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The Lost History of 1914: How the Great War Was Not Inevitable
Now in paperback, a brilliant history of the year it began―"a year forever memorable," in Woodrow Wilson's words―that examines the war and its causes through new eyes.
400 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2012
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July 1, 2012
Most people learn that the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria was the spark that ignited World War I, and that, because of interlocking military alliances, the war was inevitable even without that specific immediate cause. However, in The Lost History of 1914, Jack Beatty challenges the theory of the war’s inevitability. Countries are not monolithic, and Beatty shows that there were statesmen around in 1914 who might have avoided war. He writes, “Regarding war as improbable…leaders took risks that made it possible. Armageddon happened because men believed it could not happen.”
Beatty describes the situation in each of the principal belligerent states in the years immediately prior to the outbreak of the war. In each country, an event or events that “almost happened” might have been sufficient to keep them out of the war.
Pre-war Germany could be characterized as an army with a state rather than a state with an army. This status was exacerbated in 1912 when the Social Democrats, an anti-militarist party, made a political misjudgment, allowing for militaristic parties to build a majority coalition.
In Russia, some officials wanted peace at any cost, since they understood that a war would undoubtedly bring about a revolution of the country’s oppressed classes. Unfortunately, Germany was aware of Russia’s dilemma and sought to exploit it, sending a German general to command a Turkish army corps based in Constantinople. Russia became fearful that Germany might close the Turkish Straits to her, cutting off her only all-season sea route. Thus, fear of encirclement motivated Russia to mobilize against Austria after the assassination despite the risk of domestic revolution. (As Henry Morganthau later observed, “In the perspective of history, [the Bolshevik Revolution] may well appear as nothing more than the economic consequences of the closing of the Straits.”)
In 1914, it was actually England that may have been the country in Europe closest to revolution. The issue of Home Rule for Ireland had become extremely contentious. Beatty opines that the Ulster crisis was a contributing cause of the war rather than a barrier because Germany and Austria believed England would be unable to fight a continental war, being so close to civil war. In the event, the Irish mostly rallied around the Crown in 1914. Nevertheless, even when faced with severe manpower shortages, the British never drafted Irish soldiers because they were thought to be unreliable. Indeed, in1916, the Catholic southern counties of Ireland erupted in the Easter Uprising.
The United States entered the war only in 1917, and did so by a circuitous route related to the Mexican Revolution. Because of America’s incompetence against Pancho Villa, Germany concluded that the American military would not pose a threat. In 1917, German ambassador Arthur Zimmerman tried to get Mexico to enter WWI on the side of Germany, offering them New Mexico, Arizona, and California if the Central Powers were successful. British intelligence intercepted the offer in the notorious Zimmerman Telegram and disclosed its contents to the Americans. This provocation proved too much for American public opinion, and the U.S. entered the war on the side of the Triple Entente.
In France, Joseph Caillaux, the leader of the Radical party, favored a policy of conciliation with Germany. In 1914 he was Minister of Finance and was expected to become Prime Minister shortly but for a scandal involving his wife. Had he been premier at the time of the assassination, Beatty argues that he would have sought peace with the Central Powers, and based on his previous record, he might have been successful at avoiding war.
As for Austria-Hungary, Beatty contends that if Franz Ferdinand had not been assassinated, he would have become Emperor very shortly (Emperor Francis Joseph was 84 in 1914). Since he was more concerned with controlling Hungary than with warring against Serbia, his domestic policies would have prevented Austria-Hungary from initiating a continental war.
Beatty does not limit his analysis to events that might have precluded the war—he also describes other aspects of the era that have been neglected by historians or, as he calls them, "lost." But for the most part, he is concerned with explicating the causes for WWI.
Beatty is contrasting (though not explicitly rebutting) David Fromkin’s thesis in the masterful book Europe’s Last Summer: Who Started the Great War in 1914? Fromkin argues that the assassination of Franz Ferdinand provided the pretext the major powers needed to proceed with the Great War they all wanted. (As an example, he notes that Vienna started drafting the memorandum-plan to crush Serbia two weeks BEFORE Sarajevo.) Fromkin places especial blame on Germany's General Helmuth von Moltke, but contends that all the Powers sought war. As Teddy Roosevelt said in 1897, "No triumph of peace is quite so great as the supreme triumphs of war."
Adam Hochschild also addresses the War’s causes in his latest book, To End All Wars. His focus is more on Zeitgeist, contending that the impetus to war was built on multiple illusions: (1) wars are quick and easy; (2) you will shoot at the enemy but they will not shoot at you; and (3) weaponry doesn’t change or advance: whatever helped you in the last war will help you in the current one. These illusions were probably shared by the belligerents of WWI. Beatty doesn’t address these issues, being more concerned with specific people and events that proved definitive.
Evaluation: Beatty makes an excellent contribution to a growing body of literature asserting that the hecatomb of WWI might never have occurred but for a few little-known flips of history’s coins. This stimulating book shows how contingent earth shaking events can be.
Beatty describes the situation in each of the principal belligerent states in the years immediately prior to the outbreak of the war. In each country, an event or events that “almost happened” might have been sufficient to keep them out of the war.
Pre-war Germany could be characterized as an army with a state rather than a state with an army. This status was exacerbated in 1912 when the Social Democrats, an anti-militarist party, made a political misjudgment, allowing for militaristic parties to build a majority coalition.
In Russia, some officials wanted peace at any cost, since they understood that a war would undoubtedly bring about a revolution of the country’s oppressed classes. Unfortunately, Germany was aware of Russia’s dilemma and sought to exploit it, sending a German general to command a Turkish army corps based in Constantinople. Russia became fearful that Germany might close the Turkish Straits to her, cutting off her only all-season sea route. Thus, fear of encirclement motivated Russia to mobilize against Austria after the assassination despite the risk of domestic revolution. (As Henry Morganthau later observed, “In the perspective of history, [the Bolshevik Revolution] may well appear as nothing more than the economic consequences of the closing of the Straits.”)
In 1914, it was actually England that may have been the country in Europe closest to revolution. The issue of Home Rule for Ireland had become extremely contentious. Beatty opines that the Ulster crisis was a contributing cause of the war rather than a barrier because Germany and Austria believed England would be unable to fight a continental war, being so close to civil war. In the event, the Irish mostly rallied around the Crown in 1914. Nevertheless, even when faced with severe manpower shortages, the British never drafted Irish soldiers because they were thought to be unreliable. Indeed, in1916, the Catholic southern counties of Ireland erupted in the Easter Uprising.
The United States entered the war only in 1917, and did so by a circuitous route related to the Mexican Revolution. Because of America’s incompetence against Pancho Villa, Germany concluded that the American military would not pose a threat. In 1917, German ambassador Arthur Zimmerman tried to get Mexico to enter WWI on the side of Germany, offering them New Mexico, Arizona, and California if the Central Powers were successful. British intelligence intercepted the offer in the notorious Zimmerman Telegram and disclosed its contents to the Americans. This provocation proved too much for American public opinion, and the U.S. entered the war on the side of the Triple Entente.
In France, Joseph Caillaux, the leader of the Radical party, favored a policy of conciliation with Germany. In 1914 he was Minister of Finance and was expected to become Prime Minister shortly but for a scandal involving his wife. Had he been premier at the time of the assassination, Beatty argues that he would have sought peace with the Central Powers, and based on his previous record, he might have been successful at avoiding war.
