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Furious Minds: The Making of the MAGA New Right
“[An] excellent new book.”—Michelle Goldberg, New York Times
The story of the radical conservative intellectual movement shaping Donald Trump’s agenda—and how it threatens American freedoms, values, and democracy
Donald Trump is not a big thinker, but his 2016 presidential victory presented a grand opportunity for people who are, and it set off a radicalization and reconfiguration of the American conservative intellectual world. In Furious Minds, Laura Field, who spent close to a decade in conservative academic circles, chronicles the rise of the New Right—the network of academics, public intellectuals, and influencers who provide ideological fuel to Trumpism. This movement includes figures such as Patrick Deneen, Christopher Rufo, Peter Thiel, and JD Vance. Their agenda is built to last, and it has dire long-term implications for liberal democracy.
The New Right has precedents in American history, but it is distinct for its youthfulness, misogyny, and extraordinary successes—most notably the elevation of Vance to the vice presidency. The movement—which draws together associates of the right-wing Claremont Institute, National Conservatives, Postliberals, and the Hard Right—advocates nationalist economics, tight borders, isolationism, and reactionary social values. It helped to strategize January 6th and created Project 2025. But above all, the New Right is engaged in a vast culture war against modern liberal pluralism. It is determined to harness state power and use it in new, illiberal ways, from college campuses to the international scene—all driven by the fantasy of restoring a pure America.
Incisive and urgent, Furious Minds tells the story of the thinkers of the New Right—and their powerful assault on American freedoms, values, and ideals.
The story of the radical conservative intellectual movement shaping Donald Trump’s agenda—and how it threatens American freedoms, values, and democracy
Donald Trump is not a big thinker, but his 2016 presidential victory presented a grand opportunity for people who are, and it set off a radicalization and reconfiguration of the American conservative intellectual world. In Furious Minds, Laura Field, who spent close to a decade in conservative academic circles, chronicles the rise of the New Right—the network of academics, public intellectuals, and influencers who provide ideological fuel to Trumpism. This movement includes figures such as Patrick Deneen, Christopher Rufo, Peter Thiel, and JD Vance. Their agenda is built to last, and it has dire long-term implications for liberal democracy.
The New Right has precedents in American history, but it is distinct for its youthfulness, misogyny, and extraordinary successes—most notably the elevation of Vance to the vice presidency. The movement—which draws together associates of the right-wing Claremont Institute, National Conservatives, Postliberals, and the Hard Right—advocates nationalist economics, tight borders, isolationism, and reactionary social values. It helped to strategize January 6th and created Project 2025. But above all, the New Right is engaged in a vast culture war against modern liberal pluralism. It is determined to harness state power and use it in new, illiberal ways, from college campuses to the international scene—all driven by the fantasy of restoring a pure America.
Incisive and urgent, Furious Minds tells the story of the thinkers of the New Right—and their powerful assault on American freedoms, values, and ideals.
423 pages, Kindle Edition
Published November 4, 2025
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December 15, 2025
This is perhaps the most serious and honest attempt by an academic to provide a taxonomy of the intellectual currents of the "New Right." It is specifically concerned with intellectuals and how ideas have developed in the before and during the rise of the political star of Donald Trump and what this mean for after Trump's second term ends. The exact relationship Field sees between the Trump phenomenon and these ideas is somewhat unexamined. She cites their connection to Trump administration figures or their actual appointments in the administration as evidence of their influence, but she doesn't actually marshal much in the way of evidence to connect these ideas to the political agenda of Trump's MAGA movement. The closest we get is the "Stop the Steal" and Eastman's activities leading up to January 2020. Despite the political salience of this issue, it is clear that most people interpret these events as a small coterie of rogues (with Claremont backgrounds) tempting a deeply narcissistic leader. In other words, it has more to do with opportunism than any pioneering intellectual work. This isn't to say that the ideas of MAGA and the ideas of these ,i>Furious Minds don't meaningfully overlap, but it is hard to say who is influencing who, why certain ideas become salient, how much purchase any of these ideas have, and who has real decision-making power in right-wing politics besides Donald Trump and whether this will matter when he does exit the stage.
Furious Minds doesn't cover much in the way of new ground for readers who are passingly aware of active political discourse. Maybe the average NYT/WSJ reader will be unfamiliar with the distinctions between West Coast and East Coast Struassians or may not be aware of what integralism is, but they already have a well-developed caricature of what the political programs are that follow from figures in the right or far right, and this book is still eager to dramatize these ideas rather than really evaluate them epistemically, empirically, or ethically. In this case, the author wants these liberal readers to avoid smugness and sneering (though this recommendation appears more at the tactical rather than genuine level) and instead get serious about defending liberal thought from the left. Field doesn't address whether there are actually left-wing intellectual interested in providing intellectual defenses of liberalism...
An interesting aspect of the work is just how limited in scope it is. Field focuses mostly on actual academics or those in think tanks or at periodicals with real academic credentials and training. She also spends a lot of time recapitulating the arguments from major think pieces, polemics, and manifestos from the figures of interest. Ultimately, she settles on three fractious strains of loosely aligned New Righters, including West Coast Straussians (the Claremonsters in the Harry Jaffa tradition), the post-liberals (Deneen & Vermeule), and the National Conservatives (Yoram Harzony). Ideologically, the camps are united by a rejection of fusionism (communicated as Reagan's three-legged stool of social conservativism, free market economics, and strong proactive defense) and an embrace on a more paleoconservative project, which is isolationist, protectionist, and nativist. This new iteration of paleocon thought is also exceedingly flexible about the size and scope of government and is Machiavellian about the uses of power.
Field is trained as a Straussian but is a left-liberal so the book is inherently more attuned to the first camp. Interestingly, she never really provides a strong defense of the tradition, despite being of it, offering critiques of its esotericism. The general characterization of the strains of the New Right intellectuals and their points of agreement are uncontroversial, but Field omits quite a bit of the picture. First, the revenge of the paleocons is almost certainly powered very left-wing and some liberal defectors frustrated by the hegemony of progressive political pieties and/or hawkish foreign policy and, relatedly, a seemingly immovable and vast fourth estate comprised of a deeply ideological and solipsistic group of professional managerial class members. The revenge strategy has been to borrow the effective tactics and strategies pioneered by leftists intellectuals and activists. The closest we get to this is Field's passing comments on Paul Gottfried, who she does manage to point out was trained by Herbert Marcuse (she does this while dismissing the long-march narrative that Marcuse coined).
The focus on credentialed intellects handicaps the book. Credentials aren't required for intellectualism or intellectual work (not that she even offers a real distinction between intellectual work and political activism/hackery). This is a handicap because it is obvious that in the body politic and among segments of elites more friendly to Trump and opposed to the style and goals of the left, the pressing challenges to liberalism are surfaced mostly by pseud/anon or fringe bloggers wielding infohazards derived from myriad sources: paganism, primitivism, cybernetics, obscure history, psychometrics, evolutionary psychology, behavioral genetics, and population genetics. Field overlooks many of these currents, binning them as "Hard Right," basically just labelling them as racist and sexist. The only figure she covers in detail is Bronze Age Pervert (BAP) among the many figures of influence, though she name checks many of the others. Relatedly, the role that the "Tech Right" has played is omitted almost in its entirety. I don't think Andreessen is mentioned at all, though Thiel of course is (but really as a donor rather than a thinker). Nick Land is mentioned once, "Dimes Square" is given a few paragraphs wrt to horseshoe theory, and Charles Murray isn't mentioned at all. The last omission is the most interesting because the typical move for those like Field (i.e. left-wing types studying right-wing intellects like Quinn Slobodian, John Ganz, etc) is to label them all social Darwinists and eugenicists. Field, of course, knows that most of the religious thinkers in this space explicitly reject this type of thought (e.g. Ahmari, Lind, etc). She is thus more interested in playing up sexism and chauvinism, but this is very weak tea too as she doesn't really cover any of the scientific anti-feminism despite some superficial archaeology and usage of the "red pill" concept.
Anyway, the biggest issue with this work is that Field's attempts to rebut some of the ideas amounts to mere hand-waving about empirical errors or context collapse. The nature of the errors is rarely, if ever, specified in great detail. Meanwhile, she fails to define the paradigm that the "New Right" is attacking except in uncharitable reading of figures she hardly covers like Curtis Yarvin's "Cathedral" concept. We're left to infer the paradigm is the broad liberal tradition (i.e. Enlightenment philosophy), which she's often defends but does so in vague terms. However, this is really only the explicit target of the post-liberal camp, which also happens to harbor many thinkers and writers with left-of-center, non-Trump friendly politics. Moreover, her tepid defenses of liberalism also unreflectively include "woke" ideas, which is controversial and, in my view, in error. Most of the academics who pioneered ideas that now go under the woke label (e.g. critical theory, queer theory, intersectionality, etc) were explicitly reacting to what they saw as the failures of liberalism to redress structural racial and class grievances in addition to a general disgust for America as a hegemonic imperial power.
The book also explicitly assumes that "ideas have consequences," something also alleged to be an important premise for Straussians, but this is never examined either. Further, her definition of ideas (mostly as rhetoric) and critique of the Claremonsters on this front often defaults to a posture of historicism and materialism. On theoretical grounds, she is quite literally changing the terms of engagement in order to do her refutation. If she believes ideas matter, she should be telling reader why her ideas are correct and good and why the New Right's ideas are wrong. Such an argument would create issues for her later claims about moral relativism versus moral realism, which she also remains fairly ambiguous about other than to defend the subsidiarity of liberal philosophy. This is funny too when she's compelled to agree with the "New Right's" critique of "neoliberal" (a term she fortunately manages to avoid) economics which is more or less entirely aligned with left-wing materialists. It seems there are many materialists on the New Right, especially when it comes to economic policy. They just want to shed the sexual politics that the American left had jammed together with socialism or social democracy.
Another perplexing issue in her book is her belief that Adrian Vermeule is the most formidable intellectual in the space. This is basically premised on the fact he can obfuscate with ancient words and concepts, has impeccable credentials, and rejects Originalism (the right of center judicial philosophy) and living constitutionalism (the left of center judicial philosophy). But the "common good" framework is entirely pre-textual, which she points out but then hypocritically double backs on when it may be useful for left-wing political goals. The treatment of Vermeule is perplexing, especially when he is certainly the least meaningful figure when it comes to the more yeomen, day-to-day intellectual entrepreneurship New Right figures engage in.
What should emerge is that the "New Right" is more or less the re-education of Trump-friendly or Trump-curious intellectual in realism about political power (i.e. shedding much of the idealism of Reagan, Bush, Romney, etc) and, in so doing, they've adopted left-wing tactics and ideas for their own pre-existing political ends. Nothing has really changed much about their worldviews, moral intuitions, or normative vision for America. This is frightening for prudish members of the professional managerial class (PMC) with deep attachment to the left-liberal status quo, especially on social issues, but it's a natural response to the situation right-wing politics found itself in during the early 21st century (i.e. it was treated as a dinosaur version of politics that was inevitably doomed). The best guidance from Field is that lefty academics should start actually treating right-wing ideas fairly and seriously. They should actually work to understand how deep and diverse the intellectual traditions of the right are. It is probably too late for them to heed this advice as higher education, especially the humanities, may be entering an inescapable death spiral.
