帝國為什麼會衰敗: 條條死路通羅馬，關於西方政治社會的再思考

by Peter Heather, 彼得‧希瑟, 約翰‧拉普利

羅馬版《國家為什麼會失敗》
跨越1500年的比較歷史研究
條條「死」路通羅馬？
本書將告訴你歐美世界的原型設定
就是西方國家之所以失敗的根源！
在打開本書前，您需要先知道幾件事：
➢5世紀的羅馬帝國與21世紀的西方國家，是一對相像的孿生兄弟
➢今天的「新羅馬史研究」可以打破三觀，給我們全新的反思角度
➢「蠻族入侵」vs.「移民問題」，在保守派眼中，移民就是現代的「蠻族」
➢當西方國家遭遇內部中心衰弱、外部強權崛起時，十字路口該如何向前？
羅馬帝國，二千年來始終是西方國家在審視自我時的原型，羅馬帝國的衰亡也是諸多歷史學者關心的課題。關於羅馬帝國為何崩潰，過往常見的說法源於吉朋的《羅馬帝國衰亡史》，吉朋認為羅馬帝國從打開邊境，讓基督徒、哥德人、汪達爾人進入帝國後，這些外來族群就有如病毒一般侵蝕宿主，羅馬帝國自此就走上由內而外崩解的末路。也因此，當現代西方國家在面對類似的移民問題時，往往也會吸取羅馬的「教訓」，進而控制邊界、管制移民。
但本書兩位作者希瑟及拉普利認為，以羅馬的案例而言，帝國的解體不應歸咎於外來族群，而是因為在帝國的經濟與政治勢力向外緣地區擴張時，促成新的邊境聯盟、新的移民，以及區域衝突，

Genres: History, Politics, Nonfiction, Economics, Ancient History, Sociology, American

197 pages, Kindle Edition

First published January 1, 1983

About the author

Peter Heather is currently Professor of Medieval History at King's College London. He has held appointments at University College London and Yale University and was Fellow and Tutor in Medieval History at Worcester College, Oxford until December 2007.

Reviews

[Nate · Rating 4 out of 5]

It seems like there aren’t any exact parallels between Rome’s agrarian economy and the globalist economy we have now. What we do have in common is that we both exported our exploitation . We outsourced undesirable jobs to third world countries and enjoyed the cheap goods and labour. In this way we were able to sustain a growing middle class without cutting into the profits of the super rich. Now, like the western Roman Empire, enough wealth has been transferred to the periphery that they are powers in their own right. This caused inflation and a reliance on credit to sustain our accustomed lifestyle but we will never regain the colonial, global dominance the west has enjoyed for so long.
That and a host of other factors for Rome and us like internal political and social divisions and lowering standards of living contributed to Rome’s fall and may do the same for us.
We’re either on a long, slow slide into poverty and irrelevance or will be forced to negotiate in fairer terms with our former subjects, either way, the barbarians are at the gates.

[Mircea Petcu · Rating 5 out of 5]

În anul 399 d. Hr., consulul Flavius Mallius Theodorus anunța în fața Senatului roman începutul unei noi "Epoci de Aur" pentru romani. Proclamația acestuia pare bizară dacă ne gândim că Imperiul Roman de Apus se va prăbuși în mai puțin de un secol.
Cartea contestă teoria declinului lent, economic și politic, a Imperiului Roman. În realitate, statul roman s-ar fi aflat la sfârșitul secolului IV la apogeul prosperității agricole (baza prosperității economice). Iar creștinismul, departe de a slăbi imperiul prin pacifismul declarat (teza lui Gibbon), a canalizat energiile spre noi direcții interesante.

În schimb, autorii argumentează că imperiul a fost destabilizat de apariția foarte agresivului Imperiu Sasanid. Succesele repurtate de sasanizi pe câmpul de luptă au determinat creșterea efectivelor armatei romane cu cel puțin 50%. Și având în vedere că 75% din veniturile fiscale erau alocate către armată, a generat a creștere a impozitelor cu o treime. O altă reacție negativă a fost devalorizarea progresivă a dinarilor de argint, moneda în care fuseseră plătiți dintotdeauna legionarii. Un efect mai insidios a fost împărțirea imperiului între Est și Vest, pentru a face mai bine provocărilor militare din Est. Îndreptarea atenției împăraților spre Est a impulsionat elitele din Vest, cu precădere cele galice, să sprijine împărați uzurpatori care să le prioritizeze nevoile.
Peste acest context s-a suprapus șocul exogen. Seceta prelungită din stepa eurasiatică a provocat deplasarea nomazilor, în special a hunilor, spre vest, dislocând populațiile întâlnite în cale. În mod normal, romanii n-ar fi avut probleme să combată această amenințare. Dar, fiind ocupați cu sasanizii în est, și-au pierdut flexibilitatea și capacitatea de a lupta ca un tot unitar. Cu fiecare teritoriu ieșit de sub stăpânirea romană, legiunile deveneau mai slabe, ce avea drept consecință pierderea altor teritorii, și tot așa, într-un cerc vicios.

Criza care a cuprins imperiul occidental modern este alcătuită din aceleași elemente dinamice: competiția superputerilor, șocul exogen (inclusiv migrațiile la scară largă) și presiunea politică internă crescândă.

Recomand

[Terence · Rating 2 out of 5]

I’m wary of books written by historians who claim to find parallels between ancient history and modern events but wanted to check this one out because I have enjoyed Peter Heather’s histories of late Rome. I was also encouraged by the co-authorship of a modern economist, John Rapley, whose presence would provide a check on Heather’s perspective and vice versa.

