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At seven o'clock in the morning on February 21, 1916, the ground in northern France began to shake. For the next ten hours, twelve hundred German guns showered shells on a salient in French lines. The massive weight of explosives collapsed dugouts, obliterated trenches, severed communication wires, and drove men mad. As the barrage lifted, German troops moved forward, darting from shell crater to shell crater. The battle of Verdun had begun. In Verdun, historian Paul Jankowski provides the definitive account of the iconic battle of World War I. A leading expert on the French past, Jankowski combines the best of traditional military history-its emphasis on leaders, plans, technology, and the contingency of combat-with the newer social and cultural approach, stressing the soldier's experience, the institutional structures of the military, and the impact of war on national memory. Unusually, this book draws on deep research in French and German archives; this mastery of sources in both languages gives Verdun unprecedented authority and scope. In many ways, Jankowski writes, the battle represents a conundrum. It has an almost unique status among the battles of the Great War; and yet, he argues, it was not decisive, sparked no political changes, and was not even the bloodiest episode of the conflict. It is said that Verdun made France, he writes; but the question should be, What did France make of Verdun? Over time, it proved to be the last great victory of French arms, standing on their own. And, for France and Germany, the battle would symbolize the terror of industrialized warfare, a technocratic Moloch devouring its children, where no advance or retreat was possible, yet national resources poured in ceaselessly, perpetuating slaughter indefinitely.
368 pages, Paperback
First published November 26, 2013
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343 people want to read
About the author
Paul Jankowski
9 books4 followersPaul Jankowski is an American historian and the Raymond Ginger Professor of History Emeritus at Brandeis University. Raised in Europe and the United States, Jankowski attended Balliol College, Oxford for both his undergraduate and graduate degrees,[completing his doctoral dissertation on Simon Sabiani and the rise of fascism and the French Parti Populaire Français in Marseille. Jankowski specializes in the history of modern France and modern Europe, the history of war, and the history of international relations in the interwar period.
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February 25, 2020
How revisionist are you? Not as wholeheartedly as all the awards would suggest. If you can’t offer an alternative for iconoclasting the established significance of Verdun, don’t. Even if the next generation will pick up the shards & build something new with them. The battle narrative can be refreshing in places, I’ll give him that.
Jankowski questions Falkenhayn's strategic intent of Ausblutung because all the evidence comes from post-war sources*. He takes the customary moment to lament the destruction of the Potsdam archives, before dismissing the predetermination in Falkenhayn's memoirs as unreliable. I will agree that putting the French losses at 2.5 times his own is hyperbole, but not that Falkenhayn wasn’t a man with a plan. The state of elation at the initial gains in various ‘live’ sources such as Crown Prince Wilhelm's diary is supposed to be proof to the contrary. If I recall my Alistair Horne correctly, Falkenhayn left the Fifth Army commander as much in the dark as the ranks as to the ultimate goal.
The word of the day is “Why?” Next to the opaque objective and the current reputation of Verdun as the ultimate expression of senseless slaughter, Jankowski sees little to no gain. There was no strategic victory. Not unless you look at the long-term attrition of the Western Front, I say. While losses stood equal and Noria planted the seeds of mutiny into the collective morale of the French Army, the Germans had to juggle the demands of the Meuse with the demands of the Somme. They also refrained from going on the offensive in the West for almost the remainder of the war.
Why defend it at all? Verdun was a point on a map, not France herself. A docile French press had at first little appetite for exalting a place the High Command risked losing any day either [but] after ten days “the fate of the nation was at hand at a modern Thermophylae” revoking the image of 1792.
A mirage, if you asked the Troisième Bureau. Surprise was inevitably less than total given the scale of preparations. The human desires of Alsacian deserters were a tell-tale sign in spite of all the effort sunk into camouflage and deception. The concerted plan of attack as formulated at the recent Chantilly (I) conference allowed for a ‘limited’ disruption. True to Foch and form, any enemy attack was welcomed as an opportunity for counter-attack.
More important than Verdun itself or the obsolete concrete slugs encircling the town was the railway network to Paris. The hills beyond, the zone between Meuse and Aisne, figured prominently in military plans for a tactical retreat. Before it came to that, to get to Verdun there were half a dozen more hills behind the beheaded Côte 304. This is certainly a novelty for the average modern Verdun reader, but one so often argumented in hindsight that we cannot discard it. The attack on the first day may have been ‘all hell let loose’ for the French in the zone, but farther to the rear the lack of activity on the other bank of the Meuse raised skeptical eyebrows. What if this was a diversion? What if it was one of several attacks of equal magnitude?
Jankowski adds to this that a multiple attack might’ve been Falkenhayn’s original idea; the man was after all a dedicated Westerner who wanted France out of the war before the British grew too strong. This goes back to the gist of his Memorandum… except for the “multiple” part.
The fact that the offensive at Verdun had to be enlarged to encompass both sides of the river validates the skepticism felt in Paris bitterly in German eyes. “Try as they might, the German gunners could neither penetrate every recess nor destroy every obstacle with their 10:1 superiority in heavy shells." After 8 Days it became clear that no advance could be sustained against those minority survivors and their Chauchat MG’s. But they stood not alone! There was the growing artillery on the Mort-Homme. There was the Fort de Marre on the right and the Fort de Moulainville on the left, both still in possession of their full weaponry. “Only a conspiracy of circumstance, preparation and error made for any significant movement. The art and preparation of one side had to encounter the ineptitude or the improvidence of the other to fall or lines to fracture.”
Jankowski has the politicians (with Briand & Pointcarré in the lead) make the stand against military reason. He does not specify what they hoped to gain, but concludes that in the end there were no political dividends. While the fall of Joffre was in the cards, the rise of Pétain and Nivelle was not. Nor did the cabinet or parliament get shuffled by tremors from the Meuse hills. Not quite. Joffre sided with the politicians, against the increasingly outspoken critics of his strategy based on Grignotage. Or did they side with him, fearing they’d join the fall? Either way, Verdun is political hubris: “Prestige filled the void left by strategic enigma. Once mentioned it became a self-fullfilling prophecy that rendered renunciation unthinkable”. . With more down-to-earth cynicism: The material war made attrition indecisive. This stark fact was hard to explain in the morning papers; the theme of the Triumph of the Spirit over brute material power thus became a theme that made good copy.
The morphing mythology serves Jankowski as an argument, which can currently (still) be summarized as “the stoic poilus under siege vs. the betrayed Lantser”. Oddly enough, German history has not yielded any historical analogies. Yet a century on, France has no official Verdun Day, the opening at 21 March serving as a mutually acceptable point of reference.
Aside from the main line of argument, we get three strikes for free.
”Logistics no longer favoured the bold… no one yet knew, in short, how to attach the enemy logistics instead of his defences.” This is the kind of prism through which you could view the entire second half of the war, with the growing importance of bombing raids on both the operational level (German third line and Etappengebiet ) and strategic level (German industry).