P.S. I may return to this review to expand and re-organize its ideas. The general tenor of my assessment is expected to be unchanged.
Furious Minds doesn't cover much in the way of new ground for readers who are passingly aware of active political discourse. Maybe the average NYT/WSJ reader will be unfamiliar with the distinctions between West Coast and East Coast Struassians or may not be aware of what integralism is, but they already have a well-developed caricature of what the political programs are that follow from figures in the right or far right, and this book is still eager to dramatize these ideas rather than really evaluate them epistemically, empirically, or ethically. In this case, the author wants these liberal readers to avoid smugness and sneering (though this recommendation appears more at the tactical rather than genuine level) and instead get serious about defending liberal thought from the left. Field doesn't address whether there are actually left-wing intellectual interested in providing intellectual defenses of liberalism...
An interesting aspect of the work is just how limited in scope it is. Field focuses mostly on actual academics or those in think tanks or at periodicals with real academic credentials and training. She also spends a lot of time recapitulating the arguments from major think pieces, polemics, and manifestos from the figures of interest. Ultimately, she settles on three fractious strains of loosely aligned New Righters, including West Coast Straussians (the Claremonsters in the Harry Jaffa tradition), the post-liberals (Deneen & Vermeule), and the National Conservatives (Yoram Harzony). Ideologically, the camps are united by a rejection of fusionism (communicated as Reagan's three-legged stool of social conservativism, free market economics, and strong proactive defense) and an embrace on a more paleoconservative project, which is isolationist, protectionist, and nativist. This new iteration of paleocon thought is also exceedingly flexible about the size and scope of government and is Machiavellian about the uses of power.
Field is trained as a Straussian but is a left-liberal so the book is inherently more attuned to the first camp. Interestingly, she never really provides a strong defense of the tradition, despite being of it, offering critiques of its esotericism. The general characterization of the strains of the New Right intellectuals and their points of agreement are uncontroversial, but Field omits quite a bit of the picture. First, the revenge of the paleocons is almost certainly powered very left-wing and some liberal defectors frustrated by the hegemony of progressive political pieties and/or hawkish foreign policy and, relatedly, a seemingly immovable and vast fourth estate comprised of a deeply ideological and solipsistic group of professional managerial class members. The revenge strategy has been to borrow the effective tactics and strategies pioneered by leftists intellectuals and activists. The closest we get to this is Field's passing comments on Paul Gottfried, who she does manage to point out was trained by Herbert Marcuse (she does this while dismissing the long-march narrative that Marcuse coined).
The focus on credentialed intellects handicaps the book. Credentials aren't required for intellectualism or intellectual work (not that she even offers a real distinction between intellectual work and political activism/hackery). This is a handicap because it is obvious that in the body politic and among segments of elites more friendly to Trump and opposed to the style and goals of the left, the pressing challenges to liberalism are surfaced mostly by pseud/anon or fringe bloggers wielding infohazards derived from myriad sources: paganism, primitivism, cybernetics, obscure history, psychometrics, evolutionary psychology, behavioral genetics, and population genetics. Field overlooks many of these currents, binning them as "Hard Right," basically just labelling them as racist and sexist. The only figure she covers in detail is Bronze Age Pervert (BAP) among the many figures of influence, though she name checks many of the others. Relatedly, the role that the "Tech Right" has played is omitted almost in its entirety. I don't think Andreessen is mentioned at all, though Thiel of course is (but really as a donor rather than a thinker). Nick Land is mentioned once, "Dimes Square" is given a few paragraphs wrt to horseshoe theory, and Charles Murray isn't mentioned at all. The last omission is the most interesting because the typical move for those like Field (i.e. left-wing types studying right-wing intellects like Quinn Slobodian, John Ganz, etc) is to label them all social Darwinists and eugenicists. Field, of course, knows that most of the religious thinkers in this space explicitly reject this type of thought (e.g. Ahmari, Lind, etc). She is thus more interested in playing up sexism and chauvinism, but this is very weak tea too as she doesn't really cover any of the scientific anti-feminism despite some superficial archaeology and usage of the "red pill" concept.
Anyway, the biggest issue with this work is that Field's attempts to rebut some of the ideas amounts to mere hand-waving about empirical errors or context collapse. The nature of the errors is rarely, if ever, specified in great detail. Meanwhile, she fails to define the paradigm that the "New Right" is attacking except in uncharitable reading of figures she hardly covers like Curtis Yarvin's "Cathedral" concept. We're left to infer the paradigm is the broad liberal tradition (i.e. Enlightenment philosophy), which she's often defends but does so in vague terms. However, this is really only the explicit target of the post-liberal camp, which also happens to harbor many thinkers and writers with left-of-center, non-Trump friendly politics. Moreover, her tepid defenses of liberalism also unreflectively include "woke" ideas, which is controversial and, in my view, in error. Most of the academics who pioneered ideas that now go under the woke label (e.g. critical theory, queer theory, intersectionality, etc) were explicitly reacting to what they saw as the failures of liberalism to redress structural racial and class grievances in addition to a general disgust for America as a hegemonic imperial power.
The book also explicitly assumes that "ideas have consequences," something also alleged to be an important premise for Straussians, but this is never examined either. Further, her definition of ideas (mostly as rhetoric) and critique of the Claremonsters on this front often defaults to a posture of historicism and materialism. On theoretical grounds, she is quite literally changing the terms of engagement in order to do her refutation. If she believes ideas matter, she should be telling reader why her ideas are correct and good and why the New Right's ideas are wrong. Such an argument would create issues for her later claims about moral relativism versus moral realism, which she also remains fairly ambiguous about other than to defend the subsidiarity of liberal philosophy. This is funny too when she's compelled to agree with the "New Right's" critique of "neoliberal" (a term she fortunately manages to avoid) economics which is more or less entirely aligned with left-wing materialists. It seems there are many materialists on the New Right, especially when it comes to economic policy. They just want to shed the sexual politics that the American left had jammed together with socialism or social democracy.
Another perplexing issue in her book is her belief that Adrian Vermeule is the most formidable intellectual in the space. This is basically premised on the fact he can obfuscate with ancient words and concepts, has impeccable credentials, and rejects Originalism (the right of center judicial philosophy) and living constitutionalism (the left of center judicial philosophy). But the "common good" framework is entirely pre-textual, which she points out but then hypocritically double backs on when it may be useful for left-wing political goals. The treatment of Vermeule is perplexing, especially when he is certainly the least meaningful figure when it comes to the more yeomen, day-to-day intellectual entrepreneurship New Right figures engage in.
What should emerge is that the "New Right" is more or less the re-education of Trump-friendly or Trump-curious intellectual in realism about political power (i.e. shedding much of the idealism of Reagan, Bush, Romney, etc) and, in so doing, they've adopted left-wing tactics and ideas for their own pre-existing political ends. Nothing has really changed much about their worldviews, moral intuitions, or normative vision for America. This is frightening for prudish members of the professional managerial class (PMC) with deep attachment to the left-liberal status quo, especially on social issues, but it's a natural response to the situation right-wing politics found itself in during the early 21st century (i.e. it was treated as a dinosaur version of politics that was inevitably doomed). The best guidance from Field is that lefty academics should start actually treating right-wing ideas fairly and seriously. They should actually work to understand how deep and diverse the intellectual traditions of the right are. It is probably too late for them to heed this advice as higher education, especially the humanities, may be entering an inescapable death spiral.
P.S. I may return to this review to expand and re-organize its ideas. The general tenor of my assessment is expected to be unchanged.
November 25, 2025
Laura Field says people often laughed when she said she was writing a book about MAGA intellectuals. "Sounds like an oxymoron," they supposedly said. I often have a similar experience when I tell people about how, in researching JD Vance for the Harris campaign, I became convinced he has deep, intellectual reasons for his MAGA turn. These reactions are wrong. Though Trump himself is no philosopher, there is a new wave of conservative intellectuals that are very different from the Reaganite Republican intellectuals touting free markets, bombastic evangelical culture wars, and military interventionism. Anyone following politics would do well to understand these new ideas and recognize how they are shaping everyday policy debates.
I think Field does a mostly very good job doing a tour of the so-called "New Right." I am not as qualified as someone on the New Right would be to judge this, but I think I am about as well positioned as a non-academic liberal could be. I spent a lot of time reading about the New Right during my time researching JD Vance since he has intertwined himself with the movement about as much as any politician could with an intellectual movement. And since moving to DC, I have now met a handful of people on the New Right and asked them lots of questions in a way that I'm sure was very annoying.
Field opens with one of the best concise definitions of the movement I've seen. Wheras the Reaganite right was the "three legged stool" of libertarian free markets, religious social conservatism, and an anti-communist activist foreign policy, the MAGA New Right is "three ribs" of opposition to immigration, economic protectionism, and America First isolationist foreign policy centered on the "spine" of commitment to the "strong gods" of family, faith, and community (the term strong gods comes from this essay — https://firstthings.com/return-of-the...). She then outlines various factions and subfactions of the New Right. Each chapter is more or less devoted to one of these groups.
Many of the chapters are devoted to groups that follow in the footsteps of Leo Strauss, a German-Jewish émigré political philosopher whose readings of classical texts emphasized the fragility of liberal democracy, the permanence of elite rule, and the need for guiding myths to stabilize mass society. Even before the emergence of the New Right, many of the most prominent conservatives were "Straussians," meaning they were trained to study texts in the distinctive way Strauss pioneered. Field is therefore well positioned to write this book, since she has Straussian academic training. As such, her chapters on The Claremont Institute, The Journal of American Greatness, and Bronze Age Pervert—all of whom are in the Straussian tradition—are by far the strongest in the book.
The rest of the chapters are more of a mixed bag. Each of them had to do three things. Most importantly, it had to comprehensively explain the ideas and influence of its subject. Second, it had to rebut the worst ideas of its subject. And third, since the New Right often does critique status quo liberalism in a way that committed liberals should be more attuned to, it had to acknowledge when there was at least a grain of truth to the ideas from these thinkers and use their critique to talk about what a better form of liberalism might be—one that is not so vulnerable to authoritarian critique.
The book worked best when Field focused on the description of the ideas. Too many chapters devolved into brief descriptions of the ideas, followed by long critiques of them. In most cases, these critiques weren't necessary since any liberal reading the book would have thought about them right away. The critiques that did help were usually those on more complex ideas or those with a historical lineage that most people wouldn't know. Field was less ambitious in trying to find the grains of truth to liberal critiques, but I was disappointed that she tended to be most charitable whenever a New Right critique of liberalism rhymed with a leftist critique of liberalism, which let Field seem less dogmatic without really ever breaking with the left-of-center tribe. That said, the chapters were still very well done and informative, even to someone who has spent a lot of time reading about this and follows politics closely.
