The Traitor of Arnhem: WWII’s Greatest Betrayal and the Moment That Changed History Forever

by Robert Verkaik

The end of the Second World War is in sight.Following the overwhelming victory on D-Day, Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin all seek to shape the global future to their own ends and win the race to Berlin.The British launch Operation Market Garden, the greatest airborne operation the world has ever seen. It is a bold roll of the dice, which, if successful, will end the war in weeks. But behind the scenes, spies are working, and plans are betrayed, the operation fails and thousands of Allied soldiers die.The Traitor of Arnhem tells a never-before-told story of this iconic operation, and of the very different figures working in secret to cause the catastrophic defeat. One traitor a terrifying giant of a man, a supposed hero of the resistance who sent hundreds of fellow freedom fighters to torture and death, the other an aristocrat and an English gentleman, working from inside the heart of the Allied war effort in London. Both of them working for the Russians.Drawn from unseen records and shedding fresh light on the operation and the spies responsible for its failure, this is an incredible account of the battle that would go on to shape the twentieth century.

Genres: History, World War II, Nonfiction, Military History, Espionage, War

400 pages, Paperback

First published May 9, 2024

Reviews

[Sarah B · Rating 3 out of 5]

I will start this review by saying this is not the type of thing I usually read. I don't know much about spies at all. And I am not too much into watching those spy movies either...but I saw this book and well I got curious. If you have seen some of my other reviews you might know my cousin is hooked on World War 2, so I often keep my eye out for any books she might be interested in. So I got curious and decided to read this, find out what it was about.

This book is mainly about a man named Christiaan Lindemans. He was a Dutchman who was a spy for the British and he went by the name of King Kong. Apparently he is very famous and there is some huge controversy about him (of course I was totally oblivious to this) because he was a double agent working for the Nazis.

So the book has three sections:

Section 1: pages 1 to 104.

Tells the story of King Kong. I really enjoyed this part of the book. It was definitely my favorite. Why? Because it describes the things that King Kong was doing as a spy and it was just so outrageous! It was almost like reading fiction. I had no idea what real spies do but his lifestyle was very shocking. Better yet it explained why he became a double agent.

This section moved at a pretty decent speed. It was pretty tight on focus and stayed in target with King Kong.

Section 2: pages 105 - 196

This was a part I didn't like at all! It seemed to not have a central character but seemed to talk about many different people. It was supposed to be about this other secret spy called Josephine but as I said it was wandering all over the place! For awhile, after reading 41 pages into this part, it seemed to improve for a short time but then it started to get scattered again.

I was yawning and struggling through these pages. I was also rather confused. How did all of this connect to King Kong?? Was there TWO traitors at Arnhem? But the title suggests only one. So. . .? I kind of decided this was some gibberish I really wasn't interested in at all.

Section 3: pages 197 - 346

Well the title of this part was Russia but guess who was back? King Kong!! This gave me hope that the third part might actually be readable. And it was. Not as good as the first part but pretty good. In here is was discussing a few things. Like was King Kong a double agent? People tried to find proof. They try to ask him questions but let's just say he was not very cooperative. But it tells what happened to King Kong later, after the war.

There are also questions in here about who this Josephine might be.

I thought parts of this also wandered around a bit. Not all of the details were interesting to me.

I will say the author clearly did a LOT of research to write this and there is a big bibliography / notes section way in the back. If you are totally into this subject I am sure you will enjoy this book much more than I did.

I think the most interesting thing in this whole book is the sentence about what a spy is like, you know, an ordinary person who can blend into the crowd. They might even look anxious. They can fool people. I believe lots of movies show spies as these incredibly handsome people with nice clothes and lots of style and they probably have gadgets. It seems that King Kong was quite the playboy with lots of girlfriends (is that where the movies get the idea from?)... But a spy can look like an ordinary person.

[The Villan · Rating 4 out of 5]

Very good read and well researched. It’s amazing to think what could’ve happened if Market Garden had succeeded and how many lives both civilian and military might’ve been saved by possibly ending the war sooner. It angers me still when I read anything about the Cambridge 5 who got away with their betrayal for so long due to the British belief in the Old School Tie brigade

[Elizabeth Swift · Rating 3 out of 5]

It's always amazing to me that we can think we know a lot about a subject and , yet, we don't know so much. This talks about traitors of WWII centered around the battle called Market Garden from the points of view of Britain, Holland, and Russia. It was a bit tedious by the last chapters, but still very interesting. I knew of the British traitors Philby and Burgess, but wasn't quite aware of how many double and triple agents there were. This was a whole new world for me. I'm going next to read Verkaik's book The Traitor of Colditz

[Alan Roberts · Rating 5 out of 5]

Im rating this quite a while after I read the book, but from what I remember it was very suspenseful and at times emotional. I loved the historical aspects and context this book contains, highly recommend to anyone interested in WW2. You grow to love characters and also at times hate characters. Highly Suggest.

[James · Rating 4 out of 5]

The first book I read and the start of many more!

The book itself was a great read, with a lot to learn about operation market garden.