“The besieged had given up the ghost. For all his method, Nivelle had conquered an absent foe.”
BOOM. The corpse of confidence in Nivelle’s capabilities to turn the war in April ’17 based upon his artillery-infantry coordination to recapture Douamont falls on the floor.
Of note to WWII buffs :
The Germans took Blitzkrieg from it [as a remedy against future Verduns], the French the methodical approach of “guerre longue, bataille conduite” they’d apply in 1940 – NOT because they were suffering from an instant Maginot complex.
* Currently Reading (21 +Feb. 2020) Pétain doesn't buy the Verbluten notion in his 1929 booklet, either.
Jankowski questions Falkenhayn's strategic intent of Ausblutung because all the evidence comes from post-war sources*. He takes the customary moment to lament the destruction of the Potsdam archives, before dismissing the predetermination in Falkenhayn's memoirs as unreliable. I will agree that putting the French losses at 2.5 times his own is hyperbole, but not that Falkenhayn wasn’t a man with a plan. The state of elation at the initial gains in various ‘live’ sources such as Crown Prince Wilhelm's diary is supposed to be proof to the contrary. If I recall my Alistair Horne correctly, Falkenhayn left the Fifth Army commander as much in the dark as the ranks as to the ultimate goal.
The word of the day is “Why?” Next to the opaque objective and the current reputation of Verdun as the ultimate expression of senseless slaughter, Jankowski sees little to no gain. There was no strategic victory. Not unless you look at the long-term attrition of the Western Front, I say. While losses stood equal and Noria planted the seeds of mutiny into the collective morale of the French Army, the Germans had to juggle the demands of the Meuse with the demands of the Somme. They also refrained from going on the offensive in the West for almost the remainder of the war.
Why defend it at all? Verdun was a point on a map, not France herself. A docile French press had at first little appetite for exalting a place the High Command risked losing any day either [but] after ten days “the fate of the nation was at hand at a modern Thermophylae” revoking the image of 1792.
A mirage, if you asked the Troisième Bureau. Surprise was inevitably less than total given the scale of preparations. The human desires of Alsacian deserters were a tell-tale sign in spite of all the effort sunk into camouflage and deception. The concerted plan of attack as formulated at the recent Chantilly (I) conference allowed for a ‘limited’ disruption. True to Foch and form, any enemy attack was welcomed as an opportunity for counter-attack.
More important than Verdun itself or the obsolete concrete slugs encircling the town was the railway network to Paris. The hills beyond, the zone between Meuse and Aisne, figured prominently in military plans for a tactical retreat. Before it came to that, to get to Verdun there were half a dozen more hills behind the beheaded Côte 304. This is certainly a novelty for the average modern Verdun reader, but one so often argumented in hindsight that we cannot discard it. The attack on the first day may have been ‘all hell let loose’ for the French in the zone, but farther to the rear the lack of activity on the other bank of the Meuse raised skeptical eyebrows. What if this was a diversion? What if it was one of several attacks of equal magnitude?
Jankowski adds to this that a multiple attack might’ve been Falkenhayn’s original idea; the man was after all a dedicated Westerner who wanted France out of the war before the British grew too strong. This goes back to the gist of his Memorandum… except for the “multiple” part.
The fact that the offensive at Verdun had to be enlarged to encompass both sides of the river validates the skepticism felt in Paris bitterly in German eyes. “Try as they might, the German gunners could neither penetrate every recess nor destroy every obstacle with their 10:1 superiority in heavy shells." After 8 Days it became clear that no advance could be sustained against those minority survivors and their Chauchat MG’s. But they stood not alone! There was the growing artillery on the Mort-Homme. There was the Fort de Marre on the right and the Fort de Moulainville on the left, both still in possession of their full weaponry. “Only a conspiracy of circumstance, preparation and error made for any significant movement. The art and preparation of one side had to encounter the ineptitude or the improvidence of the other to fall or lines to fracture.”
Jankowski has the politicians (with Briand & Pointcarré in the lead) make the stand against military reason. He does not specify what they hoped to gain, but concludes that in the end there were no political dividends. While the fall of Joffre was in the cards, the rise of Pétain and Nivelle was not. Nor did the cabinet or parliament get shuffled by tremors from the Meuse hills. Not quite. Joffre sided with the politicians, against the increasingly outspoken critics of his strategy based on Grignotage. Or did they side with him, fearing they’d join the fall? Either way, Verdun is political hubris: “Prestige filled the void left by strategic enigma. Once mentioned it became a self-fullfilling prophecy that rendered renunciation unthinkable”. . With more down-to-earth cynicism: The material war made attrition indecisive. This stark fact was hard to explain in the morning papers; the theme of the Triumph of the Spirit over brute material power thus became a theme that made good copy.
The morphing mythology serves Jankowski as an argument, which can currently (still) be summarized as “the stoic poilus under siege vs. the betrayed Lantser”. Oddly enough, German history has not yielded any historical analogies. Yet a century on, France has no official Verdun Day, the opening at 21 March serving as a mutually acceptable point of reference.
Aside from the main line of argument, we get three strikes for free.
”Logistics no longer favoured the bold… no one yet knew, in short, how to attach the enemy logistics instead of his defences.” This is the kind of prism through which you could view the entire second half of the war, with the growing importance of bombing raids on both the operational level (German third line and Etappengebiet ) and strategic level (German industry).
“The besieged had given up the ghost. For all his method, Nivelle had conquered an absent foe.”
BOOM. The corpse of confidence in Nivelle’s capabilities to turn the war in April ’17 based upon his artillery-infantry coordination to recapture Douamont falls on the floor.
Of note to WWII buffs :
The Germans took Blitzkrieg from it [as a remedy against future Verduns], the French the methodical approach of “guerre longue, bataille conduite” they’d apply in 1940 – NOT because they were suffering from an instant Maginot complex.
* Currently Reading (21 +Feb. 2020) Pétain doesn't buy the Verbluten notion in his 1929 booklet, either.
November 21, 2015
When the First World War is discussed, the battle of Verdun is often the first topic addressed. Yet that battle was not decisive nor the bloodiest in the overall scheme of the war. It has become mythical, especially to the French and the author attempts to show how and why.......and does it very well.
The battle was joined for two major reasons; (1)Germany wanted to bleed the French Army dry through attrition and (2)cause troops to be transferred to Verdun from the Somme, thus giving Germany the advantage in that battle.. But the Germans badly underestimated the French and as the battle raged onward (it was the longest battle in WWI), it then became a matter of prestige; a battle that neither side expected to decide the outcome of the war became a battle that neither side dared to give up.
This is not a book of battle plans and tactics but a well researched, well thought out explanation of why Verdun has gained such continuing importance in history. Highly recommended.
