own narrowly defined job description. I’m not dismissing his military service, by all indications he served honorably while he was in—but I don’t think his ten year stint in the military as an engineer makes him the unquestioned expert on this subject. That said, let’s move on…
The book is not surprisingly, very British centric. That’s fine, the author is a Brit himself, so the British military is the one he is most familiar with. Nothing wrong with this at all, but because of this many of the conclusions drawn by the author about the roots of military incompetence are tied specifically to aspects of British (and in particular Victorian) society that simply are not applicable outside that setting. This by itself is not crippling, but I think it bears mentioning.
A bigger problem with this book is that many of the psychological principles and theories on which the author bases a lot of his assumptions and conclusions on are outdated and have since been debunked or otherwise dismissed as incorrect. Specifically, his reliance on Freudian psychology takes a lot of wind out of his arguments. Now granted, I’m examining his work with the benefit of hindsight, but anyone considering reading this book should be aware that the science is very out of date. So be prepared to hear about how Haig’s potty training led to Paschendale and sexual prudishness contributed to failures in the Crimean War…I wish I was kidding.
The author examines the career progression of senior military leaders, but examines only their formative years, perhaps briefly looking at time spent as a cadet at a military academy (usually only for a single cherry-picked anecdote), then skips ahead 25-30 years to their time as a General. There is next to no examination of anything other than the very beginning or end of a career. In so doing he completely ignores DECADES worth of important experiences as junior and mid-grade level officers. There is almost no examination of what their experiences were as a platoon leader, the first tastes of combat, or even as an FGO commanding a battalion, and so on. This approach is utterly baffling to me. Imagine if you were profiling a professional athlete and completely skipped over their time playing in college, their time as a rookie, years spent learning the game, refining skills, gaining experience, and then looked only at their childhood and their last year before retirement. That’s what this author does, nearly without exception.
All of those frustrations aside, my single biggest issue with this book is how myopic it is. The author puts forth the hypothesis early on that military incompetence is pretty much rooted in a single trait: authoritarianism. He then spends the majority of the book completely fixated on this ONE issue. I’ve served under many different commanders…some bad, some good, some mediocre. Again, I don’t claim to be an expert on military leadership, but I’m sorry, there are SO MANY other things that make commanders incompetent. Just a few of the things I have seen in bad commanders (many of whom did not fit Dr. Dixon’s criteria for authoritarianism) include: chronic indecisiveness, lack of technical knowledge relevant to the unit’s mission, no social skills whatsoever, lack of general awareness, and above all…risk aversion/fear of looking bad to superiors (rooted in self-serving careerism). The author would probably try to tell you that these are all rooted in authoritarianism. They are not. Some people are JUST indecisive, or JUST oblivious. Does this make them incompetent? Sure. Does this also mean that they are authoritarians? No. So I don’t understand why the author chooses to fixate on this single issue for damn near the entirety of the book.
While there are some mildly interesting brief historical accounts early in the book and occasional good bits of insight, it was not enough to make it worthwhile. The rest of it just fell flat for me. Sadly, I cannot recommend this book to anyone either as a student of psychology, or as a military professional.
A small point I want to make right off the bat—The author was a notable psychologist in his time. He was also a World War II veteran—a fact which I’ve seen some reviewers point to as evidence of the infallibility of his conclusions on all things war, military, and leadership. That is a faulty assumption. Many, I’d even say most people who are in the military do not become experts in much of anything aside from their own narrowly defined job description. I’m not dismissing his military service, by all indications he served honorably while he was in—but I don’t think his ten year stint in the military as an engineer makes him the unquestioned expert on this subject. That said, let’s move on…
The book is not surprisingly, very British centric. That’s fine, the author is a Brit himself, so the British military is the one he is most familiar with. Nothing wrong with this at all, but because of this many of the conclusions drawn by the author about the roots of military incompetence are tied specifically to aspects of British (and in particular Victorian) society that simply are not applicable outside that setting. This by itself is not crippling, but I think it bears mentioning.
A bigger problem with this book is that many of the psychological principles and theories on which the author bases a lot of his assumptions and conclusions on are outdated and have since been debunked or otherwise dismissed as incorrect. Specifically, his reliance on Freudian psychology takes a lot of wind out of his arguments. Now granted, I’m examining his work with the benefit of hindsight, but anyone considering reading this book should be aware that the science is very out of date. So be prepared to hear about how Haig’s potty training led to Paschendale and sexual prudishness contributed to failures in the Crimean War…I wish I was kidding.
The author examines the career progression of senior military leaders, but examines only their formative years, perhaps briefly looking at time spent as a cadet at a military academy (usually only for a single cherry-picked anecdote), then skips ahead 25-30 years to their time as a General. There is next to no examination of anything other than the very beginning or end of a career. In so doing he completely ignores DECADES worth of important experiences as junior and mid-grade level officers. There is almost no examination of what their experiences were as a platoon leader, the first tastes of combat, or even as an FGO commanding a battalion, and so on. This approach is utterly baffling to me. Imagine if you were profiling a professional athlete and completely skipped over their time playing in college, their time as a rookie, years spent learning the game, refining skills, gaining experience, and then looked only at their childhood and their last year before retirement. That’s what this author does, nearly without exception.
All of those frustrations aside, my single biggest issue with this book is how myopic it is. The author puts forth the hypothesis early on that military incompetence is pretty much rooted in a single trait: authoritarianism. He then spends the majority of the book completely fixated on this ONE issue. I’ve served under many different commanders…some bad, some good, some mediocre. Again, I don’t claim to be an expert on military leadership, but I’m sorry, there are SO MANY other things that make commanders incompetent. Just a few of the things I have seen in bad commanders (many of whom did not fit Dr. Dixon’s criteria for authoritarianism) include: chronic indecisiveness, lack of technical knowledge relevant to the unit’s mission, no social skills whatsoever, lack of general awareness, and above all…risk aversion/fear of looking bad to superiors (rooted in self-serving careerism). The author would probably try to tell you that these are all rooted in authoritarianism. They are not. Some people are JUST indecisive, or JUST oblivious. Does this make them incompetent? Sure. Does this also mean that they are authoritarians? No. So I don’t understand why the author chooses to fixate on this single issue for damn near the entirety of the book.
While there are some mildly interesting brief historical accounts early in the book and occasional good bits of insight, it was not enough to make it worthwhile. The rest of it just fell flat for me. Sadly, I cannot recommend this book to anyone either as a student of psychology, or as a military professional.
November 1, 2017
This book covers the psychological factors that lead to horrible leadership failures. It shows how authoritarian personalities that can function during peace, but not during times of stress cause horrible tragedies. For those not interested in military affairs, this also shows up in America's current politics with the rise of authoritarianism in the right and a bit as well on the left. We can see those same types of failure in our government.
Dixon divided his work in three parts, first analysis of the worst blunders in modern military history with an emphasis on the commander's behavior. It's a bit dismal. Then he shows us how the average military establishment attracts and encourages authoritarians. Finally he contrasts and compares successful generals with the failures and the personality differences are drastic.
One critique that can be leveled is that possibly Dixon cherry picked his examples, and while that might be the case, some of the failures were monsters who cared nothing for their men's lives. Should we tolerate psychopaths as leaders for our military or government? Future preventable blunders await.
I've heard about this book in the distant past and thanks to Andrew for reminding me.
In this vein, for information about ordinary soldiers in combat I recommend Marshall's Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War.
Dixon divided his work in three parts, first analysis of the worst blunders in modern military history with an emphasis on the commander's behavior. It's a bit dismal. Then he shows us how the average military establishment attracts and encourages authoritarians. Finally he contrasts and compares successful generals with the failures and the personality differences are drastic.
One critique that can be leveled is that possibly Dixon cherry picked his examples, and while that might be the case, some of the failures were monsters who cared nothing for their men's lives. Should we tolerate psychopaths as leaders for our military or government? Future preventable blunders await.
I've heard about this book in the distant past and thanks to Andrew for reminding me.
In this vein, for information about ordinary soldiers in combat I recommend Marshall's Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War.