[Harvey St.John · Rating 1 out of 5]

(Below references are made to the paperback edition of this book published in 2025.)
This is an interesting and well researched book, but the author clearly draws the wrong conclusions. I can only presume that this is in order to sensationalise the book.
On P.311 Verkaik states: “it does seem worth questioning whether the betrayals added up to the few percentage points that turned victory into defeat.” Verkaik carries out a brilliant analysis of the betrayals, but fails completely to properly analyse their effect on Operation Market Garden. Verkaik completely ignores the significance of two key points:
1. The operation plan of Market Garden would have been obvious to the Germans on Day 1 of the battle. They were faced with XXX Corps attacking up only one road and airborne landings all along it culminating in the final bridge over the Rhine. You did not have to be Napoleon or Alexander the Great to work out what the British and Americans were up to. This means that by Day 2 of the Battle the Germans would certainly have drawn reinforcements into position along the road and to Arnhem itself.

2. Despite point 1 above and the betrayal of the plans for Operation Market Garden, the British and Americans very nearly succeeded in their objective. Perhaps due to the information provided by Lindemans, Model sent reinforcements from Arnhem to the Waal Bridge at Nijmegen on 18 September 1944. This act did delay the capture of this bridge, but it was nevertheless captured on evening of 20 September 1944. British resistance at Arnhem Bridge only ceased at 5.00am on 21 September 1944. It is a fact that at the time Waal Bridge at Nijmegen was captured there were still British paratroopers holding out at Arnhem Bridge, and there were no German forces between the four British tanks with the surviving members of the 504th Infantry Regiment and Arnhem Bridge. In Chapter XIX, The Missed Opportunity of It Never Snows in September Kershaw quotes Heinz Harmel Commander of the 10SS Panzer Division: “Why did they not drive on to Elst instead of staying in Lent? At this instant, there were no German armoured forces available to block Elst.” This is the main reason why the Battle of Arnhem was lost.
Given points 1 and 2 above it is difficult to justify the conclusion of Verkaik that the betrayal of the plans for Operation Market Gardens to the Germans three days before the Allies started the Operation resulted in the Allied defeat.

It is important to note here the strength of the Germans at Arnhem on Day 1. According to It Never Snows in September by Kershaw, the II SS Panzer Corps only numbered 6000-7000 men. According to Arnhem by Beevor the manpower of the II SS Panzer Corps was less than 20 per cent of its full strength. The German armour at Arnhem even included a number of outdated French Char B tanks, which were easily dealt with by British paratroopers armed with 6 pounder anti-tank guns. The Germans shifted further reinforcements to Arnhem after Day 1 of the battle. As Beevor states in Arnhem, “The vast majority of the tanks which Allied troops faced in Market Garden were not present at the start of the operation, but were bought in from Germany with astonishing speed on Blitztransport trains.” In fact, some of the troops that the Germans later transferred to fight at Arnhem were naval personnel who were equipped with captured British Lee Enfield rifles.

Moreover, there are also many other reasons why the Allies lost the Battle of Arnhem, to name only seven:

1. The Germans used the railway yard at Kleve to bring up their reinforcements. It was the obvious place for the Germans to bring up reinforcements. Kleve was just over the Dutch border in Germany, but it was never bombed either before or during the Battle of Arnhem. It should have been bombed before the operation got under way in order to destroy the railway yard.

2. The difficulty of moving XXX Corps up one narrow road. As Beevor states in Arnhem, “the survival of the British 1st Airborne Division entirely depended on the speed with which Horrocks’s XXX Corps could advance up a single road all the way to Arnhem for 103 kilometres.” Moreover, there certainly seems to be plenty of evidence for a lack of urgency amongst the ranks of XXX Corps. Beevor also states, “The Irish Guards group, convinced by Brigadier Gwatkin’s mistaken notion that they need not hurry until the bridge at Son was rebuilt, moved out of Valkenswaard at what Joe Vandeleur described as a “leisurely pace”.” In addition, Lt Col Joe Vandeleur and his fellow officers even went for a swim during their advance up the road towards Arnhem.

3. There were two roads up to Eindhoven from the British front line, but the British only attacked up one. Attacking up two roads on 17 September 1944 would have provided a diversion for the Germans and the British might have reached Eindhoven sooner. Moreover, the possession of two roads up to Eindhoven would have provided some relief to the traffic congestion as far as Eindhoven.

4. The British paratroopers and glider borne troops being landed 11 km from Arnhem Bridge. This is something which went against all the principles of airborne warfare. In 1940 the Germans had demonstrated the value of landing on top of their target at Fort Eben-Emael. The British had learnt well and on 6 June 1944 British glider borne troops performed a successful operation at Benouville Bridge and Ranville Bridge by landing within yards of the target.

5. The British commanders foresaw German Resistance cracking like an egg. But the Allied commanders must have known that the German Army seldom cracked like an egg. Instead, the German Army would regroup and almost always counter-attack. The German Army had the advantage of short supply lines and it had its back against the wall.

6. At the time of Operation Market Garden, the British were still shipping their supplies from the Mulberry Harbour in Normandy. This is a distance of almost 700km.

7. Generalfeldmarschall Walter Model and Generaloberst Kurt Student were two of the most able commanders on the German side during World War Two.
So, Robert Verkaik is clearly stretching a point by stating that the two traitors caused the Allied defeat.

