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Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind
John Searle's Speech Acts (1969) and Expression and Meaning (1979) developed a highly original and influential approach to the study of language. But behind both works lay the assumption that the philosophy of language is in the end a branch of the philosophy of the mind: speech acts are forms of human action and represent just one example of the mind's capacity to relate the human organism to the world. The present book is concerned with these biologically fundamental capacities, and, though third in the sequence, in effect it provides the philosophical foundations for the other two. Intentionality is taken to be the crucial mental phenomenon, and its analysis involves wide-ranging discussions of perception, action, causation, meaning, and reference. In all these areas John Searle has original and stimulating views. He ends with a resolution of the 'mind-body' problem.
288 pages, ebook
First published January 1, 1983
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424 people want to read
About the author
John Rogers Searle
96 books371 followersJohn Rogers Searle (born July 31, 1932 in Denver, Colorado) is an American philosopher and was the Slusser Professor of Philosophy and Mills Professor of Philosophy of Mind and Language at the University of California, Berkeley (UC Berkeley). Widely noted for his contributions to the philosophy of language, philosophy of mind and social philosophy, he was the first tenured professor to join the Free Speech Movement at UC Berkeley. He received the Jean Nicod Prize in 2000, and the National Humanities Medal in 2004.
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Displaying 1 - 16 of 16 reviews
December 1, 2024
I picked up this book out of a specific interest in the concept of intentions, how and why we form them, how we act on them, and how we share them. Searle’s contribution to the discussion is to see Intentionality as a quality of a mental state. As I see it, Intentionality is a stance, a way that our perception, actions, thoughts, communication is directed at the world or is “about” the world that we share with others.
In some ways I see a connection between GEM Anscombe’s understanding of intention as an essential part of a practical syllogism by which we articulate a belief or desire and then identify in the local circumstances the means for acting on that belief/desire. Searle also intimately connects intentions to beliefs and desires (i.e., things that we believe to be true about the world and things that we want to be true about the world). The realization or articulation of those beliefs and desires express conditions of satisfaction by which they can be true (i.e., world matches our beliefs, the world is altered to match our desires) and we choose ways of meeting those conditions of satisfaction by taking actions and saying things.
Searle’s overarching objective is to talk about a philosophy of mind that bridges the gulf between mental states of individuals and the world that we live in. Intentionality is that bridge because it is a kind of directness that the mind gives to our actions. It begins with a mental state with physiological causes that we realize in the form of intentions toward the world that are fulfilled through perceptions that we make, actions that we taken, causes that we bring about. There is no awkward middle state in which we form a realization of our intentions and apply them to a perception of the world. Instead, our mental states are realized as intentions directly in the world.
Searle’s argument is satisfyingly direct and commonsensical. It works well for understanding individual actions and the fulfillment of individual intentions. The step that Searle takes in connecting our intentions to other people who share the world with us is to set intentions against the backdrop of a Background (the abilities and conditions needed to satisfy intentions) and Networks of other intentions that also mediate the realization of our intentions. Language is one mediator of our intentions in this world where it is important to share and coordinate. What follows from this consideration is an interesting discussion of language and how intentionality in meaning requires a kind of intensionality (with an s) whereby our intentions are put into the world as shareable thoughts (in the sense that I understand Frege to use the term) that are positioned relative to other agents, times, places, and possible worlds that set the conditions of their satisfaction in local circumstances.
This move takes Searle into the realm of discourse and rhetoric but his methodology of examining intension-with-an-s falls a bit short for me because he limits his investigation to the sentence, assuming that sentences contain the conditions of satisfaction in them. I would say that they don’t because sentences, as ways of interactiong with others and sharing thoughts do not exist in isolation either. He needs a more molar unit of language to see intentions in action. To assume that sentences alone would carry the conditions of their satisfaction overlooks that spoken sentences occur in streams of discourse and written sentences appear in paragraphs that appear in documents that are structured by conventional, genres that support social interactions. I believe this point about the the importance of establishing intensional meaning but the notion of language and discourse in which this occurs is too flat to work for me.