As books of this genre go, Why Empires Fall is pretty good. The essential argument is that there is a strong parallel between the decline and eventual disappearance of the Roman Empire and the decline (if not quite disappearance yet) of the West (here broadly defined as western Europe and its colonial offspring). The chief culprit in both instances being the growth of peripheral polities and economies that challenge the central power’s hegemony, suck up capital and transfer wealth to the borderlands. A process that Heather has commented on in his histories, and which has been pointed out by other historians in other contexts (n.1).

I was underwhelmed by the authors’ conclusion: “[T]he West simply can’t ever make itself great again in 19th and 20th century terms…. If the citizens of Western countries are to grasp the key challenges that lie ahead, resolving inevitably divisive arguments democratically in ways that give the wider citizenry a sense of inclusion and fairness, and particularly if they can do so in ways that allow the citizens of rising peripheral states to believe that they, too, are being offered a stake in a more equal future…the gains are potentially colossal. Not only would the form of the Western nation state…have managed to negotiate a moment of potentially existential crisis, but it would have generated a post-colonial legacy of real greatness, of which it citizens could be genuinely proud” (pp. 166-7).

It's not that I disagree with the conclusion. It’s that such a rational & far-sighted policy ever being pursued by the increasingly reactionary governments of the West is far-fetched, and Heather and Rapley don’t suggest how we might achieve it.

I won’t recommend Why Empires Fall. It’s a well written and erudite look at the subject but doesn’t add anything new to the discussion. (I would recommend any of Heather’s histories, which are a true pleasure to read; I haven’t read anything of Rapley’s, so you’re on your own with him.)

[Note 1]: By chance, I recently read an article (in the latest London Review of Books IIRC) discussing the waning influence of France in its former African colonies that illustrates this evolution.

[Saúl · Rating 3 out of 5]

Interesante ensayo que busca establecer paralelismos entre la caída del Imperio Romano Occidental con la decadencia del Occidente moderno (el nuevo imperio con base en Estados Unidos). Los intentos de comparar ambos períodos históricos son interesantes y las razones que se aportan también, aunque a veces existen comparaciones un poco metidas con calzador y los capítulos referidos a la decadencia occidental son excesivamente anglocentristas, cosa que tampoco se le puede criticar del todo. Aunque por lógicas razones temporales no se habla del segundo mandato Trump es un libro ciertamente actual y las conclusiones que dan son bastante lógicas desde mi punto de vista.
En todo caso, reconozco que acudí a este libro por Peter Heather, uno de los mayores especialistas en la antigüedad tardía, y las páginas que más he disfrutado son las que resumen la caída de Roma, aunque sin aportar nada nuevo a lo que ya ha escrito previamente con sus libros "La caída del Imperio romano" y "La restauración de Roma".
En definitiva, un libro que aporta debate sobre las causas y las consecuencias de la evidente decadencia de las sociedades liberales occidentales y que merece la pena leer si se está interesado en el período histórico del que es especialista el autor principal del libro.

[Richard Marney · Rating 4 out of 5]

Why did Rome fall? What threatens the West today? How does Rome’s experience help understand the West’s current (potentially) fraught future? And what governments should and shouldn’t attempt to “make [ fill in your favorite country ] great again”? How did Trump’s counter productive China policy tell us about the nature of the Beijing’s threat and the opportunities for cooperation? These are some of the many questions covered in this brief, but provocative book.

[R · Rating 4 out of 5]

There is an imperial life cycle which begins with economic development. Empires come into being to generate new flows of wealth for a dominating imperial core, but in doing so, create new wealth in both conquered provinces and some more peripheral territories too (land and people that are not formally colonized but are drawn into subordinate economic relationships with the developing core). Such economic transformation is bound to have political consequences. Any concentration or flow of wealth is the potential building block of new political power for the actors that can harness it. As a direct result large scale economic development in the periphery kick starts a political process which will eventually challenge the domination of the imperial power that initiated the original cycle. India is a classic example. Its economy grew at a smaller pace than the core imperial provinces which provided new opportunities for the likes of Tata to sell to the West which created new wealth in India. Like the fourth century Rome, the post 1945 West still largely managed to control the more robust clients in the inner periphery, whilst its own internal prosperity blossomed as never before. The internal ambitions of an assertive inner peripheries had been effectively contained, but more bigger challenges to continued imperial domination would soon grow elsewhere as outer periphery countries grew their populations, thus entry by western firms into their markets became a bargaining chip that they exploited. In return, outer periphery countries got access to western education, that only increased the skills of their workforce.

The parallels of history. In 1999 state of the union address, Bill Clinton declared that the “promise of our future is limitless”. A mere decade later the West’s share of global output shrunk from 80% to 60%. 1 January 399. Inauguration day for consuls, where each elected one had to give a speech. In this case it was Flavius Manlius, who speech has two themes. 1) the brilliance of the administration 2) that prosperity was hardwired into the empire. A decade later, Rome was ransacked by barbarian immigrants, with the collapse of the Roman empire 50 years later.

Two strong parallels between the histories of Rome and the modern west. Crisis hit systems at their point of maximum prosperity which resulted in the internal epicentres of economic and political dominance shifting. The reason why these crises hit at the point of maximum prosperity emerges with clarity when we turn attention outwards because imperial systems don’t cease to operate at the limited of their formal frontiers. In their ascendancy both empires grew rich off the world around them. But in doing so they inadvertently lay the roots of their own demise.

When you factor in the relative speed of movement in the Roman empire (in those days about a 20th of today’s speeds), direct rule stretched over 100,000 kilometres making it as much a global empire as the Wests, however unlike the West’s dotted empire, Rome consisted of a solid block.