In P.267 Paragraph 3 Verkaik states, “The failure of Market Garden was not simply a military defeat – it was arguably a disaster for the world. While it is likely that had it succeeded, Nazi resistance in the West would have quickly crumbled and the German military leaders would have sued for peace, what seems unarguable is that its failure encouraged Hitler into a final deluded belief that he would be able to force a separate peace with the Western Allies which prolonged the war by months and allowed the Russians to advance hundreds of miles to the West.” To start with Verkaik also admits on P.131 Paragraph 3 that, “On 12, July, an Anglo-Soviet treaty was signed in the Russian capital to fight together and not make a separate peace with the Nazis.” So the Germans would never have been able to surrender solely to the Western Allies. Moreover, Verkaik forgets the Casablanca Conference of January 1943 where the Allies agreed and demanded an unconditional surrender. The German military leaders would never have sued for peace easily. The German military leaders knew far more about their crimes than the Allies, and they knew that they would be held accountable for them under an unconditional surrender. The latter point ensured that the Germans would fight to the end. The Germans did not surrender after the Battle of the Bulge, when it became obvious that they would be defeated in the West. It is unlikely that a victory at Arnhem would have denied the Red Army its advance into Eastern Europe and East Germany, and the post-war division of Europe between East and West through the middle of Germany. It must be recognised that even if the Battle of Arnhem had been won, it probably would not have ended the war significantly earlier. This is because:
1. After Arnhem the Allies might still have been stopped along the River Ijssel.

2. Three months after Operation Market Garden the Germans mustered more than 400,000 men for the Battle of the Bulge. These men were equipped with approximately 2500 Armoured Fighting Vehicles of various types (including 557 tanks and 667 assault guns) and 4000+ artillery pieces (including anti-tank guns). It is reasonable to assume that after Operation Market Garden the Germans would have had some reserves that they could place between an Allied Army that was victorious at Arnhem and Germany itself. The Germans proved time and time again that they were brilliant at regrouping, re-equipping and transferring troops from the Eastern Front to the Western Front at astonishing speed. Just half of the strength that was available to the Germans at the time of the Battle of the Bulge would have been sufficient to grind any post-Arnhem Allied advance into Germany to a virtual halt.

3. The supplies for the Allied advance beyond Arnhem would all have had to be transported down one narrow road of 103km. In addition, all the supplies for all the following units would have to be moved along the same road. Of course, it would also have been necessary to send the same supply trucks back down the same congested road to get more supplies. It should be remembered here that at the end of Operation Market Garden groups of German soldiers were still crossing the Allied salient at its base. Moreover, the Battle of Overloon, which had the objective of widening the salient created by the Battle of Arnhem, would have been necessary even if the Operation Market Garden was a success. The Battle of Overloon was fought from 30 September to 18 October 1944. The necessity for the Battle of Overloon would have delayed the Allied advance into Germany, and bought time for the Germans to bring up further reinforcements and build up their defences.

4. In December 1944, German forces blew holes in the Rhine River dyke at Driel (and other locations such as Ommeren in the Betuwe area) to deliberately flood the region and block the Allied advance. There is a photograph (reproduced in Corps Commander by Sir Brian Horrocks) recording how the British Army was forced to run amphibious vehicles (DUKWs and Weasels) along the roads through Kranenburg towards Kleve. The topography of Holland greatly benefitted the defender. The German Navy divers also successfully attacked both the road bridge and the railway bridge at Nijmengen on the night of 28 / 29 September 1944. These events demonstrate that the Germans would still have successfully hampered and sabotaged Allied efforts to advance into Germany even if Operation Market Garden had been successful.
On P.314 Verkaik actually admits that Blunt’s intelligence prior to the commencement of Operation Market Garden was delayed until after the commencement of Operation Market Garden:
“While Lindemans’ early warning of an Anglo-American airborne assault is well known, the second intelligence breach has been largely ignored. This is because Kraemer’s microdot report was delayed so that it arrived at the same time as the Anglo- British forces were arriving over Holland.”
“However, Walter Schellenberg, the head of German intelligence, was convinced it helped the Germans to understand the battlefield at a vital point in the battle”
The “vital point” is not defined by Walter Schellenberg, and he obviously did not appreciate the very first point I made above, that the Allied plans were blatantly obvious to the Germans as soon as Operation Market Garden commenced.

On pages 264-267 Robert Verkaik once again stretches the point by stating that Churchill wanted to reach Berlin before the Soviets. The matter is not that simple. Verkaik forgets that between 13 and 15 February 1945 the Western Allies bombed Dresden four times with the object of disrupting this vital transport and communication hub used by Germany to move troops against the advancing Red Army, i.e. the Western Allies acted to speed the Red Army’s advance.


So Verkaik’s conclusion on P319, namely:
“What we can say is that if Blunt was Josephine …..then Blunt can be argued to be the most devastatingly successful and destructive spy in history”
is clearly incorrect.