As for Austria-Hungary, Beatty contends that if Franz Ferdinand had not been assassinated, he would have become Emperor very shortly (Emperor Francis Joseph was 84 in 1914). Since he was more concerned with controlling Hungary than with warring against Serbia, his domestic policies would have prevented Austria-Hungary from initiating a continental war.
Beatty does not limit his analysis to events that might have precluded the war—he also describes other aspects of the era that have been neglected by historians or, as he calls them, "lost." But for the most part, he is concerned with explicating the causes for WWI.
Beatty is contrasting (though not explicitly rebutting) David Fromkin’s thesis in the masterful book Europe’s Last Summer: Who Started the Great War in 1914? Fromkin argues that the assassination of Franz Ferdinand provided the pretext the major powers needed to proceed with the Great War they all wanted. (As an example, he notes that Vienna started drafting the memorandum-plan to crush Serbia two weeks BEFORE Sarajevo.) Fromkin places especial blame on Germany's General Helmuth von Moltke, but contends that all the Powers sought war. As Teddy Roosevelt said in 1897, "No triumph of peace is quite so great as the supreme triumphs of war."
Adam Hochschild also addresses the War’s causes in his latest book, To End All Wars. His focus is more on Zeitgeist, contending that the impetus to war was built on multiple illusions: (1) wars are quick and easy; (2) you will shoot at the enemy but they will not shoot at you; and (3) weaponry doesn’t change or advance: whatever helped you in the last war will help you in the current one. These illusions were probably shared by the belligerents of WWI. Beatty doesn’t address these issues, being more concerned with specific people and events that proved definitive.
Evaluation: Beatty makes an excellent contribution to a growing body of literature asserting that the hecatomb of WWI might never have occurred but for a few little-known flips of history’s coins. This stimulating book shows how contingent earth shaking events can be.
February 10, 2024
I really enjoyed this book. Beatty's writing moves easily, and the photos, propaganda pieces, and artwork really amplify the perspectives of WW1.
This should definitely not be the first book you read about WW1. Beatty deconstructs many of the catch phrases and conventional wisdom around the war, demonstrating why there is always more nuance; why some "common knowledge" is just inaccurate, are vestiges of propaganda. Going into this book, I suspected it to have a revisionist flavor, and it does, at times. More often though, Beatty brings clarification. Often comparing the claims of soldiers, generals, and politicians, with the wider, more informed view that history lends.
This should definitely not be the first book you read about WW1. Beatty deconstructs many of the catch phrases and conventional wisdom around the war, demonstrating why there is always more nuance; why some "common knowledge" is just inaccurate, are vestiges of propaganda. Going into this book, I suspected it to have a revisionist flavor, and it does, at times. More often though, Beatty brings clarification. Often comparing the claims of soldiers, generals, and politicians, with the wider, more informed view that history lends.
July 3, 2012
We never studied WWI when I was in high school and since I wasn't a history major in college, I never learned anything about it. Once I started reading and studying the labor movement at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century in America, I got interested. Of course, there's All Quiet on the Western Frontier for the soldier's point of view and there are numerous histories as well. I saw a review on this one and decided to pick it up. I love it! It deals more with the psychology of the age than just the facts. Germany was fighting itself: two parties, the liberal (government by the people as in democracy) and the conservative (government by the kaiser and the army) were in conflict. Adding to this was the growing labor movement, exacerbated by the fact that Russia had just gone through a revolution and was exporting socialists to Germany. Russia, of course, had her own problems with the authority of the Tsar - remember, this is BEFORE the soviet revolution. Although the Tsar had made concessions to stay in power, his attitude had not changed and he managed to subvert many of the changes he had agreed to. All the while the United States was involved in the Mexican Revolution which had repercussions that contradicted the inevitability of her entrance into the war. One thing I really didn't like. The author kept using "sunk" instead of "sank." That just rattled my cage. Also (not the author's fault) someone didn't proof the Introduction well and there is a mixup in paragraphs: one paragraph apparently became a combination of two different ones which actually appear after the combined one. All in all, Beatty shows that there was no reason that WWI was inevitable, even after the assassination of Franz Ferdinand. Countries made decisions that they could very well have reneged on or changed that would have kept the war from happening. As we know, they all made the wrong choices.
January 12, 2018
Today 1914 is remembered mostly if not only for the beginning of the First World War and the events leading directly up to it. Everything else, including a number of circumstances that might in fact have prevented the outbreak of the war had things gone just a little bit differently, is largely forgotten, having been overshadowed by the carnage that followed. Beatty offers up a number of these lesser known pieces of history while simultaneously taking a fresh look at events precipitating and occuring during the Great War. An interesting read, though occasionally a little dry and longwinded.
August 9, 2016
The illustrations are significant inclusions.
Acknowledgments were given to those who helped edit and provide clarity "for improving, aggregately, nearly every page of this book". It's scary to think what the condition of the text would have been without these folks because there were so many edits and needs for clarity that escaped them to make the book almost unreadable/annoying reading at times. For example:
Page 57
Speaking of General V. A. Sukhomlinov, Russian minister of war: "In Sazonov's (Russian foreign minister) view, "It was very difficult to make him work, but to get him to speak the truth was well-nigh impossible."
Page 62
Again speaking of General V. A. Sukhomlinov: 'Later, in 1917, the Rusian Provisional Government in Russia's first "show trial," convicted him of treasonable incompetence, corruption and for having alleged Austrian spies as friends.'
Page 89
the King (of England) warned (Sir Edward) Grey (the English foreign secretary) of the "constitutional gravity" of the French military talks (Grey was having) -- talks that amounted to planning for a joint Anglo-French defense of France against a German attack, talks that were not approved by the cabinet or Parliament, talks whose import Grey reportedly kept from (Prime Minister) Asquith for three years. When they came partially to light in 1911 there was a blowup in the cabinet. Liberals in and out of parliment scored Grey for his "severe economy of truth".
Page 249
"The cult of the offensive belongs to 19194's (trust the author meant 1914) lost history.
Memorable passages:
Page 129
Throughout the twentieth century and with ideologically charged vigor during the Cold War, the United States acted as a counterrevolutionary power in Latin American, intervening either directly or by proxy against Marxist-Leninist revolutions (Cuba, Nicaragua), leftist guerrilla movements (El Salvador), ad democratically elected socialist governments (Guatemala, Chile). Brazilian generals, Panamanian, Paraguayan, and Chilean strongmen found friends in Washington. The apocryphal quip attributed to Franklin D. Roosevelt, that Nicaraguan strongman Anastasio Somoza was an SOB but “our SOB,” captured the cynical maxim guiding the conduct of a succession of American presidents toward right-wing dictators who plundered their people but protected U. S. economic interests.
Page 140
A graveyard for bandits, Chihuahua was a garden for rustlers.
Page 156
Millions marched to war in 1914 and a million died, but only in Mexico for justice and dignity. The great French socialist Jean Jaures assigned different moral weights to the violence of war and revolution: “In the Europe of today, it is not by means of international war that the work of freedom and justice will be accomplished . . . if we have a horror of war, it is not all because of a weak an enervated sentimentality. The revolutionary resigns himself to human suffering when it is the necessary condition of a great human advancement, when by it the oppressed and exploited rise up to freedom."
That describes one face of Mexico’s violence in 1914 and suggests why if frightened the ruling classes of Europe and why they wanted “order” restored in Mexico.
Page 167
John Reed asked readers of the New York Times to imagine the rage felt by the people of Veracruz [Mexico] seeing their streets shot up “because some foreign businessmen that had enriched were not satisfied and wanted it all.” John Mason Hart, a leading scholar of the Mexican Revolution, shares that view: Wilson intervened to protect U. S. Businesses in Mexico, which had prospered in the Dias years to the point where “Mexico has passed into the hands of foreign economic interests,” of which American railroad, mining, and oil companies represented the largest share.