In some ways I see a connection between GEM Anscombe’s understanding of intention as an essential part of a practical syllogism by which we articulate a belief or desire and then identify in the local circumstances the means for acting on that belief/desire. Searle also intimately connects intentions to beliefs and desires (i.e., things that we believe to be true about the world and things that we want to be true about the world). The realization or articulation of those beliefs and desires express conditions of satisfaction by which they can be true (i.e., world matches our beliefs, the world is altered to match our desires) and we choose ways of meeting those conditions of satisfaction by taking actions and saying things.
Searle’s overarching objective is to talk about a philosophy of mind that bridges the gulf between mental states of individuals and the world that we live in. Intentionality is that bridge because it is a kind of directness that the mind gives to our actions. It begins with a mental state with physiological causes that we realize in the form of intentions toward the world that are fulfilled through perceptions that we make, actions that we taken, causes that we bring about. There is no awkward middle state in which we form a realization of our intentions and apply them to a perception of the world. Instead, our mental states are realized as intentions directly in the world.
Searle’s argument is satisfyingly direct and commonsensical. It works well for understanding individual actions and the fulfillment of individual intentions. The step that Searle takes in connecting our intentions to other people who share the world with us is to set intentions against the backdrop of a Background (the abilities and conditions needed to satisfy intentions) and Networks of other intentions that also mediate the realization of our intentions. Language is one mediator of our intentions in this world where it is important to share and coordinate. What follows from this consideration is an interesting discussion of language and how intentionality in meaning requires a kind of intensionality (with an s) whereby our intentions are put into the world as shareable thoughts (in the sense that I understand Frege to use the term) that are positioned relative to other agents, times, places, and possible worlds that set the conditions of their satisfaction in local circumstances.
This move takes Searle into the realm of discourse and rhetoric but his methodology of examining intension-with-an-s falls a bit short for me because he limits his investigation to the sentence, assuming that sentences contain the conditions of satisfaction in them. I would say that they don’t because sentences, as ways of interactiong with others and sharing thoughts do not exist in isolation either. He needs a more molar unit of language to see intentions in action. To assume that sentences alone would carry the conditions of their satisfaction overlooks that spoken sentences occur in streams of discourse and written sentences appear in paragraphs that appear in documents that are structured by conventional, genres that support social interactions. I believe this point about the the importance of establishing intensional meaning but the notion of language and discourse in which this occurs is too flat to work for me.
March 6, 2007
I think this man is fundamentally misguided in everything he writes and teaches. He tries to make common sense into philosophy, and while it is not convincing, it is kind of fun to read to see how wrong he can be. This book is probably the best because it is one of his earliest, and sets out the tenets of this thought. Almost every other book of his after this reiterates this theory in one way or another.
December 6, 2016
Probably one of the most comprehensive overviews of Searle's view on mind and language and the relationship between the two. It does not go into Searle's views on the relationship between facts and assertions (on the one hand) or beliefs and society (on the other) and so it is not totally inclusive of Searle's broad philosophical views. Still, it is pretty substantial.
There are a number of challenges with reading the book, which is that Searle is not particularly clear with regard to where he stands relative to the historical discussion. Frege, who plays a major role in Searle's discussion, has very clear views about the role of psychology in a theory of meaning, and Searle seems to disagree with Frege, but never makes this specific. I worry that this leads to some confusion about what Searle's views are, because some of those claims are unclear.
It is also a very technical view, though Searle is a much better writer than others in technical philosophy. If I were building a curriculum on Searle's philosophy (not totally out of the realm of possibility) I probably would assign this as a central reading; if I were to put together a syllabus on modern philosophy of language, I would probably use some excerpts, but have to make some careful choices about presentation. My advice for reading it is more or less the same. Worthwhile read, but one to read carefully or not at all.