November 14, 2014
The book starts with short description of unnecessary carnage in WW-1, Boer war and Crimea, among others. Very helpful for someone who is not a history-buff like myself (buffs are advised by the author to skip this first part).
Then Dixon tries to psychologically explain what caused these mishaps, quoting from many sources.
For example on British in America (p.199): "The men in their scarlet uniforms and white spatterdashes, marching in columns, were the sort of target an ambush force dreams of. (...) som of the British troops broke for cover and fired from behind trees. This appalled [general] Braddock and his officers; they considered skulking behind trees both undisciplined and unsoldierly. So they drove the Tommies back into columns, where of course they were butchered." Similarly (p.292): "A plot to assassinate Hitler during the 1930s was turned down as 'not cricket'- the very words used by the Government of the day."
Dixon writes in a very pleasant, meandering and natural way. An example of a nice understatement (p.120-121): "the Navy (...) did on occasion show a surprising streak of realism, fostered perhaps by the age-old experience of being up against the hard facts of nature- and the dangerously low buoyancy of the human body".
On Montgomery and Kitchener Dixon writes (p371): "Both, when they lapsed, did so as a result of shortcomings in personality rather than intellect". And (p.394): "The theory advanced in this book (...) military incompetence cannot be attributed to dullness of intellect. (...) recurring pattern to military mishaps which defies (...) 'bloody fool' theory".
Another factor explaining incompetence: "the fear of failure rather than the hope of success tends to be the dominant motive force" (p.222).
The Afterword is also great, and sums up a lot of the content of the book. It reads in full (p.405): "Lest the reader should have doubted my qualifications to write this book, let me reassure him that I have marked authoritarian traits, a weak ego, fear of failure motivation, and no illusion about the fact that I would have made a grossly incompetent general. It takes one to know one!"
Then Dixon tries to psychologically explain what caused these mishaps, quoting from many sources.
For example on British in America (p.199): "The men in their scarlet uniforms and white spatterdashes, marching in columns, were the sort of target an ambush force dreams of. (...) som of the British troops broke for cover and fired from behind trees. This appalled [general] Braddock and his officers; they considered skulking behind trees both undisciplined and unsoldierly. So they drove the Tommies back into columns, where of course they were butchered." Similarly (p.292): "A plot to assassinate Hitler during the 1930s was turned down as 'not cricket'- the very words used by the Government of the day."
Dixon writes in a very pleasant, meandering and natural way. An example of a nice understatement (p.120-121): "the Navy (...) did on occasion show a surprising streak of realism, fostered perhaps by the age-old experience of being up against the hard facts of nature- and the dangerously low buoyancy of the human body".
On Montgomery and Kitchener Dixon writes (p371): "Both, when they lapsed, did so as a result of shortcomings in personality rather than intellect". And (p.394): "The theory advanced in this book (...) military incompetence cannot be attributed to dullness of intellect. (...) recurring pattern to military mishaps which defies (...) 'bloody fool' theory".
Another factor explaining incompetence: "the fear of failure rather than the hope of success tends to be the dominant motive force" (p.222).
The Afterword is also great, and sums up a lot of the content of the book. It reads in full (p.405): "Lest the reader should have doubted my qualifications to write this book, let me reassure him that I have marked authoritarian traits, a weak ego, fear of failure motivation, and no illusion about the fact that I would have made a grossly incompetent general. It takes one to know one!"
November 29, 2020
A good book, providing a deep analysis of the psychological conditions which effect the decision-making of military commanders. The book builds a detailed thesis based on historical observations and application of various threads of psychology. The basic premise: traits of extreme authoritarianism in a military commander, internally implanted through both emotional foundations (childhood) and immersion in military culture (professional life), can hinder the decision-making tempo and decision output needed for battlefield success. The first part of the book presents a series of case studies of military incompetence, with background characterizations of the commanders involved. The second part dives into the makeup of authoritarianism, both as a trait developed in childhood and as a characteristic endemic of military cultures. The final part presents the thesis and through a series of vignettes comparing and contrasting competent and incompetent military leadership, sometimes within the same leader. The result is a well-argued thesis that attempts to answer all criticisms. The book is a bit dated (first edition was in 1976), so I’m sure elements of the theory are probably contested by present day psychologist. But I did grasp a larger concept beyond the very Freudian foundation the author paints; a concept with more familiar language in the present. The military incompetents examined in the book lacked an ability to orient, failed to fully observe their situation, and did not structure their decision-making to the circumstances. Once you get past the sections with Freudian emphasis on demanding fathers, aloof mothers, and fixation on dirt, the book provides healthy food for thought on how a military leader can identify the issues within their inner-self which are negatively effecting their professional competence. Highly recommended for anyone pursuing a military profession and in need of internal improvements.
March 27, 2011
Dixon's study of military incompetence deepens the traditional observation that peacetime armies and wartime armies prefer (and promote) very different types of officer. Dixon seeks to give this observation an explanation a basis that is rooted in Freudian psychology. The work appears rather dated in its psychology. I doubt many modern psychologists would credit the idea that Field Marshall Haig sent thousands of men to their death on the battlefield of the Somme because his mother had been too strict during his potty training. Besides, Dixon's version of military history, while entertaining, also seems biased towards supporting the conclusions he wants to reach.
But it is nevertheless a worthwhile effort to study the character of military commanders good and bad, and even if you don't accept Dixon's interpretation, it at least makes you think about the issue. It has often been observed that few successful generals are nice, uncomplicated men. His classification into autocratic and authoritarian personalities is probably an oversimplification, but still a useful framework that can be applied for many purposes.
But it is nevertheless a worthwhile effort to study the character of military commanders good and bad, and even if you don't accept Dixon's interpretation, it at least makes you think about the issue. It has often been observed that few successful generals are nice, uncomplicated men. His classification into autocratic and authoritarian personalities is probably an oversimplification, but still a useful framework that can be applied for many purposes.
October 5, 2009
The book was interesting in that it brought a whole new approach to thinking about military leaders and where they come from. It also brought an interesting perspective about military leadership, military organizations and who they potentially attract for leaders. The author suffers from not having a deep or particularly wide understanding of war. Additionally, he is very focused on the British military which really narrows many of his conclussions. It is a topic that is worth thinking about, I am not sure though that the author really did it much justice. With that said, he is one of the first to write in this area and therefore deserves credit.
March 11, 2012
This book is worth reading on several levels. The anecdotes of military incompetence are fascinating and the reasons for failure are well linked in. More importantly anyone who works in a heirarchy (most of us?) should read this book. It explains why those most anxious to increase their status are often the least suitable for management positions. It should not only be read by the military but also in business schools. It's only the emphasis on Freudian psychology that prebents me from rating it higher.
January 10, 2016
Dixon is an engaging and entertaining curmudgeon, who takes a psychological stab at explaining military incompetence. With several years as a bomb defusal specialist in the Royal Engineers before becoming a psychiatrist, Dixon is well suited to write such a study of generalship. Taking the British-centrism and psychoanalytic perspective as features rather than bugs, this is an interesting attempt to explain and improve the serious failures of military incompetence; starting from lost battles and heavy casualties up to the possibility of a nuclear war in error.
The first part of the book is a chronicle of British military incompetence from Crimea to Operation Market Garden, amply demonstrating several key operational qualities of military incompetence: wastage of life, clinging to tradition, rejection of contrary information, underestimation of the enemy, indecisiveness combined with obstinate persistence in a failing task, failure to exploit opportunities, failure to use reconnaissance and intelligence, predilection for frontal assaults, belief in brute force over deception, scapegoating, suppression of news from the front, and a belief in mystical forces.
The second part goes into the theory of why incompetence generals exhibit these traits. Dixon offers three nested psychological explanations. The first is cognitive dissonance; believing themselves to be great captains of a great army, incompetent officers deny any facts to the contrary, leading their forces into disaster. Second, high levels of cognitive dissonance are associated with the authoritarian personality (see Adorno 1950), along with a love of pomp and pointless order that Dixon classifies as 'military bull'. Third, these are of course the daily life traits of the anal-dystonic ego, and their inability to cope with a messy and chaotic world or the emotional damage of toilet training. I believe that psychoanalyzing from history is a methodological mistake (moreso than standard psychoanalysis), and Dixon uses this argument to gore his personal enemies rather than advance a case. However the cognitive dissonance and authoritarian personality parts seem spot on.