A question that lingered in my head was how much influence these people *actually* have and how many followers of these ideas there *actually* are. Profiles of these ideas by journalists in newspapers and magazines often have an air of the circus master calling everyone to "step right up" and see the weirdos and monsters that every Republican in Washington is reading. This book was not nearly so sensationalist, but it didn't answer the extent to which people are reading and absorbing the most frightening thinkers on this list. I also can't lean on my own experience to answer this question. The New Righters that I have met are all on the comparatively reasonable side of things (meaning I disagree with them but can't imagine them mainlining racism or dreaming of an authoritarian takeover as some of the thinkers in this book were).
If anything, this indicates we should have varying degrees of alarm about the New Right. Amidst reports that followers of Nick Fuentes and fascists predominate young Republican staffer circles, prominent New Right Conservative Rod Dreher wrote in alarm that 40% of young Republicans fit this description (https://roddreher.substack.com/p/what...). I'll admit to being alarmed at the degree to which Dreher wants Catholic thought to influence politics, but this episode has taught me that not everyone whose ideas fit into Field's "three ribs and a spine" description of the New Right is equally dangerous.
In any case, these ideas are sure to remain important, and anyone who follows politics closely should be familiar with what motivates the New Right. This book is a strong way to get started or to broaden what you know if you have already read about them.
I think Field does a mostly very good job doing a tour of the so-called "New Right." I am not as qualified as someone on the New Right would be to judge this, but I think I am about as well positioned as a non-academic liberal could be. I spent a lot of time reading about the New Right during my time researching JD Vance since he has intertwined himself with the movement about as much as any politician could with an intellectual movement. And since moving to DC, I have now met a handful of people on the New Right and asked them lots of questions in a way that I'm sure was very annoying.
Field opens with one of the best concise definitions of the movement I've seen. Wheras the Reaganite right was the "three legged stool" of libertarian free markets, religious social conservatism, and an anti-communist activist foreign policy, the MAGA New Right is "three ribs" of opposition to immigration, economic protectionism, and America First isolationist foreign policy centered on the "spine" of commitment to the "strong gods" of family, faith, and community (the term strong gods comes from this essay — https://firstthings.com/return-of-the...). She then outlines various factions and subfactions of the New Right. Each chapter is more or less devoted to one of these groups.
Many of the chapters are devoted to groups that follow in the footsteps of Leo Strauss, a German-Jewish émigré political philosopher whose readings of classical texts emphasized the fragility of liberal democracy, the permanence of elite rule, and the need for guiding myths to stabilize mass society. Even before the emergence of the New Right, many of the most prominent conservatives were "Straussians," meaning they were trained to study texts in the distinctive way Strauss pioneered. Field is therefore well positioned to write this book, since she has Straussian academic training. As such, her chapters on The Claremont Institute, The Journal of American Greatness, and Bronze Age Pervert—all of whom are in the Straussian tradition—are by far the strongest in the book.
The rest of the chapters are more of a mixed bag. Each of them had to do three things. Most importantly, it had to comprehensively explain the ideas and influence of its subject. Second, it had to rebut the worst ideas of its subject. And third, since the New Right often does critique status quo liberalism in a way that committed liberals should be more attuned to, it had to acknowledge when there was at least a grain of truth to the ideas from these thinkers and use their critique to talk about what a better form of liberalism might be—one that is not so vulnerable to authoritarian critique.
The book worked best when Field focused on the description of the ideas. Too many chapters devolved into brief descriptions of the ideas, followed by long critiques of them. In most cases, these critiques weren't necessary since any liberal reading the book would have thought about them right away. The critiques that did help were usually those on more complex ideas or those with a historical lineage that most people wouldn't know. Field was less ambitious in trying to find the grains of truth to liberal critiques, but I was disappointed that she tended to be most charitable whenever a New Right critique of liberalism rhymed with a leftist critique of liberalism, which let Field seem less dogmatic without really ever breaking with the left-of-center tribe. That said, the chapters were still very well done and informative, even to someone who has spent a lot of time reading about this and follows politics closely.
A question that lingered in my head was how much influence these people *actually* have and how many followers of these ideas there *actually* are. Profiles of these ideas by journalists in newspapers and magazines often have an air of the circus master calling everyone to "step right up" and see the weirdos and monsters that every Republican in Washington is reading. This book was not nearly so sensationalist, but it didn't answer the extent to which people are reading and absorbing the most frightening thinkers on this list. I also can't lean on my own experience to answer this question. The New Righters that I have met are all on the comparatively reasonable side of things (meaning I disagree with them but can't imagine them mainlining racism or dreaming of an authoritarian takeover as some of the thinkers in this book were).
If anything, this indicates we should have varying degrees of alarm about the New Right. Amidst reports that followers of Nick Fuentes and fascists predominate young Republican staffer circles, prominent New Right Conservative Rod Dreher wrote in alarm that 40% of young Republicans fit this description (https://roddreher.substack.com/p/what...). I'll admit to being alarmed at the degree to which Dreher wants Catholic thought to influence politics, but this episode has taught me that not everyone whose ideas fit into Field's "three ribs and a spine" description of the New Right is equally dangerous.
In any case, these ideas are sure to remain important, and anyone who follows politics closely should be familiar with what motivates the New Right. This book is a strong way to get started or to broaden what you know if you have already read about them.
December 21, 2025
it's impressive how approachable Laura Field makes her subject matter, and for that reason, I highly recommend this book. there's both depth and breadth here, and she manages to give people she disagrees with a fair shot (much more charitable than I would be). along the way, I appreciated how the author synthesized so many philosophical backgrounds and sources, and I even learned to appreciate liberalism in a new way.
any quibbles I have are stylistic, and I won't enumerate them-- I am just picky
any quibbles I have are stylistic, and I won't enumerate them-- I am just picky
January 22, 2026
Probably the most comprehensive survey of the contemporary right-wing intellectual landscape to date. This has become a crowded field over the past decade, and much of the literature isn't very good, so it was refreshing to see Field devote attention to online media spaces as well as the substantive commitments of MAGA intellectuals. It's a necessary though disconcerting task, especially now that we're at a sufficient remove from the rise of Trump that the right's various transformations in the interim can now be properly historicized.
Field also does well to trace the influence of Strauss and his interpreters — genealogies of Straussianism made up a cottage industry in their own right around the time of the Iraq War, and their relative absence in analyses of Trumpism always seemed like a blind spot to me. This actually is one area where she might have stressed the continuities between fusionist conservatism (or something like it) and our "New" Right; Vermeule's expansive conception of executive authority during the Bush years is particularly illustrative in this regard. It strikes me that an overemphasis on rupture might feed into the New Right's self-aggrandizing claims that it rejects the "dead consensus." Altogether, though, the book is very well done.
Field also does well to trace the influence of Strauss and his interpreters — genealogies of Straussianism made up a cottage industry in their own right around the time of the Iraq War, and their relative absence in analyses of Trumpism always seemed like a blind spot to me. This actually is one area where she might have stressed the continuities between fusionist conservatism (or something like it) and our "New" Right; Vermeule's expansive conception of executive authority during the Bush years is particularly illustrative in this regard. It strikes me that an overemphasis on rupture might feed into the New Right's self-aggrandizing claims that it rejects the "dead consensus." Altogether, though, the book is very well done.
January 8, 2026
This author had the line that Trump is an evangelical leader to the evangelicals. It’s true. I just don’t get it, but it’s true.
This author quoted from “Jesus and John Wayne,” I felt the problem with that book was the rot was always there within the Church and it just took Trump to solidify it. Trump didn’t create the machismo; it’s a feature built into fundamental Christianity, Islam and Judaism. This author makes a similar problem with her main thesis. The Republicans have been rotten at least since Rush Limbaugh, and now the fish rots from the head and the stink has become obvious to everyone not in the cult, the MAGA right is who they are, and unfortunately they are who America is right now. There is not a "New Right," they are the same as they always have been.
Heidegger’s authentic person is a Nazi. It’s for the best that this author never mentioned Oswald Spengler as influential to the modern fascist thinkers because Spengler really should have just remained a high school math teacher instead of writing “Decline of the West.” Heidegger and Carl Schmitt who this author pivots her story with were influenced by Spengler’s morphological non-sense for justifying a return to purity. Schmitt’s defense of conservatism was always going to lead to the Nazis or today’s MAGA. It’s easy for pro MAGA people to re-morph their philosophical arguments.
An author of a book such as this one risk having their book become obsolete after day one because Trump will do something so outrageous that it doesn’t fit the story the author is trying to tell. The awful people who enable Trump must bend themselves to his new outrageous atrocity and claim that ‘we have always been at war with Oceania,’ or in other words “Venezulia today, the world tomorrow” while arguing it was about the democracy and then pretending it is about the oil. It’s confusing. The day after I wrote this paragraph, the American Gestapo, ICE, murdered Renee Good in Minnesota and obstructed justice in lying about the incident. The New Right will justify it without remorse.
Ultimately, the enabling of pedophiles and defending sex crimes against the young becomes a bridge too far for the world to ignore. The Epstein files is when the billionaires get to be held accountable and the slow dripping makes their intellectual arguments quaint. Even Christian Nationalist find a problem with Epstein’s friends.
The author tries to put a coherence around the beliefs of the opportunists who surround and fawn at the altar of Trump, but in the end that is a fool hearty mission because Trump’s ultimate good is for himself, and twisted reasoning only leads to furious minds. They justify hating LGTB, non-Christian, any other group that is not them while the mob is satisfied through made-up grievances that reside only in their mind and the billionaires continue to ignore us as they exploit us. Their furious minds were furious before they found their philosophical grounds.
This author quoted from “Jesus and John Wayne,” I felt the problem with that book was the rot was always there within the Church and it just took Trump to solidify it. Trump didn’t create the machismo; it’s a feature built into fundamental Christianity, Islam and Judaism. This author makes a similar problem with her main thesis. The Republicans have been rotten at least since Rush Limbaugh, and now the fish rots from the head and the stink has become obvious to everyone not in the cult, the MAGA right is who they are, and unfortunately they are who America is right now. There is not a "New Right," they are the same as they always have been.
Heidegger’s authentic person is a Nazi. It’s for the best that this author never mentioned Oswald Spengler as influential to the modern fascist thinkers because Spengler really should have just remained a high school math teacher instead of writing “Decline of the West.” Heidegger and Carl Schmitt who this author pivots her story with were influenced by Spengler’s morphological non-sense for justifying a return to purity. Schmitt’s defense of conservatism was always going to lead to the Nazis or today’s MAGA. It’s easy for pro MAGA people to re-morph their philosophical arguments.
