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France 1940: Defending the Republic
A new perspective on the calamitous fall of France in 1940 and why blame has been misplaced ever since
In this revisionist account of France’s crushing defeat in 1940, a world authority on French history argues that the nation’s downfall has long been misunderstood. Philip Nord assesses France’s diplomatic and military preparations for war with Germany, its conduct of the war once the fighting began, and the political consequences of defeat on the battlefield. He also tracks attitudes among French leaders once defeat seemed a likelihood, identifying who among them took advantage of the nation’s misfortunes to sabotage democratic institutions and plot an authoritarian way forward. Nord finds that the longstanding view that France’s collapse was due to military unpreparedeness and a decadent national character is unsupported by fact.
Instead, he reveals that the Third Republic was no worse prepared and its military failings no less dramatic than those of the United States and other Allies in the early years of the war. What was unique in France was the betrayal by military and political elites who abandoned the Republic and supported the reprehensible Vichy takeover. Why then have historians and politicians ever since interpreted the defeat as a judgment on the nation as a whole? Why has the focus been on the failings of the Third Republic and not on elite betrayal? The author examines these questions in a fascinating conclusion.
In this revisionist account of France’s crushing defeat in 1940, a world authority on French history argues that the nation’s downfall has long been misunderstood. Philip Nord assesses France’s diplomatic and military preparations for war with Germany, its conduct of the war once the fighting began, and the political consequences of defeat on the battlefield. He also tracks attitudes among French leaders once defeat seemed a likelihood, identifying who among them took advantage of the nation’s misfortunes to sabotage democratic institutions and plot an authoritarian way forward. Nord finds that the longstanding view that France’s collapse was due to military unpreparedeness and a decadent national character is unsupported by fact.
Instead, he reveals that the Third Republic was no worse prepared and its military failings no less dramatic than those of the United States and other Allies in the early years of the war. What was unique in France was the betrayal by military and political elites who abandoned the Republic and supported the reprehensible Vichy takeover. Why then have historians and politicians ever since interpreted the defeat as a judgment on the nation as a whole? Why has the focus been on the failings of the Third Republic and not on elite betrayal? The author examines these questions in a fascinating conclusion.
208 pages, Hardcover
Published April 28, 2015
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Displaying 1 - 13 of 13 reviews
May 12, 2016
A short but well-argued refutation of the common perception that the abrupt collapse of French resistance to German invasion in 1940 was due to French decadence. Nord credibly argues that the sudden end of French resistance was prompted, not by a failure on the part of ordinary French soldiers and citizens, but by a betrayal of the French Republic by the military and administrative elites charged with her preservation. That seems to me consistent with the history of the Third Republic from its inception, and that to accept the canard of French decadence is to accept the arguments of those who did not keep faith with the Republic they were sworn to defend
November 13, 2024
"The Soviet Union's strategic unpreparedness and the scale of its initial defeats were far greater than those of France. Yet the Soviets in the end held fast, whereas the French did not. A portion of the credit must go to Stalin himself, the keystone of the Soviet system; although he buckled, he did not break. In the end, though, it was geography that mattered most. The Soviet Union was big enough to cede territory to the Germans equivalent to many Frances and yet still retain adequate room and resources to carry on the fight. The English Channel was Britain's Maginot Line, the Russian steppes the Soviet Union's."
"It was the army command that lost the Battle of France, not civilian error or a disinclination to fight, let alone faults, real or imagined, in French society as a whole." "France's defeat in 1940 was a military phenomenon, not the inevitable expression of some generalized national malaise or moral deficiency."
"What counted most in 1940 was the conduct of the nation's military and administrative elites. They had never much liked the Republic and found in the political crisis consequent on defeat an opportunity to exploit the regime's weaknesses against it, to do it in and replace it with an authoritarian order more to their satisfaction."
"It's impossible not to take a dim view of Reynaud's capitulation. He made disastrous personnel choices, in effect creating a pro-armistice bloc - Pétain, Baudouin, Ybarnégaray, Bouthillier, Provost - that didn't have to exist. From a political point of view, the most disastrous appointment of all was the rancorous, indeed mutinous Weygand as commander of France's armies in the field. And then Reynaud gave in to the pro-armistice faction when may be he did not have to."
"It's not so much that the Third Republic was a rotten regime, but that post-revolutionary France. was saddled with a military establishment that had not made its peace with democratic institutions and would not do so until the 1960s. If there was a flaw in the regime, it lay not in republican political culture but in a military caste as yet inadequately republicanized."