The implicit solutions, stop promoting authoritarian assholes, reduce tradition and increase flexibility in military culture, are the weakest parts of the book. The best way to fight and survive is a poorly understood subject, and Dixon's psychological weakness might have some survival value on a daily basis, even as they lead to systemic disaster. A fun book, but one with some strange oddities.
The first part of the book is a chronicle of British military incompetence from Crimea to Operation Market Garden, amply demonstrating several key operational qualities of military incompetence: wastage of life, clinging to tradition, rejection of contrary information, underestimation of the enemy, indecisiveness combined with obstinate persistence in a failing task, failure to exploit opportunities, failure to use reconnaissance and intelligence, predilection for frontal assaults, belief in brute force over deception, scapegoating, suppression of news from the front, and a belief in mystical forces.
The second part goes into the theory of why incompetence generals exhibit these traits. Dixon offers three nested psychological explanations. The first is cognitive dissonance; believing themselves to be great captains of a great army, incompetent officers deny any facts to the contrary, leading their forces into disaster. Second, high levels of cognitive dissonance are associated with the authoritarian personality (see Adorno 1950), along with a love of pomp and pointless order that Dixon classifies as 'military bull'. Third, these are of course the daily life traits of the anal-dystonic ego, and their inability to cope with a messy and chaotic world or the emotional damage of toilet training. I believe that psychoanalyzing from history is a methodological mistake (moreso than standard psychoanalysis), and Dixon uses this argument to gore his personal enemies rather than advance a case. However the cognitive dissonance and authoritarian personality parts seem spot on.
The implicit solutions, stop promoting authoritarian assholes, reduce tradition and increase flexibility in military culture, are the weakest parts of the book. The best way to fight and survive is a poorly understood subject, and Dixon's psychological weakness might have some survival value on a daily basis, even as they lead to systemic disaster. A fun book, but one with some strange oddities.
July 21, 2025
_“If the history of military failure teaches us anything, it is that the price of incompetence is paid in blood.”_
It is a piercing exploration of one of history’s most baffling patterns: why do well-resourced, professionally structured militaries so often produce disastrous leadership at the moments that matter most? Author offers more than a catalogue of military blunders; he delivers a forensic psychological investigation—part historical analysis, part institutional critique, and part character study of failure at the highest levels of command.
Drawing from infamous episodes like the Charge of the Light Brigade, the mud-soaked slaughter of the Somme, and the fall of Singapore, Dixon uncovers a chilling consistency in the traits of failed commanders. Beneath the surface of rigid discipline lies a fragile core: a deep-seated fear of failure masked by overconfidence, a lack of self-trust cloaked in dogma, and a pathological discomfort with ambiguity. This cocktail produces indecision, reckless risk-taking, and, most disturbingly, a cold indifference to human loss when ego eclipses empathy.
Dixon argues that these traits are not incidental—they are nurtured. Military institutions have historically prized blind obedience, anti-intellectualism, and an aversion to innovation. Cadet training reinforces an ethos of toughness and conformity, suppressing reflection and rewarding aggression. Defensive strategy is seen as weakness; technology is distrusted; critical thinking is sidelined in favour of tradition and bravado. Promotions favour the loyal over the competent, the polished over the perceptive. Thus, a deeply flawed system reproduces itself through a cycle of self-affirming mediocrity.
Adding further depth, Dixon links authoritarian traits—emotional rigidity, the need for control, and resistance to doubt—to early developmental influences, particularly controlling or perfectionist mothers. Though speculative, this insight offers a striking psychological dimension: that the roots of military failure may sometimes lie in the unresolved emotional terrain of childhood.
Importantly, the book does not merely indict—it also contrasts. Dixon highlights the rare commanders who defied institutional gravity. Generals like Slim, Nelson, and Montgomery are portrayed as exceptions: thoughtful, emotionally balanced, and open to dissent. Montgomery’s success at El Alamein, for instance, stemmed not just from strategic competence, but from intellectual flexibility and an ability to filter clarity from battlefield chaos. Dixon also draws attention to the Israeli military’s decentralised command model—an example of institutional design that fosters initiative, accountability, and critical thinking, in stark contrast to the stifling orthodoxy of many Western command systems.
The conceptual cornerstone of the book is cognitive dissonance—the lengths to which institutions and individuals will go to protect cherished beliefs in the face of failure. Whether through scapegoating subordinates, suppressing bad news from the front, or rewriting the narrative of loss, militaries often choose illusion over self-examination. Dixon shows how incompetence becomes systemic not because it is invisible, but because it is institutionally tolerated, even rewarded.
Dixon’s insights apply wherever promotion is based on conformity rather than competence, where dissent is punished, and where the pursuit of personal advancement eclipses the pursuit of truth. It is an uncomfortable but essential read—especially for those entrusted with power, or those who study the systems that confer it.
March 3, 2025
As made clear in the title, Dixon describes instances of stunning military incompetence from the Crimean War through WW II and psychoanalyzes the men responsible as well as the social and institutional cultures in which they existed. The incompetencies are frankly incredible – the consequences in blood and misery staggering in scope. Dixon is British, and he confines himself to British military campaigns. The first half of the book is taken up with the case histories he has selected, briefly described and narrated with caustic humor (totally justified) throughout. The second half of the book consists of his application of psychoanalytical principles and evaluations to those case histories and the grotesquely incompetent officers responsible. He also offers indictments of the nature of military organizations and British social conventions in child rearing and the ever present, class-conscious distinctions so characteristic of British society.
The first, historical, half of the text is compelling. The Peter Principle is real – people are advanced to a point that exceeds their capabilities. It is one of those unavoidable realities of bureaucracies, with us today. The consequences can be huge. And it is not a British problem – the accomplished and well-versed historian Geoffrey Wawro wrote an introduction to this modern release of the book (originally published in 1976) in which he describes numerous American examples of incompetence and its costs from Korea through Vietnam and into Iraq and Afghanistan. It is worth reading as a stand-alone essay on its own merit.
The second half, the extensive psychoanalysis of the commanders involved, is interesting... but clinical and very narrowly focused on psychological causations and influences, less compelling in a historical sense. I think there is as much of a case to be made that the British social environment of the times was a bigger factor than Dixon allows – the disparagement of professional education, of ambition, of experience, and the condescending class distinctions reflexively enforced throughout, the honor system and aristocracy. Of course, such did not exist in the United States, and as Wawro makes clear, incompetence is not limited to British commanders. I would also like to have seen some understanding of why military organizations are authoritarian and structured as they are (Dixon deplores that) ... and an appreciation for ‘why’ they need to be that way.
The first, historical, half of the text is compelling. The Peter Principle is real – people are advanced to a point that exceeds their capabilities. It is one of those unavoidable realities of bureaucracies, with us today. The consequences can be huge. And it is not a British problem – the accomplished and well-versed historian Geoffrey Wawro wrote an introduction to this modern release of the book (originally published in 1976) in which he describes numerous American examples of incompetence and its costs from Korea through Vietnam and into Iraq and Afghanistan. It is worth reading as a stand-alone essay on its own merit.
The second half, the extensive psychoanalysis of the commanders involved, is interesting... but clinical and very narrowly focused on psychological causations and influences, less compelling in a historical sense. I think there is as much of a case to be made that the British social environment of the times was a bigger factor than Dixon allows – the disparagement of professional education, of ambition, of experience, and the condescending class distinctions reflexively enforced throughout, the honor system and aristocracy. Of course, such did not exist in the United States, and as Wawro makes clear, incompetence is not limited to British commanders. I would also like to have seen some understanding of why military organizations are authoritarian and structured as they are (Dixon deplores that) ... and an appreciation for ‘why’ they need to be that way.
June 17, 2020
The towering irony that Dixon identifies is that militaries are structurally predisposed to discourage, if not persecute, the non-conformists and unconventional thinkers who make the best military strategists. Only in rare individual cases, or unusual circumstances, does a Napoleon or a Zhukov last long enough, as a career officer, to become a senior commander.