A general comment is the lack of years included in dates. The inclusion of more years in the dates provided in the book would make it easier to follow.
My specific comments are:
P.113 Paragraph 1 “Stalin, who regarded Britain as a more natural enemy than Germany”. This is incorrect. In Mein Kampf Hitler had made no secret of his hatred for communism. He had made it clear that communism was a deadly enemy of Germany. Read The Maisky Dairies, where the Soviet efforts throughout the 1930s to obtain an agreement with Britain and the Soviet Union are detailed. Maisky (the Soviet Ambassador to London from 1932 to 1943) even admired Winston Churchill and visited him at Chartwell during the 1930s. In fact, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia signed a Mutual Assistance treaty on 16 May 1935. It was designed to guard against German expansion. It would have depended on France also acting. But it was betrayed by Chamberlain’s Munich Agreement in 1938. This forced the Soviet Union into the Molotov Ribbentrop pact on 23 August 1939, in an attempted to protect itself from German expansion. This is all detailed in The Maisky Dairies, which is a first-hand source.
P.113 Paragraph 3 “Hitler ordered the invasion of Poland and on 3 September, Britain and France ….. declared war on Germany. Within days, Stalin followed suit, taking the Red Army into Poland, occupying the Baltic states and attacking Finland”. This paragraph shows a lack of understanding of the chronology of events as the Soviet Union did not attack Finland “within days”:
1. The German invasion of Poland began on 1 September 1939.
2. The Soviet invasion of Poland began on 17 September 1939.
3. The Soviet invasion of Finland began on 30 November 1939.
P.114 Paragraph 3. “Reports of the purges and terrors inside communist Russia as well as the appalling tragedy unfolding in Ukraine”. It is inaccurate to see Ukraine as a special case for Soviet repression, and the Soviet Famine of 1930-1933 solely or especially as a Ukrainian famine. This is because the Soviet Famine of 1930-1933 involved the deaths of approximately 3 million people in Ukraine, approximately 2 million people in Russia, and approximately 2 million people in Kazakhstan.
P.131 Paragraph 4. “Under a further lease agreement (Anglo-Soviet treaty) 3000 RAF Hurricane fighters, …. were shipped to Russia, along with guns, tanks, clothing, rubber, engines, trains”. British steam locomotives and rolling stock were not sent to the Soviet Union during World War Two. The United States supplied the Soviet Union with steam locomotives. British LMS 8F steam locomotives and rolling stock were used on the first part of the rail corridor through Iran as far as Tehran before the United States Army took over running this line. When the United States Army took over this railway line the British Steam locomotives were replaced with American diesel locomotives.
P.275 Paragraph 3. “Yakov Dzhugashvili, better known as Stalin’s only son”. Stalin in fact had two legitimate sons (the other was Vasily Stalin), one adopted son (Artyom Sergeyev), and an illegitimate son (Alexander Davydov). The latter was only confirmed by DNA testing in 2016.
P.289 Paragraph 3. “Blunt secretly made microdot copies of the letters and sent them to Moscow under cover of diplomatic mail”. The matter of whether Blunt sent Edward VIII’s letters to Moscow has never been conclusively proved, let alone any methods for how it was done. Yuri Modin, formerly controller for the Cambridge spy ring, when asked if the Soviets could have blackmailed the British royal family, merely stated - “Yes, we could have done that, but we would not”.
P.291 Paragraph 1. “Trepper was in fact 1,500 miles away, languishing in a Russian prison.” I believe that this sentence actually does not belong in this paragraph and should instead be in P.291 Paragraph 5 after the sentence: “In September 1946, Philby reported that Leopold Trepper had been traced to an address in Harrogate, Yorkshire.”

[Romulo Perez-Segnini · Rating 1 out of 5]

DNF.

A jambalaya of names that had my head spinning. It is clear that the author did a lot of research but did he have to include every name he came upon on this book? Simplicity is key.

I felt like there was going to be a quiz after every chapter.

[Stephanie Carne · Rating 4 out of 5]

I thought this was an interesting book. I did not have much knowledge of what happened at Arnhem so I found the material fascinating. I thought the author did a good job of the research and he really lays out all the potential things that may have been avoided as a result of the defeat at Arnhem.
I thought the last couple of chapters were a little repetitive.

[Bertie · Rating 3 out of 5]

One of the saddest books ever…not least because the repercussions are still causing war to this day…

[Jamie · Rating 4 out of 5]

Amazing story and collaboration of historical details. Changed my view of the WW2 narrative.

[Kristi · Rating 1 out of 5]