The battle was joined for two major reasons; (1)Germany wanted to bleed the French Army dry through attrition and (2)cause troops to be transferred to Verdun from the Somme, thus giving Germany the advantage in that battle.. But the Germans badly underestimated the French and as the battle raged onward (it was the longest battle in WWI), it then became a matter of prestige; a battle that neither side expected to decide the outcome of the war became a battle that neither side dared to give up.
This is not a book of battle plans and tactics but a well researched, well thought out explanation of why Verdun has gained such continuing importance in history. Highly recommended.
April 28, 2014
After finishing this book I found myself slightly disappointed in it. This is probably because it was not what I expected. Let me start with what it is not. It is not a tactical look at the Battle of Verdun, though the author does throw out some interesting statistics from the battle. The reader can not follow the flow of the 10 month battle while reading this volume. The author seems to view the actual fighting as immaterial to his narrative. If the reader is looking for book telling the story of the battle, he/she won’t find it here.
This is basically the story of the whys. Jankowski looks at why the battle was fought in the first place, taking issue with the conventionally accepted view that is was to “bleed France white”. The author looks at the German plans to assault this strategically insignificant piece of the front. He states categorically that the war could not be won at Verdun no matter how successful Falkenhayn’s offensive was. He also looks at why France choose to defend there so tenaciously. In fact prior to the battle, Joffre had virtually stripped Verdun’s defenses to gather troops and artillery for his offensives. Only belatedly did the French start reinforcing the Verdun sector. In fact the defenses were so weak that if the battle had kicked of 10 days earlier like it was planned, the Germans could have walked into Verdun. He makes a point of saying that a French retreat of 5 miles would not have made any difference at all in the strategic balance on the western front.
Jankowski also takes on the task of explaining why the individual infantryman in the two armies fought so hard over this piece of ground. He looks at what affected their morale and their fighting spirit. He takes pains to explain despite horrendous casualties why there were no mutinies in either army, and surprising little desertion. These chapters could be used in explaining why men fight in any war
One section I personally found interesting was the author’s opinion on the differences in philosophy between the French and Germans on artillery. The French were wedded to the direct fire infantry support weapons. This philosophy produced probably the finest light artillery piece of the war – the French 75. However, France was sorely lacking in heavy, indirect fire guns. The German’s on the other hand, were invested indirect fire weapons and had plenty of heavy (150mm or larger) guns at the opening of the battle which were used to devastating effect. On day the assault kicked off the Germans fired more than 1,000,000 rounds of arty. At one point each gun was firing once every 15 seconds. The French never really caught up to the Germans in either the quantity or quality of heavy artillery
Jankowski does take on some of the myths of the battle – one of which is the cost in human lives. His estimates of the total death count are significantly lower than commonly accepted – appox 300,000 total on both sides. He states that Verdun was not the most costly battle of the war. That honor goes to either the opening offensives of the war in '14 or the Champaign offensive of 1915. He even states that it didn’t have the highest casualty rates – that “honor” goes to the previous yr’s offensive. The author also states that one cannot even really state when the battle ended – it just kind of petered out after about 10 months. It was however the longest battle of the war.
Overall this was a decent look at the whys of the battle and puts Verdun in context, but really doesn’t tell the story of the battle – I would give it 3.5 stars rounded down for good reads.
This is basically the story of the whys. Jankowski looks at why the battle was fought in the first place, taking issue with the conventionally accepted view that is was to “bleed France white”. The author looks at the German plans to assault this strategically insignificant piece of the front. He states categorically that the war could not be won at Verdun no matter how successful Falkenhayn’s offensive was. He also looks at why France choose to defend there so tenaciously. In fact prior to the battle, Joffre had virtually stripped Verdun’s defenses to gather troops and artillery for his offensives. Only belatedly did the French start reinforcing the Verdun sector. In fact the defenses were so weak that if the battle had kicked of 10 days earlier like it was planned, the Germans could have walked into Verdun. He makes a point of saying that a French retreat of 5 miles would not have made any difference at all in the strategic balance on the western front.
Jankowski also takes on the task of explaining why the individual infantryman in the two armies fought so hard over this piece of ground. He looks at what affected their morale and their fighting spirit. He takes pains to explain despite horrendous casualties why there were no mutinies in either army, and surprising little desertion. These chapters could be used in explaining why men fight in any war
One section I personally found interesting was the author’s opinion on the differences in philosophy between the French and Germans on artillery. The French were wedded to the direct fire infantry support weapons. This philosophy produced probably the finest light artillery piece of the war – the French 75. However, France was sorely lacking in heavy, indirect fire guns. The German’s on the other hand, were invested indirect fire weapons and had plenty of heavy (150mm or larger) guns at the opening of the battle which were used to devastating effect. On day the assault kicked off the Germans fired more than 1,000,000 rounds of arty. At one point each gun was firing once every 15 seconds. The French never really caught up to the Germans in either the quantity or quality of heavy artillery
Jankowski does take on some of the myths of the battle – one of which is the cost in human lives. His estimates of the total death count are significantly lower than commonly accepted – appox 300,000 total on both sides. He states that Verdun was not the most costly battle of the war. That honor goes to either the opening offensives of the war in '14 or the Champaign offensive of 1915. He even states that it didn’t have the highest casualty rates – that “honor” goes to the previous yr’s offensive. The author also states that one cannot even really state when the battle ended – it just kind of petered out after about 10 months. It was however the longest battle of the war.
Overall this was a decent look at the whys of the battle and puts Verdun in context, but really doesn’t tell the story of the battle – I would give it 3.5 stars rounded down for good reads.
August 31, 2019
Thoughtful telling of both sides of the battle. The final chapter gives good insight on difference between the home front and war front.
December 5, 2014
This is not a traditional military history, though it does tell about the battle's events. This book's value is to place Verdun in perspective -- why they fought, rather than how, and what France and Germany took away from it, from that time to ours. It is helpful in telling the reader why the Germans chose that place and an offensive in that manner, and why the French responded as they did. Mr. Jankowski does examine, and sometimes debunk, the later characterizations of the battle, notably, that "attrition" may not have been the real reason behind Gen. Falkenhayn's strategy -- even given Falkenhayn's own attempt, postwar, to re-characterize his actions. We learn how the battle affected, and, more important, was affected by, combat on other parts of the Western Front and elsewhere. We learn more about the battle in context of German and French soldiers' morale (both armies would mutiny later on). And we learn some surprising perspectives: the main battle of Verdun may have run out by the end of 1916, but the front remained active and when the Americans attacked in that sector in 1918, we're told, they used 3,000 guns to start the attack, far more than Falkenhayn's 1200 or so.