Dixon compensates for an occasional gap or gloss, in his arguments, by being brilliantly original. Were I to highlight areas that could have been improved, one would be the curious near-absence of US military leaders, who include more than their fair share of both geniuses (e.g. Grant, Sherman and Eisenhower) and incompetents. Dixon's analysis of some interestingly ambiguous cases is also under-developed – i.e. individuals who could be considered flawed geniuses, underperformers, or overrated creations of propaganda machines – such as Montgomery and MacArthur.
Dixon compensates for an occasional gap or gloss, in his arguments, by being brilliantly original. Were I to highlight areas that could have been improved, one would be the curious near-absence of US military leaders, who include more than their fair share of both geniuses (e.g. Grant, Sherman and Eisenhower) and incompetents. Dixon's analysis of some interestingly ambiguous cases is also under-developed – i.e. individuals who could be considered flawed geniuses, underperformers, or overrated creations of propaganda machines – such as Montgomery and MacArthur.
August 28, 2024
This book has not aged well. It proffers outmoded and often debunked psychological theories to ‘explain’ military disasters, mainly from the view of the UK army and occasionally Navy, with a few other ‘case studies’ thrown in.
Internally inconsistent, confused in narrative both within chapters and across the book, and often contradictory, the author goes into voluminous detail on some areas, then draws one liner tenuous conclusions that often give a whiff of ‘see! I’m right’ (but this doesn’t necessarily accord with the ‘related’ content.
The distracting, and frankly weird obsession with toileting issues and ineffective parenting as the root cause of such things as Passchendale and Pear Harbour lends further incredulity to the theses proffered by this Freud fan-boy
Sadly, all this distracts from the few gems within. A good editor and some modernization could turn this into a reasonable, if dated, academic paper, but it never needed to be a whole book.
Read only for historical interest
Internally inconsistent, confused in narrative both within chapters and across the book, and often contradictory, the author goes into voluminous detail on some areas, then draws one liner tenuous conclusions that often give a whiff of ‘see! I’m right’ (but this doesn’t necessarily accord with the ‘related’ content.
The distracting, and frankly weird obsession with toileting issues and ineffective parenting as the root cause of such things as Passchendale and Pear Harbour lends further incredulity to the theses proffered by this Freud fan-boy
Sadly, all this distracts from the few gems within. A good editor and some modernization could turn this into a reasonable, if dated, academic paper, but it never needed to be a whole book.
Read only for historical interest
February 11, 2024
En bra idé (att fundera kring varför så många militära beslut är katastrofala) och fin, torr brittisk humor. Dock vilar de psykologiska avsnitten (som är omfattande) på psykoanalytiska teorier varför boken är daterad.
February 26, 2018
thought provoking
September 2, 2025
I enjoy the dialogue around the pitfalls of authoritarian militarism but the evidence and analysis was definitely unsound. Anecdotes of Freudian connections between childhood insecurities and the outcomes of massive battles are a shaky foundation to base a theory on, but militarism is so often shielded from criticism that I appreciate the book nonetheless. It is also quite limited in scope as it focuses on Victorian culture in the British military. I’m also conflicted by how fun it was to read about the profound incompetence of pompous, egotistical generals and how depressing the tragedy
of the lives wasted.
The best aspect of the book is the awareness of how militaries often work to maintain a sense of mystery, complexity, and honor in the eyes of a civilian population in order to defend against criticism of poor decision making. Definitely applies to us military today
of the lives wasted.
The best aspect of the book is the awareness of how militaries often work to maintain a sense of mystery, complexity, and honor in the eyes of a civilian population in order to defend against criticism of poor decision making. Definitely applies to us military today
April 28, 2022
On the Psychology of Military Incompetence takes us through the past few centuries of British military catastrophes, outlining the failures of leadership that led to several humiliating defeats and unimaginable amounts of human suffering. More than that, it deconstructs the personality traits of the generals and speculates on the psychological basis of these traits with reference to psychoanalytic theory.
Some of the ineptitude borders on the unbelievable; General Melchert in Blackadder Goes Forth (Stephen Fry’s character) seems to be far more competent than many of the commanders discussed in the book. Unlike the writers of Blackadder, however, Dixon is by no means trying to make a caricature of the generals. On the contrary, he makes every effort to give them the benefit of the doubt – highlighting, for instance, that the British navy’s continued reluctance to adopt innovations (like changing the hulls from wood to iron) saved the taxpayer great expense, albeit at the probable cost of many lives. Yet even the most ardent supporters of the military couldn’t deny the magnitude of some of the failures involved.
For that reason, the book often made me sad – the needless loss of life due to pure incompetence; the contrast between the bravery and self-sacrifice of the soldiers (like in The Charge of the Light Brigade) and the generals who blunder’d. Dixon outlines how pride, jealousy, irrationality, and a lack of accountability combine to create unimaginable amounts of suffering. For instance, a complete lack of logistics in the Siege of Kut led to mass starvation and disease among the British troops. Dixon has many classic one-liners:
- Of Lord Raglan in the Crimean War: “No one could accuse him of having a mind cluttered by any previous experience of command, for he had none“
- Of Redvers Buller in the Boer War: “An aversion to reconnaissance, coupled with a dislike of intelligence (in both senses of the word)”
- Of the Navy: “When there was talk of iron replacing wood in the construction of ships one admiral was heard to remark that the idea was preposterous. Since iron was heavier than water the ships would be bound to sink!”
In Part 2, the book threads history with psychology, exploring both the individual complexes of the inept generals and the organisational psychology that leads to collective incompetence. He argues that military organisations select for the personality traits that create poor leaders (though the traits may be beneficial for common soldiers); specifically, the military selects for Authoritarian personality types. This leads to, among other things: an inability to accept contradicting information, an urge to be in a position of power, and overall poor decision-making.
The Fall of Singapore is one of the best case studies (though this is slightly biased by my upbringing); it is a clear example of the inadequacy of the “Bloody Fool Theory”, for Percival was highly intelligent. Yet despite his IQ, he was comically inept, refusing to build North-facing defences because doing so would supposedly lower morale – so he continued to fortify the sea-facing defences...
The psychology of the book is fascinating, but it does remind me of the classic criticisms regarding the pseudoscientific nature of psychoanalysis. The author finds many examples that support his thesis and its contrapositive (i.e incompetent authoritarians and competent non-authoritarians) but seems to allocate little effort to exploring exceptions. Nevertheless, I think the book is useful even if one does not accept all the psychoanalysis: the discussion of the common traits of bad generals is incisive, even if one places little weight on Dixon’s speculation regarding the psychoanalytic origins of such behaviours. For my part, I find the psychoanalytical arguments somewhat compelling but not strong enough to be predictive.
Lastly, though long, the book is a pleasure to read. It is beautifully English, dripping with dry wit and revelling in deliberate anglo-centrism. Nobody can criticise the British like the British!
My highlights here.
Some of the ineptitude borders on the unbelievable; General Melchert in Blackadder Goes Forth (Stephen Fry’s character) seems to be far more competent than many of the commanders discussed in the book. Unlike the writers of Blackadder, however, Dixon is by no means trying to make a caricature of the generals. On the contrary, he makes every effort to give them the benefit of the doubt – highlighting, for instance, that the British navy’s continued reluctance to adopt innovations (like changing the hulls from wood to iron) saved the taxpayer great expense, albeit at the probable cost of many lives. Yet even the most ardent supporters of the military couldn’t deny the magnitude of some of the failures involved.
For that reason, the book often made me sad – the needless loss of life due to pure incompetence; the contrast between the bravery and self-sacrifice of the soldiers (like in The Charge of the Light Brigade) and the generals who blunder’d. Dixon outlines how pride, jealousy, irrationality, and a lack of accountability combine to create unimaginable amounts of suffering. For instance, a complete lack of logistics in the Siege of Kut led to mass starvation and disease among the British troops. Dixon has many classic one-liners:
- Of Lord Raglan in the Crimean War: “No one could accuse him of having a mind cluttered by any previous experience of command, for he had none“
- Of Redvers Buller in the Boer War: “An aversion to reconnaissance, coupled with a dislike of intelligence (in both senses of the word)”
- Of the Navy: “When there was talk of iron replacing wood in the construction of ships one admiral was heard to remark that the idea was preposterous. Since iron was heavier than water the ships would be bound to sink!”