An author of a book such as this one risk having their book become obsolete after day one because Trump will do something so outrageous that it doesn’t fit the story the author is trying to tell. The awful people who enable Trump must bend themselves to his new outrageous atrocity and claim that ‘we have always been at war with Oceania,’ or in other words “Venezulia today, the world tomorrow” while arguing it was about the democracy and then pretending it is about the oil. It’s confusing. The day after I wrote this paragraph, the American Gestapo, ICE, murdered Renee Good in Minnesota and obstructed justice in lying about the incident. The New Right will justify it without remorse.
Ultimately, the enabling of pedophiles and defending sex crimes against the young becomes a bridge too far for the world to ignore. The Epstein files is when the billionaires get to be held accountable and the slow dripping makes their intellectual arguments quaint. Even Christian Nationalist find a problem with Epstein’s friends.
The author tries to put a coherence around the beliefs of the opportunists who surround and fawn at the altar of Trump, but in the end that is a fool hearty mission because Trump’s ultimate good is for himself, and twisted reasoning only leads to furious minds. They justify hating LGTB, non-Christian, any other group that is not them while the mob is satisfied through made-up grievances that reside only in their mind and the billionaires continue to ignore us as they exploit us. Their furious minds were furious before they found their philosophical grounds.
January 29, 2026
I learned a lot from this book. Field covers a lot of ground that I haven't seen treated this comprehensively in any other academic source. There's a lot of great material on the Claremont Institute, on post-liberals like Patrick Deneen, and on fringy-er members of the hard right. That last group makes for some interesting reading. It's hard to keep a straight face while reading a book published by Princeton University Press containing the sentence "Raw Egg Nationalist was a guest on Bronze Age Pervert's podcast." But such is the world in which we live, I suppose.
This book is an intellectual history of sorts, but Field often brings a first-personal voice to the story, reflecting on her own experiences, or giving her own opinions of the people and arguments she surveys. Occasionally, that can feel somewhat distracting. But more often, it's a welcome dose of sanity in the midst of some truly, truly strange views.
I also appreciate that Field tries to acknowledge those cases in which these new right thinkers have a valid point, or at least a valid grievance. Granted, that usually tends to be cases where their critiques line up with her own much more progressive sensibilities - as with the post-liberal critique of 'neoliberal' economic excess. But Field is doing her best to strike something beyond a purely defensive posture here, and to think about how liberalism needs to grow and adopt in order to respond to the genuine challenges it faces.
Timely, readable, and important. And highly recommended.
This book is an intellectual history of sorts, but Field often brings a first-personal voice to the story, reflecting on her own experiences, or giving her own opinions of the people and arguments she surveys. Occasionally, that can feel somewhat distracting. But more often, it's a welcome dose of sanity in the midst of some truly, truly strange views.
I also appreciate that Field tries to acknowledge those cases in which these new right thinkers have a valid point, or at least a valid grievance. Granted, that usually tends to be cases where their critiques line up with her own much more progressive sensibilities - as with the post-liberal critique of 'neoliberal' economic excess. But Field is doing her best to strike something beyond a purely defensive posture here, and to think about how liberalism needs to grow and adopt in order to respond to the genuine challenges it faces.
Timely, readable, and important. And highly recommended.
January 13, 2026
This was a very insightful and useful, intellectual history that I was largely unaware of. And indispensable in my mind for a deeper understanding of what is happening in our country right now.
December 31, 2025
One of the best books I’ve ever read.
December 2, 2025
A serious overview of the not-so-disparate conservative intellectual coalitions affiliated with Trumpism, like the postliberals, West Coast Straussians, Catholic Integralists, and National Conservatives. I knew most of these names, institutions, and blogs, but I imagine most of this country has never heard of any of them, which is deeply concerning because they hold so much power today. However, I’ve never come across a book that succinctly explains their intellectual roots, pathologies, “galaxy-brained” theories, and hedging explanations like this one. Also, Field’s background as a Straussian is essential because she can explain the bizarre philosophical and historical references from these thinkers that go over most people’s heads. This background also makes her a helpful interpreter of Leo Strauss and Harry V. Jaffa’s philosophies, which I always struggled to understand.
And… yeah…. we should be worried about these guys.
And… yeah…. we should be worried about these guys.
December 20, 2025
At its best when Field is an ex-conservative political theorist. At its worst when Field is a Brooking's fellow in illiberal studies.
The peaks are serious, knowledgeable engagement with the history and present of the intellectual American right. The troughs are understandable but low information density denouncements of deplorables.
Field also frequently criticizes the right for their under-determined "ideas approach" first, but the book can be read as presupposing this. It is entirely possible the intellectual currents of the new right are largely epiphenomenon, swirling alongside, but casually independent of MAGA-Trump. The book is so focused on cataloguing the new right, it fails to ask if it matters.
Nonetheless, Field still offers to my knowledge the most substantial summary of the New Right that doesn't fall into the understandable but unserious trap of treating their output simply terroristic ideologies, not the ideas of intelligent but misguided people.
The peaks are serious, knowledgeable engagement with the history and present of the intellectual American right. The troughs are understandable but low information density denouncements of deplorables.
Field also frequently criticizes the right for their under-determined "ideas approach" first, but the book can be read as presupposing this. It is entirely possible the intellectual currents of the new right are largely epiphenomenon, swirling alongside, but casually independent of MAGA-Trump. The book is so focused on cataloguing the new right, it fails to ask if it matters.
Nonetheless, Field still offers to my knowledge the most substantial summary of the New Right that doesn't fall into the understandable but unserious trap of treating their output simply terroristic ideologies, not the ideas of intelligent but misguided people.
December 17, 2025
God I hate listening to audiobooks but when every copy in the Bay Area is checked out and there are 3x more holds than books…
The best parts were her relating what goes on at conferences and mocking ci people, though she tends to be a bit too charitable to the new right in general. I have three main problems with her approach in the book whose cause is all probably her being an academic with a specific focus refusing to talk about things she doesn’t have specific expertise in. Cmon just lie!!!!
1. Eschews entirely the popular appeal of MAGA. No Trump voter is debating whether the Lincoln Douglas debates were improving upon or just realizing the Declaration of Independence. I get she’s focusing on the intellectual origins of trumpism but the way she starts the book relating Goldwater and pat buchanan’s mass appeal makes it odd that she just doesn’t talk abt maga as a popular movement
2. The most interesting section to me was the apocalypticism of the new right as a religious and secular phenomenon. Would have appreciated more on that, especially in comparison to other political “eschatology” like Marxism. She even says “late stage” at one point but just doesn’t elaborate on connections to the commies’ use of that phrase.
3. Little on how the nat con or new right or integralist philosophy actually affected the policy changes in new right? Idk maybe I missed this but I feel like she says so much about their political Phil and that it’s a rejection of fusionism without explaining the intellectual mechanism behind, eg, protectionism. Maybe I just overlooked something though
The best parts were her relating what goes on at conferences and mocking ci people, though she tends to be a bit too charitable to the new right in general. I have three main problems with her approach in the book whose cause is all probably her being an academic with a specific focus refusing to talk about things she doesn’t have specific expertise in. Cmon just lie!!!!
1. Eschews entirely the popular appeal of MAGA. No Trump voter is debating whether the Lincoln Douglas debates were improving upon or just realizing the Declaration of Independence. I get she’s focusing on the intellectual origins of trumpism but the way she starts the book relating Goldwater and pat buchanan’s mass appeal makes it odd that she just doesn’t talk abt maga as a popular movement
2. The most interesting section to me was the apocalypticism of the new right as a religious and secular phenomenon. Would have appreciated more on that, especially in comparison to other political “eschatology” like Marxism. She even says “late stage” at one point but just doesn’t elaborate on connections to the commies’ use of that phrase.
3. Little on how the nat con or new right or integralist philosophy actually affected the policy changes in new right? Idk maybe I missed this but I feel like she says so much about their political Phil and that it’s a rejection of fusionism without explaining the intellectual mechanism behind, eg, protectionism. Maybe I just overlooked something though
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
December 30, 2025
Ajattelematta tartuin tähän juuri joulun alla ja luinkin kirjan sitten loppuun jouluaattona. Tämä ei todellakaan ole mitään kepeää lomaviihdettä vaan melkoisen tiukkaa tekstiä, ahdistavaakin, joten outo ajankohta kertonee kirjan vetovoimasta. Kirjan idea osuu hienosti siihen, mitä olen viime aikoina muutenkin harrastanut: halu ymmärtää ”niitä toisia” ajaa lukemaan sellaistakin, josta tulee lähinnä paha olo. Ehkä se silti on tärkeää.
December 21, 2025
I devoured this book over the course of one weekend. Having taken it out from my local library, I’m now going to buy a copy so I can turn back to it again more easily. An intellectual tour-de-force that explains much about why today’s New Right is so fiercely trying to undo the modern, tolerant, liberal order.
November 23, 2025
2.5 stars
December 30, 2025
Field beschrijft een geschiedenis die nog aan het gebeurden is.
Read
January 16, 2026Super dry academic books like this are…rough for me. But I’m glad I listened to this one despite being terribly depressing.
Read
January 17, 2026Man undrar ju ibland ifall vissa som hyllade Deneen & postliberalismen för ett par år sedan i Sverige ngnsin begrundat sina val ¯\_(ツ)_/¯
December 14, 2025
This book examines some intellectuals, in a sense broad enough to include Adrian Vermuele and “Bronze Age Pervert,” who have set themselves against liberal democracy in America & see Trump as a way to realize their hopes. Field is especially good on the pervasive misogyny among these people. The typical MAGA redhat may not have heard of any of them, but their influence is real.
In his Anatomy of Fascism, Robert Paxton notes that fascists have little interest in arguments and rational persuasion, but he adds that intellectuals played their parts:
“The intellectuals of the early days had several kinds of major impact. First, they helped create a space for fascist movements by weakening the elite's attachment to Enlightenment values, until then very widely accepted and applied in concrete form in constitutional government and liberal society. Intellectuals then made it possible to imagine fascism.”
That is why this book matters.
In his Anatomy of Fascism, Robert Paxton notes that fascists have little interest in arguments and rational persuasion, but he adds that intellectuals played their parts:
“The intellectuals of the early days had several kinds of major impact. First, they helped create a space for fascist movements by weakening the elite's attachment to Enlightenment values, until then very widely accepted and applied in concrete form in constitutional government and liberal society. Intellectuals then made it possible to imagine fascism.”
That is why this book matters.
January 18, 2026
"Okay, What Kind of a Conservative are You?"
Overall Rating: 4.75/5.0
2026 begins with a very real Civil War on the American Right. Who exactly are the key players, what are their ideas, and what are they fighting over? What will come after Trump? Laura Field's Furious Minds is an excellent book to help answer these questions.
Although not aligned with the New Right herself, Field does a commendable job of presenting the competing schools of New Right thought fairly, even when they are outside of the liberal* Overton Window. Indeed, being outside the New Right herself allows her, for the most part, to maintain a certain objectivity that would be more difficult if she had a personal investment in one of the New Right's schools of thought.