The book is succinct at 265 pp. and the author seems to have done considerable and original research in French and German archives, particularly on casualty numbers, military postal censorship and civil-military relations on both sides. He makes good use of soldiers' letters, diaries and memoirs, and not just of those who survived the war but those of the dead. In all, it's an original and new look at Verdun and the wider war, and its legacy to this time, a century on. Highest recommendation.
The book is succinct at 265 pp. and the author seems to have done considerable and original research in French and German archives, particularly on casualty numbers, military postal censorship and civil-military relations on both sides. He makes good use of soldiers' letters, diaries and memoirs, and not just of those who survived the war but those of the dead. In all, it's an original and new look at Verdun and the wider war, and its legacy to this time, a century on. Highest recommendation.
October 29, 2022
[Start with 300 unnecessary words explaining what Verdun was]
[Add some backhanded complement, implying you somehow know any better despite never researching the topic yourself]
[Get one like]
[Look forward to finishing another book just to craft another MASTERFUL review]
[Still no call from the Times Literary Supplement? Really?]
[Add some backhanded complement, implying you somehow know any better despite never researching the topic yourself]
[Get one like]
[Look forward to finishing another book just to craft another MASTERFUL review]
[Still no call from the Times Literary Supplement? Really?]
February 12, 2016
A book about Verdun that talks about everything other than the actual battle. Do yourself a favor and skip this one.
July 22, 2017
In short: well researched, good info, but at times a bit wandering and was a real trudge of a read, even for someone who loves military history books.
October 8, 2020
Verdun will go down in history as the slaughterhouse of the world
--American ambulance driver, Verdun
Verdun: The Longest Battle of the Great War by Paul Jankowski is an account of a single battle lasting almost the entire year of 1916. Jankowski is a history professor at Brandeis University outside of Boston, Massachusetts. His writing centers on modern French history including the Stavisky Affair, political scandals, and Simon Sabiani.
The German advance through France ended at the First Battle of the Marne. The Schlieffen Plan stalled with unexpected resistance of the Belgium army and overextended of supply lines. Although railroads allowed for increased supplies, the sheer number of troops and need heavy ammunition could not be maintained. Russia's quick mobilization and Britain joining the war in defense of Belgium were also not expected. Once the German advance was stopped both sides dug into a standoff which characterized the war: Trench Warfare.
Verdun was a battle between France and German and two very different plans. The Germans brought in heavy artillery that lobbed shells over obstacles to their targets. The gunners, many times, never saw their target and relied on spotters to direct fire, either forward observers or balloons and aircraft. This strategy worked well against the French defense of fortresses that were not able to stand up to heavy attacks. The French chose lighter artillery that was intended mostly as an anti-personnel weapon and used direct fire opposed to the German's indirect fire. All told 44 million shells were fired that year in Verdun including chemical weapons being fired from both sides.
The battle was also a battle of generals. Marshal Joseph Jacques Cesaire Joffre lead the French. He was made famous in the Battle of the Marne for regrouping retreating troops and making a stand and holding the German advance. His plans at Verdun were to wear out the Germans. France lost so many troops in battle that the original plan to have 40 divisions for the Somme, was reduced to 14 divisions. Germany was lead by Erich von Falkenhayn. Falkenhayn plan was to bleed the French white. He failed to seize the offensive when it was open and after a year of fighting the trench lines remain little changes. Flakenhayn expressed progress by comparing the number of dead French to dead Germans as a ratio of his success. Both generals were replaced after Verdun. 300,000 were killed at Verdun with casualty estimates ranging from 600,000 to 1,000,000.
Jankowski presents a very fact heavy book with almost a quarter of the book as source reference. There are interesting facts laced through out the book. On the subject of mutiny and desertion, a German study found a much stronger relation to desertion based on bad weather than on combat. Also what was to be done with 300,000 dead? Men were dying on an average of 1,000 a day. The French although losing the battle in casualties claim the holding of Verdun with much pride. A German source is noted as saying the battle of Verdun was over June 15, 1940, after the French surrender. Perhaps the entire war may be summarized by a single paragraph from Jankowsi:
With success so elusive and failure so costly, reason might dictate that the Germans suspend their initiative, or the French moderate their response. Why ten months and more of debilitating attacks and counterattack, why the losses that irreparably weakened each national protagonist, just to return each side to its original lines?
Verdun is being released for the 100th anniversary of the start of World War I. Although a century old, the war has plenty of valid lessons for today. There are no quick and easy wars. Romanticized ideals of nationalism and answering the call of duty quickly turn into doubt as the reality of war sets in. There has been hardly a war a country enters into without copious popular support and hardly a war that ends without doubt, protest, and unpopularity at home. Jankowski gives a well researched and clearly written account of one of the major battles in WWI. Highly recommended for World War I historians.
August 31, 2020
Over 8 million horses perished during WWI. After reading this book I feel as though the author has beaten every dead horse repeatedly. This is another book in need of a good editor. As another reviewer stated this book is about everything except the actual battle. First the analysis of Verdun is addressed via the aims of France and Germany. Basically the aim of both is to hold the line, not send in adequate reinforcements to win a battle, and to bleed each other white via attrition. OK that is two chapters.... Mr. Jankowski REPEATEDLY points out that battles of WWI were unlike those of Napoleon and virtually every other European war / battle known to man. YOU THINK!!! This is the first war where materiel was more important than men. If this author did not repeat himself ad nauseum, the book would be a great article. Then we have the offensive, prestige and attritional traps chapters. Verdun goes on for 300 days because no one ever takes an insightful and reinforced attack strategy, no one wants to lose face, and the loss of the battle of attrition because of one and two. Losses about even in the final analysis ( perhaps some thousands more lost on the French side, but because we are calculating in 100's of thousands, it hardly matters ). Then we have the chapters Nightmare , Rancor, Warning Signals, and Enemies. Yes the battle was a nightmare of rats, hunger, death, cold, shells, gas, flame throwers and odors of rotting bodies. The French and Germans did not hate each other as much as they did the officers who sacrificed them daily. There were a few desertions and revolts, but none was significant. We did not know this about WWI???? Then we have a chapters on loyalties where the author basically tells us that the men hated at times the civilians, the generals, clans within the armies, the generals, independent kingships within the army (German ), the generals, the person next to them and sometimes the actual enemies. What exactly were the loyalties?? When they existed they were often simply to duty to the man next to you or numbness to the point of inability to revolt en masse. If you want to read a book on the history of the Battle of Verdun, choose another book. I wish I had... Kristi & Abby Tabby
May 30, 2023
This is the first comprehensive work I have read on THE GREAT WAR! It was something on my list, but I really wasn't able to get to it until this year. The book itself was random although it did come with a number of recommendations. It was a good place to start! Since then, I have added a few more to my list with the next The Storm of Steel by Ernest Junger.
The opening salvo for the book was by an American ambulance driver who was taken aback by the intense and continuous shelling. When speaking of Verdun, he said it was the - "Slaughterhouse of the world."