The parallels between the Roman empire’s collapse and the debates being had in Britain about wealth are striking. Rome’s economy was fundamentally a steady state and agrarian which turned wealth and power at the highest level into a zero-sum game. For there to be political winners there had to be political losers. Power was based on the control of stable agrarian assets and if the system faced serious challenges you could not just generate vast amounts of new wealth and therefore winners to ride out the problems. Much like property today, wealth is determined by your parents, and increasingly not your ability, meaning those that have wealth do whatever is necessary to protect that wealth as they know they cannot generate it themselves. When Rome’s empire started to collapse, it needed more soldiers, but due to the narrow tax base being based only on the wealthy, it was impossible to raise taxes substantially enough. Furthermore, in Rome, when the wealthy saw their privileges decline, they often started to negotiate with the nearest barbarian king to preserve their landed assets. Today, many global elites have shifted their assets portfolios to outsourcing centres in the periphery (India) as the costs are too high and benefits too low of keeping them in Britain (unless taxes for a select few are cut to keep them in the UK). As a result, the outer periphery grows richer and the inner periphery poorer.

As the empire began splitting, with no emperor controlling all the resources of the roman empire, it started to affect the running of the empire from Rome. War between Roman soldiers in the empire increased, thus providing opportunities for the barbarians to conquer the empire, such as Persia. Much like the G7 today, or the EU, it spends too much time clucking amongst itself, and not focusing on growing its economy and being united to threats. As the system unravelled, the Roman empire found itself caught in a spiral. Superpower rivalry and self-assertion of a developing inner periphery combined with immigration in the outer periphery imposed conflicting interests and tensions within the administration and empire. More resources were then spent managing inner the periphery than the outer, thus strengthening rivals in the outer periphery. Again, much like the G7 today, tensions are leading to the rise of China and India. In short, large scale immigration originating in the outer periphery, an assertive inner periphery, peer rivalry, and growing internal political stress caused by inequality all contributed to the decline of Rome.

Immigration in Rome, and like the western world today caused tensions. As a rule of thumb, a 1% increase in the immigration population led to a 2% increase in GDP, however due to inequality most of that benefit flowed to the better off. Whilst anti-immigration policies increase social cohesion (as shown by Japan and Rome’s relative social cohesion) it leads to a country being poorer over the longer run primarily due to declining birth rates, unless it is constantly improving productivity. Immigration is far from cost free.

Inner periphery super power was a huge source of instability for the Roman empire. Its rivalry with Persia involved quarrelling about trade, borders, and competing ideologies. But once it became clear that neither side had the power to definitively defeat the other, conflict was generally confined to squabbling when they realised they were under threat from outside the empire. Once these threats receded, or had taken Rome’s outer periphery, they went to total war for 25 years which bankrupted both nations, and allowed the newly created and united Islamic Arab state to conquer the middle east.

Like Rome, the west is facing a crisis of its own making.

1. The operations of its own structures have stimulated the rise of superpower peer competition in the outer periphery (China) and new assertive powers within the inner periphery (Turkey, Hungry) creating divides amongst the west.
2. It faces a financial problem with domestic issues like inequality, and limited new sources of tax revenue. Unlike Rome, the west cannot conquer lands to increase revenue.
3. The issue of immigration, and how bigger role this needs to play in the West’s economies.

On all three fronts, politicians need to be honest to their people about the trade-offs required to maintain the West’s position in the world.

[Elliot Scott · Rating 5 out of 5]

I feel incredibly fortunate to have come across this book. Never have I come across a more coherent and well juxtaposed comparative study with such profound clarity as to the true direction of our civilisation, and such breadth.

I highly recommend for those with a strong background in history, political economy, and finance. Brief and dense, but full of profound conclusions.

[Florian Lorenzen · Rating 3 out of 5]

Es ist bereits 14 Jahre her, als der damalige, mittlerweile verstorbene FDP-Vorsitzende Guido Westerwelle in der Hartz-IV-Debatte von „spätrömischer Dekadenz“ sprach, die dem Volk anstrengungslosen Wohlstand verspreche. Anderthalb Jahrzehnte später sind gegenwartshistorische Vergleiche mit dem Untergang des römischen Imperiums weiterhin beliebt. Der britische Althistoriker Peter Heather und der US-Amerikanische Ökonom John Rapley haben nun mit „Stürzende Imperien“ ein ganzes Buch zu der Frage vorgelegt, was sich aus dem Untergangs Roms für den bereits begonnenen Bedeutungsverlust des Westens lernen lässt.

Was vom Konzept her ganz vielversprechend klingt, ist jedoch leider nur semi-gut gemacht. Die Parallelen zwischen dem alten Rom und dem heutigen Westen werden meines Erachtens etwas überstrapaziert. Nur an wenigen Stellen wird die grundlegend verschiedenen Ausgangskonstellationen mitgedacht, was in wenig brauchbaren politischen Handlungsempfehlungen mündet. Auch wenn dies aus Sicht des Lesers vielleicht weniger spannend gewesen wäre, hätte es dem Buch meines Erachtens gut getan, an der einen oder anderen Stelle festzuhalten, dass sich aus der Geschichte des alten Roms für heute nicht immer etwas nützliches für die Gegenwart ableiten lässt.

Außerdem argumentieren beide Autoren stark aus einer ökonomischen Perspektive, die zweifelsohne wichtig ist. Jedoch wissen wir spätestens seit Joseph Nye, dass Großmächte neben wirtschaftlicher Macht auch über andere Formen von Soft Power (wie kulturelle Macht) sowie über Hard Power (Militärische Macht) verfügen. Diese differenzierte Sichtweise auf Macht fehlt hier weitgehend.