I must preface this review with the fact that I read "A Bridge Too Far" by Cornelius Ryan 50 years ago. The subject of Arnhem and Montgomery's striving for glory has appeared briefly in other WWII history books that I have read. My beliefs from this reading is that Eisenhower was not in favor of the mission, but capitulated to help maintain American - British relations in the fight across Europe to Berlin. The plan was ill-conceived in that all the reinforcing tanks, artillery, other materiel and reinforcements would have to travel north on one road. Successful movement on this road would require the capture of bridges - one would be too far. In addition Montgomery, because of his ego, ignored reports of Panzer tanks in large numbers. Monty said they were simply damaged, unusable tanks that had been left behind by the Wehrmacht. I have always blamed Montgomery for one the worst Allied losses of the war. I shall find out if I remember correctly and am too biased against the British commander's ego. **** If you have not read Cornelius Ryan, please to so: The Longest Day: June 6, 1944, The Last Battle: The Classic History of the Battle for Berlin. I have never forgotten how he used interviews with participants in the events to enhance the power of his writing........ OK I made it to page 18. It is a good idea to not make readers angry with the beginning of a book!!!!!!!!!!! Dear author, you state in the foreward that you do not write HISTORY. There are far better historians to detail WWII history. "This is a spy story"... Perhaps no truer statement has initiated a book. So far I believe that the accent should be on story as in novel based upon history, but not necessarily true..... Then the writer goes on to impugn the Dutch people. "the Dutch population's initial response to the arrival of the Germans in May 1940 had been one of lukewarm acquiescence". The German invasion of the Netherlands was a military campaign, part of Case Yellow, the Nazi German invasion of the Low Countries (Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) and France during World War II. The battle lasted from 10 May 1940 until the surrender of the main Dutch forces on 14 May. Dutch troops in the province of Zealand continued to resist the Wehrmacht until 17 May, when Germany completed its occupation of the whole country.
The invasion of the Netherlands saw some of the earliest mass paratroop drops, to occupy tactical points and assist the advance of ground troops. The German Luftwaffe used paratroopers in the capture of several airfields in the vicinity of Rotterdam and The Hague, helping to quickly overrun the country and immobilize Dutch forces. The bombing of Rotterdam was one of the largest German bombing of civilians and has been referred to as the Dutch Blitz. At least 1,150 people were killed, with 711 deaths in the 14 May bombing alone. The Germans threatened to bomb other Dutch cities if the Dutch forces refused to surrender. The General Staff knew it could not stop the bombers and ordered the Royal Netherlands Army to cease hostilities. The last occupied parts of the Netherlands were liberated in 1945. I suppose the author thinks the response of the Norwegians, Belgians and French were also lukewarm. Norway had declared neutrality. The German invasion of Norway began on April 9, 1940, as part of Operation Weserübung. The invasion aimed to secure naval bases against the British and to ensure the supply of iron ore from Sweden. The Norwegian campaign involved both the Norwegian military and Allied forces attempting to resist the invasion, which lasted until June 10, 1940. The invasion was significant as it allowed Germany to control Norway and use its strategic locations for further military operations in the North Atlantic. Even with the bungled help of Britain and other Allied forces the Norwegian military was only able to hold out for 2 months. If you want to speak of lukewarm resistance, please check out Sweden. This country managed to maintain "neutrality" throughout WWII while providing luxury train transportation to Nazis in the occupation of Norway, supplying war materiel, including ball bearings, to Germany and even participating in joint sports events. They may have managed to save their country and people from death and devastation, but they did not hold the moral high ground. Read: Sweden, the Swastika and Stalin: The Swedish Experience in the Second World War by John Scott Lennox Gilmour. OH THAT'S RIGHT, I FORGOT, YOU DO NOT WRITE HISTORY. The author provides a crib sheet of character names ( which will soon be demonstrated as necessary ) Fancy name for the list: Dramatis Personae. WOW!!! Finally I am reading content.... so to speak. page 23. "Lindemans found accommodation with the Vermeulin family. Vermeulin was living with his second wife and her 19-year-old daughter, Gilberte, from her first marriage." NO LAST NAME FOR GILBERTE. She will be important so it is always a good idea to provide sufficient information when a character is introduced. First and only mention of Vermeulin name. The stepfather and Gilberte ( last name unknown) were working with the French resistance. Then: " Monsieur Letuppe had let the resistance use his home".... WHO THE HELL IS MONSIEUR LETUPPE??? I THOUGHT I HAD MISSED HIM AMID THE MYRIAD OF NAMES SO I CHECKED THE INDEX FOR HIS INTRODUCTION TO THE NARRATIVE. THAT WAS HIS INTRODUCTION. WHO THE HELL WAS HE????? I NOTICED THAT LETUPPE, GILBERTE WAS LISTED IN THE INDEX SO I WENT BACK TO THE "DRAMATIS PERSONAE" AND REALIZED LETUPPE WAS THE LAST NAME OF THE GIRLFRIEND GILBERTE. WHAT A DISASTEROUS BEGINNING!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! I GRADUATED SUMMA CUM LAUDE, WAS ELECTED TO PHI BETA KAPPA, HAD A FULL FELLOWSHIP FROM THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH FOR GRADUATE SCHOOL TO BECOME A CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST AND TAUGHT AT THE COLLEGE LEVEL FOR DECADES.................................. IN OTHER WORDS, I AM NOT STUPID!!!! YET YOU MANAGED TO MAKE THE INTRODUCTORY CHAPTERS MAKE ME FEEL LIKE I MUST HAVE MISSED INFORMATION BECAUSE NO AUTHOR OF MERIT WOULD INTRODUCE IMPORTANT FIGURES IN A NARRATIVE WITHOUT THEIR LAST NAMES OR AN EXPLANATION OF THEIR IDENTITY. CAN YOU TELL I AM A BIT PISSED OFF AND I AM ONLY ON PAGE 25. I HAVE BEEN DEBATING WHETHER TO READ MORE, BUT YOU, THE AUTHOR, HAVE LOST ALL CREDIBILITY WITH ME. YOU DECLARED THAT YOU DO NOT WRITE HISTORY BOOK YOU WRITE A SPY "STORY". I WOULD NOT TRUST YOU TO PRESENT THE HISTORICAL TRUTH. I READ WWII HISTORY AND DO NOT WANT TO WASTE MORE TIME WITH AN AUTHOR WHO CANNOT SUCCESSFULLY INTRODUCE IMPORTANT PROTAGONISTS IN THE "STORY". I FEAR I WILL ONLY GET MORE ANGRY, SO I QUIT AND WILL READ WWII DOCUMENTED AND RESEARCHED FACTS. Kristi & Abby Tabby P.S. I looked at the reviews of the book to see if I was off base in my reaction. Of the 15 5-star ratings at this time there is only one mildly positive review. Eight of the 5-star gang have never reviewed a book on Goodreads..... If I love a book I let people know.

