An extremely frustrating book that tries to answer one of the central questions of modern politics—why are rural voters increasingly Republicans and urban voters increasingly Democrats?—and falls far short.
The first core problem of the book is how functionally one-sided it is. The vast majority of pages are devoted to explaining the rural worldview, why voters outside metropolitan areas have rushed to conservative politics, and castigating liberals generally and the Democratic Party specifically for losing rural voters. There is very little space devoted to the opposite, equally important question, of why voters in major cities have increasingly shunned the Republican Party over the last two decades. There is barely any discussion of the actual politics in urban areas, the policy shifts within the Republican party that have made it more anti-urban, or the international context in which cities are becoming increasingly liberal and rural areas increasingly conservative. In what I thought was a particularly egregious example, the discussion of the 2020 Georgia Senate election focuses on the rural organizers who worked to stem losses for the Democratic Party and not the objective political sea change in Atlanta and the surrounding suburbs that flipped the state blue for the first time in years.
The secondary problem is that the authors have a weak case for the shift in rural voting patterns. Their core thesis is that rural and urban voters have remarkably similar views on economic policy, racial animus is similarly prevalent in many of America's major cities as in its small towns, and the existing gap in social policy views is not large enough to explain the wide gap in voting patterns. Much of the blame for the rightward shift in rural politics is thus placed on the outcomes delivered by Democratic economic policy—NAFTA, airline deregulation, and the broader "neoliberal" turn of the Carter-Clinton-Obama era broke whatever remained of the "New Deal" rural coalition. Then the parties' institutional structure took over to accentuate this division. Yet there's little explanation for why it took until the mid-2000s for this urban-rural political divide to really materialize if it was firmly rooted in, e.g., NAFTA, or why rural voters now vociferously oppose many of the New Deal policies that supposedly kept them in the coalition. Likewise, the book seems to dance around the core non-economic policy divides—admitting that rural voters have more conservative social attitudes and exhibit more anti-Black racial animus, but mostly placing those explanations as tertiary drivers of the urban-rural voting gap.
One particular annoyance I have with the book is the constant need to say that rural voters are driven to the Republican party because they're talked down to by "overbearing urban elites," but then to believe it is the *attitudes* of urban voters & politicians driving this feeling. In other words, it is not so much that rural voters oppose gun control and environmental regulation, but that they disapprove of having gun control and environmental regulation "imposed on them" by liberal city-dwellers. Yet you could just as easily say urban voters resent having lax gun laws and environmental deregulation "imposed" on them, and the urban voters would at least have a stronger argument at a federal level because of the overrepresentation of rural interests in the Senate. The core problem is that this is obviously an actual, concrete policy disagreement where rural voters have more conservative social views than urban ones, and this is driving a gap in voting patterns! Yet the authors do not believe social policy drives the gap in voting patterns, so instead, they softly imply that upstate New Yorkers would come around to gun control or exurban Californians would drop their opposition to solar if politicians just switched up their tone. Once again, the feelings of rural voters are completely centered here, and the idea that urban voters in Austin might feel like state-level policy is being "imposed" on them in the same way rural Oregonians feel it's "imposed" on them is barely ever discussed.
The third problem is that the book feels exceptionally outdated, as if much of it was written in 2018-2020 and the shift in election and policy outcomes in 2024 was tacked on as an afterthought. The post-2020 shift in economic geography that occurred to the detriment of cities gets almost no discussion; urban areas like New York and San Francisco are still treated as nearly unstoppable economic hubs and suburban/rural areas are treated as drained of all opportunity. There's vanishingly little discussion of the 2024 election outcomes, where Donald Trump bucked the trend by doing much better in urban areas than the median Republican, and the entire discussion of the Biden administration's explicitly anti-neoliberal rural investment approach is quarantined to a couple of pages.
As with any wide-ranging political book, there were still parts I found interesting or novel. As descriptive empirical work on the political shift in rural areas, much of the book is informative. The data work on the growth of gun clubs and evangelical churches as rural institutions was a particularly great read, and I wish I could force most political pundits to read the sections on demographic change in rural and urban areas. Yet my disagreements with the core thesis and structure of the book are too massive for me to recommend this.