Was dem Buch wiederum gut gelingt, ist, den einen oder anderen Mythos über das alte Rom zu entzaubern. Denn in der Rezeption des römischen Imperiums, insb. im Hinblick auf seinen Niedergang, kommen bis heute historiografisch veraltete Darstellungen zum Vorschein, aus denen teilweise bedenkliche politische Schlüsse für die Gegenwart gezogen werden. Auf diesen Aspekten bezogen konnte „Stürzende Imperien“ mich überzeugen – insgesamt verbleibt bei mir aber ein durchschnittlicher Gesamteindruck

Review bei Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/p/C-4gKLYNLcE/

[Olivier Pasquier · Rating 5 out of 5]

I don't often read in English but maybe i should do it more. Indeed, essays from english speaking countries tend to be more factual and entertaining to read. This one falls under that spectrum, giving precise comparison between the fall of the Roman Empire and the decline of the current Western society. It puts into perspective the mainstream theory stating that migrations fastered the collapse of the Roman Empire, the authors prefer a more heterodox approach arguing that the fiscal burden wasn't benefiting roman tax-payers. The overall essay gives precious insights on global circumstances that destroy Empires. A must read if you are a History nerd !

[B · Rating 2 out of 5]

A book that promises much and underdelivers… overwhelmingly.

The beginning is enticing enough, especially for any Roman history buff. The authors make the interesting/flashy (yet ultimately flawed) argument that the last ¾ of a century of the Roman empire has much in common with the current state of the “West” (led by the U.S.), and that one can surmise the germs of its seemingly impending demise from similar symptoms that led to Rome’s fall.

The parallels the authors attempt to posit between those two eras (4th century Rome, and today’s West) are: 1) massive wave of migration due to an exogenous shock 2) emergence of a serious adversary 3) conglomerates of alliances that chip away at the foundation of the superpower by enticing its elites.

These “parallels” are loose at best (with the possible and partial exception of the emergence of China), and as the book progresses, they become fuzzier --even by the authors’ own admission, the thread murkier, and the direction of the book rather unclear. In the end, the book simply peters out into a sort of an unassuming and average textbook on political economy (to be fair, the authors do a great job explaining the workings of the Bretton Woods system – alas, that is not the main topic of the book!), and the puzzled reader finds the authors’ contention that “Rome’s demise provides important lessons for the present” hollow.

Along the way, the authors also make some erroneous statements. For example, they write “Christianity, as it evolved in the fourth and fifth centuries, was a vigorous, innovative synthesis of biblical and classical cultural elements,” which is utter rubbish, as evidenced by the wanton destruction (of human capital as well as cultural heritage) conducted by the zealots of the new religion that ushered the dark ages. A little later, they argue that the Byzantine Empire was reduced to a “rump state” in the 7th century when the “Muslim armies” appeared, which is untrue. In reality, the Byzantine Empire was quite a force to be reckoned with up until the 11th century at the very least. Further on, the authors make another glaring mistake when they state that “as the 19th century wore on, the U.S. joined Britain’s other European rivals... in using government policy to nurture the development of its own manufacturing industries, rather than leaving it to the free market as Britain had done.” I am appalled that respectable academics can make such a blatantly erroneous claim. Britain did not leave its industries to the free market UNTIL it completed their development by the early 19th century.

All that said, the book is not a complete waste of time. I still enjoyed learning quite a few details on Roman history. I also found it interesting that the authors, basing their research on recent archeological findings, refute Gibbon’s (“the” authority in Roman history) claim that Rome’s collapse was preceded by long-term economic decline, and point out that he considered only the “internal factors” in the Empire’s collapse, while disregarding external ones. At the end of the day, however, the book reads as little more than an undergraduate history paper owing to the weakness of its main point and somewhat gonzo-style of writing.

[Andrés CM · Rating 4 out of 5]

Una obra de historia comparada que analiza las similitudes y diferencias entre el auge y la decadencia de dos grandes potencias históricas: el Imperio romano y el Occidente moderno. Los autores combinan sus conocimientos y perspectivas para ofrecer una visión original y provocadora de los procesos históricos que determinan el destino de las civilizaciones.
RESEÑA COMPLETA: https://atrapadaenunashojasdepapel.bl...

[Wendelle]

My curiosity was piqued by this book because it was published by Yale University Press, and the authors are each established professors in Roman history and political economy respectively. It's a brief monograph, but not actually breezy reading, because its deep dives into the nitty gritty details of Roman decline can make for turgid reading at times. Anyways, this book attempts an analysis into the touted parallels between Roman and modern Western history. In summary, it identifies 5 axes or dimensions that characterized Rome during its state of decline: exogenous shock factors such as large-scale migration from the outer periphery of empire, a restless and assertive inner periphery, superpower competition, and internal political stress. It then compares current Western affairs to see if the factors or characteristics are identical. Here's what this book of the 2 authors concludes:

1. Exogenous factors of mass migration from an outer periphery are not identical, and are overstated for the modern case. This is because in the Roman case, migration of Huns and other aggressors were i) militarized waves of conquest, and ii) a zero-sum contest over a limited resource of land, in the agrarian economy of Rome. In contrast, i) current migration is not militarized, often selective, and completely Pacific. Secondly, ii) immigration is a net positive for the modern West because it expands the industrial economy with production and innovation, and immigration actually props up the welfare state of social safety nets for locals as lives become longer and pensions and such require regenerative infusions from a working population. Thus, the authors claim, we are no longer living in zero-sum economies where what benefits immigrants takes away from locals, as Roman economics was. The alternative outlook is Japan's present, where prosperity and a flatlining population without immigration combine to have a high percentage of pensioners which tax the resources of the welfare state, requiring half of every dollar collected of the safety net. The tradeoff that Japan has made in the authors' evaluation is the maintenance of its cultural and social cohesion. This is what the book states. Furthermore, this book points out, the real story of migration currently unfolding in this period of human history is the movement of millions from rural areas towards the coasts and cities of their own countries, creating megalopolis such as Lagos and Sao Paolo.