Page 170
The defeat of Villa and Zapata ended Mexico’s peasant revolution. As from time immemorial in Mexico, the revolutionary elites betrayed the peasants after riding them into power. They had “forced their way into a history that had previously unfolded above them,” and then history closed over them again an over Woodrow Wilson’s solidarity with them.
Page 172
“as clear as a knife in the back and near as next door”
Page 175
At a Bosnian railway station in 1910 a would-be assassin armed with a revolver was close enough to touch the emperor; but in a tragedy for humanity, he lost his nerve in the royal presence.
Page 236
The bad behavior of the all concerned in the Caillaux affair presented an irresistible teaching moment for nationalist alarmed over the crisis of the French family. …I took my head in my hands, certain that the case represents nothing less than the trial of our secular society, of the rotten and immoral existence that the republic has inflicted on France,” one right-wing journalist lamented. Nationalist believed the fate of France was tied to the family, “the essential foundation of the life of a nation and its necessary expansion.” Yet the French family was notoriously barren (in 189t more deaths than births were recorded). Flame fell on familiar targets.
Nationalist arraigned “Anglo-Saxon cultural imperialism,” carrier of the “plague of feminism”. As early as the 1880’s, a professor at the Paris Faculty of Medicine has disparaged “voluntary sterility” – birth control.
Page 264
Manning the trenches in February found 1,705 soldiers killed, 1,147 missing, and 30,381 wounded. Attaching in March the figures were 31,000 killed, 19,680 wounded, 180,898 missing.
Page 265
Reference to Christmas in the Trenches.
Page 272 - 274
The Daily Chronicle’s man at the front, Philip Gibbs . . . Patriotism did not require “conscious falsehood”, only selective truth, the leaving out of “horrors.”
The correspondents had to conform to the war policy of their papers. At the Times that was “to increase the flow of recruits . . . an aim that would get little help from accounts of what happened to recruits once they became soldiers,” the paper wrote in its official history. The editors and war correspondents believed they served the country but their real master was the war.
Gibbs had to be broken to the war’s service. When he tried to expose the Loos scandal a military censor, acting "in defence [sic] of the High Command and its tragic blundering,” cut forty pages from his report. Gibbs learned his lesson. Sixty thousand British soldiers were killed or wounded on the first day of the Somme. Yet Daily Chronicle readers gained no clue of this massacre from Gibbs’s dispatch, which began, “It is, on balance, a good day for the British and French.” July 1, 1916 was the worst day in the history of the British army.
Page 274
Lloyd George wrote to his friend C. P. Scott: “Even an audience of hardened politicians and journalists was strongly affected,” he noted. “The thing is horrible and beyond human nature to bear . . . If people really knew, the war would be stopped tomorrow. But of course they don’t know and they can’t know. The correspondents don’t write and the censors would not print the truth.”
Page 289
A 1906 Admiralty study put before Asquith of a “Joint Naval and Military Attach upon the Dardanelles” did not no much as consider a ships-along attack, citing Admiral Nelson’s dictum that “any sailor who attached a fort was a fool” (he lost arm attacking one).
Page 307
“Combat without mercy”: In a September 1922 issue of Foreign Affairs the journalist and politician Andre Tardieu brought home to American readers what that had cost France:
The war bled us terrible. Out of our population of less then 38,000,000 there were mobilized 8,500,000; 5,300,000 of them were killed or wounded . . . not counting 500,000 men who have come back to us from German prisons in very bad physical condition.
Almost 4,000,000 hectares of land were devastated, together with 4,000 towns and villages, 600,000 buildings were destroyed among them 200,000 factories and workshops …
To measure what we have undergone, suppose that the war had taken place in American, and that you had suffered proportionately. You would have had 4000,000 of your men killed and 20,000,000 wounded. All of your industries from Washington (D.C. presumably) to Pittsburgh would have ceased to exist. All your coal mines would have been ruined. That is what the war would have meant to you. That is what it has meant to us.
“They will not be able to make us do it another day; that would be to misconstrue the price of our effort,” a Verdun veteran wrote. The French could not pay it twice in a generation. Verdun held out for ten months in 1916; twenty-four years later German Troops seized the forts, the citadel, and the city in twenty-four hours.
Part of the price of victory in 1918 was defeat in 1940. They could not be made to do it again.
Acknowledgments were given to those who helped edit and provide clarity "for improving, aggregately, nearly every page of this book". It's scary to think what the condition of the text would have been without these folks because there were so many edits and needs for clarity that escaped them to make the book almost unreadable/annoying reading at times. For example:
Page 57
Speaking of General V. A. Sukhomlinov, Russian minister of war: "In Sazonov's (Russian foreign minister) view, "It was very difficult to make him work, but to get him to speak the truth was well-nigh impossible."
Page 62
Again speaking of General V. A. Sukhomlinov: 'Later, in 1917, the Rusian Provisional Government in Russia's first "show trial," convicted him of treasonable incompetence, corruption and for having alleged Austrian spies as friends.'
Page 89
the King (of England) warned (Sir Edward) Grey (the English foreign secretary) of the "constitutional gravity" of the French military talks (Grey was having) -- talks that amounted to planning for a joint Anglo-French defense of France against a German attack, talks that were not approved by the cabinet or Parliament, talks whose import Grey reportedly kept from (Prime Minister) Asquith for three years. When they came partially to light in 1911 there was a blowup in the cabinet. Liberals in and out of parliment scored Grey for his "severe economy of truth".
Page 249
"The cult of the offensive belongs to 19194's (trust the author meant 1914) lost history.
Memorable passages:
Page 129
Throughout the twentieth century and with ideologically charged vigor during the Cold War, the United States acted as a counterrevolutionary power in Latin American, intervening either directly or by proxy against Marxist-Leninist revolutions (Cuba, Nicaragua), leftist guerrilla movements (El Salvador), ad democratically elected socialist governments (Guatemala, Chile). Brazilian generals, Panamanian, Paraguayan, and Chilean strongmen found friends in Washington. The apocryphal quip attributed to Franklin D. Roosevelt, that Nicaraguan strongman Anastasio Somoza was an SOB but “our SOB,” captured the cynical maxim guiding the conduct of a succession of American presidents toward right-wing dictators who plundered their people but protected U. S. economic interests.
Page 140
A graveyard for bandits, Chihuahua was a garden for rustlers.
Page 156
Millions marched to war in 1914 and a million died, but only in Mexico for justice and dignity. The great French socialist Jean Jaures assigned different moral weights to the violence of war and revolution: “In the Europe of today, it is not by means of international war that the work of freedom and justice will be accomplished . . . if we have a horror of war, it is not all because of a weak an enervated sentimentality. The revolutionary resigns himself to human suffering when it is the necessary condition of a great human advancement, when by it the oppressed and exploited rise up to freedom."
That describes one face of Mexico’s violence in 1914 and suggests why if frightened the ruling classes of Europe and why they wanted “order” restored in Mexico.
Page 167
John Reed asked readers of the New York Times to imagine the rage felt by the people of Veracruz [Mexico] seeing their streets shot up “because some foreign businessmen that had enriched were not satisfied and wanted it all.” John Mason Hart, a leading scholar of the Mexican Revolution, shares that view: Wilson intervened to protect U. S. Businesses in Mexico, which had prospered in the Dias years to the point where “Mexico has passed into the hands of foreign economic interests,” of which American railroad, mining, and oil companies represented the largest share.