In Part 2, the book threads history with psychology, exploring both the individual complexes of the inept generals and the organisational psychology that leads to collective incompetence. He argues that military organisations select for the personality traits that create poor leaders (though the traits may be beneficial for common soldiers); specifically, the military selects for Authoritarian personality types. This leads to, among other things: an inability to accept contradicting information, an urge to be in a position of power, and overall poor decision-making.
The Fall of Singapore is one of the best case studies (though this is slightly biased by my upbringing); it is a clear example of the inadequacy of the “Bloody Fool Theory”, for Percival was highly intelligent. Yet despite his IQ, he was comically inept, refusing to build North-facing defences because doing so would supposedly lower morale – so he continued to fortify the sea-facing defences...
The psychology of the book is fascinating, but it does remind me of the classic criticisms regarding the pseudoscientific nature of psychoanalysis. The author finds many examples that support his thesis and its contrapositive (i.e incompetent authoritarians and competent non-authoritarians) but seems to allocate little effort to exploring exceptions. Nevertheless, I think the book is useful even if one does not accept all the psychoanalysis: the discussion of the common traits of bad generals is incisive, even if one places little weight on Dixon’s speculation regarding the psychoanalytic origins of such behaviours. For my part, I find the psychoanalytical arguments somewhat compelling but not strong enough to be predictive.
Lastly, though long, the book is a pleasure to read. It is beautifully English, dripping with dry wit and revelling in deliberate anglo-centrism. Nobody can criticise the British like the British!
My highlights here.
March 13, 2015
What were they thinking?!
If you’ve ever wondered that while studying the Great War, you’re in good company, although it’s Norman Dixon’s contention that most of us who have done so, have come to the wrong conclusion. As a former British Army officer and an experimental psychologist, he is under no illusions about the war’s horrific cost in lives and resources, nor is he bashful about laying the blame where it belongs. But he believes there’s another way to explain and understand the characteristics and character of the men whose behavior brought about such devastation and disastrous consequences.
Like “better living through chemistry,” Dixon advocates better comprehension of history through psychology: that by examining several of the worst examples of inept generalship in a longitudinal fashion, we begin to see patterns of thought and action that can be elucidated by an appeal to psychological and psychoanalytical principles that were current when the book first went to press. (The pictured edition, which I own and upon which I base these comments, dates to 1976, and it went through five printings before being revised in the 1990s.)
Following an insightful foreword, a scintillating introduction, and a unique lesson on the nature of generalship, the First World War as a whole and two of its episodes (Cambrai and Kut) are presented in three out of the ten dismal chapters in military history (dating from Crimea to Arnhem) that make up Part One. The author treats these tragedies with the respect they deserve, while his conversational tone keeps this section of the book from becoming an abject litany of woe.
Part Two is where Doc Dixon assesses, diagnoses, and analyzes his “patients.” A diagnosis of military incompetence derives from the manifestation of these signs and symptoms (summarized in brief):
Serious wastage of human resources.
Fundamental conservatism and clinging to outworn tradition.
A tendency to reject or ignore information.
A tendency to underestimate the enemy.
Indecisiveness.
Obstinate persistence in a given task.
Failure to exploit a situation.
Failure to make adequate reconnaissance.
A predilection for frontal assaults.
Belief in brute force.
Failure to make use of surprise.
Undue readiness to find scapegoats.
Suppression or distortion of news.
Belief in mystical forces.
My professional education and training in psychology is about 15 years more recent than the date of this edition, and even since my time in practice, the discipline of psychology has gone through another revision of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual. That makes some of Dixon’s psychoanalysis a bit dated, although even at the time of writing, he readily acknowledged the existence of contrary professional opinions. But I think his assessments are sound, and that, in general (pun not intended!), he hasn’t misdiagnosed any incompetents.
Writers who are tackling historical fiction set during any of the fiascoes covered in this book will find plenty to ponder about how to portray historical characters, and Dixon’s elaboration of his fourteen points of diagnosis will be valuable for all novelists, in whatever genre, who want to develop psychologically appropriate characterizations, particularly of dysfunctional fictional leaders.
Summary: Fascinating brief analyses of the personalities who were responsible for the worst military disasters in history. Just a little bit dated, in the Freudian part (1976 edition in paperback).
If you’ve ever wondered that while studying the Great War, you’re in good company, although it’s Norman Dixon’s contention that most of us who have done so, have come to the wrong conclusion. As a former British Army officer and an experimental psychologist, he is under no illusions about the war’s horrific cost in lives and resources, nor is he bashful about laying the blame where it belongs. But he believes there’s another way to explain and understand the characteristics and character of the men whose behavior brought about such devastation and disastrous consequences.
Like “better living through chemistry,” Dixon advocates better comprehension of history through psychology: that by examining several of the worst examples of inept generalship in a longitudinal fashion, we begin to see patterns of thought and action that can be elucidated by an appeal to psychological and psychoanalytical principles that were current when the book first went to press. (The pictured edition, which I own and upon which I base these comments, dates to 1976, and it went through five printings before being revised in the 1990s.)
Following an insightful foreword, a scintillating introduction, and a unique lesson on the nature of generalship, the First World War as a whole and two of its episodes (Cambrai and Kut) are presented in three out of the ten dismal chapters in military history (dating from Crimea to Arnhem) that make up Part One. The author treats these tragedies with the respect they deserve, while his conversational tone keeps this section of the book from becoming an abject litany of woe.
Part Two is where Doc Dixon assesses, diagnoses, and analyzes his “patients.” A diagnosis of military incompetence derives from the manifestation of these signs and symptoms (summarized in brief):
Serious wastage of human resources.
Fundamental conservatism and clinging to outworn tradition.
A tendency to reject or ignore information.
A tendency to underestimate the enemy.
Indecisiveness.
Obstinate persistence in a given task.
Failure to exploit a situation.
Failure to make adequate reconnaissance.
A predilection for frontal assaults.
Belief in brute force.
Failure to make use of surprise.
Undue readiness to find scapegoats.
Suppression or distortion of news.
Belief in mystical forces.
My professional education and training in psychology is about 15 years more recent than the date of this edition, and even since my time in practice, the discipline of psychology has gone through another revision of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual. That makes some of Dixon’s psychoanalysis a bit dated, although even at the time of writing, he readily acknowledged the existence of contrary professional opinions. But I think his assessments are sound, and that, in general (pun not intended!), he hasn’t misdiagnosed any incompetents.
Writers who are tackling historical fiction set during any of the fiascoes covered in this book will find plenty to ponder about how to portray historical characters, and Dixon’s elaboration of his fourteen points of diagnosis will be valuable for all novelists, in whatever genre, who want to develop psychologically appropriate characterizations, particularly of dysfunctional fictional leaders.
Summary: Fascinating brief analyses of the personalities who were responsible for the worst military disasters in history. Just a little bit dated, in the Freudian part (1976 edition in paperback).
May 19, 2011
Interesante análisis sobre las causas psicológicas de a incompetencia militar. Comienza con una breve reseña de grandes desastres militares, enfocados en el ejército británico, y luego realiza un análisis de los puntos en común que tienen las personalidades de los generales que estaban a cargo.
La tesis del autor es que la estructura misma del mundo militar atrae y premia a personalidades autoritarias (aunque pueda parecer evidente) y que éstas tienen tal falta de amor propio que terminan siendo malos comandantes al descuidar información importante que no calza con sus expectativas, clara indiferencia con el sufrimiento de sus propios soldados, y falta de imaginación y rigidez para adaptarse a las condiciones y tecnologías.
Por oposición plantea que los mejores comandantes son aquellos no autoritarios, con un gran ego a prueba de balas (y que por ello pueden reconocer sus errores sin cargarle el muerto a nadie), y con gran capacidad de adaptación.