Before diving into the book, however, a couple of notes:
In this review, I will use the word liberal in the sense it is most commonly understood in political science. Liberal thus refers to something closer to Classical Liberalism, which emphasizes open debate and the democratic process for political decision-making, free-market economics, high degrees of personal liberty, and, overall, leans toward minimal government. This is opposed to the more colloquial meaning in conservative circles, where "liberal" conjures up images of white middle-aged ESG-and-DEI-thumping, socialist-sympathizing, soccer moms.
Second: I read this book as someone having a smattering of prior familiarity with New Right thinking. I have read some Anton, Schmitt, Nietzsche, Rufo, Peterson, James Lindsay, and Charles Haywood. I have also started tracking the rise of Nick Fuentes. I do not, however, claim to approach the book as a scholar with deep familiarity with the New Right. My motivation was to get a good overview of the terrain while using the familiarity I do have to assess Field's overall objectivity.
When I encountered authors I had not studied before, I consulted with Grok and Gemini to see whether their summaries aligned with what Field was saying enough. Grok was chosen because it is designed to be less constrained by "woke" thinking, while Gemini is said to be closer to the left bias the New Right attributes to most chatbots.
Overview of Contents
The New Right in Academia
About half of the book discusses the main schools of New Right thought in academia. She lists the Claremonters, National Conservatives, and Post-Liberals.
Claremonters, such as Michael Anton, are associated primarily with the Claremont Institute and Hillsdale College. She explains that they are enamored with America's Founding and its Constitution.
National Conservatives (Nat-Cons), such as Yoram Hazony, place greater emphasis on Nationalism. For them, immigration and the question of who should be considered an American are key concerns. The Nat-Cons also seek to move away from globalist, neo-liberalism, which they feel leaves middle America with the short stick. They want to move to an economic model that is more America-centric.
Post-Liberals, such as Deenen and Vermeule, are the most radical. They, as the name suggests, feel that not only has liberalism failed but that it is irreparable. They emphasize the damage that free-market capitalism causes to those not at the top and to the environment. They also decry the loss of a sense of community due to a lack of common values and what they see as the outright degeneracy that liberalism's permissiveness entails.
In addition to discussing the divisions, Fields emphasizes that there are also common themes. One consistent theme is the harm feminism has done to Western Civilization and the need to reverse it. Overall, a constant New Right theme is that men and society need to start acting more masculine.
Outside Academia
In the approximate half not devoted to academia, Field discusses the "Hard Right". This includes activist and "very online" elements, as well as those already in powerful political positions.
Among the activists, Field finds Chris Rufo particularly important. Rufo is an anti-CRT activist who then turned to educational activism, including against Ivy League schools for their supposed tolerance of antisemitism during the pro-Palestinian protests following Oct 7.
In the realm of those currently or previously holding high political office, Field discusses Stephen Miller and Steve Bannon. Both have clear ties to the hard and alt-right. In the case of Miller, Field writes that leaked e-mails show sympathies for white supremacy (a claim Miller, being Jewish, denies). Even higher up the political ladder, Field emphasizes that Vance, since his conversion to Catholicism in 2018, has become intimately familiar with and sympathetic to both National Conservatism and Post-Liberalism, and, indeed, is a prominent speaker at Nat-Con conferences.
In what seems more appropriately called "very online" and still a little too extreme to be mainstream political activism, Field discusses "Bronze Age Pervert" (BAP), who seeks a society openly embracing such things as war, genocide, and eugenics. Field points out that BAP is viewed favorably (with the caveat that what he suggests may be deliberately exaggerated for stylistic or "inspirational" purposes) by academics, such as Anton, and by those already established in politics.
Finally, there are the "Independent Christian Charismatics," whom Field argues were critical to Trump's rise. These are leaders who emphasize that they have direct personal relationships with God and whose "prophecies" and sermons, Field writes, were key to Trump's first election and later to the events of Jan 6.
The Book's Strengths
Until very recently, many on the left considered the notion of a "conservative intellectual" to be an oxymoron. Leftist intellectuals felt they were above discussing such nonsense, and besides, all that futilely trying to have such discussions would do is platform ideas not worthy of one. Better to let such rare ideas just die off in obscurity.
Field, by contrast, acknowledges that the New Right has many highly intelligent and credentialed intellectuals whose ideas need to be taken seriously. Field even concedes that there are areas where the New Right is stronger than mainstream academics, and that the latter is at a disadvantage as a result. An example is knowledge of the Greek and Roman classics. In discussing specific ideas, Field openly acknowledges when she thinks the New Right ideas have kernels, or even more, of truth. She discusses the idea head-on, rather than summarily dismissing them as instances of "isms" (e.g., racism, sexism) or products of psychological maladies.
Field covers a great deal of ground in this medium-length book. The intellectuals, the activists, the political well-placed, the fringe, her critiques of the ideas, and the divisions within the New Right. One particularly fascinating example of a division is the attitude toward Jews. Field writes that many key figures of the new right are themselves Jewish: Bronze Age Pervert, Stephen Miller, and Yoram Hazony. As Jews, however, they are increasingly shunned by some of the same New Right who accuse Jews of dual loyalty. This is despite the important roles they played in creating the New Right to begin with.
The Book's Weaknesses
Although the book does a good job of balancing the presentation of ideas with her own often valid critiques, in some cases, the criticism is weak.
For example, in discussing the New Right's criticism of ESG, Field suggests that it is primarily a voluntary decision by investors to invest their money in companies that align with their social values. Field does not mention the fact that much ESG money is in pension funds or 401 (k)'s, with beneficiaries not choosing who manages it. In addition, votes are cast by proxy through fund managers rather than by the beneficiaries.
Field is also weak in her defense of DEI. She ignores the real harm done to white people when, for example, they were only 6% of new hires during the height of the DEI era during the pandemic (as documented by Bloomberg in their article "Corporate America Promised to Hire a Lot More People of Color. It Actually Did." )
Similarly, Field minimizes concern regarding cancel culture, saying that although there might be some career ramifications, the impact was relatively small compared to the prejudice minorities in America have faced, and, besides, getting cancelled from a job might actually be a positive for opportunities elsewhere. This, of course, ignores the fact that at the height of cancel culture, if you lost your job due to your political beliefs in what were then some very woke fields, you would be very unlikely to get hired anywhere else (so, can you please go over again why you had to leave your job at the XYZ Big Tech Firm?)
A more minor weakness is that there is only limited discussion of the interplay between the intellectual and activist New Right discussed in this book and the manosphere. (For a better discussion of that, see Elle Reeve's Black Pill: How I Witnessed the Darkest Corners of the Internet Come to Life, Poison Society, and Capture American Politics.) This is forgivable, however, since a book with such a broad scope cannot go into great depth on everything.
Personal Reflections
The greatest thing about this book is how much there is to think about. I myself am just a boring, milquetoast conservative whose political alignment is closest to classical liberalism. That, however, is something which the New Right rejects. During my lifetime, Western Liberalism never seemed seriously threatened. I have taken it for granted, but it seems it can no longer be.
The threats from the left were clear in 2020. This book helps make the present threats from the right clear. How can liberalism be defended, going all the way back to first principles? The debates are no longer academic; they are now "live." My lack of religious beliefs has never seemed seriously threatened, but how would an atheist fare in a Christian Nationalist country? The book raises alarms here. How liberal would I remain if the Nat-Cons or Post-Liberals become a threat to me personally? Would I favor non-liberal means of dealing with them? If so, would that just prove Schmitt right?
Similarly, are those on the New Right who think that there is inevitably going to be a Caesar right? Can we prevent it at this point? If not, which would be less bad: a Red Caesar or a Blue Caesar? Even the question of, given all the problems with Democracy and the potential for AI to unearth more with capitalism, might the most seemingly extreme of the New Right be correct that some kind of constitutional or even absolute monarchy is best? I do not have good answers to many of these questions, which are now "in play," but the book provides a great resource on where to start.
Conclusion
Furious Minds is, easily, the best book I have read since late 2024. I wish it had existed at the beginning of 2024. At that point, it seemed like we had made it past woke illiberalism and could now relax. There were warning signs, but they seemed vague. James Lindsay was early in sounding the alarm bells to those on the right, but too few explicit names were mentioned. (Perhaps he was worried about alienating his primarily Christian following by naming someone they liked, whereas Field is freer here?) This book is very specific about the threats and names the names.
Conservatives reading this book will have varying degrees of sympathy for the ideas discussed. I have considerable sympathy for some, but am very alarmed by others. Others, of course, will lean more heavily one way regarding the author's critiques and with how fairly she presents their favored strain of conservatism. In any case, now is, indeed, the time for conservatives to answer, "What kind of conservative are you?" An important theme is that the New Right has plans that go well beyond Trump, and he is seen merely as necessary to pave the way for them.
Those who are left-leaning, of course, will be unlikely to feel much, if any, sympathy for advocates of right-wing post-liberalism. (The exception being that the New Right is less free-market.) They may consider this book a wake-up call that they can no longer avoid direct engagement with these ideologies and may find value in other weaknesses the author points out in their approach to the culture wars to this point. (For example, the author calls out the left for being far behind the right in mastering propaganda and emotional appeal, which, honestly, are critical in politics. Not having exercised it much, they are also weak in the real-world defense of liberalism. )
As Field argues in the final chapter, we are not living in Greek Theatre. Counting on a Deus Ex Machina to come to the rescue is not a good plan. It is time for the opponents of post-liberalism to be alarmed, do some serious studying, and get ready to act!
Overall Rating: 4.75/5.0
2026 begins with a very real Civil War on the American Right. Who exactly are the key players, what are their ideas, and what are they fighting over? What will come after Trump? Laura Field's Furious Minds is an excellent book to help answer these questions.
Although not aligned with the New Right herself, Field does a commendable job of presenting the competing schools of New Right thought fairly, even when they are outside of the liberal* Overton Window. Indeed, being outside the New Right herself allows her, for the most part, to maintain a certain objectivity that would be more difficult if she had a personal investment in one of the New Right's schools of thought.
Before diving into the book, however, a couple of notes:
In this review, I will use the word liberal in the sense it is most commonly understood in political science. Liberal thus refers to something closer to Classical Liberalism, which emphasizes open debate and the democratic process for political decision-making, free-market economics, high degrees of personal liberty, and, overall, leans toward minimal government. This is opposed to the more colloquial meaning in conservative circles, where "liberal" conjures up images of white middle-aged ESG-and-DEI-thumping, socialist-sympathizing, soccer moms.
Second: I read this book as someone having a smattering of prior familiarity with New Right thinking. I have read some Anton, Schmitt, Nietzsche, Rufo, Peterson, James Lindsay, and Charles Haywood. I have also started tracking the rise of Nick Fuentes. I do not, however, claim to approach the book as a scholar with deep familiarity with the New Right. My motivation was to get a good overview of the terrain while using the familiarity I do have to assess Field's overall objectivity.