Page 170
The defeat of Villa and Zapata ended Mexico’s peasant revolution. As from time immemorial in Mexico, the revolutionary elites betrayed the peasants after riding them into power. They had “forced their way into a history that had previously unfolded above them,” and then history closed over them again an over Woodrow Wilson’s solidarity with them.
Page 172
“as clear as a knife in the back and near as next door”
Page 175
At a Bosnian railway station in 1910 a would-be assassin armed with a revolver was close enough to touch the emperor; but in a tragedy for humanity, he lost his nerve in the royal presence.
Page 236
The bad behavior of the all concerned in the Caillaux affair presented an irresistible teaching moment for nationalist alarmed over the crisis of the French family. …I took my head in my hands, certain that the case represents nothing less than the trial of our secular society, of the rotten and immoral existence that the republic has inflicted on France,” one right-wing journalist lamented. Nationalist believed the fate of France was tied to the family, “the essential foundation of the life of a nation and its necessary expansion.” Yet the French family was notoriously barren (in 189t more deaths than births were recorded). Flame fell on familiar targets.
Nationalist arraigned “Anglo-Saxon cultural imperialism,” carrier of the “plague of feminism”. As early as the 1880’s, a professor at the Paris Faculty of Medicine has disparaged “voluntary sterility” – birth control.
Page 264
Manning the trenches in February found 1,705 soldiers killed, 1,147 missing, and 30,381 wounded. Attaching in March the figures were 31,000 killed, 19,680 wounded, 180,898 missing.
Page 265
Reference to Christmas in the Trenches.
Page 272 - 274
The Daily Chronicle’s man at the front, Philip Gibbs . . . Patriotism did not require “conscious falsehood”, only selective truth, the leaving out of “horrors.”
The correspondents had to conform to the war policy of their papers. At the Times that was “to increase the flow of recruits . . . an aim that would get little help from accounts of what happened to recruits once they became soldiers,” the paper wrote in its official history. The editors and war correspondents believed they served the country but their real master was the war.
Gibbs had to be broken to the war’s service. When he tried to expose the Loos scandal a military censor, acting "in defence [sic] of the High Command and its tragic blundering,” cut forty pages from his report. Gibbs learned his lesson. Sixty thousand British soldiers were killed or wounded on the first day of the Somme. Yet Daily Chronicle readers gained no clue of this massacre from Gibbs’s dispatch, which began, “It is, on balance, a good day for the British and French.” July 1, 1916 was the worst day in the history of the British army.
Page 274
Lloyd George wrote to his friend C. P. Scott: “Even an audience of hardened politicians and journalists was strongly affected,” he noted. “The thing is horrible and beyond human nature to bear . . . If people really knew, the war would be stopped tomorrow. But of course they don’t know and they can’t know. The correspondents don’t write and the censors would not print the truth.”
Page 289
A 1906 Admiralty study put before Asquith of a “Joint Naval and Military Attach upon the Dardanelles” did not no much as consider a ships-along attack, citing Admiral Nelson’s dictum that “any sailor who attached a fort was a fool” (he lost arm attacking one).
Page 307
“Combat without mercy”: In a September 1922 issue of Foreign Affairs the journalist and politician Andre Tardieu brought home to American readers what that had cost France:
The war bled us terrible. Out of our population of less then 38,000,000 there were mobilized 8,500,000; 5,300,000 of them were killed or wounded . . . not counting 500,000 men who have come back to us from German prisons in very bad physical condition.
Almost 4,000,000 hectares of land were devastated, together with 4,000 towns and villages, 600,000 buildings were destroyed among them 200,000 factories and workshops …
To measure what we have undergone, suppose that the war had taken place in American, and that you had suffered proportionately. You would have had 4000,000 of your men killed and 20,000,000 wounded. All of your industries from Washington (D.C. presumably) to Pittsburgh would have ceased to exist. All your coal mines would have been ruined. That is what the war would have meant to you. That is what it has meant to us.
“They will not be able to make us do it another day; that would be to misconstrue the price of our effort,” a Verdun veteran wrote. The French could not pay it twice in a generation. Verdun held out for ten months in 1916; twenty-four years later German Troops seized the forts, the citadel, and the city in twenty-four hours.
Part of the price of victory in 1918 was defeat in 1940. They could not be made to do it again.
January 20, 2018
A unique look at the time before WW I. It discusses events in each country that may have led to the war not occurring in 1914. Largely sticks with little-known facts of the time, which is its main appeal. It draws heavily on scholarly books for war-related premises and assumptions. Not strong throughout but good overall.
September 12, 2021
Fascinating, but suffers from chronic issues an editor should have fixed. Inaccessible, recommend only if you're really determined and interested in WWI and its causes. Some haunting thoughts about how WWI led German youth and Hitler to the Holocaust are probably the biggest takeaways here, and if you ever liked President Wilson, you may not after reading this book. The text includes political cartoons, some more relevant than others, most memorably creepy. Useful if you're planning to write historical fiction about WWI, 1914, and/or contributing factors to the Holocaust and have the time and energy for a bit of a slog.
This is a fascinating look at what was going on in most of the involved European countries (plus the USA and Mexico) going into WWI. The material is interesting enough that I kept reading despite major stylistic and editing issues. As far as I can tell, the historical research is sound, but it needed another few passes by and editor or a team of editors to make it accessible to a general audience. I was put on my guard when the same paragraph appeared twice, copy and pasted, in the introduction, and sure enough, that was a warning. The writing regularly refers to preceding passages to illustrate a point without one clear antecedent, which frequently sent me backwards trying to guess at the most likely candidate. And, despite claiming to posit alternate scenarios that would have averted the war, most of the space is dedicated to explaining what did and had happened that led to the war, instead of gaming out alternatives or drawing a clear, resounding point of what needed to change to avert the war. Though those moments were there, they were lost amid the rest of the text. The endnotes were at times disappointing, when I wanted more explanation of a statement, but the endnote only referred me to source material somewhere else.
This is a fascinating look at what was going on in most of the involved European countries (plus the USA and Mexico) going into WWI. The material is interesting enough that I kept reading despite major stylistic and editing issues. As far as I can tell, the historical research is sound, but it needed another few passes by and editor or a team of editors to make it accessible to a general audience. I was put on my guard when the same paragraph appeared twice, copy and pasted, in the introduction, and sure enough, that was a warning. The writing regularly refers to preceding passages to illustrate a point without one clear antecedent, which frequently sent me backwards trying to guess at the most likely candidate. And, despite claiming to posit alternate scenarios that would have averted the war, most of the space is dedicated to explaining what did and had happened that led to the war, instead of gaming out alternatives or drawing a clear, resounding point of what needed to change to avert the war. Though those moments were there, they were lost amid the rest of the text. The endnotes were at times disappointing, when I wanted more explanation of a statement, but the endnote only referred me to source material somewhere else.
May 9, 2012
Not really just about 1914, the book is about the history of the participant countries of WWI leading up to 1914, and why each one easily could have been uninvolved in the war, or unable to participate in beginning it. I learned a ton about European and US history. Usually, books don't focus on the episodes of turmoil of countries that don't lead to war.
The main part of the book is dedicated to a single country per chapter, and works well.
The last three chapters cover the start of the war, and the effect on the participating countries. I still learned a lot of things I didn't know, but these chapters were choppy and jumped around rather than continuing the tight focus of the other chapters.
The main part of the book is dedicated to a single country per chapter, and works well.