La primera parte del libro es muy entretenida, mientras que la segunda se vuelve algo pesada. Aún así, es un excelente ensayo sobre las características del liderazgo, aplicable no sólo al campo militar.
La tesis del autor es que la estructura misma del mundo militar atrae y premia a personalidades autoritarias (aunque pueda parecer evidente) y que éstas tienen tal falta de amor propio que terminan siendo malos comandantes al descuidar información importante que no calza con sus expectativas, clara indiferencia con el sufrimiento de sus propios soldados, y falta de imaginación y rigidez para adaptarse a las condiciones y tecnologías.
Por oposición plantea que los mejores comandantes son aquellos no autoritarios, con un gran ego a prueba de balas (y que por ello pueden reconocer sus errores sin cargarle el muerto a nadie), y con gran capacidad de adaptación.
La primera parte del libro es muy entretenida, mientras que la segunda se vuelve algo pesada. Aún así, es un excelente ensayo sobre las características del liderazgo, aplicable no sólo al campo militar.
March 13, 2013
Make no mistake, this is a psychology book. While the first half is an in-depth examination of (primarily British) military incompetence from 1850-1950, the second half is a psychological examination of the factors that could have caused such incompetence. The data and theories were still current when the book was written in the 1970s, but would not hold water today.
March 19, 2016
freudian psychoanalysis doesn't age well, and clunky, archaic terminology is just one facet of a palpably dated book. but what dixon identifies as the root causes of military incompetence are an argument against reactionary monoculture and authoritarianism in any organisation.
July 22, 2021
Good read. The book runs through the lives of various military leaders of the world to bring out instances of Military incompetence displayed duringvarious wars. However the book has a bias towards British Generals probably because the author is British.
August 30, 2017
A fascinating first third got mired by Freudian psyco-babble about anal fixation and potty training. It recovered a bit at the end though.
July 20, 2020
On The Psychology of Military Incompetence by Norman F Dixon came out in about 1975. It was a book that I probably should have read during my time in uniform (80s, 90s and early 2000s) and I decided to read it now, firstly to see what I had missed and secondly to see if there were any parallels with non-military leadership. Dixon is a psychologist who had served in the British Army during the Second World War so has sound credentials to write this book. The focus of the book is on generals, that is senior leaders who have sufficient responsibility for their decisions to have a significant and sometimes catastrophic consequences. It doesn't address leadership at the mid-rank or junior officer level, nor the NCO level. The book starts with a number of examples of military disasters that are caused by incompetence and then spends the bulk of the thesis on describing and analysing the psychological traits of the commanders who were responsible for the disasters. It finishes with examples of good generals who possesses the opposite traits of the incompetent ones and some generals who were successful, despite possessing the undesirable traits.
The key distinguishing trait that Dixon finds in incompetent generals is authoritarianism, as distinct from autocratic behaviour. After fair bit of reading, it's unsurprising the learn that generals who are dismissive of views of people from other countries, have a sycophantic relationship with their superiors, treat their subordinates harshly, and don't listen to advice that counters their previously held views, tend to make catastrophic mistakes. Given that he is British, Dixon spends some time on exploring the formative years of the generals in the British public school system and the officer training establishment, where he contends, these traits are fostered. He then makes the case that the poor generals, however intelligent, are bound to become incompetent due to the fostering of authoritarian traits. I think that there are some gaps in this thesis. Firstly, it must assume that the competent generals succeeded in spite of the formative environment that they were also exposed to. Dixon doesn't explore any quantitative analysis, that is, are the incompetent or competent in the majority? Also, it ignores the psychological development that the officer experiences in the early to mid-career. He uses case studies and examples of experiences and attitudes at school, at the officer training academy and in early career as lieutenants, but no real analysis of the 20 years that an officer serves from becoming a captain to becoming a general and how that may have influenced him. (And it's only "him" which is appropriate given that the work was published in 1975).
The psychologist in Dixon is evident in his analysis of the attitude to sex and how that influences the general in other aspects. Basically the hypothesis is that those generals with a liberal attitude to sex were less authoritarian than those with a repressive and prudish attitude to sex. I wonder how that analysis would stand up to scrutiny some 45 years later? Generals today who have a liberal attitude to sex are dismissed - Napoleon and Wellington would not last long in today's armies.
It is true that military academies are now looking more broadly than from a narrow social class for future officers, including more women. It would be interesting to see a follow-up analysis of how things have changed since 1975 and the effect that those changes have had on today's generals. if at all.
As far as making parallels to civilian leaders, it's not news that authoritarian personality types don't necessarily make great leaders despite what they themselves may think.
The key distinguishing trait that Dixon finds in incompetent generals is authoritarianism, as distinct from autocratic behaviour. After fair bit of reading, it's unsurprising the learn that generals who are dismissive of views of people from other countries, have a sycophantic relationship with their superiors, treat their subordinates harshly, and don't listen to advice that counters their previously held views, tend to make catastrophic mistakes. Given that he is British, Dixon spends some time on exploring the formative years of the generals in the British public school system and the officer training establishment, where he contends, these traits are fostered. He then makes the case that the poor generals, however intelligent, are bound to become incompetent due to the fostering of authoritarian traits. I think that there are some gaps in this thesis. Firstly, it must assume that the competent generals succeeded in spite of the formative environment that they were also exposed to. Dixon doesn't explore any quantitative analysis, that is, are the incompetent or competent in the majority? Also, it ignores the psychological development that the officer experiences in the early to mid-career. He uses case studies and examples of experiences and attitudes at school, at the officer training academy and in early career as lieutenants, but no real analysis of the 20 years that an officer serves from becoming a captain to becoming a general and how that may have influenced him. (And it's only "him" which is appropriate given that the work was published in 1975).
The psychologist in Dixon is evident in his analysis of the attitude to sex and how that influences the general in other aspects. Basically the hypothesis is that those generals with a liberal attitude to sex were less authoritarian than those with a repressive and prudish attitude to sex. I wonder how that analysis would stand up to scrutiny some 45 years later? Generals today who have a liberal attitude to sex are dismissed - Napoleon and Wellington would not last long in today's armies.
It is true that military academies are now looking more broadly than from a narrow social class for future officers, including more women. It would be interesting to see a follow-up analysis of how things have changed since 1975 and the effect that those changes have had on today's generals. if at all.
As far as making parallels to civilian leaders, it's not news that authoritarian personality types don't necessarily make great leaders despite what they themselves may think.
March 21, 2024
At times like these, here in Europe at least, questions on how battles - and wars - are won or lost are existential. What do we need, in order to save ourselves?
It's too tempting to reduce the question to just considering which side can get hold of the larger amount of energy - food and fuel for fighters and other citizens alike, energy to keep warm (or cool), and kinetic energy, in the form of ammunition, to throw at the foe.
This book is for people who want the whole story: the human factors which can make the crucial difference.
The author first takes us on a tour of some of the most well-known and notorious instances of incompetent military leadership: from the initial battles of the Crimean War, with British troops put ashore with neither shelter nor food in the teeth of ice-cold driving rain, through a century of catastrophic mismanagement, to Arnhem, where a single file of tanks on a narrow, raised road across 60 miles of boggy ground (ring any bells?) failed to reach their appointed place in the consequentially-unsuccessful Operation Market Garden.
After dismissing the popular explanation of straightforward stupidity as a factor (many of the leaders of disasters had other, successful, campaigns under their belts), we are left with, as the author puts it, 'a case to answer'.
This 'case' takes us through a menu of psychological factors common to people who are attracted to, and who are good at getting promoted in, a military environment - but which then place them in an impossible position: the very qualities that got them to the top prove a liability when it comes to leading squads of real humans to perform unnatural feats in conditions of extreme stress.
Why, then, isn't military incompetence more rife? And why, also, did the side on which Britain fought go on to win both the wars just mentioned? In some ways these two questions answer each other: we read on to find out about the psychological factors which rendered the opposition's leaders in these two conflicts even more incompetent than our own!