There are a number of challenges with reading the book, which is that Searle is not particularly clear with regard to where he stands relative to the historical discussion. Frege, who plays a major role in Searle's discussion, has very clear views about the role of psychology in a theory of meaning, and Searle seems to disagree with Frege, but never makes this specific. I worry that this leads to some confusion about what Searle's views are, because some of those claims are unclear.
It is also a very technical view, though Searle is a much better writer than others in technical philosophy. If I were building a curriculum on Searle's philosophy (not totally out of the realm of possibility) I probably would assign this as a central reading; if I were to put together a syllabus on modern philosophy of language, I would probably use some excerpts, but have to make some careful choices about presentation. My advice for reading it is more or less the same. Worthwhile read, but one to read carefully or not at all.
September 16, 2024
reminded me of the first time I read about relative coordinate space for 3d graphics, intentions behind thoughts and actions acting in different perspective spaces is an interesting idea. Also kinda weird to mix the formal math notation with philosophical ideas about consciousness to try and come up with a way to prove ideas or describe consciousness itself.
People in the 70s were crazy
People in the 70s were crazy
March 7, 2024
This book follows his earlier “Speech Act Theory “and “Expression and Meaning.”
As he states in his introduction, “A basic assumption behind my approach to problems of language is that the philosophy of language is a branch of the philosophy of mind. The capacity of speech acts to represent objects in states of affairs in the world is an extension of the more biologically fundamental capacities of the mind (or brain) to relate the Organism to the world by way of such mental states as belief and desire, and especially through action and perception.”
Intentionality is the aboutness of some of our thoughts. Not all conscious states are Intentional, as in undirected anxiety or depression.
Wittgenstein had stated in “Philosophical Investigations” that we used language in countless ways. Searle with his speech act theory states that there exactly five ways in which we use language: assertions (we make statements), declarations (we make social facts), directives (we issue commands), expressives (expressing emotions) and commissives (promise making). As it happens these five speech acts mirror the Intentional states we have in our minds.
Searle offers a biological account of the nature of the mind. In order to make sense of Intentional states, he looks at the nature of perception, concluding that it is intentional. He also looks at the nature of action, which is also Intentional. He then looks at what he calls Intentional causation.
He then talks about what he calls The Background and The Network, which are the beliefs and abilities which we have accumulated in our lives and use to function, but do not sit around believing in every day. As an example of this, he mentions all of the background a person would need to have to run for President. I am uncomfortable with these ideas as he is not clear about how we accumulate them.
He then turns to the topic of meaning in language: “…for a speaker to mean something by an utterance is for him to make that utterance with the intent of producing certain effect on his audience.” As he states later “the intentionality of the mind not only creates the possibility of meaning, but it limits its forms.”
In the later chapters, he looks at technical issues in the philosophy of language, such as: intensionality-with-an-s, the question of whether meanings are in the head or external to thought, de re vs. de dicto arguments, indexicals, the causal theory of meaning and the nature of proper names.
In the final chapter, he takes up some of the questions that are common to other works on the philosophy of mind. He concludes many of the arguments, such as functionalism and behaviorism are attempts to avoid Cartesian dualism rather than explain the facts of mental states. He points out that there are features of the world that are similar in complexity to mind, such as liquidity, digestion, photosynthesis, elasticity and others that cannot be explained when you look at the underlying components that make up those structures. Is an H2O molecule wet?
This is an excellent book that argues for biological naturalism as it pertains to the mind. One of the very few to do so.
As he states in his introduction, “A basic assumption behind my approach to problems of language is that the philosophy of language is a branch of the philosophy of mind. The capacity of speech acts to represent objects in states of affairs in the world is an extension of the more biologically fundamental capacities of the mind (or brain) to relate the Organism to the world by way of such mental states as belief and desire, and especially through action and perception.”
Intentionality is the aboutness of some of our thoughts. Not all conscious states are Intentional, as in undirected anxiety or depression.