The last three chapters cover the start of the war, and the effect on the participating countries. I still learned a lot of things I didn't know, but these chapters were choppy and jumped around rather than continuing the tight focus of the other chapters.
July 2, 2012
I'd recommend this book to anyone who wants to learn more about the causes of the first World War. Beatty focuses on some of the internal issues behind the collapse of international relations, so his point of view is different from many works on the subject. Most significantly, he challenges the mindset of many historians that the coming of the war was somehow inevitable, that hostilities would have broken out 'sooner or later'. (In that way, his view is similar to Richard Evans' three volume history of Nazi Germany, which is also excellent.)
December 22, 2022
The Lost History of 1914 is a wide-ranging book about some of the things going on in 1914 you might not know about; such as the near miss of civil war in Ireland, US intervention in Mexico, and high political and legal drama in France. It also includes lesser-known events after the war has started such as the relief of starvation in Belgium by Herbert Hoover (President to be in the depression – just one of many ironies in this book). This then is easy to read bite sized chunks of history. But there is a second side to this book it is about as the subtitle says, “how the great war was not inevitable”. Arguing that the spark of the Great War was a particular circumstance that launched the war and otherwise it would have not happened. So, it is like there are two books in one, in the first Jack Beatty is moderately successful, in the second not so much.
Taking the Lost History theme first this is quite good. There are lots of interesting events and incidents I did not know about brought out. This is easily digested snippets of history at its best. Raising events that are interesting and not well known and putting them into the wider context. This book could have been billed as one to dive into little bits of unknown history, however, the second theme which requires sustained argumentation gets in the way of this. To truly explore this theme events from around the world could have been brought in; for example, what is happening on China or India? Moreover, Beatty seems distracted by side tracks. Thus, in a chapter nominally on the “home front” there are almost a dozen pages on Gallipoli (pp.284-294). Hardly lost history. Definitely not 1914!
The argument that the Great War was not inevitable however is a disaster. Beatty claims his aim is to show “Franz Ferdinand’s death… not as the catalyst of a war that would have broken out over some other crisis “at no distant date” but rather as its all but unique precipitant”(p.3) but he shies away from making the argument. It is the argumentation that is the problem; to make a case the author should state what his point is, explain the point, bring in the evidence tying it to the argument, and summarise it. Do this for each argument and roll them all up into a single convincing whole in the conclusion. Beatty does none of this. He throws out an interesting case study and notes it shows there are alternative paths. No tying things together, no explanation. I was regularly left wondering how a chapter helps his case.
A contentious innovative argument also needs to do rebuttal of the dominant theory. Beatty does ponder some of the potential arguments on the other side. Thus, he raises the ‘culture of the offensive’ in militaries across the continent (pp.249-256) – which to me would seem to support why the Great War is inevitable and Beatty does not explain the reasoning behind bringing it out. It is almost as an aside failing even to consider he is undermining his own argument if he does not show either a, it is irrelevant to the start/spread of the war, b, it could easy be changed, c, it did not actually exist.
I am disappointed in the book as I feel this theme could have been so much better done. There are the kernels of an argument but nothing is made of it. To truly make the case that war was not inevitable the system must change. And several of Beatty’s bits of lost history give hints that it could have happened (e.g. socialists gaining power) but it is not taken further.
I’m tempted to actively recommend against this book and give it two stars, but if you are happy to take it as the first theme, and ignore the tangents it is quite an interesting book. It also is easy to read and gives lots of ideas so it is hard to be too negative. But don’t buy this book if you are looking for good case for why the Great War was not inevitable as I did.
Taking the Lost History theme first this is quite good. There are lots of interesting events and incidents I did not know about brought out. This is easily digested snippets of history at its best. Raising events that are interesting and not well known and putting them into the wider context. This book could have been billed as one to dive into little bits of unknown history, however, the second theme which requires sustained argumentation gets in the way of this. To truly explore this theme events from around the world could have been brought in; for example, what is happening on China or India? Moreover, Beatty seems distracted by side tracks. Thus, in a chapter nominally on the “home front” there are almost a dozen pages on Gallipoli (pp.284-294). Hardly lost history. Definitely not 1914!
The argument that the Great War was not inevitable however is a disaster. Beatty claims his aim is to show “Franz Ferdinand’s death… not as the catalyst of a war that would have broken out over some other crisis “at no distant date” but rather as its all but unique precipitant”(p.3) but he shies away from making the argument. It is the argumentation that is the problem; to make a case the author should state what his point is, explain the point, bring in the evidence tying it to the argument, and summarise it. Do this for each argument and roll them all up into a single convincing whole in the conclusion. Beatty does none of this. He throws out an interesting case study and notes it shows there are alternative paths. No tying things together, no explanation. I was regularly left wondering how a chapter helps his case.
A contentious innovative argument also needs to do rebuttal of the dominant theory. Beatty does ponder some of the potential arguments on the other side. Thus, he raises the ‘culture of the offensive’ in militaries across the continent (pp.249-256) – which to me would seem to support why the Great War is inevitable and Beatty does not explain the reasoning behind bringing it out. It is almost as an aside failing even to consider he is undermining his own argument if he does not show either a, it is irrelevant to the start/spread of the war, b, it could easy be changed, c, it did not actually exist.
I am disappointed in the book as I feel this theme could have been so much better done. There are the kernels of an argument but nothing is made of it. To truly make the case that war was not inevitable the system must change. And several of Beatty’s bits of lost history give hints that it could have happened (e.g. socialists gaining power) but it is not taken further.
I’m tempted to actively recommend against this book and give it two stars, but if you are happy to take it as the first theme, and ignore the tangents it is quite an interesting book. It also is easy to read and gives lots of ideas so it is hard to be too negative. But don’t buy this book if you are looking for good case for why the Great War was not inevitable as I did.
January 20, 2021
The first World War, also known as the Great War, started in July of 1914 and ended in November of 1918. The fight was between the Central Powers - Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey - and the Allied Powers - France, Great Britain, Russia, Italy, Japan, and towards the end of the war, the United States. Many historians today tell the story of the Great War saying it was bound to happen due to the events that elevated tensions between nations in the years prior to 1914. In The Lost History of 1914: Reconsidering the Year the Great War Began, Jack Beatty, the author, challenges the reader to see such events with another perspective, to look at it not as an inevitable thing but rather as something that could have been stopped if only the nations involved had gone in a different path. But while reading chapter 4 named United States and Mexico: The President and The Bandit, I have found that he was not as efficient as he could have been to prove his thesis to the reader. The excerpt had typographical errors, editing mistakes, and was very hard to focus on what he was trying to say.
The book started with an unreadable introduction which started my loss of interest in it. In the preface there is a huge editing error where several paragraphs are repeated verbatim. On page 6 for example, there is a paragraph that starters by saying “The last three chapters, set in November and December, depict the war’s transformation of war and of the societies seen earlier in peace” and then it proceeds to talk about trench warfare. In the following paragraph, the first sentence is the exact same, word for word, but it ends with a different topic, where Beatty summarizes what he wrote later in the book on chapter 7. Additionally, in this same paragraph it says “Extending the motif of lost history…” then following a couple more paragraphs, the start of a new one repeats the same sentence which is in the one where we learn that what he was trying to say from the beginning is that trench warfare is mentioned in chapter 7 of his book. As I said, his writing was very hard to follow, even in the first few pages you were already able to notice that.
Beatty’s idea of The Lost History of 1914 is excellent, however he swerved into too many side stories that the overall point was somewhat lost. In the beginning of chapter 4 for example, he started talking about Mexico's history of struggle and in that he mentioned the Aztecs. He went on about it for so long that I had to stop reading for a minute and think about what he was trying to prove.