But isn't all this something of an insult to the majority military leaders who, under extraordinary stress and danger, nevertheless pull off incredible feats of leadership and bravery? Well, the author asks us not to take it as such. He wants, more than anything, to solve a problem, and stresses that in spite of all the psychological factors we explore with him, the incompetence is the exception rather than the rule.
As he delightfully puts it, devotees of the military should no more take offence at an analysis of one of the reasons why things can go wrong, as should "admirers of teeth complain about a book on dental caries".
And what of this constellation of factors which come together to make for incompetent military leaders? Many of them can be seen all over the world, but some are uniquely British.
These latter - although this book was written nearly half a century ago now - still plague us on these islands. And I don't mean among the military.
I'm a lifelong civilian, and a physicist rather than a psychologist or historian. And yet I found this read fascinating, and in places hauntingly familiar. Anybody, in the end, who has even the remotest interest in why they have ended up labouring under poor leadership, in Britain or elsewhere, would do well to read this book.
It's too tempting to reduce the question to just considering which side can get hold of the larger amount of energy - food and fuel for fighters and other citizens alike, energy to keep warm (or cool), and kinetic energy, in the form of ammunition, to throw at the foe.
This book is for people who want the whole story: the human factors which can make the crucial difference.
The author first takes us on a tour of some of the most well-known and notorious instances of incompetent military leadership: from the initial battles of the Crimean War, with British troops put ashore with neither shelter nor food in the teeth of ice-cold driving rain, through a century of catastrophic mismanagement, to Arnhem, where a single file of tanks on a narrow, raised road across 60 miles of boggy ground (ring any bells?) failed to reach their appointed place in the consequentially-unsuccessful Operation Market Garden.
After dismissing the popular explanation of straightforward stupidity as a factor (many of the leaders of disasters had other, successful, campaigns under their belts), we are left with, as the author puts it, 'a case to answer'.
This 'case' takes us through a menu of psychological factors common to people who are attracted to, and who are good at getting promoted in, a military environment - but which then place them in an impossible position: the very qualities that got them to the top prove a liability when it comes to leading squads of real humans to perform unnatural feats in conditions of extreme stress.
Why, then, isn't military incompetence more rife? And why, also, did the side on which Britain fought go on to win both the wars just mentioned? In some ways these two questions answer each other: we read on to find out about the psychological factors which rendered the opposition's leaders in these two conflicts even more incompetent than our own!
But isn't all this something of an insult to the majority military leaders who, under extraordinary stress and danger, nevertheless pull off incredible feats of leadership and bravery? Well, the author asks us not to take it as such. He wants, more than anything, to solve a problem, and stresses that in spite of all the psychological factors we explore with him, the incompetence is the exception rather than the rule.
As he delightfully puts it, devotees of the military should no more take offence at an analysis of one of the reasons why things can go wrong, as should "admirers of teeth complain about a book on dental caries".
And what of this constellation of factors which come together to make for incompetent military leaders? Many of them can be seen all over the world, but some are uniquely British.
These latter - although this book was written nearly half a century ago now - still plague us on these islands. And I don't mean among the military.
I'm a lifelong civilian, and a physicist rather than a psychologist or historian. And yet I found this read fascinating, and in places hauntingly familiar. Anybody, in the end, who has even the remotest interest in why they have ended up labouring under poor leadership, in Britain or elsewhere, would do well to read this book.
June 12, 2025
"On Psychology of Military Incompetence" by Norman F Dixon:
The book jacket provides a brief overview of the author's background. Dixon was awarded the MBE (Most Excellent Order of the British Empire) for his military service and held positions as Reader in Psychology at University College London and Fellow of the British Psychological Society. As expected, the book focuses on psychology rather than military history and has a British-centric perspective.
Overview of the Book
I hadn't read many books on military history before this one, but it was mentioned in Niall Ferguson's book "Doom" in the chapter on the psychology of political incompetence. The book is divided into three parts. The first part briefly recounts various 20th-century wars, including the Crimean and Boer Wars, as well as some battles from World War I and II. The main focus is on the psychological aspects of the generals and commanders involved, exploring how their personalities and shortcomings led to significant loss of life and unnecessary suffering.
Analysis of Military Incompetence
In the second part of the book, Dixon analyzes and theorizes about the incompetence of military commanders, attributing it to their background, early life, and upbringing. He doesn't portray military generals as foolish or stupid but rather examines how certain personality traits, such as authoritarianism, can lead to poor decision-making. Dixon argues that the culture and character of the army, particularly the British army, are rooted in old-school snobbishness, gender bias, and a class system. He introduces the concept of "The Cult of Muscular Christianity" and highlights the difference between authoritarian and autocratic leadership styles.
Authoritarian vs. Autocratic Leadership
Dixon distinguishes between authoritarian leaders, who discourage questioning and independent thinking, and autocratic leaders, who are more competent and effective. He notes that authoritarian leaders are often driven by fear of failure rather than hope for success. According to Dixon, "the nature of military organizations is such as to attract, favor, and promote people who might be expected to lie towards the authoritarian end of a personality continuum." He provides examples of incompetent commanders, including Lord Raglan and General Buller, and contrasts them with competent commanders like Field Marshal Montgomery and Admiral Lord Nelson.
Conclusion and Takeaways
In the third part of the book, Dixon explains why, despite the incompetence of some generals, battles were still won, and his hypothesis about good commanders holds true. He examines exceptions to the rule and provides detailed descriptions of the commanders he admires. The book's key takeaway is that it's not a military history book but rather a study on psychology and leadership, with lessons that can be applied to business and politics. I would give it four stars and recommend it, despite being an older book, as its themes remain relevant today, especially in the context of rising authoritarianism.
Critique and Recommendations
Some drawbacks of the book include the use of French terms and obscure old English words, which may require readers to have some background knowledge of military history. Nevertheless, Dixon's work remains a valuable contribution to the study of military psychology and leadership.
April 16, 2019
Intriguing thesis, given its unconventional premise (i.e. there does seem to be some antipathy towards military failures). I had many issues with this book - namely it being the most disorganized read I have ever read. Possibly the egregious error of the editor. The content is broken into 3 parts: history, psychology, and then more historical examples...? Instead of gradually tying together the threads of his argument as the book progressed, ideas began unraveling. Take for example the chapter called "the worst and the best". He subtitles specific individuals such as Marshal Zhukov (who hasn't been discussed until this point, 80% in) and then rambles on about MacArthur and the Israeli Army? Where are we going with this? Up to the very conclusion, he repeatedly brought up more random examples rather than reinforcing what he had previously stated. It was actually infuriating that his argument was all over the place. It discredited his thesis rather than supported it.
I have no idea who this author thought his intended audience was, but I suspect it was a select group of British historians. He blatantly states an assumption in the introduction that "readers will be familiar with the events" - but I am not! I am an American, with military experience and NOT a historical background. He uses acronyms without spelling them out at least once, last names without full titles and not a whit of a sentence with a generic summary. I tired quickly of looking up specific individuals.
I will say that his points about military incompetence are spot on and I have seen some personal examples of similar behavior from my time in the military. Unfortunate that I was so infuriated with his lack of logical progression in argument and assumption about his reader. This book has the potential to be a great resource, if only the author opened his mind to the possibility and didn't remain so narrowly focused on a British audience of sorts.
I have no idea who this author thought his intended audience was, but I suspect it was a select group of British historians. He blatantly states an assumption in the introduction that "readers will be familiar with the events" - but I am not! I am an American, with military experience and NOT a historical background. He uses acronyms without spelling them out at least once, last names without full titles and not a whit of a sentence with a generic summary. I tired quickly of looking up specific individuals.
I will say that his points about military incompetence are spot on and I have seen some personal examples of similar behavior from my time in the military. Unfortunate that I was so infuriated with his lack of logical progression in argument and assumption about his reader. This book has the potential to be a great resource, if only the author opened his mind to the possibility and didn't remain so narrowly focused on a British audience of sorts.
May 12, 2019
Este libro intenta explicar cómo es posible que dentro de un mundo de la máxima exigencia y con la máxima responsabilidad como es el militar, se produzcan casos tan flagrantes como los que describe de incompetencia.