It really set the tone for much of the book, not so much that it was blood and gore, but rather the philosophy of the whole war. The German General Eric Von Falkenhayn had no strategy other than that of attrition. To, in his words, "bleed the French white" and the French were as determined to defend Verdun as the Germans were to take it.
One source I review said that over 400,000 French soldiers lost their lives from February 21st to December 18th, 1916. That would come close to one soldier dying per second for twenty fours a day, 7 days a week for 10 months.
It was estimated between 40 and 60 million shells were used. At one point the French alone were making 400, 000 shells a month. The largest cause of death again estimated at 70% was the result of the shelling.
The author covered the politics involved, including the various generals on both sides of the conflict. It always amazed me how so few people can be responsible for the life and death of so many.
This was a very sobering read for me as most are. I would easily recommend it as a good place to start if you are interested in studying The Great War.
The opening salvo for the book was by an American ambulance driver who was taken aback by the intense and continuous shelling. When speaking of Verdun, he said it was the - "Slaughterhouse of the world."
It really set the tone for much of the book, not so much that it was blood and gore, but rather the philosophy of the whole war. The German General Eric Von Falkenhayn had no strategy other than that of attrition. To, in his words, "bleed the French white" and the French were as determined to defend Verdun as the Germans were to take it.
One source I review said that over 400,000 French soldiers lost their lives from February 21st to December 18th, 1916. That would come close to one soldier dying per second for twenty fours a day, 7 days a week for 10 months.
It was estimated between 40 and 60 million shells were used. At one point the French alone were making 400, 000 shells a month. The largest cause of death again estimated at 70% was the result of the shelling.
The author covered the politics involved, including the various generals on both sides of the conflict. It always amazed me how so few people can be responsible for the life and death of so many.
This was a very sobering read for me as most are. I would easily recommend it as a good place to start if you are interested in studying The Great War.
May 20, 2022
Good review of epic battle that defined France in WW1 - although we find it was not as important as it was made out to be at the time. I think the "long look back" at Verdun with the benefit of hindsight, declassified archives and academic scholarship determines that Verdun was more about maintaining morale and creating a point for the nation to rally towards - than an actual critical battle. That confusion about "why Verdun" from both French and German perspectives is what I found most intriguing in this well researched history.
As the industrialized horror of WW1 dragged on "public morale" as well as military "esprit de corp" was top of mind for the French as as such framing Verdun as a critical battle became an all encompassing political concern. It was a stalemate that no-one wanted to break - not that they could. Verdun also became a problem for Command as various Generals mis-concieved their strengths and weaknesses.
Utlimately I found it explained much about the propaganda war and challenge of maintaining morale of French troops for the 4 year that the front existed, as it did about the actual battles across that period.
As the industrialized horror of WW1 dragged on "public morale" as well as military "esprit de corp" was top of mind for the French as as such framing Verdun as a critical battle became an all encompassing political concern. It was a stalemate that no-one wanted to break - not that they could. Verdun also became a problem for Command as various Generals mis-concieved their strengths and weaknesses.
Utlimately I found it explained much about the propaganda war and challenge of maintaining morale of French troops for the 4 year that the front existed, as it did about the actual battles across that period.
July 26, 2021
Firstly, this is not a narrative sequence of events, it does have some chronological structure, but is not a complete historical narrative. So, it would be advisable to have some previous knowledge of the sequence of events that was the battle of Verdun.
This work sets out to dispell the myths about Verdun, "The French Thermopylae", to quote one example of the myths addressed. Further, it sets out to cover aspects of the battle that are not well covered by other works.
This is an interesting book, I found it easy to follow some lines of argument and equally easy to disagree with others. However, I think it's best for each reader to form their own opinion on this without getting bogged down with specific examples. Trust me I tried to write an example here and could have written a doctoral thesis so I gave up 😂.
So, all in all, an interesting and different take on the battle of Verdun. An important work, but not a defining one.
Recommended if you like the subject
Thanks for reading
This work sets out to dispell the myths about Verdun, "The French Thermopylae", to quote one example of the myths addressed. Further, it sets out to cover aspects of the battle that are not well covered by other works.
This is an interesting book, I found it easy to follow some lines of argument and equally easy to disagree with others. However, I think it's best for each reader to form their own opinion on this without getting bogged down with specific examples. Trust me I tried to write an example here and could have written a doctoral thesis so I gave up 😂.
So, all in all, an interesting and different take on the battle of Verdun. An important work, but not a defining one.
Recommended if you like the subject
Thanks for reading
February 24, 2018
A history of the longest battle of the First World War – or is it? The events of the actual battle get remarkably little space or discussion. Instead the book deals with the social history of the soldiers on both sides (although primarily the French), and on the various traps of attrition, prestige, and inertia that the generals and their political masters fell into. This is fascinating stuff, but there's an unspoken assumption that the reader is primarily interested in these broader issues, and furthermore already knows all the important features of the battle itself in enough detail to not need even a chronology. Having read the book I still don't know how the battle ended. It's probably better therefore to think about this book as an exploration of the wider landscape, both official and personal, of the experience of a huge and extended battle, rather than having all that much to do with the battle as an event.
March 28, 2018
Verdun: The Longest Battle of the Great War is about the significance and the background behind the titular battle. The book explores the reasons behind the battle, perspectives regarding it, and the impact that the battle had on both sides. The book also gives insight into some of the decisions made by leaders as the battle was happening.
The book is worth reading if you’re interested in the kind of book it is. For those who want to know about the events of the war, the strategies involved, and how it ended, this book falls short. As I said above, the book focuses more on the details behind the battle, not the battle details themselves. The content of the book is certainly interesting, although that depends on what the reader wants out of a book.
The book is worth reading if you’re interested in the kind of book it is. For those who want to know about the events of the war, the strategies involved, and how it ended, this book falls short. As I said above, the book focuses more on the details behind the battle, not the battle details themselves. The content of the book is certainly interesting, although that depends on what the reader wants out of a book.
July 8, 2025
This was recommended to me as a sort of military anthropology attempt, focusing not so much on events and battles and strategy, but more on the meaning that people give events, the whys involved in people's decision to fight against terrible odds and so on.
Verdun has long held an outsized significance in post-war memory, despite the fact that it was neither the biggest batle, or the most strategically important, or with the most important losses. This book attempts to explain why.
Only 3 stars from me because I would have preferred an even more anthropological focus.
Verdun has long held an outsized significance in post-war memory, despite the fact that it was neither the biggest batle, or the most strategically important, or with the most important losses. This book attempts to explain why.
Only 3 stars from me because I would have preferred an even more anthropological focus.
December 27, 2025
I bought this book back in 2019 and finally got around to reading it. I was expecting a narrative account of the battle, Antony Beevor style.