Instead of chronological telling of events, Beatty goes in detail about events 10 year prior the war in the nations involved in the conflict. He presents and evaluates theories proposed by historians about how the war might have been stopped if only things had turned out differently. However, I got lost in the details of his side stories, along with the editing errors that limited my enjoyment of the book.
The book started with an unreadable introduction which started my loss of interest in it. In the preface there is a huge editing error where several paragraphs are repeated verbatim. On page 6 for example, there is a paragraph that starters by saying “The last three chapters, set in November and December, depict the war’s transformation of war and of the societies seen earlier in peace” and then it proceeds to talk about trench warfare. In the following paragraph, the first sentence is the exact same, word for word, but it ends with a different topic, where Beatty summarizes what he wrote later in the book on chapter 7. Additionally, in this same paragraph it says “Extending the motif of lost history…” then following a couple more paragraphs, the start of a new one repeats the same sentence which is in the one where we learn that what he was trying to say from the beginning is that trench warfare is mentioned in chapter 7 of his book. As I said, his writing was very hard to follow, even in the first few pages you were already able to notice that.
Beatty’s idea of The Lost History of 1914 is excellent, however he swerved into too many side stories that the overall point was somewhat lost. In the beginning of chapter 4 for example, he started talking about Mexico's history of struggle and in that he mentioned the Aztecs. He went on about it for so long that I had to stop reading for a minute and think about what he was trying to prove.
Instead of chronological telling of events, Beatty goes in detail about events 10 year prior the war in the nations involved in the conflict. He presents and evaluates theories proposed by historians about how the war might have been stopped if only things had turned out differently. However, I got lost in the details of his side stories, along with the editing errors that limited my enjoyment of the book.
June 20, 2023
Jack Beatty has taken a hard look at the "inevitability" of World War One, and deftly refuted the argument. The core of his book is the first six chapters, each looking at one of the major combatant countries and how close each came to NOT entering onto military action in Europe in 1914 (or 1917). The six are Germany, Russia, England, United States, Austria-Hungary, and France.
The most interesting arguments are those on England, the US, and France. As any serious scholar of England knows, until the very last days of July 1914, it looked far more likely that the British Expeditionary Force would go to Ireland, as civil war broke out between Protestants and Catholics over Home Rule, than to France in the wake of Germany's attack through Belgium.
If not for a nationalist editor publishing scandalous but true accounts of the skirt-chasing Minister of Finance, Joseph Callaux, Mme Callaux would have no cause to shoot and kill the newspaperman - derailing her husband's otherwise easy electoral victory and appointment as Prime Minister. With the renowned Jean Jaures as his foreign minister, and Callaux's track record of successfully mollifying German demands, it is unlikely that war on the western front would have broken out.
The most fascinating chapter is on the US, as Beatty underscores the anti-imperialist stance of President Wilson, and his break with the Taft policy of supporting Mexico's dictator, the favorite of Wall Street. Beatty shows how Wilson's motives in landing troops in Veracruz, Mexico in April 1914 was to support the rebels, by blocking arm shipments to the president of Mexico - but the fact of American troops on Mexican soil was portrayed as renewed imperialism. Provoked by Villa's 1916 raid on Columbus, NM, Wilson sent General Pershing on a wild-goose chase after the rebel formerly supported by Wilson. The renewed presence of American troops on Mexican soil prompted closer ties between Mexico and Imperial Germany, culminating in the disastrous Zimmermann telegram of 1917, promising Texas, New Mexico and Arizona to be restored to Mexico. Beatty argues that the telegram was even more decisive than the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare against American merchant ships in generating a fever for war in the heartland.
There is much more in Beatty's book; I have not even touched on the last four chapters, covering the last months of 1914, as the spade replaces the machine gun as the key instrument of war. Beatty's book is well-written, and well worth the time and attention of anyone interested in how the war could have been avoided.
The most interesting arguments are those on England, the US, and France. As any serious scholar of England knows, until the very last days of July 1914, it looked far more likely that the British Expeditionary Force would go to Ireland, as civil war broke out between Protestants and Catholics over Home Rule, than to France in the wake of Germany's attack through Belgium.
If not for a nationalist editor publishing scandalous but true accounts of the skirt-chasing Minister of Finance, Joseph Callaux, Mme Callaux would have no cause to shoot and kill the newspaperman - derailing her husband's otherwise easy electoral victory and appointment as Prime Minister. With the renowned Jean Jaures as his foreign minister, and Callaux's track record of successfully mollifying German demands, it is unlikely that war on the western front would have broken out.
The most fascinating chapter is on the US, as Beatty underscores the anti-imperialist stance of President Wilson, and his break with the Taft policy of supporting Mexico's dictator, the favorite of Wall Street. Beatty shows how Wilson's motives in landing troops in Veracruz, Mexico in April 1914 was to support the rebels, by blocking arm shipments to the president of Mexico - but the fact of American troops on Mexican soil was portrayed as renewed imperialism. Provoked by Villa's 1916 raid on Columbus, NM, Wilson sent General Pershing on a wild-goose chase after the rebel formerly supported by Wilson. The renewed presence of American troops on Mexican soil prompted closer ties between Mexico and Imperial Germany, culminating in the disastrous Zimmermann telegram of 1917, promising Texas, New Mexico and Arizona to be restored to Mexico. Beatty argues that the telegram was even more decisive than the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare against American merchant ships in generating a fever for war in the heartland.
There is much more in Beatty's book; I have not even touched on the last four chapters, covering the last months of 1914, as the spade replaces the machine gun as the key instrument of war. Beatty's book is well-written, and well worth the time and attention of anyone interested in how the war could have been avoided.
August 24, 2024
This is a fascinating book which I really enjoyed. It has an ingenious concept and a clear and clean structure which opens with a chapter for each one of the 6 main belligerent countries in the run up to World War 1 ( although the chapter for England is mostly about the forestalling of civil war in Ireland and that of the United States is mostly about events in Mexico). The final three main chapters cover the early phases of war on the front line and on how things panned out on the home front in most of the main countries.
The main thrust of Beatty's book is to demonstrate that war was not inevitable following the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand and that there were plenty of opportunities for several key players to shape events to turn out differently. Beatty evidently has assembled a huge range of material from which to support his line of argument and is adept at drawing out loads of interesting facts and lively quotations, occasionally he veers towards speculation and the dreaded 'counterfactual' history i.e, sliding door moments, not 'proper' history. He has a neat turn of phrase, particularly in his use of short punchy sentences.
This is a scholarly work whose only negative for me was the over-use of notes ( 50 pages of them) plus footnotes aplenty. This constant referencing was a distraction. Either you read them as and when each footnote occurred in the text or read through them at the end of each chapter. Or perhaps best to ignore them completely.
The main thrust of Beatty's book is to demonstrate that war was not inevitable following the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand and that there were plenty of opportunities for several key players to shape events to turn out differently. Beatty evidently has assembled a huge range of material from which to support his line of argument and is adept at drawing out loads of interesting facts and lively quotations, occasionally he veers towards speculation and the dreaded 'counterfactual' history i.e, sliding door moments, not 'proper' history. He has a neat turn of phrase, particularly in his use of short punchy sentences.
This is a scholarly work whose only negative for me was the over-use of notes ( 50 pages of them) plus footnotes aplenty. This constant referencing was a distraction. Either you read them as and when each footnote occurred in the text or read through them at the end of each chapter. Or perhaps best to ignore them completely.