II) In terms of superpower politics, the authors see a parallel between Rome and Persia's tug of war with the current dipole between the West and China. They explain that while skirmishes might erupt on the points of contact of the borders of Rome and Persia, they only truly fell together when all-out war resulted in mutual exhaustion before the new challenges of nascent empires from Arabia. Thus, putting their energies into superpower contest killed them both. This is what the authors claim in the book and they see lessons here for the appropriate relationship America and China can take with each other, if both are to survive mutual dangers and challenges, namely, global warming and global disease and such.

III) just as Roman prosperity also caused the prosperity of its provinces, and thus empowered these provinces away from imperial rule, the current world fabric of globalization and industrialization that the West has created has led to the prosperity and rising power of its immediate periphery, which this book means to say are the West's previous colonies. The backbone of industrialization and manufacturing have shifted to these countries due to cheaper costs, and they now have rising power and a say in the world's Congress. The book says that the West should now emphasize how the Western-made social fabric-- of rule of law, impartial institutions, freedoms of speech and media, elected politicians-- can benefit their own countries.

This is the summary of the book as far as I am able to condense its claims.

[Kenneth · Rating 5 out of 5]

Incredibly readable right up to the end. Even these guys can't make modern economics interesting, at least not while staring down the possible collapse of my country. But in my post-Trump election reading it helped me put some of what is happening into context. Context, I've got that going for me at least.

[Nick Tinholt · Rating 3 out of 5]

On the whole I feel that this book provided a relatively in depth description into the parallels between the rise of both Rome and the New World Order. However, I feel as though the authors, in lieu of there being a breadth of reasons for why the fall of Rome and the New World Order are similar, used the final chapters as an opportunity to make general (and rather tired) criticisms of Brexit, the election of Donald Trump etc. This brand of negativity bias lacks the historical nuance that could have been employed here to demonstrate why the current globalist system will be put under pressures with the rise of China (and current decline of the West), but instead failed to do so.

I would recommend reading this book, but I would note that the conclusions the authors come to are nothing new if you follow regular political discourse coming out of the US in recent years.

[Florence Ridley · Rating 5 out of 5]

Great mix of pop-history and -economics. Very readable, persuasively argued and interesting. Also a testament to the importance of even ancient history in modern policy-making.

[Ronnie Pimentel · Rating 1 out of 5]

I was enticed by the title of the book, but quite disappointed at the end.

The first third of the book gives a very interesting and plausible explanation of the economic forces leading to the rise of the northern tribes, invasion and eventual collapse of the Roman Empire.

Then the authors move to propose great parallels in terms of political and social economic conditions between the Roman empire in the fourth and fifth century and the western civilization now; analogies that I feel are a little far-fetched.

The authors final take on the current crisis of the west, root causes,and potential solutions to avoid an ill fate, are more in line with a left wing political propaganda than a an objective, well balanced opinion.

[Gee · Rating 2 out of 5]

An unenjoyable slog through Roman history and a present-day survey of the political landscape that continuously justifies and chants the reigning neo-liberal party lines. "Immigrants? They're great! They work soooooo hard!" "BRexit? Short-sighted and self-defeating!" Give me a break; you have to be blind in order to be so dismissive about the obvious breakdown of nation-states and the decaying cultural glue that had previously bound them.

[Christy Matthews · Rating 2 out of 5]

Jumped around way too much and failed to spend enough time on a topic to make substantial points. Also assumed a significant background in ancient history and the related battles and migration patterns. The author is also very political which continues to detract from points.

[Emilio Minichiello · Rating 4 out of 5]

(4.5 stars) Really solid book comparing the macroeconomics of the modern west to late Rome. The basic premise is that Western supremacy had created its own downfall, by empowering what the authors call the periphery, leading to stronger nations surrounding the West. In the 400s, Rome experienced several key events that led ultimately to their downfall: the rise of Persia as a superpower, the Huns pushing “barbarians” further towards the Mediterranean, and growing strength of periphery local leaders. Together this led to a very fast and surprising push by various Germanic groups to seize farming land, which caused Rome to raise taxes, which ultimately made the periphery leaders switch sides, leading quickly to the end of Western Rome. Now in the modern context, China is like Persia, with India, Africa, East Asia and South America acting like the strengthening periphery. The authors have extremely interesting and pragmatic advice for western leaders over the next decades: accept that western supremacy is over and learn to cooperate with the strengthening periphery. Ally with them and build up a larger coalition to keep China in check. Forget about nationalistic isolationism, that will only leave China stronger. Fascinating and well written, my only gripe is that I had hoped to learn a little more about the actual historical timeline of events leading to the collapse of Rome.

[Andrés Zelada · Rating 4 out of 5]

Este libro toma la típica comparación cuñada (que Occidente va a caer, igual que Roma, por su propia decadencia moral y por dejar que entren los extranjeros) y la somete a un análisis serio. En los primeros cuatro capítulos traza paralelismos entre Roma y Occidente para hablar del surgimiento de los imperios: caracteriza Occidente como un imperio (a pesar del obvio hecho de que son países separados) y explica cómo su surgimiento genera la reorganización de las periferias, es decir, de los territorios que no pertenecen al imperio. Estas periferias se van haciendo fuertes con el contacto imperial y acaban por constituir un desafío.