What I got instead was a disconnected and confusing story of the battle of Verdun with the book jumping around between different themes but never really getting deep enough into any of them.
If I didn’t know anything about the battle before this book, I would have only been left with confusion. The subject matter however is interesting and that’s what redeems a lot of this book.
What I got instead was a disconnected and confusing story of the battle of Verdun with the book jumping around between different themes but never really getting deep enough into any of them.
If I didn’t know anything about the battle before this book, I would have only been left with confusion. The subject matter however is interesting and that’s what redeems a lot of this book.
December 4, 2019
It was a very good book for people who like to read historical non-fiction I personally loved it because I love reading historical fiction books and this really captures the sounds and looks of this great WWI battle
Read
December 7, 2021I really enjoyed this book it is an amazing account of the battle of Verdun. The emotion it follows of the characters feels as if you are back in the war. I would use this in my middle school history class.
January 10, 2018
Se pude leer aunque es un poco flojo, esperaba mas anecdotas y hubo mucho análisis de las relaciones entre los soldados de ambos bandos
April 28, 2024
Not a blow by blow account of the battle, rather an examination of the reasons for it, and why the renown or significance of the battle has grown.
July 13, 2024
Not what I was looking for
March 20, 2014
What was the purpose of the German assault on the Fortress of Verdun in 1916? Was it truly to ‘bleed the French white’ as General Falkenhayn stated in his memoirs after the war, or was it just another blundering frontal assault like the Somme or Ypres? Those looking for another history of the battle or a chronology as to who fought who and when, try somewhere else. Jankowski clearly states at the beginning of the book that this is not his purpose.
His purpose is two-fold: try to figure out why the battle happened, and why the men who fought it continued even after they knew how futile it was. First he discusses the length of the battle and how do you measure how long it lasted. We know when the battle started February 21, 1916, but when did it end? Since the trenches never truly quieted down, when does a major battle become minor skirmishes and does this signify the end?
Secondly, how did the way the French and German soldiers view the battle. For the French it was to protect this part of the trenches, but the land around Verdun had very little military importance. If the Germans had broken through they would still have been 200 miles away from Paris. For the Germans it became a mano-a-mano between Falkenhayn and Joffre and then Petain.
Thirdly, it became a prestige thing, who could make the other side say Uncle. Who was tougher, more willing to spend manpower and material for a piece of land that meant nothing to the outcome of the war. The French were trying to prevent what the perceived as another Sedan, while for the Germans it was pushing the French to give up another piece of real estate.
Fourthly, and for me this was the major question of the battle, why did the men on both sides of the battle continue to fight? Dulce et decorum est Pro patria mori…It is sweet to dies for one’s country. Is this the reason that men fight? Over the 300 days of the Battle for Verdun, men were asked to live in some of the worst conditions that could be imagined. The cold and heat from February to December including a raining season that left the ground so saturated that the mud could never be washed off completely.
The men lived with vermin, lice, rats, constant shelling, constant sniping and though the French were rotated every three weeks, the Germans spent months in the trenches. Because of the constant bombardment it was hard to bring up food and ammunition and men complained that they never got ‘hot meals’ and that mail was late or destroyed. The men knew that the ‘General Staff’ lived in Chateaux twenty to fifty miles behind the lines with soft beds and catered meals every night.
Jankowski did a fantastic job explaining how the men in the trenches felt towards their leaders, the enemy and the home front. In every war the frontline soldiers consider the ‘rear echelon’ to be shirkers and poseurs. In ‘Nam we referred to them as REMF, you can guess what the MF stood for. This was the first modern war. That meant that the ‘heads’ of the Armies didn’t fight with their men, this was a ‘Captain and Sargent’ war. General’s seldom viewed a battle but waited at headquarters for reports that might not come for days.
I remember my dad telling me how in WW 2, after spending four months in the trenches near Monti Casino in Italy during the winter, he finally got leave to go to Rome. He also received his purple heart and promotion to Private First Class. Before he and his company go to Rome they were stop by an MP Colonel. He spent ten minutes (standing on his jeep with his clean uniform and polished boots) telling my dad and his friends that they were a disgrace to the US Army and blah blah blah.
My dad’s platoon laughed at the guy and kept on heading to the R&R depot. The MP followed them and reported them to the General in charge. Not only did he lose his stripes, but the General cancelled his and his buddies leave. On the way out from the depot, someone put a grenade in the Colonel’s jeep and blew it up. Now who could have done that?
This is a fast way of saying that men fight for their buddies and no one else. When under fire they don’t care about country, family, the military or anyone else but the guys who are protecting their six. Everyone else can go to hell. Jankowski does a fine job explaining this. Worth the read.
Zeb Kantrowitz
His purpose is two-fold: try to figure out why the battle happened, and why the men who fought it continued even after they knew how futile it was. First he discusses the length of the battle and how do you measure how long it lasted. We know when the battle started February 21, 1916, but when did it end? Since the trenches never truly quieted down, when does a major battle become minor skirmishes and does this signify the end?
Secondly, how did the way the French and German soldiers view the battle. For the French it was to protect this part of the trenches, but the land around Verdun had very little military importance. If the Germans had broken through they would still have been 200 miles away from Paris. For the Germans it became a mano-a-mano between Falkenhayn and Joffre and then Petain.
Thirdly, it became a prestige thing, who could make the other side say Uncle. Who was tougher, more willing to spend manpower and material for a piece of land that meant nothing to the outcome of the war. The French were trying to prevent what the perceived as another Sedan, while for the Germans it was pushing the French to give up another piece of real estate.
Fourthly, and for me this was the major question of the battle, why did the men on both sides of the battle continue to fight? Dulce et decorum est Pro patria mori…It is sweet to dies for one’s country. Is this the reason that men fight? Over the 300 days of the Battle for Verdun, men were asked to live in some of the worst conditions that could be imagined. The cold and heat from February to December including a raining season that left the ground so saturated that the mud could never be washed off completely.
The men lived with vermin, lice, rats, constant shelling, constant sniping and though the French were rotated every three weeks, the Germans spent months in the trenches. Because of the constant bombardment it was hard to bring up food and ammunition and men complained that they never got ‘hot meals’ and that mail was late or destroyed. The men knew that the ‘General Staff’ lived in Chateaux twenty to fifty miles behind the lines with soft beds and catered meals every night.
Jankowski did a fantastic job explaining how the men in the trenches felt towards their leaders, the enemy and the home front. In every war the frontline soldiers consider the ‘rear echelon’ to be shirkers and poseurs. In ‘Nam we referred to them as REMF, you can guess what the MF stood for. This was the first modern war. That meant that the ‘heads’ of the Armies didn’t fight with their men, this was a ‘Captain and Sargent’ war. General’s seldom viewed a battle but waited at headquarters for reports that might not come for days.