Wittgenstein had stated in “Philosophical Investigations” that we used language in countless ways. Searle with his speech act theory states that there exactly five ways in which we use language: assertions (we make statements), declarations (we make social facts), directives (we issue commands), expressives (expressing emotions) and commissives (promise making). As it happens these five speech acts mirror the Intentional states we have in our minds.
Searle offers a biological account of the nature of the mind. In order to make sense of Intentional states, he looks at the nature of perception, concluding that it is intentional. He also looks at the nature of action, which is also Intentional. He then looks at what he calls Intentional causation.
He then talks about what he calls The Background and The Network, which are the beliefs and abilities which we have accumulated in our lives and use to function, but do not sit around believing in every day. As an example of this, he mentions all of the background a person would need to have to run for President. I am uncomfortable with these ideas as he is not clear about how we accumulate them.
He then turns to the topic of meaning in language: “…for a speaker to mean something by an utterance is for him to make that utterance with the intent of producing certain effect on his audience.” As he states later “the intentionality of the mind not only creates the possibility of meaning, but it limits its forms.”
In the later chapters, he looks at technical issues in the philosophy of language, such as: intensionality-with-an-s, the question of whether meanings are in the head or external to thought, de re vs. de dicto arguments, indexicals, the causal theory of meaning and the nature of proper names.
In the final chapter, he takes up some of the questions that are common to other works on the philosophy of mind. He concludes many of the arguments, such as functionalism and behaviorism are attempts to avoid Cartesian dualism rather than explain the facts of mental states. He points out that there are features of the world that are similar in complexity to mind, such as liquidity, digestion, photosynthesis, elasticity and others that cannot be explained when you look at the underlying components that make up those structures. Is an H2O molecule wet?
This is an excellent book that argues for biological naturalism as it pertains to the mind. One of the very few to do so.
October 19, 2024
THE THIRD PART OF A “TRILOGY” BY THE FAMED ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHER
John Rogers Searle (born 1932) is an American philosopher at UC Berkeley. He wrote in the Introduction to this 1983 book, “The primary aim of this book is to develop a theory of intentionality. I hesitate to call it a general theory because a large number of topics, e.g., the emotions, are left undiscussed, but I do believe the approach here presented will prove useful for explaining Intentional phenomena generally. This book is the third in a series of related studies of mind and language. One of its objectives is to provide a foundation for my two earlier books, ‘Speech Acts’ … and ‘Expression and Meaning.’”
In the first chapter, he states, “I am really making two claims here, and they need to be distinguished. In am claiming first that Intentional states are in general parts of Networks of Intentional states and only have their conditions of satisfaction relative to their position in the Network. Versions of this view, generally called ‘holism,’ are quite common in contemporary philosophy; indeed a certain effortless holism is something of a current philosophical orthodoxy. But I am also making a second, much more controversial claim: in addition to the Network of representations, there is also a background of nonrepresentational mental capacities; and, in general, representations only function they only have the conditions of satisfaction that they do, against this nonrepresentational Background.” (Pg. 20-21)
He summarizes, “I want to argue that the traditional sense data theorists were correct in recognizing that we have experiences, visual and otherwise, but they mislocated the Intentionality of perception in supposing that experiences were the objects of perception, and the naïve realists were correct in recognizing that material objects and events are characteristically the objects of perception, but many of them failed to realize that the material object can only be the object of visual perception because the perception has an Intentional content, and the vehicle of the Intentional content is a visual experience.” (Pg. 60-61)
He explains in chapter 3, “We are not trying to show that Intentionality is really something else, but rather to explain it in terms of a family of notions each of which is explained independently, usually by way of examples. To repeat: these is no nonintentional standpoint from which we can survey the relations between Intentional states and their conditions of satisfaction. Any analysis must take place from within the circle of Intentional concepts.” (Pg. 79)