Los últimos cuatro capítulos no pueden trazar un paralelismo, porque habla de la caída de los imperios, y Occidente aún no ha caído. Pero sí lleva hasta donde puede la comparativa con el caso romano y explica posibles escenarios de futuro y formas en que Occidente podría afrontarlos.

Me ha parecido un análisis muy interesante, y que se aleja de las cuñadeces habituales.

[Lubna · Rating 4 out of 5]

I haven’t read a lot of books in this genre, but I found it an interesting introduction to the type of history books that compare the Roman Empire to the modern-day “West”. As someone originally from the so-called “periphery” of the empire who moved to the “centre” as skilled labour, I find many of the developments in recent decades very interesting, and I see how they aren’t necessarily related to the late stages of the Roman Empire.

I’ve seen a lot of anti-immigrant, racist, rhetoric use Rome as an example of how the “barbarians” i.e. people like me, are “invading” the “West” and “replacing” its people. I’ve always found such arguments idiotic, but it’s good to know more about why they’re idiotic, in case I need to explain it to someone else. Of course, poor, uneducated people in the West find people like me an easy scapegoat for their misery instead of blaming the real criminals who are robbing us all blind.

The book is too short to provide much detail and the conclusion seems rather utopian and naive (considering the dystopian hellscape the world is right now) but it has intrigued me enough to delve deeper into the subject and read more about ancient Rome.

[Yatin Sethi · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book delves deep into the complexities surrounding the rise and eventual decline of empires throughout history, offering a lot of information and insights into the forces at play. While the information presented is undoubtedly valuable, the writing style may prove daunting for some readers. It requires patience and concentration to fully grasp the concepts presented within its pages. Despite its difficulty, the rewards of getting into this scholarly work are well worth the effort.

[Gage Horobetz · Rating 4 out of 5]

6.8/10- Empires/Nations rise from strong civic unity and robust economics along with diverse natural resources. They can erode from the inside primarily from the loss of civic unity and shared identity among citizens. But also can be challenged by external pressures like lack of innovation and a lack of flexibility in governance and economics. As well as military pressures. Pete loves Rome, so that is the majority of the examples.

[Sem Beljaars · Rating 3 out of 5]

Het boek probeert de val van het Romeinse rijk te koppelen aan de “val” van het Westerse rijk, maar ik vind de argumenten zwak. Bovendien wordt de val van het Romeinse rijk maar miniem toegelicht: de lezer krijgt het idee dat Rome bloeide tot aan de vijfde eeuw na Christus, en dat enkel de volksverhuizingen uit die tijd Rome ten val brachten. Tot slot wordt nooit duidelijk gemaakt waarom het Westen wordt gezien als een “rijk” dat kan “vallen”.

[Matteo Polenghi · Rating 5 out of 5]

One of the best essays I've ever read. Mind-opening like few. Extraordinary ability of the authors to compare the two similar histories and what can governments change to not repeat. Every politician should read to understand where priorities lie.

[Mariah Glackler · Rating 2 out of 5]

The empires fell

[Mark Cramer · Rating 4 out of 5]