[Mal Warwick · Rating 4 out of 5]

SHOCKING REVELATION ABOUT A TURNING POINT IN WORLD WAR II

World War II might have ended six months earlier if General Bernard Montgomery's Operation Market Garden had worked. The plan called for American, British, and Polish paratroopers to drop behind German lines in the Netherlands in September 1944. Its objective was to capture the one remaining intact bridge over the Rhine.

The operation's success would have enabled Allied troops to speed across Germany and seize Berlin before the Russians, who were then approaching Berlin from the east. But it didn't work. And many military observers have believed the plan's undisputed complexity explains why. It simply required too many things to happen on a timetable that was impossibly tight.

However, as British author Robert Verkaik demonstrates in The Traitor of Arnhem, Market Garden failed simply because someone tipped off the Germans. The warning allowed them to move thousands of troops into position in the paratroopers' intended path toward the Rhine.

So, who was the "traitor of Arnhem?"

Verkaik examines the intelligence swirling around Operation Market Garden from every possible angle. He divides his book into three sections, reviewing in turn the roles played by the Dutch, the British, and the Russians. His research was exhaustive, and the result can be exhausting for the reader. Although a handful of characters emerge as central to the story, dozens of others crop up in Verkaik's account. The evidence he turned up 80 years after World War II is filled with uncertainty and contradictions. And he never definitively identifies one of the two men who both betrayed Market Garden to the Nazis.

Yes, there were two traitors of Arnhem, not one. And several other men and women played roles in facilitating the betrayal or covering up the evidence it took place. But it's clear who were the two men at the heart of the story. One was a gigantic Dutch resistance hero named Christiaan Lindemans but widely known as King Kong, who switched allegiance to the Germans midway through the war. Lindemans was a Communist. The other is better known to us today: Sir Anthony Blunt, one of the five Cambridge spies who went to work for the NKVD while still students at the university. And, yes, he was a Communist, too.

It's significant that the Germans learned about Market Garden from two independent sources. As Nazi officers' subsequent testimony makes clear, the two sources reinforced each other, helping convince them to reposition troops to block the Allies' movement toward the Rhine.

Why did they do it?

So why, you might ask, would two Communists betray the Allies to the Nazis? Although Verkaik never proves that Moscow Central directed them to do so, it's clear that at least Blunt acted to prevent the Allies from crossing the Rhine and beating the Russians to Berlin. Lindemans' motives are more difficult to suss out. He served three masters—the Germans, the British, and the Russians—but in the final analysis he may simply have been in the espionage game to enrich himself. Perhaps ideological motives played little if any role in his thinking.

Be advised, though, that you'd need to read Verkaik's book carefully to glean this central truth from the tangle of detail he reports. And his sometimes sloppy, even ungrammatical writing makes some of the prose a chore to read. However, the detail the author digs out of obscure records helps shape the true history of World War II. Because the Allies' defeat at Arnhem enabled Stalin to rush his troops into Berlin and claim the greatest prize in Germany. Undoubtedly, the division of Germany that came about as a result helped set the course for the Cold War that followed.

About the author

For more than a decade, Robert Verkaik worked as a senior editor at the Independent and the Mail on Sunday, two of Britain's leading newspapers. Today he writes about the causes of extremism and social immobility for a number of press outlets in the UK. He is the author of several books. The Traitor of Arnhem is his second book-length work about World War II.

[Joseph Hamilton · Rating 4 out of 5]

The title of the book and movie A Bridge Too Far sums up why the allied airborne assault into Holland, Operation Market Garden, failed. A Dutch resistance fighter who worked for the British and German sides and possibly the Russian side - the Communist resistance fighters answered to Moscow - may be the traitor referred to in this book’s title but his information only reached the German troops a few hours before the fighting began. It’s true he likely also revealed the allied objectives, bridges across the Waal river, but the experienced German leaders probably, in my opinion, would have quickly if not instantly realized that anyway.

The more interesting and greater part of the book concerns the possibility of another traitor, one of the Cambridge spies working for Russia, Anthony Blunt. The book’s thesis is that by the time of Operation Market Garden, September 1944, Russia was advancing across eastern Europe and, while Stalin had wanted a second front to open, he wanted it to only draw German forces away from the East but otherwise stall in place. The author explains a distinction between British and Russian behind the lines methods and objectives. For the British it was militarily winning the war with sabotage, assassination, etc. For the Russians it was putting a political infrastructure in place that would be positioned to take power after the war.

So the idea here is that a spy codenamed Josephine, never identified but possibly Anthony Blunt, shared the Operation Market Garden battle plan with Germany. An appendix at the end of the book lists the reasons why Blunt was likely Josephine. Some are inarguable, such as, Josephine misinformed the Germans as to where the allied invasion of France would occur and correctly informed them about Operation Market Garden. Only an extremely small number of people knew both these secrets and Blunt was the personal assistant to the director of MI5, Britain’s version of the FBI’s counterintelligence division, and he presented Churchill’s daily intelligence briefing.

I think the author rushed a first draft into print. While the book contains a lot of interesting details, a better job could have been done connecting the dots. But this is a common failing with most espionage histories and perhaps it is the unresolved element of mystery that makes them such compelling reading. Still I wish he could have dug deeper about the German dive bombing of Wormwood Scrubs when it was the MI5 headquarters and ditto about the cause of death of the Dutch traitor after his 1984 exhumation and autopsy.