When I encountered authors I had not studied before, I consulted with Grok and Gemini to see whether their summaries aligned with what Field was saying enough. Grok was chosen because it is designed to be less constrained by "woke" thinking, while Gemini is said to be closer to the left bias the New Right attributes to most chatbots.
Overview of Contents
The New Right in Academia
About half of the book discusses the main schools of New Right thought in academia. She lists the Claremonters, National Conservatives, and Post-Liberals.
Claremonters, such as Michael Anton, are associated primarily with the Claremont Institute and Hillsdale College. She explains that they are enamored with America's Founding and its Constitution.
National Conservatives (Nat-Cons), such as Yoram Hazony, place greater emphasis on Nationalism. For them, immigration and the question of who should be considered an American are key concerns. The Nat-Cons also seek to move away from globalist, neo-liberalism, which they feel leaves middle America with the short stick. They want to move to an economic model that is more America-centric.
Post-Liberals, such as Deenen and Vermeule, are the most radical. They, as the name suggests, feel that not only has liberalism failed but that it is irreparable. They emphasize the damage that free-market capitalism causes to those not at the top and to the environment. They also decry the loss of a sense of community due to a lack of common values and what they see as the outright degeneracy that liberalism's permissiveness entails.
In addition to discussing the divisions, Fields emphasizes that there are also common themes. One consistent theme is the harm feminism has done to Western Civilization and the need to reverse it. Overall, a constant New Right theme is that men and society need to start acting more masculine.
Outside Academia
In the approximate half not devoted to academia, Field discusses the "Hard Right". This includes activist and "very online" elements, as well as those already in powerful political positions.
Among the activists, Field finds Chris Rufo particularly important. Rufo is an anti-CRT activist who then turned to educational activism, including against Ivy League schools for their supposed tolerance of antisemitism during the pro-Palestinian protests following Oct 7.
In the realm of those currently or previously holding high political office, Field discusses Stephen Miller and Steve Bannon. Both have clear ties to the hard and alt-right. In the case of Miller, Field writes that leaked e-mails show sympathies for white supremacy (a claim Miller, being Jewish, denies). Even higher up the political ladder, Field emphasizes that Vance, since his conversion to Catholicism in 2018, has become intimately familiar with and sympathetic to both National Conservatism and Post-Liberalism, and, indeed, is a prominent speaker at Nat-Con conferences.
In what seems more appropriately called "very online" and still a little too extreme to be mainstream political activism, Field discusses "Bronze Age Pervert" (BAP), who seeks a society openly embracing such things as war, genocide, and eugenics. Field points out that BAP is viewed favorably (with the caveat that what he suggests may be deliberately exaggerated for stylistic or "inspirational" purposes) by academics, such as Anton, and by those already established in politics.
Finally, there are the "Independent Christian Charismatics," whom Field argues were critical to Trump's rise. These are leaders who emphasize that they have direct personal relationships with God and whose "prophecies" and sermons, Field writes, were key to Trump's first election and later to the events of Jan 6.
The Book's Strengths
Until very recently, many on the left considered the notion of a "conservative intellectual" to be an oxymoron. Leftist intellectuals felt they were above discussing such nonsense, and besides, all that futilely trying to have such discussions would do is platform ideas not worthy of one. Better to let such rare ideas just die off in obscurity.
Field, by contrast, acknowledges that the New Right has many highly intelligent and credentialed intellectuals whose ideas need to be taken seriously. Field even concedes that there are areas where the New Right is stronger than mainstream academics, and that the latter is at a disadvantage as a result. An example is knowledge of the Greek and Roman classics. In discussing specific ideas, Field openly acknowledges when she thinks the New Right ideas have kernels, or even more, of truth. She discusses the idea head-on, rather than summarily dismissing them as instances of "isms" (e.g., racism, sexism) or products of psychological maladies.
Field covers a great deal of ground in this medium-length book. The intellectuals, the activists, the political well-placed, the fringe, her critiques of the ideas, and the divisions within the New Right. One particularly fascinating example of a division is the attitude toward Jews. Field writes that many key figures of the new right are themselves Jewish: Bronze Age Pervert, Stephen Miller, and Yoram Hazony. As Jews, however, they are increasingly shunned by some of the same New Right who accuse Jews of dual loyalty. This is despite the important roles they played in creating the New Right to begin with.
The Book's Weaknesses
Although the book does a good job of balancing the presentation of ideas with her own often valid critiques, in some cases, the criticism is weak.
For example, in discussing the New Right's criticism of ESG, Field suggests that it is primarily a voluntary decision by investors to invest their money in companies that align with their social values. Field does not mention the fact that much ESG money is in pension funds or 401 (k)'s, with beneficiaries not choosing who manages it. In addition, votes are cast by proxy through fund managers rather than by the beneficiaries.
Field is also weak in her defense of DEI. She ignores the real harm done to white people when, for example, they were only 6% of new hires during the height of the DEI era during the pandemic (as documented by Bloomberg in their article "Corporate America Promised to Hire a Lot More People of Color. It Actually Did." )
Similarly, Field minimizes concern regarding cancel culture, saying that although there might be some career ramifications, the impact was relatively small compared to the prejudice minorities in America have faced, and, besides, getting cancelled from a job might actually be a positive for opportunities elsewhere. This, of course, ignores the fact that at the height of cancel culture, if you lost your job due to your political beliefs in what were then some very woke fields, you would be very unlikely to get hired anywhere else (so, can you please go over again why you had to leave your job at the XYZ Big Tech Firm?)
A more minor weakness is that there is only limited discussion of the interplay between the intellectual and activist New Right discussed in this book and the manosphere. (For a better discussion of that, see Elle Reeve's Black Pill: How I Witnessed the Darkest Corners of the Internet Come to Life, Poison Society, and Capture American Politics.) This is forgivable, however, since a book with such a broad scope cannot go into great depth on everything.
Personal Reflections
The greatest thing about this book is how much there is to think about. I myself am just a boring, milquetoast conservative whose political alignment is closest to classical liberalism. That, however, is something which the New Right rejects. During my lifetime, Western Liberalism never seemed seriously threatened. I have taken it for granted, but it seems it can no longer be.
The threats from the left were clear in 2020. This book helps make the present threats from the right clear. How can liberalism be defended, going all the way back to first principles? The debates are no longer academic; they are now "live." My lack of religious beliefs has never seemed seriously threatened, but how would an atheist fare in a Christian Nationalist country? The book raises alarms here. How liberal would I remain if the Nat-Cons or Post-Liberals become a threat to me personally? Would I favor non-liberal means of dealing with them? If so, would that just prove Schmitt right?
Similarly, are those on the New Right who think that there is inevitably going to be a Caesar right? Can we prevent it at this point? If not, which would be less bad: a Red Caesar or a Blue Caesar? Even the question of, given all the problems with Democracy and the potential for AI to unearth more with capitalism, might the most seemingly extreme of the New Right be correct that some kind of constitutional or even absolute monarchy is best? I do not have good answers to many of these questions, which are now "in play," but the book provides a great resource on where to start.
Conclusion
Furious Minds is, easily, the best book I have read since late 2024. I wish it had existed at the beginning of 2024. At that point, it seemed like we had made it past woke illiberalism and could now relax. There were warning signs, but they seemed vague. James Lindsay was early in sounding the alarm bells to those on the right, but too few explicit names were mentioned. (Perhaps he was worried about alienating his primarily Christian following by naming someone they liked, whereas Field is freer here?) This book is very specific about the threats and names the names.
Conservatives reading this book will have varying degrees of sympathy for the ideas discussed. I have considerable sympathy for some, but am very alarmed by others. Others, of course, will lean more heavily one way regarding the author's critiques and with how fairly she presents their favored strain of conservatism. In any case, now is, indeed, the time for conservatives to answer, "What kind of conservative are you?" An important theme is that the New Right has plans that go well beyond Trump, and he is seen merely as necessary to pave the way for them.
Those who are left-leaning, of course, will be unlikely to feel much, if any, sympathy for advocates of right-wing post-liberalism. (The exception being that the New Right is less free-market.) They may consider this book a wake-up call that they can no longer avoid direct engagement with these ideologies and may find value in other weaknesses the author points out in their approach to the culture wars to this point. (For example, the author calls out the left for being far behind the right in mastering propaganda and emotional appeal, which, honestly, are critical in politics. Not having exercised it much, they are also weak in the real-world defense of liberalism. )
As Field argues in the final chapter, we are not living in Greek Theatre. Counting on a Deus Ex Machina to come to the rescue is not a good plan. It is time for the opponents of post-liberalism to be alarmed, do some serious studying, and get ready to act!
December 6, 2025
Laura Field delivers an informative tour of the disparate factions on the right that provided intellectual impetus and apologetic for the Trump presidency, with a particular emphasis (and insider’s perspective) on the Claremont Review.
Personally, I found the initial chapters on the “Claremonsters”, Post-Liberals, National Conservatives (contributors with which I’m somewhat familiar) far more engrossing than the esoteric likes of “Bronze Age Pervert”, “Raw Egg Nationalist”, Curtis Yarvin, et al., who seem to have an inflated sense of their own influence and worth which I question extends beyond the realm of Twitter/X.
As a Catholic convert in college in the 90’s I was fairly acquainted with the ecumenical conservativism of First Things (under Richard J. Neuhaus) and the conventional conservativism / neoconservatism of the National Review, The Weekly Standard, etc. However not being in the insulated world of academia after college and not spending a great deal of time on Twitter, I felt my grasp of the “intellectual right” in the 00’s becoming more and more tenuous. In that sense, I found this highly digestible whirlwind history of popular “conservatism” and its subsequent perversions culminating in Trump’s election extremely helpful.
Perhaps especially J.D. Vance as VP and in the potential presidential line of succession, this who’s who of the current intellectual right serves a useful guidebook.
Personally, I found the initial chapters on the “Claremonsters”, Post-Liberals, National Conservatives (contributors with which I’m somewhat familiar) far more engrossing than the esoteric likes of “Bronze Age Pervert”, “Raw Egg Nationalist”, Curtis Yarvin, et al., who seem to have an inflated sense of their own influence and worth which I question extends beyond the realm of Twitter/X.
As a Catholic convert in college in the 90’s I was fairly acquainted with the ecumenical conservativism of First Things (under Richard J. Neuhaus) and the conventional conservativism / neoconservatism of the National Review, The Weekly Standard, etc. However not being in the insulated world of academia after college and not spending a great deal of time on Twitter, I felt my grasp of the “intellectual right” in the 00’s becoming more and more tenuous. In that sense, I found this highly digestible whirlwind history of popular “conservatism” and its subsequent perversions culminating in Trump’s election extremely helpful.
Perhaps especially J.D. Vance as VP and in the potential presidential line of succession, this who’s who of the current intellectual right serves a useful guidebook.