He argues, “I am rejecting both accounts of experience. Both accounts fail to describe the Intentionality of our experiences of acting and perceiving. They both fail to account for the fact that the conditions of satisfaction are determined by the experience and that part of the conditions of satisfaction is that the experience is one of making its Intentional object happen or one of its Intentional object making it happen. For this reason we can experience causation, but we don’t have to have an a priori concept of cause to do it, any more than we have to have an a priori concept of red to experience redness.” (Pg. 132)
He notes, “But when it comes to examining the conditions of the possibility of the functioning of the mind, we simply have very little vocabulary to hand except the vocabulary of first-order Intentional states. There simply is no first-order for the Background, because the Background has no Intentionality. As the precondition of Intentionality, the Background is as invisible to Intentionality as the eye which sees is invisible to itself.” (Pg. 157)
He observes in the Epilogue, “My own approach to mental states and events has been totally realistic in the sense that I think there really are such things as intrinsic mental phenomena which cannot be reduced to something else or eliminated by some kind of re-definition. There really are pains, tickles, and itches, beliefs, fears, hopes, desires, perceptual experiences, experiences of acting, thoughts, feelings, and all the rest. Now you might think that such a claim was so obviously true as to be hardly worth making, but the amazing thing is that is it routinely denied, though usually in a disguised form, by many, perhaps most, of the advanced thinkers who write on these topics.” (Pg. 262)
He continues, “no one ever came to these views by a close scrutiny of the phenomena in question. No one ever considered his own terrible pain or his deepest worry and concluded that they were just Turing machine states or that they could be entirely defined in terms of their causes and effects or that attributing such states to themselves was just a matter of taking a certain stance toward themselves. Second, no one would think of treating other biological phenomena in this way.” (Pg. 263)
He concludes, “The picture that I have been suggesting, and the picture that I believe will eventually lead to a resolution of the dilemma, is one according to which mental states are both CAUSED by the operations of the brain and REALIZED IN the structure of the brain… Once the possibility of mental and physical phenomena standing in both these relations is understood we have removed at least one major obstacle to seeing how mental states which are caused by brain states can also cause further brain states and mental states.”
This book will be “must reading” for anyone seriously studying Searle’s thought, or the philosophy of mind in general.
John Rogers Searle (born 1932) is an American philosopher at UC Berkeley. He wrote in the Introduction to this 1983 book, “The primary aim of this book is to develop a theory of intentionality. I hesitate to call it a general theory because a large number of topics, e.g., the emotions, are left undiscussed, but I do believe the approach here presented will prove useful for explaining Intentional phenomena generally. This book is the third in a series of related studies of mind and language. One of its objectives is to provide a foundation for my two earlier books, ‘Speech Acts’ … and ‘Expression and Meaning.’”
In the first chapter, he states, “I am really making two claims here, and they need to be distinguished. In am claiming first that Intentional states are in general parts of Networks of Intentional states and only have their conditions of satisfaction relative to their position in the Network. Versions of this view, generally called ‘holism,’ are quite common in contemporary philosophy; indeed a certain effortless holism is something of a current philosophical orthodoxy. But I am also making a second, much more controversial claim: in addition to the Network of representations, there is also a background of nonrepresentational mental capacities; and, in general, representations only function they only have the conditions of satisfaction that they do, against this nonrepresentational Background.” (Pg. 20-21)
He summarizes, “I want to argue that the traditional sense data theorists were correct in recognizing that we have experiences, visual and otherwise, but they mislocated the Intentionality of perception in supposing that experiences were the objects of perception, and the naïve realists were correct in recognizing that material objects and events are characteristically the objects of perception, but many of them failed to realize that the material object can only be the object of visual perception because the perception has an Intentional content, and the vehicle of the Intentional content is a visual experience.” (Pg. 60-61)