I came across only one typographic error. On page 305 is says “For instance when, having exhausted Onodera as a potential fit for Josephine, the interrogators turn up the pressure and Kraemer starts talking about Grunboek - the man with ties to the Hungarian secret service that was viewed as entirely taken over by the NKVD: at once Maj. It is at this point that SIS started to receive reports from captured Abwehr officers and German diplomatic staff, claiming Kraemer was working ‘unconsciously or consciously for the Russians.’”

Also on page 263 Blunt is quoted as saying “it has given me the greatest pleasure to have been able to pass the names of every MI5 officer to the Russians.” Although the source is footnoted, it is an abbreviation that, as far as I could tell, was not spelled out anywhere. Flora Solomon (p.377) is another such example.

[Prof. Purple · Rating 4 out of 5]

In The Traitor of Arnhem: WWII's Greatest Betrayal and the Moment That Changed History Forever, author Robert Verkaik delves into the catastrophic failure of Operation Market Garden during World War II, positing that espionage and betrayal were pivotal factors in the Allied defeat. Published in May 2024, this meticulously researched work sheds new light on the clandestine activities that undermined one of the war's most ambitious operations.

Operation Market Garden, conceived as a bold strategy to expedite the end of the war by securing key bridges in the Netherlands, faltered disastrously. Verkaik argues that this failure was not merely due to tactical errors or unforeseen German resilience but was significantly influenced by treachery within the Allied ranks. Central to his thesis is the role of Anthony Blunt, a member of the notorious Cambridge Spy Ring, who, according to Verkaik, leaked critical information to the Germans, thereby compromising the mission. This assertion challenges traditional narratives and suggests a more intricate web of espionage affecting the operation's outcome.

Verkaik's narrative is enriched by his exploration of Christiaan Lindemans, codenamed "King Kong," a Dutch resistance fighter whose alleged collaboration with German forces further exacerbated the Allies' challenges. The author presents a compelling case that Lindemans' duplicity, combined with Blunt's espionage, orchestrated a perfect storm leading to the operation's failure. Through extensive archival research, including declassified MI5 and MI6 files, interviews, and personal letters, Verkaik constructs a narrative that is both engaging and provocative.

Critics have lauded the book for its thoroughness and the fresh perspective it brings to a well-examined historical event. Kirkus Reviews describes it as "a disturbing reevaluation of an iconic World War II battle," noting that while the evidence is largely circumstantial, Verkaik's argument is compelling. Similarly, The Wall Street Journal commends the author for relating "the complex stories of Lindemans and Blunt with the economy and verve of a spy novelist." These endorsements underscore the book's success in challenging established historical interpretations and prompting renewed discourse on the factors contributing to Operation Market Garden's failure.

The Traitor of Arnhem not only revisits a pivotal moment in World War II history but also serves as a poignant reminder of how espionage and internal betrayal can alter the course of events. Verkaik's work stands as a significant contribution to historical literature, offering readers a nuanced understanding of the complexities and hidden machinations that influenced the trajectory of the war.

[Russel Henderson · Rating 4 out of 5]

The central thesis is at least thought-provoking, if not necessarily definitive. Verkaik argues that the Soviets alerted the Germans about Market Garden to slow down the offensive and allow the Red Army to reach Berlin first and strengthen Stalin's hand in the postwar order. He argues that Philby and especially Blunt were well-positioned to pass information to the Nazi agents and also to suppress investigations into Soviet links to Lindemans and other known double-agents. It's a reasonable contention; we pretty much accept that the Soviet pause in front of Warsaw was at least partly motivated by considerations about a postwar Poland but we're shocked at the notion that they might have exploited their spy rings to bloody the Western Allies and slow their progress. We accept uncritically that Blunt and Philby (et al) only passed benign information to the NKVD during WWII, but it was in the interests of the British to minimize that too. Blunt's kid gloves treatment reflected the potential for embarrassment to the Royal Family and to the British elite's conduct of the war, even decades on.

Verkaik probably overstates his case. He overstates the role of Blunt, who was well-positioned but probably not as powerful as Verkaik suggests. Market Garden was a complex, ambitious operation by any measure and even if its operational security was preserved it may have been an even-money proposition at best. And why were some secrets that would have been of clear benefit to the Soviets preserved while others potentially betrayed? But he raises broad questions that need to be answered. Did the Russians seek to slow the Allied offensive? Was British investigation into some of these agents and double-agents successfully frustrated by Blunt and Philby, or was it muddled by the British elite's fear of embarrassment about its conduct of the war, especially its intelligence and security failures?

It's also not a great book to take in on Audible as Verkaik speaks of French, Dutch, German, and Russian actors interchangeably, as well as place names throughout France and the Low Countries, so it's difficult to follow. But that's a failure of the form and not of the work itself.

[Mark]

This book is very well researched and holds a bright light up into the failure of operation Market Garden and Arnhem probably not only the worst allied defeat of WW2 but an event which shaped the cold war and the current events in Ukraine.
This book shows that espionage played a massive factor in the failure of market garden and probably tipped the scales in what was always an underesourced and ambitious plan to take the Rhine bridges.
Betrayed by Dutch spies working for the Germans who were waiting at the landing points and down playing the strengths of the remaining panzer divisions which had taken a pounding in Normandy. Betrayed by British spies working for the Russians most notably Anthony Blunt and Kim Philby burgess and Maclean who ensured the battle was delayed as long as possible to enable Stalin to get to Berlin before the US and the allies. This forming the iron curtain Cold War and subsequent events! Why Ukraine ? Putin named one of his battalions after Stalin’s favourite Assassin and has long believed glasnost was a betrayal of the Russian people. That the territory achieved by Stalin after WW2 should be reinstated.
The ripples of Arnhem and the soviet spy era still play out today.