November 30, 2025
An interesting overview of groups whose influence has far outpaced their scrutiny. Field is quite informative and includes volumes of detail regarding who these people are, what they believe and the intellectual traditions they emerge from. Her actual rebuttals of their ideas however are rather weak, and depend upon accepting many of the liberal priors they reject. Perhaps a rigorous philosophical critique can be for a different volume.
December 25, 2025
This is an important book that corrects the under-reporting and misunderstanding about the connection between the New Right and the Trump-led MAGA movement. It does not focus primarily on the rise of Trump, although much of that is revealed in describing the broader emergence of the New Right as well as Trump's reciprocal role in promoting it. In the process, Furious Minds details the ideas and actions of many of the key figures, including lesser-known facts about prominent personalities such as Peter Thiel, J.D. Vance, Tucker Carlson, Christoper Rufo, as well as weirder, fringe figures like Curtis Yarvin, Raw Egg Nationalist, and Bronze Age Pervert. What might surprise some readers is the number of PhDs and other highly educated individuals who played a major part in forming the intellectual underpinnings of MAGA. Some of them were/are out and out enthusiastic supporters of Trump; others viewed him as a "useful idiot" that would advance their goals.
Political theorist Laura Field (BA-University of Alberta; PhD-University of Texas) is ideally situated to tell this story from her academic training (Straussian), her relationships with and later research on conservatives including many in the New Right and their precursors. Furious Minds documents the emergence and coalescence of this movement and its key institutions (the Claremont Institute, Hillsdale College, the Heritage Foundation, among others) between 2016 and 2024.
A distinctive feature of Field's analysis is her 4-fold typology of the New Right, which divides its institutions and personalities: "Claremonters"--e.g., Michael Anton, John Eastman, and Charles Kesler-- those originating or working at the Claremont Institute (at Southern California's Claremont McKenna College); "Postliberals" (including, among others, Notre Dame professor Patrick Deneen, Harvard Law professor Adrian Vermeule, and J.D. Vance); "National Conservatives" (such as Yoram Hazony, Josh Hawley, Christopher Rufo, Kevin Roberts, and Viktor Orban), and Hard Right Conservatives (e.g, Stephen Wolfe, "Bronze Age Pervert" Costin Alamariu, and "Raw Egg Nationalist" Charles Cornish-Dale).
I'm not convinced this is the most useful classification scheme, as the members of different quadrants, respectively, often have more in common with one another than differences. Although dissimilar in their certitude and propensity for advocating violence, what unites all or nearly all members of the New Right is their right-wing anti-liberalism--their opposition to democracy, wokeness and DEI, pluralism, globalism, the rule of law, moral relativism, LGBTQ, elites (hypocritically for many), and secularism (most New Rightists); and their emphasis on manliness and misogyny (in varying degrees), their rightist populism, flirtations with anti-Semitism, racism, and fascism; and their ethnocentrism, "blood and soil" nationalism, or Christian nationalism (again in varying degrees).
A minor nit is the book's copious references to Greek and ancient literature and philosophies. As someone not well-versed in those writings, I'm sure I missed some points the author was making.
Overall, Furious Minds is most informative and should appeal to anyone seeking a greater understanding of the MAGA movement from the perspective of the broader thinking that feeds it. Be advised that the book deals only with MAGA’s intellectual underpinnings; it is not at all an empirical analysis of the mass public’s Trump-related beliefs or voting behavior.
Political theorist Laura Field (BA-University of Alberta; PhD-University of Texas) is ideally situated to tell this story from her academic training (Straussian), her relationships with and later research on conservatives including many in the New Right and their precursors. Furious Minds documents the emergence and coalescence of this movement and its key institutions (the Claremont Institute, Hillsdale College, the Heritage Foundation, among others) between 2016 and 2024.
A distinctive feature of Field's analysis is her 4-fold typology of the New Right, which divides its institutions and personalities: "Claremonters"--e.g., Michael Anton, John Eastman, and Charles Kesler-- those originating or working at the Claremont Institute (at Southern California's Claremont McKenna College); "Postliberals" (including, among others, Notre Dame professor Patrick Deneen, Harvard Law professor Adrian Vermeule, and J.D. Vance); "National Conservatives" (such as Yoram Hazony, Josh Hawley, Christopher Rufo, Kevin Roberts, and Viktor Orban), and Hard Right Conservatives (e.g, Stephen Wolfe, "Bronze Age Pervert" Costin Alamariu, and "Raw Egg Nationalist" Charles Cornish-Dale).
I'm not convinced this is the most useful classification scheme, as the members of different quadrants, respectively, often have more in common with one another than differences. Although dissimilar in their certitude and propensity for advocating violence, what unites all or nearly all members of the New Right is their right-wing anti-liberalism--their opposition to democracy, wokeness and DEI, pluralism, globalism, the rule of law, moral relativism, LGBTQ, elites (hypocritically for many), and secularism (most New Rightists); and their emphasis on manliness and misogyny (in varying degrees), their rightist populism, flirtations with anti-Semitism, racism, and fascism; and their ethnocentrism, "blood and soil" nationalism, or Christian nationalism (again in varying degrees).
A minor nit is the book's copious references to Greek and ancient literature and philosophies. As someone not well-versed in those writings, I'm sure I missed some points the author was making.
Overall, Furious Minds is most informative and should appeal to anyone seeking a greater understanding of the MAGA movement from the perspective of the broader thinking that feeds it. Be advised that the book deals only with MAGA’s intellectual underpinnings; it is not at all an empirical analysis of the mass public’s Trump-related beliefs or voting behavior.
January 20, 2026
An absolutely essential guide to the many tribes of the MAGA New Right. This intellectual movement has arrived at maturity in the early 2020s after the chaos of the first Trump years. Field excavates the factions of this movement, which has coalesced around Trump: Hard Right edgelords, Nationalist Conversatives, Catholic integralists, Protestant neo-theocrats, postliberals, masculine reactionaries, Claremonters, and so on.
She spells out the differences between these groups deftly, but she also shows their commonalities. They are all fundamentally illiberal. They reject the basic pluralism of our liberal society, including gains by women and sexual minorities. They mostly reject free market economics in favor of a nationalist. They are either openly racist or flirtatious with race-science and a strictly ethnic/religious/racial definition of the nation. They loathe liberalism for (ostensibly) being value neutral, corrosive of traditions, communities, and "folkways," and for empowering groups they find to be vile. They will reject democratic processes if they keep leading to liberal outcomes, and many have turned openly to forms of authoritarianism. And they are almost all dudes who are obsessed with the supposed "gynocracy" and the crises of masculinity in the modern age. Their points of emphasis vary, but they all operate within this general intellectual orbit.
Field correctly warns liberal readers to not dismiss the New Right's ideas as mere irritable gestures. They have ideas, albeit bad ones, about what the nation is, what the good life is, what makes human beings happy, how society should be ordered (guess what? they are on top), and other fundamental political/philosophical questions. And their ideas clearly have appeal, as similar ideas have appealed to millions of people at different points in history. Liberals can't dismiss these ideas; they have to tackle them head on, and they have more than adequate intellectual resources to do so.
Field is a particularly excellent guide to this movement because she not only reads these people but knows them and attends their conference. As this is not a purely objective study, she also argues with them and convincingly shows the poverty and brutality of their thinking. Anyways, along with Matthew Rose's A World After Liberalism, this is probably the best book on modern far right ideas and people I've encountered. Strongly recommended (although it's also maddening!).
She spells out the differences between these groups deftly, but she also shows their commonalities. They are all fundamentally illiberal. They reject the basic pluralism of our liberal society, including gains by women and sexual minorities. They mostly reject free market economics in favor of a nationalist. They are either openly racist or flirtatious with race-science and a strictly ethnic/religious/racial definition of the nation. They loathe liberalism for (ostensibly) being value neutral, corrosive of traditions, communities, and "folkways," and for empowering groups they find to be vile. They will reject democratic processes if they keep leading to liberal outcomes, and many have turned openly to forms of authoritarianism. And they are almost all dudes who are obsessed with the supposed "gynocracy" and the crises of masculinity in the modern age. Their points of emphasis vary, but they all operate within this general intellectual orbit.
Field correctly warns liberal readers to not dismiss the New Right's ideas as mere irritable gestures. They have ideas, albeit bad ones, about what the nation is, what the good life is, what makes human beings happy, how society should be ordered (guess what? they are on top), and other fundamental political/philosophical questions. And their ideas clearly have appeal, as similar ideas have appealed to millions of people at different points in history. Liberals can't dismiss these ideas; they have to tackle them head on, and they have more than adequate intellectual resources to do so.
Field is a particularly excellent guide to this movement because she not only reads these people but knows them and attends their conference. As this is not a purely objective study, she also argues with them and convincingly shows the poverty and brutality of their thinking. Anyways, along with Matthew Rose's A World After Liberalism, this is probably the best book on modern far right ideas and people I've encountered. Strongly recommended (although it's also maddening!).
January 10, 2026
As Field makes clear at the outset, it is a mistake to assume there is no intellectual background to the MAGA movement. It’s easy to portray Trump’s followers as ignorant sycophants driven purely by spite and grievance; it’s much more difficult to grapple with the intellectual movements that took shape before his election and grappled onto him as a vehicle to move forward their agenda.
The three factions she identifies in the movement — Postliberals, National Conservatives, and the Hard Right — have differences in their priorities, but there are common themes they all emphasize. The ideals and myth of the national founding, the mores of social conservatism, and more than a little friction against modern gender norms.
The most important takeaway from people who want to understand how this backing turned MAGA into a rabid movement that made these fringe academics into national thought leaders is the Straussian background of ideas-first political theory. Democrats don’t think in terms of how their ideas become more palatable over time to the populace, they think in terms of how they adjust their ideas to what is palatable to the populace right now. That is a mistake, and why they often seem to be moving without a rudder, both when they are in the governing minority and can’t seem to find a consistent line of critique against republicans administrations and congressional minorities, and also when they are in power and struggle to build a comprehensive platform that can actually inspire people. It also points to why Zohran Mamdani has captured so much of that imagination: even if he can’t accomplish all of his platform the sheer fact that he asks New Yorkers to dare to believe that such things could be possible make people think of him as different. Right wing intellectuals like the ones Field profiles here understand the power of this kind of messaging very well and it’s why they drive narratives while Democrats always seem to react to them.
The three factions she identifies in the movement — Postliberals, National Conservatives, and the Hard Right — have differences in their priorities, but there are common themes they all emphasize. The ideals and myth of the national founding, the mores of social conservatism, and more than a little friction against modern gender norms.