He explains in chapter 3, “We are not trying to show that Intentionality is really something else, but rather to explain it in terms of a family of notions each of which is explained independently, usually by way of examples. To repeat: these is no nonintentional standpoint from which we can survey the relations between Intentional states and their conditions of satisfaction. Any analysis must take place from within the circle of Intentional concepts.” (Pg. 79)
He argues, “I am rejecting both accounts of experience. Both accounts fail to describe the Intentionality of our experiences of acting and perceiving. They both fail to account for the fact that the conditions of satisfaction are determined by the experience and that part of the conditions of satisfaction is that the experience is one of making its Intentional object happen or one of its Intentional object making it happen. For this reason we can experience causation, but we don’t have to have an a priori concept of cause to do it, any more than we have to have an a priori concept of red to experience redness.” (Pg. 132)
He notes, “But when it comes to examining the conditions of the possibility of the functioning of the mind, we simply have very little vocabulary to hand except the vocabulary of first-order Intentional states. There simply is no first-order for the Background, because the Background has no Intentionality. As the precondition of Intentionality, the Background is as invisible to Intentionality as the eye which sees is invisible to itself.” (Pg. 157)
He observes in the Epilogue, “My own approach to mental states and events has been totally realistic in the sense that I think there really are such things as intrinsic mental phenomena which cannot be reduced to something else or eliminated by some kind of re-definition. There really are pains, tickles, and itches, beliefs, fears, hopes, desires, perceptual experiences, experiences of acting, thoughts, feelings, and all the rest. Now you might think that such a claim was so obviously true as to be hardly worth making, but the amazing thing is that is it routinely denied, though usually in a disguised form, by many, perhaps most, of the advanced thinkers who write on these topics.” (Pg. 262)
He continues, “no one ever came to these views by a close scrutiny of the phenomena in question. No one ever considered his own terrible pain or his deepest worry and concluded that they were just Turing machine states or that they could be entirely defined in terms of their causes and effects or that attributing such states to themselves was just a matter of taking a certain stance toward themselves. Second, no one would think of treating other biological phenomena in this way.” (Pg. 263)
He concludes, “The picture that I have been suggesting, and the picture that I believe will eventually lead to a resolution of the dilemma, is one according to which mental states are both CAUSED by the operations of the brain and REALIZED IN the structure of the brain… Once the possibility of mental and physical phenomena standing in both these relations is understood we have removed at least one major obstacle to seeing how mental states which are caused by brain states can also cause further brain states and mental states.”
This book will be “must reading” for anyone seriously studying Searle’s thought, or the philosophy of mind in general.
December 23, 2022
Mediocre philosophy (and an awful person)
January 8, 2019
As usual, Searle's writing style was quite enjoyable. I also learned quite a lot about intentionality, as you would expect. But this was my first major foray into thinking about intentionality (apart from one or two other Searle books in which he mentions it), so a lot of it was a bit heavy going for me. I also found some of the philosophy of language stuff quite challenging. I have had very little exposure to philosophy of language, so that was mostly new to me. I did find the final section on the biological causes and realisers of mental states very interesting, and fairly plausible.
Overall, this is a very broad assessment of intentionality and the role it plays underpinning various mental and linguistic phenomena. Because of that, I think this book was well worth reading, as long as I can remember half of what I have learned in six months' time.
Overall, this is a very broad assessment of intentionality and the role it plays underpinning various mental and linguistic phenomena. Because of that, I think this book was well worth reading, as long as I can remember half of what I have learned in six months' time.
to-keep-reference
November 6, 2019Toma en profundidad la diferencia entre intensionalidad con s e intencionalidad con c, comentadas en La mente Pág.221-225
June 18, 2020
Probably the most complex book I've ever read yet my favorite. Inspiring and deeply thought-provoking. I strongly recommend it.
August 26, 2013
I really don't feel like writing a long, serious review right now (and I probably won't later either) so I will just write something short about my general impressions and compare Searle's treatment of intentionality with that found in Dennett's "The Intentional Stance" which I recently finished reading.