For over three centuries a western nation has dominated the global order. Moreover, in this period, the outcome of competitions among western nations shaped the modern world’s geopolitical boundaries, economic flows, values, and behaviors. Culminating in the mid-twentieth century, competitions among western nations ceased giving way to an imperial-like confederation simply called ‘the West’ (aka the American-led order), which principled itself on remaining at the center of the world order and sustaining a prosperous welfare system for its citizens and succeeding generations. However, in the early twenty-first century, events such as the 2008 Depression, the global COVID response and China’s rise are driving an insecure feeling that the West is stagnating under the costs of sustaining its unprecedented prosperity, which is driving internal socio-political division in the face of new, powerful forces on its periphery. The West’s modern-day malaise naturally drives a reflexive look to history for a comparable case, which leads to a study of the Roman Empire’s demise. Rome, as conventional history concludes, defined its own world order for centuries and then disintegrated under its own weight. However, Rome’s legacy is much more complicated than a simple slow death over three centuries because it’s values, norms and culture were foundational for succeeding orders of the new powers on Rome’s old periphery. From a comparative perspective, the key lesson of Rome’s decline is dissolution is not inevitable for the West if it can accept that it fundamentally changed the world’s power structure and adapts to those changes.
Heather and Rapley challenge the conventional understanding of the Roman Empire’s collapse as defined in Edward Gibbon’s 1776 work, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire and provide analysis for an updated diagnosis of the modern West’s perceived decline. Gibbon concludes that Rome gradually declined over multiple centuries because of the dual effects of internal immorality resulting from Rome’s increased social decadence as a byproduct of its success coupled to the tolerance of migration from barbarian tribes that made Rome impotent in the face of hostile barbarian invasions in the fourth century. In contrast, Heather and Rapley argue that Rome fell suddenly as multiple forces, moving on different timelines, converged at a single point in history to force its fall. These forces were unwittingly created by Rome over the preceding centuries of expansion because the imposition of its order created new economic power centers, which eventually converted into political power. With this understanding, Heather and Rapley’s thesis states empires permanently rearrange the ‘building blocks’ of power through their expansion and inadvertently create new centers of economic and political power on their periphery that eventually causes an empire to decline from competition on its periphery that is impossible to reverse but can adapt if it wants to survive.
By the fourth century, Rome was at the center of an enormous territory that it governed through the export of culture and military power that was sustained by an agrarian economy. In this century, Heather and Rapley describe the convergence of four specific forces that drove Rome’s collapse and then attempt to compare those forces to the West’s current experience. First, was the superpower competition with the Persian empire between the third and fourth century whose competition for control of the east required ever larger Roman armies to deter and subsequently drained the tax revenue away from other parts of Roman Empire who also needed security; namely the northern Rhine frontier. Second, was the exogenous shock of the massive migration of barbarian tribes into Rome’s northern frontier, which was forced by the hostile ambitions of the Huns in the outer periphery. Rome was unable to assimilate new tribes such as the Tervingi, eventually leading to military clashes while these migrating tribes seized Roman territory and re-ordered the power structure on the periphery. The combined effects of the persistent superpower competition on the East and mass migration in the North strained Rome’s ability to provide security to its clients accelerating the third force, which was an assertive inner periphery of client territories whose economies had grown under Roman rule and now, out of necessity, converted their economic power into political power making new networks and confederations with forces from the outer periphery. The fourth force was the internal political division where Roman elites at all levels of society changed allegiances to invading powers to preserve their own wealth and status because Rome could no longer protect or incentivize them under the weight of the other forces.
Aligning the four forces that brought down Rome to trends in today’s West, Heather and Rapley predictably denote China as the superpower competition. The risk for competition with China the success of its command economy presents a credible alternative to the West’s market approach and the accumulation of China’s economic power may soon convert to military power and become undeterred. Second, migration to the West is not a problem and this is where Heather and Rapley make their case to challenge Gibbon. Decades of declining birth-rates, ageing populations and increasingly higher, debt-finance living standards to sustain, means the West needs working labor to keep their welfare systems alive and to discourage immigration is destructive.
The two authors focus their analysis on the West’s changing inner periphery and the political division and describe these as the most important forces driving the perceived decline. Today’s inner periphery are the decolonized nations who remained client states of the 1945 re-ordered West through the Bretton-Woods monetary system. Today, the inner periphery’s population is growing where the West is declining, has bursting cities, and, through the search for cheaper production market, has received the means of industry and manufacturing as the West converts to a knowledge-service economy. This willing transfer by the West indicates that the inner periphery with a growing middle class will naturally convert their hard economic power into political power and form new power centers in the world. Linked to the inner periphery’s rise is the West’s political division, which the authors contend is byproduct of the West’s anxiety over the future of its most powerful too, namely debt. While the Bretton-Woods system created dependencies for the periphery, the West simultaneously developed a new fiscal contract that exchanged a citizen’s loyalty, expressed by paying taxes and following the law, for the state’s protection expressed now in increasing livening standards. This fiscal exchange was made easy in the past decades through debt financing and exploiting cheaper services from the still developing periphery. However, in the last few decades of globalization, the authors contend that the phenomena of government debt combined with the West’s personal debt via near universal credit has driven debt levels to astronomical levels while western populations become smaller and the hope of a new revolution in economic productivity diminish. This creates a situation where the fiscal contract is truly at risk and the West could quickly arrive at the unsustainable point where it is spending an enormous amount just to maintain present living standards and must cut-back on promised services to its citizens. The failure of the fiscal contract in the West, in the minds of the authors could be the catalyst for the West’s total decline.
The importance of Why the Empire’s Fall is it offers a fresh challenge of Roman history’s accepted orthodoxy, which is Gibbon’s conclusion that Rome collapsed under its own weight. Heather and Rapley’s critique Gibbon imply that Rome was always in control and could have simply prevented it’s collapse, which through their analysis shows that the world re-ordered by Rome created new independent variables that drove its eventual decline. For the West, this is an important concept because there is an orthodoxy that assumes the West will simply innovate itself towards continued growth and powers on the periphery will fall before they can permanently invert the order. Additionally, this work highlights that like Rome, the West has enduring values that will influence any future order. The ideas of market capitalism, democracy and the rule of law are synonymous with Rome’s enduring Latin, Christianity and written law that brought Europe through to the Renaissance. In this respect, Heather and Rapley offer optimism to a future re-ordered world if the West can accept new powers from the inner periphery, which could discover better opportunities for global influence and growth. In contrast, this work’s weakness was in its specific recommendations to cure the internal political division caused by the West’s debt financing and threat to the fiscal contract. Heather and Rapley only offer increased taxes and shallow wealth redistribution schemes, which would likely only exacerbate the incentives for elites to change allegiances and increase economic and political anxiety as citizens in liberal democracies are forced to give up more economic independence for security.
Why Empires Fall is a timely and compelling work that forces a western reader to look critically at the broad trends of modern history in context of what is known from the Roman Empire’s history. While there is expansive literature that compares Rome to modernity, especially in a Pax Americana sense, this work looks at the trans-Atlantic bloc as a singular system. This work will complement any study geopolitics and cycle theory in trying to understand the possibilities and consequences of economic behavior over the long-term. Heather and Rapley’s analysis of historical events and alignment of timelines, gives a new reality to how Rome actually fell and this work will stand as a warning to the modern West of what is likely to come.

[Альберто Лорэдо · Rating 4 out of 5]

Interesting essay comparing the fall of the Roman Empire and the similitudes with the current situation in the Western countries. Some interesting theories and hypothesis though I'm not in agreement with all of them.

As a bonus, I really loved discovering the "Thucydides trap" theory, which I must say I fully agree with it!.