November 9, 2018
Brilliant history: if you are unknowing, your eyes will be opened. If you are well-read, you will find much that you didn't know. If you are a student of human motives or a political science buff, or a history connoisseur, this book will be an endless benefit to you. Aside from one weird editorial mistake in the introduction, this book is not only a must read, it is a "must buy" for future reference. Beatty never disappoints, but he exceeds all expectations here. Wonderful, witty, deep, long in scholarship. If you read one western history book this year, let this be it.
February 27, 2020
The book presents an interesting view of all the forces and events that aligned to cause the start of World War I and those that could have prevented it had they occurred. While interesting, a healthy knowledge of the history, alliances and ethnic groups in Europe in the late 19th and early 20th century would have made it easier for me to follow the intricacies and logic the were behind things that either did or did not happen.
June 3, 2025
In this excellent history of the fateful year 1914, Beatty analyzes those 12 months from three perspectives: military, political, and existential. He thus provides us with a glimpse of 1914 that other books on the subject have not discussed before or have not touched upon sufficiently. Great reading.
April 22, 2021
Some very interesting stories in this book! I enjoyed the look at the WW1 belligerent countries in the year leading to the war. I wish there was a chapter on the Ottoman Empire. Dry at times, but worth the read.
March 6, 2018
If you like to read a little about some alternative history, you should consider this book.
March 10, 2018
To repeat what more than a few here have already mentioned, the book needed better editing. I also could not bear to finish it.
December 30, 2018
Too hard to get in to and follow.
November 4, 2022
Tedious, dull and unoriginal. The author regurgitates trivia and calls it history. This “Lost History” should have remained lost.
November 8, 2016
To itemise how WW1 was perfectly avoidable and the powers of the time all in various ways chose for it, is a good moral mission for a book. But it fails to do what the opening claims, to sensationally show that WW1 only came from an accidental combination of personal circumstances in each country. All through the book, many of the choices recorded were made on a perception, by politicians and army chiefs, that the stand-off between the empires was going to lead to a "future" war, and in Germany and Austria and Russia a simultaneous pattern of ruthless calculating that it had become better to have it now than later, from the viewpoint of their preservation as empires. The already familiar picture.
The crises of Bosnia 1908 and Morocco 1911 are seen as causes of a build-up of ill will and rivalry causing the war. The writer admits that German chief of staff Moltke was looking for a pretext for war before Russia caught up again in the arms race it had fallen behind in after its revolution crisis in 1905, when Germany would feel trapped between enemies on 2 sides and vulnerable. It simply does not fit with that history, is contradictory, for him to argue that there would not have been any war in the west if pro-peace socialist Caillaux had chanced to be Prime Minister of France, and that he would have been but for unlucky personal events. He could have been ousted, president Poincare was a mindlessly racist militarist.
Despite this, it is really good to read the details of high politics in all the belligerents in the years of build-up, informing the reader's own perception of the causes. It is good to learn 2 new damningnesses against horrible Churchill:
* that he argued against Hoover's feeding of occupied Belgium and for deliberately letting famine there be a burden on the Germans,
* and that the real purpose of Gallipoli was to let Russia annex Istanbul, a secret land bargain between empires. It only never happened because Russia fell to communism before the war ended.
The chapter on the Mexican revolution stands out, as it is only thinly linked to WW1: by a note that Germany aided whichever side in Mexico would most keep the US embroiled there instead of Europe, and Germany offered Mexico a regaining of territory from America for joining the war, which it never did. I seize on a description of dictator Diaz using the fear of libel laws to keep the press silenced about injustices in his hacienda farming system. To see a historian cite that against a corrupt past regime in Latin America, when it is still a feature of Western society now, that media and publishers and charities use a conveniently automatic fear of libel laws as an excuse to keep quiet about local injustices in businesses or children's services, even when the person striving to expose a wrong has evidence for what they say.
The crises of Bosnia 1908 and Morocco 1911 are seen as causes of a build-up of ill will and rivalry causing the war. The writer admits that German chief of staff Moltke was looking for a pretext for war before Russia caught up again in the arms race it had fallen behind in after its revolution crisis in 1905, when Germany would feel trapped between enemies on 2 sides and vulnerable. It simply does not fit with that history, is contradictory, for him to argue that there would not have been any war in the west if pro-peace socialist Caillaux had chanced to be Prime Minister of France, and that he would have been but for unlucky personal events. He could have been ousted, president Poincare was a mindlessly racist militarist.
Despite this, it is really good to read the details of high politics in all the belligerents in the years of build-up, informing the reader's own perception of the causes. It is good to learn 2 new damningnesses against horrible Churchill:
* that he argued against Hoover's feeding of occupied Belgium and for deliberately letting famine there be a burden on the Germans,
* and that the real purpose of Gallipoli was to let Russia annex Istanbul, a secret land bargain between empires. It only never happened because Russia fell to communism before the war ended.
The chapter on the Mexican revolution stands out, as it is only thinly linked to WW1: by a note that Germany aided whichever side in Mexico would most keep the US embroiled there instead of Europe, and Germany offered Mexico a regaining of territory from America for joining the war, which it never did. I seize on a description of dictator Diaz using the fear of libel laws to keep the press silenced about injustices in his hacienda farming system. To see a historian cite that against a corrupt past regime in Latin America, when it is still a feature of Western society now, that media and publishers and charities use a conveniently automatic fear of libel laws as an excuse to keep quiet about local injustices in businesses or children's services, even when the person striving to expose a wrong has evidence for what they say.
July 7, 2014
If you are looking for a quick and easy intro to World War One, this book is not for you. Beatty is a revisionist historian who argues the war was not inevitable, as so many claim, and the assumption is readers will be at least moderately fluent in the subject. The argument falls apart almost as soon as we read past the introduction, disproved by his own chapters on pre-war Germany and Russia, brilliant chapters, I might add, that more or less prove nothing could have prevented this war, and that other, even worse war than followed.
But history is not about what might have happened or what could have happened; it is about what did happen. The past cannot be changed. The trick is to understand at least some of it. Beatty does help there. The reader will visit Kaiser Wilhelm's Germany where the military is so revered it is a crime to insult an officer, monarchist Russia, quaking in fear of revolution, vexing Ireland on the verge of civil strife, Austria/Hungary rotting from within, imperialist France and its conquests in West Africa (who knew how all that got started), and the American adventure in Pancho Villa's Mexico, almost more than you want to know. As for the war itself, not quite so much, although Beatty does have a curious theory on how trench warfare saved lives.
So, lots of new stuff for old readers, and definitely recommended for those willing to slough through some curiously organized ideas.
My Kindle copy (courtesy of the Chicago Public Library) seemed to have more than a few typos and missing words. I hope the print version does better.
But history is not about what might have happened or what could have happened; it is about what did happen. The past cannot be changed. The trick is to understand at least some of it. Beatty does help there. The reader will visit Kaiser Wilhelm's Germany where the military is so revered it is a crime to insult an officer, monarchist Russia, quaking in fear of revolution, vexing Ireland on the verge of civil strife, Austria/Hungary rotting from within, imperialist France and its conquests in West Africa (who knew how all that got started), and the American adventure in Pancho Villa's Mexico, almost more than you want to know. As for the war itself, not quite so much, although Beatty does have a curious theory on how trench warfare saved lives.
So, lots of new stuff for old readers, and definitely recommended for those willing to slough through some curiously organized ideas.
My Kindle copy (courtesy of the Chicago Public Library) seemed to have more than a few typos and missing words. I hope the print version does better.