[Peter Stuart · Rating 3 out of 5]

It’s well worn cliche that history is written by the victors. In the case of this work however, a significant component has been constructed around the potential reasons for a loss, a defeat.

Structured in three main parts, the author takes us on a journey through various elements of both Operation Market Garden and the various significant events that occurred, by using a variety of sources. Yet throughout there is an underlying theme of larger geopolitical intrigue that applies equally to this single event and to the many events before and after.

Written 80yrs after the event then, it is less about history being written by the winners as opposed to by an author who with the benefit of historical hindsight, is writing more about those who made the least mistakes. Mistakes that cost the immediate lives of 100,000’s and after an uncalculateable amount

[Mark Edlund · Rating 3 out of 5]

Non-Fiction - a fascinating account of Operation Market Garden and how it possibly was betrayed by Russian and English spies. Very detailed with lots of moving parts and characters. Verkaik suggests the long game played by Stalin betrayed the Allied efforts in this campaign to allow his forces to get to Berlin first. And who was Josephine? We were in Arnhem this past spring and toured the memorial. There is no mention of this in any of their displays.
Canadian references - Canadian air gunner on a raid; character masquerades as a member of RCAF; Anglo-Canadian army breaks through; Quebec talks; spy with Canadian Special Forces; dam buster pilot returns to Canada
Pharmacy reference - mention of a Paris pharmacy

[Jim Bogue · Rating 4 out of 5]

The author argues that a Dutch traitor played a role in the infamous failure of Operation Market Garden. Then he continues on to assert that the real controller of this traitor (a man who worked at the least for Germany, Holland, and Great Britain) was the Soviet Union.
This is a long and intricate argument. It is often difficult to follow who is doing what when. The narrative leaps back and forth. The author sees Anthony Blunt, who later confessed to being a Soviet spy, as the key figure in both organizing and covering up Soviet actions.
The argument is difficult to evaluate, but this reader is not wholly convinced.

[Patrick Carroll · Rating 3 out of 5]

A comprehensive book detailing the convoluted spying networks of pre to post WorldWar II with specific focus on the battle of Arnhem. What I picked up on most was the complacency of the "old Boys Network" in MI5 and MI6 and how easily Blunt, Philby et al were able to deflect attention from themselves. Even with the misinformation "cloud" I think Montgomery's desire to "make his mark" on the European campaign post D-Day successes probably blinded him to the high risk nature of Operation Market Garden. As with all wars the people who paid the price were the soldiers on the front line. Firmly puts the battle into the heroic but doomed category.

[Craig Merkel · Rating 5 out of 5]

Loved the story. Complicated but fascinating. I thought for years that the failure of Market Garden was due to military mistakes and mismanagement; not so at all. The story of the espionage on the continent and the many resistance groups fighting self serving battles with the Nazis was an eye opener but the story of the British MI5 and MI6 was even more interesting.
If you like WW2 espionage tales then this is the one for you.
Market Garden was world changing.

[Jill Vaughn · Rating 4 out of 5]

This was an audiobook for me and the narration was great. The story was very interesting and showed the difficulty in finding the true spies who caused great damage to the allied cause. I also found interesting the tie-in of the Cambridge spies and how the seeds to the cold war were being sewn during the WWII.

[Chet Slonina · Rating 4 out of 5]

World War II may have ended earlier and the Allies may have gotten to Berlin before the Russians. A good book with Operation Market Garden in focus. The “Traitor” was one that greatly impacted British Operations in Market Garden that was to have been an overwhelming win for the Allies. Yet, by working for the enemy, the path of the war was changed.

[Andy Tuite · Rating 3 out of 5]

Fascinating account of sheer magnitude of spying during WWII. Although the book focuses on Arnhem the spy system was rampant across many battles. I think if this was a work of fiction I’d have put it down as unbelievable. Amazing we won the war with the number of traitors out there

[MeCoco · Rating 3 out of 5]

I totally agree with Philip Dröge in Historisch Nieuwsblad.
"Coincidence? Intention? Espionage is a mirror reflecting a mirror, until you no longer know what is left and right and who betrayed what".
Source https://www.historischnieuwsblad.nl/d...

[David Rogers · Rating 4 out of 5]

I never thought much about the failed WWII operation Market Garden, mainly that it was the product of British overconfidence. The back story is a compelling journey through wartime espionage that likely shape world events for decades. This tale weaves compelling characters into a great read.

[Darren Togwell · Rating 4 out of 5]

Richly detailed but sometimes difficult to follow (this figures given the content, not the author’s fault).

80 years on and it still makes you seethe that these traitors could be so brazen and give up so much life to the enemy.

[Gary Roberts · Rating 5 out of 5]

Great read not only about the impact of the Arnhem landings due to leaked information but the web of spies and networks was fascinating. Also focused a bit on some of the flaws in Operation Market Garden outside the intelligence leaks.

[Elexndra]

No rating went back to library could not get into
Library borrow

[Eric Grounds · Rating 4 out of 5]

An excellent read based on excellent, detailed research and good writing. A truly interesting story