In short, Dennett displays a rigid analytical ability with which Searle is too impatient to bother. Whereas Dennett treats seriously the question of the reality of intentional states, Searle see the question as having an obvious answer: they are real biological phenomena! Both Dennett and Searle treat intentionality seriously, they are not eliminativists (even though Dennett is sometimes mischaracterized as such), but Dennett is wise enough not to jump from the observation of the efficacy of the intentional stance to the conclusion that intentional states are real biological phenomena in the brain: they could be more like something along the lines of behavioral tendencies, or something else describable at a higher level, a possibility Searle dismisses out of hand because, a favorite style of "argument" of his, it is supposedly obviously false. Searle definitely has some interesting points in analyzing the logical structure of the phenomenon of intentionality, but seems to think that he has arrived at the obvious, biological structure of this phenomenon in the brain, moving along way too quickly without considering other possible logical analyses (the fact that his logical structure makes sense is of course no proof that it is an correct description of a real biological phenomenon) or accounting for empirical questions that raise problems for his account. This puts him in stark contrast with Dennett, and it makes his account of intentionality much more speculative, however logical and convincing it may seem.
In short, Dennett displays a rigid analytical ability with which Searle is too impatient to bother. Whereas Dennett treats seriously the question of the reality of intentional states, Searle see the question as having an obvious answer: they are real biological phenomena! Both Dennett and Searle treat intentionality seriously, they are not eliminativists (even though Dennett is sometimes mischaracterized as such), but Dennett is wise enough not to jump from the observation of the efficacy of the intentional stance to the conclusion that intentional states are real biological phenomena in the brain: they could be more like something along the lines of behavioral tendencies, or something else describable at a higher level, a possibility Searle dismisses out of hand because, a favorite style of "argument" of his, it is supposedly obviously false. Searle definitely has some interesting points in analyzing the logical structure of the phenomenon of intentionality, but seems to think that he has arrived at the obvious, biological structure of this phenomenon in the brain, moving along way too quickly without considering other possible logical analyses (the fact that his logical structure makes sense is of course no proof that it is an correct description of a real biological phenomenon) or accounting for empirical questions that raise problems for his account. This puts him in stark contrast with Dennett, and it makes his account of intentionality much more speculative, however logical and convincing it may seem.
March 17, 2013
For me, this turned out to be a very technical exploration of the philosophical theory underlying the author's position on other issues depending on the mind-body problem as it appears in the twenty-first century.
I suppose the difficult question it leaves me with is this: are we getting closer to the truth with philosophical probing s of this sort or building up more castles in the air?
There was a great dear of stimulating thought here. John Searle is undoubtedly one of the great thinkers of our time. Yet there is no easy answer here to questions about what consciousness is or where philosophy might join up with neuroscience.
Or perhaps I just need to understand it better.
I suppose the difficult question it leaves me with is this: are we getting closer to the truth with philosophical probing s of this sort or building up more castles in the air?
There was a great dear of stimulating thought here. John Searle is undoubtedly one of the great thinkers of our time. Yet there is no easy answer here to questions about what consciousness is or where philosophy might join up with neuroscience.
Or perhaps I just need to understand it better.
January 18, 2016
Professor John Searle was my college philosophy professor. I can't say enough good things about him. He was an excellent lecturer who made philosophy come alive for his students; we were always spell-bound during his lectures (with our eyes open, even!). He challenged us to think & analyze the philosophical concepts of the past, as well as the present. His lectures included his famous "Chinese Room" argument against the concept of "strong artificial intelligence," e.g. computers can be created that have the same intelligence as the mind of man. "Intentionality" is a must read, a philosophic classic . . . as is Professor Searle!
November 26, 2016
An important book in the philosophy of mind. I might add more to this "review", but I'll just mention that chapter 2 "intentionality and perception" is greatly added on in his recent 2015 book on the philosophy of perception.
October 22, 2015
I don't agree with everything here, but Searle's work is a lot better than that of many of his peers.
July 24, 2016
Ch. 1-5 interesting, 6-10 not so much.
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