The most important takeaway from people who want to understand how this backing turned MAGA into a rabid movement that made these fringe academics into national thought leaders is the Straussian background of ideas-first political theory. Democrats don’t think in terms of how their ideas become more palatable over time to the populace, they think in terms of how they adjust their ideas to what is palatable to the populace right now. That is a mistake, and why they often seem to be moving without a rudder, both when they are in the governing minority and can’t seem to find a consistent line of critique against republicans administrations and congressional minorities, and also when they are in power and struggle to build a comprehensive platform that can actually inspire people. It also points to why Zohran Mamdani has captured so much of that imagination: even if he can’t accomplish all of his platform the sheer fact that he asks New Yorkers to dare to believe that such things could be possible make people think of him as different. Right wing intellectuals like the ones Field profiles here understand the power of this kind of messaging very well and it’s why they drive narratives while Democrats always seem to react to them.
January 28, 2026
As far as books in the "How did we get here?" genre go, this is definitely towards the top. Field's book is an extraordinarily well-researched and compelling narrative about the cultural shift in America that allowed Trump to win twice, how it happened, what the seeds were, and how it can be prevented from happening again. The intense focus on right-wing university intellectuals is particularly appealing and I agree with Field's overall assertion that these intellectual influencers are not unthinking, but unfeeling, and she does an effective job of communicating the way in most, if not all ultra-conservative rhetoric is projection. Empathy is not a requirement for a PhD. She also smartly does not let Democrats/liberals off the hook for not seeing what was happening in plain sight.
I was particularly interested in the section about Curtis Yarvin and Dimes Square because I have a weirdly personal connection. I have a film industry mutual friend whose brother is a known friend of Yarvin, and in 2022 when I was freelancing I found myself on a set with all three of them and Yarvin was asked to leave after a few hours because he literally couldn't stop talking and everyone thought he was really annoying. Literal child behavior. I don't know the man personally but seeing him lambasted in this book for his shameless grift and his poor writing was amusing.
Highly recommended, although if you're not a political junkie like I am you might find it dense to a point of alienation. Even as someone who reads a lot of political non-fiction there were too many "-isms" for my liking and it does get a little repetitive.
Even so, very very very good.
I was particularly interested in the section about Curtis Yarvin and Dimes Square because I have a weirdly personal connection. I have a film industry mutual friend whose brother is a known friend of Yarvin, and in 2022 when I was freelancing I found myself on a set with all three of them and Yarvin was asked to leave after a few hours because he literally couldn't stop talking and everyone thought he was really annoying. Literal child behavior. I don't know the man personally but seeing him lambasted in this book for his shameless grift and his poor writing was amusing.
Highly recommended, although if you're not a political junkie like I am you might find it dense to a point of alienation. Even as someone who reads a lot of political non-fiction there were too many "-isms" for my liking and it does get a little repetitive.
Even so, very very very good.
January 3, 2026
A very useful read, even for someone who is obsessively up to date on most of these figures and the general thought-world of the far right. While I have my own quibbles with Field's politics, they are largely irrelevant to the reportage she does here, which has several things to recommend it above the bevy of recent monographs covering the rise of Trump or the alt-right.
Field reads her sources closely, in a way that takes ideas seriously as ideas, and she engages far-right thinkers with sustained criticism while still granting that their stated motivations are worth examining on their own terms. Thankfully, even for figures mostly known on social media, like Raw Egg Nationalist, Stephen Wolfe, and Bronze Age Pervert, she doesn't make the mistake of relying on their social media posts, but engages their serious, less mainstream writings and appearances.
Most importantly, she follows the movement past its familiar origin story, tracing its intellectual development after 2017 and especially after 2020, where many accounts stop. Her sustained attention to the Claremont school, treated not as a footnote but as an active and evolving intellectual project, is particularly clarifying.
If you're a listener of Know Your Enemy, I Don't Speak German, It Could Happen Here, etc., you will know many of these names, but Field manages to weave together an instructive and thorough account of their mutually reinforcing projects. Even for those of us with a good lay-of-the-land understanding of the far right, this is a useful book and recommended reading.
Field reads her sources closely, in a way that takes ideas seriously as ideas, and she engages far-right thinkers with sustained criticism while still granting that their stated motivations are worth examining on their own terms. Thankfully, even for figures mostly known on social media, like Raw Egg Nationalist, Stephen Wolfe, and Bronze Age Pervert, she doesn't make the mistake of relying on their social media posts, but engages their serious, less mainstream writings and appearances.
Most importantly, she follows the movement past its familiar origin story, tracing its intellectual development after 2017 and especially after 2020, where many accounts stop. Her sustained attention to the Claremont school, treated not as a footnote but as an active and evolving intellectual project, is particularly clarifying.
If you're a listener of Know Your Enemy, I Don't Speak German, It Could Happen Here, etc., you will know many of these names, but Field manages to weave together an instructive and thorough account of their mutually reinforcing projects. Even for those of us with a good lay-of-the-land understanding of the far right, this is a useful book and recommended reading.
December 12, 2025
The author begins her book by informing the readers that this is only an analysis of the "intellectual" wing of MAGA and that she will leave discussion of the other elements (QAnon, White Nationalists, etc) to other writers. That's a disappointment. It's like picking up a book about the success of the New England Patriots football dynasty and finding out that the author is only going to talk about the coaching staff. He'll leave discussion about the games and the players to other writers. MAGA's success is not because of some Ph.Ds sharing their philosophy from ivory towers. The white, mostly xenophobic and often misogynist base stoked up on resentment is MAGA. And I doubt very many of them have read writings by Adrian Vermeule or Patrick Deneen.
I believe Laura Field knows many of these men (yes, they are all men!) from the various academic circles she has inhabited. I also get the sense that she even respects their intelligence. Many of them have political philosophies developed before Trump entered politics and they simply shoehorned their philosophies into what they wished Trump's ideology would morph into. The problem is Trump doesn't have an ideology. He simply pursues power for powers sake (and for financial gain). Period.
I gave this book 3 stars because it was interesting to read about the trajectories of conservative political science thinkers, but by the time we get to Trump 2.0 I was convinced that if any of them really did have any brains in their heads, they were seriously delusional.
I believe Laura Field knows many of these men (yes, they are all men!) from the various academic circles she has inhabited. I also get the sense that she even respects their intelligence. Many of them have political philosophies developed before Trump entered politics and they simply shoehorned their philosophies into what they wished Trump's ideology would morph into. The problem is Trump doesn't have an ideology. He simply pursues power for powers sake (and for financial gain). Period.
I gave this book 3 stars because it was interesting to read about the trajectories of conservative political science thinkers, but by the time we get to Trump 2.0 I was convinced that if any of them really did have any brains in their heads, they were seriously delusional.
January 2, 2026
Sharp, excellent, and timely. I have a much better understanding of the political philosophers who have shaped MAGA. This book is frequently disturbing and always enlightening. I couldn’t put it down. Some immediate takeaways: how and why did these people, many of whom are educated Christians, embrace and foment Trumpism? Laura Field, with her Great Books training, helps readers see how these Machiavellian thinkers decided that the end does justify the means. Field’s pointed and thorough critique owes much to her training as a close reader of texts. She synthesizes the ideas that have taken hold in the last ten years, showing how they have similar roots among some followers of Strauss. It is an appalling and enlightening story.
I have a much better understanding of integralism—a theory I have previously found confusing and hard to wrap my mind around, even as I instinctively have been skeptical and suspicious of it—since reading this book. I am convinced that Catholic integralists fail to understand faith in Christ as an encounter with a Person. Instead, they see Christianity as a tool for power. I think that’s ultimately why I reject it. It’s ultimately unChristian, in my view.
Finally, I was heartened at the end of the book that Field still sees the Great Books as worthy of reading and being taught, and that she believes education as an essential antidote for our divisive age. Field is a generous and just interlocutor, and this book deserves high praise.
I have a much better understanding of integralism—a theory I have previously found confusing and hard to wrap my mind around, even as I instinctively have been skeptical and suspicious of it—since reading this book. I am convinced that Catholic integralists fail to understand faith in Christ as an encounter with a Person. Instead, they see Christianity as a tool for power. I think that’s ultimately why I reject it. It’s ultimately unChristian, in my view.
Finally, I was heartened at the end of the book that Field still sees the Great Books as worthy of reading and being taught, and that she believes education as an essential antidote for our divisive age. Field is a generous and just interlocutor, and this book deserves high praise.
January 12, 2026
This book was recommended to me by a professor of law as I was conducting research on illiberalism and Adrian Vermeule's common good constitutionalism. I had understood the theory of it all, but the politics, I was told, was what this book might illuminate. I severely underestimated how important this book would be in uncovering the complexities of the MAGA New Right. One day, this book will become required reading for those who study the challenges of the early twenty-first century.
When people asked me what I was reading, I responded, "a book about intellectualism in the MAGA New Right." Like the other reviews this book has received, many people considered MAGA and intellectualism to be opposites, their union an oxymoron. Furious Minds is an expose in the cogs in the machine of modern illiberalism, racism, misogyny, and neofacism in the MAGA New Right. From horrendous Twitter posts and blog articles to academia and conferences legitimizing a new ideology, Laura Field dissects everything the media does not cover. She gives drops names and explains the hidden origins of Trumpian policy and political thought, and leaves no terrible detail unexplained.
Awe is the word I have for Field's depth of research and attention to fact. Awful is the word I have for the topic of her research and the scenes she describes. Field has done a public service in shining a light on the darkest parts of the political system.
When people asked me what I was reading, I responded, "a book about intellectualism in the MAGA New Right." Like the other reviews this book has received, many people considered MAGA and intellectualism to be opposites, their union an oxymoron. Furious Minds is an expose in the cogs in the machine of modern illiberalism, racism, misogyny, and neofacism in the MAGA New Right. From horrendous Twitter posts and blog articles to academia and conferences legitimizing a new ideology, Laura Field dissects everything the media does not cover. She gives drops names and explains the hidden origins of Trumpian policy and political thought, and leaves no terrible detail unexplained.
Awe is the word I have for Field's depth of research and attention to fact. Awful is the word I have for the topic of her research and the scenes she describes. Field has done a public service in shining a light on the darkest parts of the political system.
December 14, 2025
I know there is a vast quantity of books out there that purport to explain MAGA to the rest of the world. This one is really distinctly valuable. Field's a political philosopher by training, and in particular was educated as a Straussian with some conservative leanings. She knows the intellectual origins of this movement intimately, and her disenchantment with it comes honestly, after a close-up familiarity with the movement's intellectual architects. This book gives a valuable guide of the four flavors of contemporary conservatism. It's not a perfectly analytical distinction (among other things, JD Vance is aligned with all four, which suggests either some overlap or that our Vice-President may be an unprincipled ideological shape-shifter. Who can say?), but she's efficient at guiding you through the intellectual territory. She's rigorous about highlighting the occasional places where thinkers have an argument worth taking seriously, and (far more common) the bad-faith, inconsistent, cherry-picked, or downright repulsive arguments that are the bulk of this work. Her dry humor, occasional and never inappropriate, serves as welcome relief. The book ends with a moral exhortation to a possible future.
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