El libro comienza presentando algunos casos concretos como ejemplo, que ya le dejan a uno bastante desconcertado ya que supusieron en su momento la absurda muerte o graves heridas de miles de soldados que merecieron que su entrega hubiera tenido mayor aprovechamiento.
Después intenta describir las características que señalan al militar incompetente, y cómo el propio sistema militar atrae a personas con esas características. Dixon llega a la conclusión de que las cualidades negativas que generan incompetencia son más de personalidad que de capacidad. Distingue entre personalidades autócratas y autoritarias, y señala las características de la vida militar que casan más fuertemente con esas personalidades, y llega a la conclusión de que son las personalidades autócratas las que pueden llegar a manifestar incompetencia, y describe las características fundamentales de esa incompetencia y cómo los autócratas la producen.
Pese a que que muchos de los argumentos presentados por Dixon provienen de la teoría psicoanalítica, son bastante sólidos y están fundamentados.
Dixon tiene un sentido del humor que se agradece a lo largo de las más de cuatrocientas páginas del libro, y expone su punto de vista con mucho rigor, que también se agradece.
Por supuesto, de este libro se pueden sacar lecturas que van más allá del mundo militar.
El libro comienza presentando algunos casos concretos como ejemplo, que ya le dejan a uno bastante desconcertado ya que supusieron en su momento la absurda muerte o graves heridas de miles de soldados que merecieron que su entrega hubiera tenido mayor aprovechamiento.
Después intenta describir las características que señalan al militar incompetente, y cómo el propio sistema militar atrae a personas con esas características. Dixon llega a la conclusión de que las cualidades negativas que generan incompetencia son más de personalidad que de capacidad. Distingue entre personalidades autócratas y autoritarias, y señala las características de la vida militar que casan más fuertemente con esas personalidades, y llega a la conclusión de que son las personalidades autócratas las que pueden llegar a manifestar incompetencia, y describe las características fundamentales de esa incompetencia y cómo los autócratas la producen.
Pese a que que muchos de los argumentos presentados por Dixon provienen de la teoría psicoanalítica, son bastante sólidos y están fundamentados.
Dixon tiene un sentido del humor que se agradece a lo largo de las más de cuatrocientas páginas del libro, y expone su punto de vista con mucho rigor, que también se agradece.
Por supuesto, de este libro se pueden sacar lecturas que van más allá del mundo militar.
March 10, 2020
An analysis of the personalities of generals (mostly british) from the crimean through second world wars. author's thesis is that a certain type of personality is naturally attracted to a military career and then promoted through the organization by the manifestations of that same personality, which then ultimately leads to a certain and predictable type of ineptitude at the highest levels of leadership.
the author is at pains to indicate that he is not judging these individuals, but only trying to show that it is not a lack of intelligence that leads to military disasters, but an inevitable result of the military culture that arises to control and direct intra-species violence. it is, however, quite clear that he despises militarism and the people either love it or happen to excel at it.
although i enjoyed the historical perspective of the boer and other wars, i got tired of hearing that all military men were compensating for their fragile egos and fear of being thought unmanly. there is a certain amount of this in all walks of life, in business and academia and of course the military. that people of such backgrounds become the leaders of large armies is not a mystery, it's simple statistics.
not a huge fan of the military macho man myself, but i hardly think this book is exposing something new, even if General Haig did have a difficult relationship with his mother.
Also, the sentence construction: "it is perhaps not surprising" was used 3 times per page. enough already.
the author is at pains to indicate that he is not judging these individuals, but only trying to show that it is not a lack of intelligence that leads to military disasters, but an inevitable result of the military culture that arises to control and direct intra-species violence. it is, however, quite clear that he despises militarism and the people either love it or happen to excel at it.
although i enjoyed the historical perspective of the boer and other wars, i got tired of hearing that all military men were compensating for their fragile egos and fear of being thought unmanly. there is a certain amount of this in all walks of life, in business and academia and of course the military. that people of such backgrounds become the leaders of large armies is not a mystery, it's simple statistics.
not a huge fan of the military macho man myself, but i hardly think this book is exposing something new, even if General Haig did have a difficult relationship with his mother.
Also, the sentence construction: "it is perhaps not surprising" was used 3 times per page. enough already.
March 9, 2019
Reading this book is like reading one of Plato's cosmologies, such as the spectacularly unreadable Timaeus. Plato starts his cosmological monographs with unfounded conjectures about the structure of the universe, and then proceeds to expound nonsense for hundreds of pages.
Dixon doesn't claim to know how the universe works; only how the human mind works: according to Freudian psychology. He then proceeds to waste a few hundred pages to elaborate on the consequences of this pseudo-religious doctrine. The conclusion of all that conjecture seems to be that an unhappy childhood produces an authoritarian personality almost determined to make incompetent decisions once elevated to the exalted ranks where there's no superior authority to counter all the adverse personality traits of such a person.
Mired in Freudian 'analysis' the text speculates on childhood traumas of more than one general, hitting (in my opinion) an all-time low when it suggests a connection between the cesspool of Passchendaele with the anal personality traits of general Haig.
The first hundred pages gives summaries of various British military disasters, such as Balaclava, Kut, and Arnhem, and while these are hardly enlightening if you don't already know your history, they're at least readable, saving this book from a one-star rating.
Dixon doesn't claim to know how the universe works; only how the human mind works: according to Freudian psychology. He then proceeds to waste a few hundred pages to elaborate on the consequences of this pseudo-religious doctrine. The conclusion of all that conjecture seems to be that an unhappy childhood produces an authoritarian personality almost determined to make incompetent decisions once elevated to the exalted ranks where there's no superior authority to counter all the adverse personality traits of such a person.
Mired in Freudian 'analysis' the text speculates on childhood traumas of more than one general, hitting (in my opinion) an all-time low when it suggests a connection between the cesspool of Passchendaele with the anal personality traits of general Haig.
The first hundred pages gives summaries of various British military disasters, such as Balaclava, Kut, and Arnhem, and while these are hardly enlightening if you don't already know your history, they're at least readable, saving this book from a one-star rating.
February 12, 2025
If a black and white assessment of military performance leveraging behaviorist psychological constructs is what you're looking for, this is a great book for you.
This book is focused on examples from the two centuries prior to the book being authored, and mostly within Great Britain. Limiting the lessons (e.g. effeminate concerns, rich/politically connected) to that time frame seems fitting, while making the book mostly inapplicable.
In the first 80% of the book he asserts clear causation of incompetence while lightly touching how these assertions align or fail to with "competent" military leadership (a few fleeting statements of Montgomery and Nelson etc...). From there he does shift over to competent leadership presenting a few examples in an extremely favorable light. Then he quickly shifts back to the "incompetent" leadership. The last few pages of chapter 28 were well written and insightful, a lovely balanced change of pace. The last chapter is the best chapter. This chapter, though it has some faults (e.g. Tet offensive had 500 us to 120k North Vietnamese casualties), it is mostly worth reading.
The book comes off as the reaction of an intelligent soldier, who had an axe to grind against the military and used his second career to grind away. Personally, it comes across that the author's bias makes me pity the poor fellow, it seems like he had a very rough time of it. I hope writing this book was cathartic for him.
This book is focused on examples from the two centuries prior to the book being authored, and mostly within Great Britain. Limiting the lessons (e.g. effeminate concerns, rich/politically connected) to that time frame seems fitting, while making the book mostly inapplicable.
In the first 80% of the book he asserts clear causation of incompetence while lightly touching how these assertions align or fail to with "competent" military leadership (a few fleeting statements of Montgomery and Nelson etc...). From there he does shift over to competent leadership presenting a few examples in an extremely favorable light. Then he quickly shifts back to the "incompetent" leadership. The last few pages of chapter 28 were well written and insightful, a lovely balanced change of pace. The last chapter is the best chapter. This chapter, though it has some faults (e.g. Tet offensive had 500 us to 120k North Vietnamese casualties), it is mostly worth reading.
The book comes off as the reaction of an intelligent soldier, who had an axe to grind against the military and used his second career to grind away. Personally, it comes across that the author's bias makes me pity the poor fellow, it seems like he had a very rough time of it. I hope writing this book was cathartic for him.
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