[Realini Ionescu · Rating 4 out of 5]

Why Empires Fall Rome, America, and the Future of The West by Peter Heather and John Rapley –the way it looks, this must be some grim reading

9 out of 10





The title seems to be self-explanatory, if empires fall, then America will too, and alas, those of us who depend on it (or is it her) will be in deep trouble, to use an euphemism, seeing as Putin has occupied big chunks of Ukraine, is waiting for perverse, decrepit, disgusting Republicans to elect yet another fool (no, this is not Trump now, we have to wait for next year, 2024) as Speaker, one of the favorites is the former wrestling coach, and mad member of one impeachment committee, illustrative of what one problem of America is



Rome has a lot to teach us, and its fall – due to barbarians in large part, it seems to me – could be replicated, not because of the migrants that are used by the extreme right in many places to get votes and scare the electorate, however difficult it will be to deal with Climate Change, that will push ever more humans to abandon their flooded shores, as it is, dire economic situation, tyrants are causing mass migration

One fabulous book on this subject is Why The West Rules For Now http://realini.blogspot.com/2017/10/w... by Ian Morris and we learn from it that China had been on the rise, surpassing the West even before its recent belligerence, from the position of super-power rival to the United States -of Erica we could say, as suggested in the book Lake Wobegon Days, which explains that King Eric of Norway was more important than Amerigo Vespucci



The same Lake Wobegon Days http://realini.blogspot.com/2020/08/l... gives the name to an effect, because it talks of how most drivers say that they are better than the average, and the same goes for other aspects of life, as we can see if we look around, America will be ruined by such a fellow, if he comes again on top in 2024, for he keeps saying he is ‘a very stable genius’

In Why The West Rules For Now, the stupendous author explains how it would have made sense for the conquistadors (who would then not have this name) to meet…Chinese, when they have landed in the New World, but because one Chinese emperor had decided to stop his massive ships from sailing away from his shores, the very small boats (when compared with the titanic vessels from China) of the Europeans gave them fantastic conquests…



One main reason why the American Empire might fall is in full display these days, as The House Of Representatives has thrown political life into chaos, pretty soon, when the temporary funding will halt, economies might tumble, as the USA government would shut, and then other dominoes will fall, in our vicinity as well



They have stopped funding for Ukraine, thus Russia is emboldened, the legitimate freedom fighters will soon have no ammunition and means to carry on the battle, which as their heroic leader, Volodymyr Zelenski, says it is the war of the democratic, free countries, against the would be empire of Russia.

This is an example of a country that however big, it is the largest in the world, wants to gain even more territory, and therefore has taken to invading a free, independent neighbor, because their czar wants to, has the propaganda and war machines to cause massive damage, tens of thousands, nay more than a hundred thousand, given that we also have to count the Russian casualties, have died in the war



One main calamity is the spread of the conspiracy theories that are like wild fire on the net, and reach all corners of the world – as an example, countries in Africa are enamored with…Russia, bloody hell, to quote this crazy woman who passed by me at the club downtown and started swearing, just because I was doing my special exercise http://realini.blogspot.com/2022/02/u... and she did not like it, or more likely, she is just mad – including this realm

Clients at the World-class outfit swallow these conspiracies by the gallon and explain how you need to know the ‘truth’, as in their ‘alternative facts’ - what a god damn voracious name to choose, I mean they really tell you they are world class, when all they are is incredibly demanding of their clients, they have shut down the cabin for three months, then little worked when they opened, a few days ago, saunas stopped, and the guy at the pool has the audacity and rudeness to tell me to remove my shirt and things from a chair by the pool, I mean fuck you, go ahead, respect your contract, promises and all, and then we could also look at nuances and more fucking impositions from your side, you eejits and pompous Ruskies



Outliers http://realini.blogspot.com/2013/05/o... is a classic of psychology written by Malcolm Gladwell, one of the most influential psychologists in the world, and within it we could also read about some other aspects of the fall of America and rise of China, if we have a look at the analysis made by the author, regarding the fundamentals of the Eastern culture, versus the Western one

Life in the East (to try and put this in a nutshell) was based on rice, which is a very demanding crop, if you put just a little more or less water, it is ruined, or affected anyway, and people there have to keep busy all the year round – a saying goes something like ‘if you rise with the sun five days a year it is fine, with the implication that you could relax a little bit on five days every year, not more – whereas in the West (including Russia and other such places) the main crops were maize, wheat, and these would allow people to stay on the stove more or less (an exaggeration, clearly, of mine, that is) for long months…when there is a problem, those in the East throw more work on it, and a recent study has shown that in that part of the world they sleep less than in the Nordic countries (they snooze the most) and the rest of the world…no wonder then that they will rule the world, alas, China is a communist tyranny…





Now for a question, and invitation – maybe you have a good idea on how we could make more than a million dollars with this http://realini.blogspot.com/2022/02/u... – as it is, this is a unique technique, which we could promote, sell, open the Oscars show with or something and then make lots of money together, if you have the how, I have the product, I just do not know how to get the befits from it, other than the exercise per se



As for my role in the Revolution that killed Ceausescu, a smaller Mao, there it is http://realini.blogspot.com/2022/03/r...



From To The Heritage:

‘Fiction is infinitely preferable to real life...As long as you avoid the books of Kafka or Beckett, the everlasting plot of fiction has fewer futile experiences than the careless plot of reality...Fiction's people are fuller, deeper, cleverer, more moving than those in real life…Its actions are more intricate, illuminating, noble, profound…There are many more dramas, climaxes, romantic fulfillment, twists, turns, gratified resolutions…Unlike reality, all of this you can experience without leaving the house or even getting out of bed…What's more, books are a form of intelligent human greatness, as stories are a higher order of sense…As random life is to destiny, so stories are to great authors, who provided us with some of the highest pleasures and the most wonderful mystifications we can find…Few stories are greater than Anna Karenina, that wise epic by an often foolish author…’

[Jonathan · Rating 1 out of 5]

I was very keen to read this book, about which I had heard good things, but I found it painful going with poor historical analogies. Ultimately I think this is a book for stupid people who want to believe that they are intelligent. The authors have swallowed whole the mantra trotted out by western governments and used that as the basis for their absurdly poor geopolitical analysis of the 21st century. If that’s your bag, then it is probably quicker just to read the BBC website every day.