Read
February 1, 2015Utterly fascinating, and if someone put this in a work of fiction I say they were being ridiculous.
The Austrian government hated the dead ArchDuke Franz Ferdinand (whose assassination started the whole thing) so much that they celebrated at his death, then went ahead and declared war on Serbia to avenge it.
The German Army leaders knew perfectly well that the war would drag on for years. They lied to their own government to get the Kaiser to declare war.
In August 1914 the UK was poised for a civil war, with the Ulster Protestants about to break away to form a separate state, and the Catholic South joining with the British Government against Ulster to keep the UK together.
The Ulstermen telegraphed their leader in London to say they were ready, but before he got round to replying the Great War broke out. It was that close!
There should have been a left-wing, pro-German government in France, but the obvious Prime Minister was involved in a murder case where his current wife had shot his previous wife. She got off on the excuse that she had aimed not at the other woman, but at the floor. Unfortunately the other woman fell down into her line of fire. And the jury believed her. (And incidently the seals on the box of randomly selected jurers had accidently been broken.)
And there's much more.
Just proves how incompetant our leaders were.
How glad we must be that none of our present leaders of great nations would never do anything so stupid as to start a war based on sloppy thinking or even barefaced lies, or just to distract the people from the problems at home.
The Austrian government hated the dead ArchDuke Franz Ferdinand (whose assassination started the whole thing) so much that they celebrated at his death, then went ahead and declared war on Serbia to avenge it.
The German Army leaders knew perfectly well that the war would drag on for years. They lied to their own government to get the Kaiser to declare war.
In August 1914 the UK was poised for a civil war, with the Ulster Protestants about to break away to form a separate state, and the Catholic South joining with the British Government against Ulster to keep the UK together.
The Ulstermen telegraphed their leader in London to say they were ready, but before he got round to replying the Great War broke out. It was that close!
There should have been a left-wing, pro-German government in France, but the obvious Prime Minister was involved in a murder case where his current wife had shot his previous wife. She got off on the excuse that she had aimed not at the other woman, but at the floor. Unfortunately the other woman fell down into her line of fire. And the jury believed her. (And incidently the seals on the box of randomly selected jurers had accidently been broken.)
And there's much more.
Just proves how incompetant our leaders were.
How glad we must be that none of our present leaders of great nations would never do anything so stupid as to start a war based on sloppy thinking or even barefaced lies, or just to distract the people from the problems at home.
August 27, 2014
Interesting spin on the origins of WWI. Some were familiar and refreshing, others new. When the Berlin Wall came down much of modern history required reinterpretation and some of this happened for the year 1914.
The author takes an interesting approach, and reviews events immediately prior to June-August 1914 when if one event had happened differently in any one of Europe's capitals the great powers might not have taken the fatal steps to war. As the author noted there was the before the Great War and the After, and as we note in the Middle East we are still dealing with the AFTER.
I particularly enjoyed the chapter on England and the Home Rule question. I have always understood England to have been a serene and sunny place that fateful Summer (see Garden Party, Downton Abbey) but the country was quite roiled up over the "Irish Question" something not necessarily covered in my Diplomatic History classes in college. As another aside on the British events is the figure of Winston Churchill. Winston had his fingers into everything. Truly one of THE men of the 20th century. Not always the best, but if he was there he wrote about it, and his work as a source remains relevant.
The author takes an interesting approach, and reviews events immediately prior to June-August 1914 when if one event had happened differently in any one of Europe's capitals the great powers might not have taken the fatal steps to war. As the author noted there was the before the Great War and the After, and as we note in the Middle East we are still dealing with the AFTER.
I particularly enjoyed the chapter on England and the Home Rule question. I have always understood England to have been a serene and sunny place that fateful Summer (see Garden Party, Downton Abbey) but the country was quite roiled up over the "Irish Question" something not necessarily covered in my Diplomatic History classes in college. As another aside on the British events is the figure of Winston Churchill. Winston had his fingers into everything. Truly one of THE men of the 20th century. Not always the best, but if he was there he wrote about it, and his work as a source remains relevant.
June 9, 2023
Perfectly adequate and interesting background to WWI but I can't help feeling that it will be of more interest to an American audience then a UK. Although I read this four years after publication I don't think many people in the UK who knew anything of, or had any interest in, history would have regarded the first world war as 'inevitable'. That hoary old chestnut as propounded in Barbara Tuchman's book 'The Guns of August' (when will that readable but utterly unreliable bit of myth-making finally be consigned to the stacks?) has long been dismissed by historians here and in the USA. There were lots of reasons for the outbreak of war in 1914, and many of the events covered in this book are interesting, but hardly unknown or 'lost', and writing a history in 2012 to disprove a thesis that was pretty much rejected fifty years ago may allow the publishers a marketing angle but not a basis for a good or useful book.
There are lots of excellent books about how WWI starred - Christopher Clark's Sleepwalkers is one - and I would recommend reading them. They are better and more thought provoking.
There are lots of excellent books about how WWI starred - Christopher Clark's Sleepwalkers is one - and I would recommend reading them. They are better and more thought provoking.
December 27, 2014
Very interesting material. The book describes an internal crisis percolating for each major belligerent in WWI, crises that are largely forgotten in the USA and in introductory history classes. For example, Great Britain was on the verge of a civil war with the Unionists of Northern Ireland, or Germany was being torn apart by the confrontation between its militaristic ruling classes and the increasingly powerful Socialist movement. Each crisis could have changed the course of WWI or even whether it happened, though as the author points out, most countries' ruling cliques looked forward to war to "cleanse" their societies and reduce social upheaval.
As other reviewers have pointed out, the writing is sometimes a challenge. Sentence subjects are hard to trace, run-on phrases are hard to disentangle, and word choices can be puzzling. But it's fast-paced, and the material is interesting enough to forgive the occasional "what does that mean?" moment.
As other reviewers have pointed out, the writing is sometimes a challenge. Sentence subjects are hard to trace, run-on phrases are hard to disentangle, and word choices can be puzzling. But it's fast-paced, and the material is interesting enough to forgive the occasional "what does that mean?" moment.
June 9, 2016
The subtitle, "Reconsidering the year the Great War began" tells the whole story. Instead of a chronological survey of events, Beatty goes into great detail on the conditions existing in the last 10 or so years bfore 1914 in the various countries who would be involved once the conflict began (Germany, Russia, England, U.S. and Mexico, Austria-Hungary, and France). It quickly becomes clear that war of some kind was inevitable although he presents and evaluates several theories proposed by other historians about how things might have turned out quite differently. In proposing and arguing his own analysis of events, he shows himself to be very well versed in the 'big picture' as well as presenting the character of the many political, diplomatic and military leaders. At times I got lost in the myriad details but this is a rewarding and well-researched view of a pivotal modern event.
July 11, 2014
THis book describes the social and political status of nation states on the brink of WWI. It is surprising how easily the war might have been averted due to various circumstances. For example, Britian was on the verge of a civil war over home rule for Ireland with troops and weapons being sent just as the archduke got shot. A major conflict there could have made it impossible to send troops to France. There are similiar tales for other states, Russia on the verge of red revolt, Germany torn apart as socialist workers tried to overthrow Prussian militarists, Austria-Hungary collapsing over internal strife of various minorities. Very interesting.
October 5, 2012
Excellent and original analysis of the path to WWI, the seminal event of the 20th century. Editing errors merit significant reduction in the rating-one hopes the next edition will correct them and the many insights presented will reach a wide audience. The portrayal of the malign influence of Franz Josef was particularly interesting and convincing.Highly recommended with reservations due to editing.
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