I remember my dad telling me how in WW 2, after spending four months in the trenches near Monti Casino in Italy during the winter, he finally got leave to go to Rome. He also received his purple heart and promotion to Private First Class. Before he and his company go to Rome they were stop by an MP Colonel. He spent ten minutes (standing on his jeep with his clean uniform and polished boots) telling my dad and his friends that they were a disgrace to the US Army and blah blah blah.
My dad’s platoon laughed at the guy and kept on heading to the R&R depot. The MP followed them and reported them to the General in charge. Not only did he lose his stripes, but the General cancelled his and his buddies leave. On the way out from the depot, someone put a grenade in the Colonel’s jeep and blew it up. Now who could have done that?
This is a fast way of saying that men fight for their buddies and no one else. When under fire they don’t care about country, family, the military or anyone else but the guys who are protecting their six. Everyone else can go to hell. Jankowski does a fine job explaining this. Worth the read.
Zeb Kantrowitz
March 25, 2014
Cerebral Overview of Verdun Battle …
This book was reviewed as part of Amazon's Vine program which included a free advance copy of the book.
The battles fought in Western Europe during World War I are often described as prolonged moments of seemingly endless carnage with entrenched opponents trying to pulverize one another into submission (or oblivion) with heavy artillery. Blistering machine gun fire met anyone who dared to exit the trenches for any reason. While the Battle of the Somme may actually represent trench warfare at its worst (in terms of mass casualties), the Battle of Verdun has arguably taken center-stage as the “granddaddy” of all World War I battles in terms of casualties and importance, as well as epitomizing trench warfare. Paul Jankowski’s VERDUN provides a fresh look at the Battle of Verdun and in the process peels away the layers of myth and mystique associated with the Great War’s longest battle.
It is important to understand that VERDUN is not a book that focuses on grisly combat action through a collection of first-hand accounts. Midway through the book, there is a brief chapter (“Nightmare”) dedicated to the battlefield experience, but it is more or less provided for contextual purposes. The book is aimed primarily at the examining the rationale behind the popular/historical myth and reverence associated with this particular battle. Jankowski appeared to approach this book with a desire to take readers down a path that replaces the pyrrhic glory associated with Verdun with a heavy dose of reality. A reality that questions the strategic value of the battle, the competence of leadership on both sides and the fact that the men who killed and were killed did so for each other rather than any sense of national pride.
Jankowski provides an erudite view of the battle that is easy to digest and maintains balance (both the German and French perspectives are presented). He examines (questions) the significance of Verdun and offers the possible rationale behind the necessity of both sides to persist in attacking/defending for almost a year, resulting in the massive waste of men and material (even ego is offered as a plausible reason). Additionally, Jankowski examines the fragile state of the men involved in the combat, their resentment of leadership, their suffering, their will to fight and even their views of the enemy.
What I found most enjoyable about VERDUN was that it seemed to “wipe the dust” off the near-century-old battle and look at it with a fresh set of eyes. Verdun has generally been portrayed in an epic and symbolic light, this book definitely takes away some of the generally-accepted veneer (Jankowski even examines how the excessive casualties associated with the battle have been historically inflated for effect). Definitely a worthy read as we approach the century mark of the War to End All Wars.
This book was reviewed as part of Amazon's Vine program which included a free advance copy of the book.
The battles fought in Western Europe during World War I are often described as prolonged moments of seemingly endless carnage with entrenched opponents trying to pulverize one another into submission (or oblivion) with heavy artillery. Blistering machine gun fire met anyone who dared to exit the trenches for any reason. While the Battle of the Somme may actually represent trench warfare at its worst (in terms of mass casualties), the Battle of Verdun has arguably taken center-stage as the “granddaddy” of all World War I battles in terms of casualties and importance, as well as epitomizing trench warfare. Paul Jankowski’s VERDUN provides a fresh look at the Battle of Verdun and in the process peels away the layers of myth and mystique associated with the Great War’s longest battle.
It is important to understand that VERDUN is not a book that focuses on grisly combat action through a collection of first-hand accounts. Midway through the book, there is a brief chapter (“Nightmare”) dedicated to the battlefield experience, but it is more or less provided for contextual purposes. The book is aimed primarily at the examining the rationale behind the popular/historical myth and reverence associated with this particular battle. Jankowski appeared to approach this book with a desire to take readers down a path that replaces the pyrrhic glory associated with Verdun with a heavy dose of reality. A reality that questions the strategic value of the battle, the competence of leadership on both sides and the fact that the men who killed and were killed did so for each other rather than any sense of national pride.
Jankowski provides an erudite view of the battle that is easy to digest and maintains balance (both the German and French perspectives are presented). He examines (questions) the significance of Verdun and offers the possible rationale behind the necessity of both sides to persist in attacking/defending for almost a year, resulting in the massive waste of men and material (even ego is offered as a plausible reason). Additionally, Jankowski examines the fragile state of the men involved in the combat, their resentment of leadership, their suffering, their will to fight and even their views of the enemy.
What I found most enjoyable about VERDUN was that it seemed to “wipe the dust” off the near-century-old battle and look at it with a fresh set of eyes. Verdun has generally been portrayed in an epic and symbolic light, this book definitely takes away some of the generally-accepted veneer (Jankowski even examines how the excessive casualties associated with the battle have been historically inflated for effect). Definitely a worthy read as we approach the century mark of the War to End All Wars.
March 19, 2016
If you're looking for a book about which unit attacked which other unit in what location on what date with what result, this book isn't for you. But if you're looking for a book dealing with the human condition as it relates to a major battle, you'll love this read -- as I did.
Mr. Jankowski's work does not lack for research and is even-handed in its approach, though my impression was that the French point of view might have been more detailed, perhaps due to the number of primary sources available. But in any event, it's a compelling read on a number of fronts, handling emotional topics such as death, despair, religion, hatred and even internal rivalry with adroitness and skill.
I have spent much of my adult life reading unit histories and detailed accounts of human conflict, but this book deals with the reasons behind facets of human conflict which simply are not seen in much writing on the subject of war. His account of how even the French view of Verdun has shifted throughout history is especially compelling.
In fact, certain portions of the book, especially those dealing with rivalries and bitterness within armies and individual units, might in itself make for a fascinating dissertation, especially since there appears to be a dearth of such information relating to the First World War.
Again: if the movements of troops on maps appeals to you, this book won't satisfy. But if you want a book that engages, provokes and makes you think, grab this one and don't put it down until you're done.
Mr. Jankowski's work does not lack for research and is even-handed in its approach, though my impression was that the French point of view might have been more detailed, perhaps due to the number of primary sources available. But in any event, it's a compelling read on a number of fronts, handling emotional topics such as death, despair, religion, hatred and even internal rivalry with adroitness and skill.
I have spent much of my adult life reading unit histories and detailed accounts of human conflict, but this book deals with the reasons behind facets of human conflict which simply are not seen in much writing on the subject of war. His account of how even the French view of Verdun has shifted throughout history is especially compelling.
In fact, certain portions of the book, especially those dealing with rivalries and bitterness within armies and individual units, might in itself make for a fascinating dissertation, especially since there appears to be a dearth of such information relating to the First World War.
Again: if the movements of troops on maps appeals to you, this book won't satisfy. But if you want a book that engages, provokes and makes you think, grab this one and don't put it down until you're done.
March 23, 2014
This is not so much a book about the battle of Verdun as about the context in which this sanguinary struggle took place.
The book has a couple maps at the outset, but not so much thereafter. While the book does describe the actual combat that took place around Verdun, this is not really a "battle book," with the emphasis on what happened during the battle, how units performed, how leaders performed, and so on. These matters are, of course, considered. But the real focus of this book is the larger picture of Verdun.
The book discusses a variety of contextual issues--the disagreements and maneuvering of top military leaders on either side (e.g., the struggles between General Falkenhayn and Generals Ludendorff and Hindenburg, the efforts of the military to keep the results of savage fighting from the media and even political leaders, the efforts of political leaders to "spin" the results, the uncertain nature of each side's strategy (Did Falkenhayn really propose and implement an attrition strategy against the French?), and so on. Over time, the meaning of Verdun shifted and changed--from both the French and German perspectives.
In a sense, Verdun tended to be reinterpreted over time.
This book tries to make sense of the big picture element of Verdun. Overall, it is pretty successful in this regard.
The book has a couple maps at the outset, but not so much thereafter. While the book does describe the actual combat that took place around Verdun, this is not really a "battle book," with the emphasis on what happened during the battle, how units performed, how leaders performed, and so on. These matters are, of course, considered. But the real focus of this book is the larger picture of Verdun.
The book discusses a variety of contextual issues--the disagreements and maneuvering of top military leaders on either side (e.g., the struggles between General Falkenhayn and Generals Ludendorff and Hindenburg, the efforts of the military to keep the results of savage fighting from the media and even political leaders, the efforts of political leaders to "spin" the results, the uncertain nature of each side's strategy (Did Falkenhayn really propose and implement an attrition strategy against the French?), and so on. Over time, the meaning of Verdun shifted and changed--from both the French and German perspectives.
In a sense, Verdun tended to be reinterpreted over time.
This book tries to make sense of the big picture element of Verdun. Overall, it is pretty successful in this regard.
February 19, 2014
Many books are written about individual battles in World War I, especially Verdun. For a variety of reasons, Verdun is emblematic of the fighting on the Western Front in the Great War. However, Paul Jankowski has not written a normal battle history in Verdun, but rather a meditation on what many consider the longest battle of World War I. Rather than a detailed description of the action tracing units involved, personalities, terrain, etc., he opens with a discussion on the place the battle holds in the memories of Frenchmen, Germans and historians. He explores why the German forces attacked at Verdun, then why the French decided to make a hold-at-all-cost defense there. He examines the evidence regarding what part the concept of offensive tactics and rates of attrition played in the battle and how prestige (French and German) controlled the length of the battle. He looked at what French and German troops thought of the battle and how they viewed each other. The other major area he covered is why the forces involved continued fighting this battle.
If you are looking for action, consider other titles on Verdun. But if you want a revisionist synthesis on why the battle happened, read on.
If you are looking for action, consider other titles on Verdun. But if you want a revisionist synthesis on why the battle happened, read on.
December 12, 2014
I've been reading more WWI history because of the 100 year anniversary. I started with more general summary works and proceeded into the specific details of campaigns starting with the "Battles of the Frontiers" in 1914. Up next was this recent volume by Paul Jankowski. The Battle of Verdun was a 10 month long masacre that started in February 1915. The city was an important national symbol to the French and the Germans had crafted a plan to take it quickly and force the French 'poilus' to fight to take it back. They had planned to bleed them dry in a human meat grinder by creating elaborate defensive works, but things didn't work out as planned. Over 10 months both sides lost over 300,000 men. That's almost the population of the state of Wyoming. Paul Jankowski does an excellent job with great maps to illustrate the unfolding carnage. As a long time reader of military history I appreciate his balanced description, but I was left with a strong sense of...revulsion? frustration? anger at the never-ending stupidity of mankind. Maybe all of the above. The book is a fine recap of the western front in the 2nd year of the war, but I don't think I have the stomach to slog through 3 more years ('16, '17 & '18) of battle histories. What a monumental waste was the "war to end all wars".
November 1, 2016
This is a fascinating book for anyone with an interest in the history of the Great War. However, this is not a standard battle history. It helps if you have a basic familiarity with the story of the Battle of Verdun. This book is more an analysis, almost a meditation on the battle. The author explores why this particular battle happened in this particular way and the myths that grew up about it..
One thing that jumped out at me: I have always accepted the standard story that the Germans intention was not to capture Verdun but to suck France into a battle of attrition that would "Bleed the French army white". The author does a good job of exploding this story. He makes the point that the only source for this is the commander's (Falkenhayn) post war memoirs. No documents exist to back up this claim. It was merely an excuse for failure, a horrible failure.
I highly recommend this book, but if has been a while since you read anything about the First World War, you may want to brush up a little first.
One thing that jumped out at me: I have always accepted the standard story that the Germans intention was not to capture Verdun but to suck France into a battle of attrition that would "Bleed the French army white". The author does a good job of exploding this story. He makes the point that the only source for this is the commander's (Falkenhayn) post war memoirs. No documents exist to back up this claim. It was merely an excuse for failure, a horrible failure.
I highly recommend this book, but if has been a while since you read anything about the First World War, you may want to brush up a little first.
May 29, 2016
Even though Verdun is one of the longest active battles in history, I had my doubts that a book nearly 300 pages long on the topic could keep me interested throughout. I was happily mistaken. The book breaks down the various aspects of the battle and its participants. It analyzes how people's memory of events can change overtime, whether that's by making a start 180 or vacillating over the decades between extremes.
As much as we elevate battles like Verdun into the pantheon of military history, there's really nothing that special about it. The fact that it has attained such a status in history is one of the focal points of this book, which analyzes just how little was at stake for both sides in this region.
All in all, this was a great book. Even though its a military topic, it ties a lot into social history and the history of front-line soldiers, which should make it engaging for anyone with an interest in the period or history in general.
As much as we elevate battles like Verdun into the pantheon of military history, there's really nothing that special about it. The fact that it has attained such a status in history is one of the focal points of this book, which analyzes just how little was at stake for both sides in this region.
All in all, this was a great book. Even though its a military topic, it ties a lot into social history and the history of front-line soldiers, which should make it engaging for anyone with an interest in the period or history in general.
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