It's easy to see from the above quotations what Nord's thesis is. Although I am no historian, it seems to me that his case is well-argued and I was impressed to learn so much about this well-worn subject in such a short book.
"It was the army command that lost the Battle of France, not civilian error or a disinclination to fight, let alone faults, real or imagined, in French society as a whole." "France's defeat in 1940 was a military phenomenon, not the inevitable expression of some generalized national malaise or moral deficiency."
"What counted most in 1940 was the conduct of the nation's military and administrative elites. They had never much liked the Republic and found in the political crisis consequent on defeat an opportunity to exploit the regime's weaknesses against it, to do it in and replace it with an authoritarian order more to their satisfaction."
"It's impossible not to take a dim view of Reynaud's capitulation. He made disastrous personnel choices, in effect creating a pro-armistice bloc - Pétain, Baudouin, Ybarnégaray, Bouthillier, Provost - that didn't have to exist. From a political point of view, the most disastrous appointment of all was the rancorous, indeed mutinous Weygand as commander of France's armies in the field. And then Reynaud gave in to the pro-armistice faction when may be he did not have to."
"It's not so much that the Third Republic was a rotten regime, but that post-revolutionary France. was saddled with a military establishment that had not made its peace with democratic institutions and would not do so until the 1960s. If there was a flaw in the regime, it lay not in republican political culture but in a military caste as yet inadequately republicanized."
It's easy to see from the above quotations what Nord's thesis is. Although I am no historian, it seems to me that his case is well-argued and I was impressed to learn so much about this well-worn subject in such a short book.
April 16, 2018
This book is a concise review of the conditions that led to the shocking fall of France in 1940. Yet, it is not just a review of the French military situation. The genesis of the embarrassment of 1940 stemmed from many factors in the 1930s, from political divisions to a lack of innovation from the top officers in the French military, to the willingness of several of the leaders in the French military and government to serve in the Vichy regime. Yet, France was not necessarily any different than Britain or America in how they prepared for the war. So many factors played into the defeat in 1940, from the slaughter that sapped French resolve in the First World War to a general lack of inflexibility of the higher French government leadership (military and civilian) to expand their thinking, that no one simple answer can explain 1940. There are so many what ifs, but what ifs are easy to discuss in hindsight. The narrator is solid for this work. Overall, an interest, quick read for anyone who has an interest in why France fell so quickly in 1940.
January 8, 2019
Great expectations from the title and disappointing book. Maybe if the title was formulated differently, it would be more acceptable. My expectations were to have a deep analysis about the battle. It has a good overview (even too long) of France of the period before May 1940, from the standpoint to describe why it happened, which is OK. And after that, the reader expects to have at least the same detailed description of the war, day by day, battle by battle. It is just scratching the surface of the battles and here is the breaking point of my opinion for the book. The 6 weeks war, was basically just mentioned. In this manner, this book is more as an excuse for the France, than to try to have more neutral view of the events and to offer more details. I hope it will be rewritten, with short first part and much better part for the war in France.
September 12, 2019
3-3.5 stars. A good refutation of the common reasons behind France's defeat in 1940. I would have placed further blame on the UK, in particular the unwillingness of Chamberlain and Halifax to support France from the re-occupation of the Rhineland to the Phoney War, and the RAF wasn't nearly as well equipped as Nord seems to suggest (if I recall, the modern fighter squadrons on the Continent were Hurricanes, with the Spitfires retained in the UK, and neither the Fairey Battles nor the Bristol Blenheims necessarily good enough against a better prepared foe).
January 22, 2020
I thought this was a good explanation of the French disaster (and by extension the British too) in 1940. I have read many explanations but this I find most convincing. Nevertheless he still leaves questions. Why was the French elite so inept, particularly the politicians and the military. The whole subject of France's war is too vast for this forum. This book needs to be read in conjunction with a lot of other literature especially the build up to the war.
November 11, 2024
An insightful look into the fall of France in 1940 that does a great job of explaining how and why France was taken over by fascism so quickly. A must read for anyone trying to truly understand the 2nd world war.
August 18, 2021
The blame given to French fascist sympathisers is more convincing than the defense of the republic.
February 12, 2017
An interesting, relatively short treatise on France's defeat in 1940, which seeks to make two broad points. The first that France was relatively well-prepared for war in 1939 and 1940 and therefore her defeat was a reflection of military, rather than political, societal, or moral failure. The second is that what was truly unique about France's collapse in 1940 (relative to the other states that fell to the Nazis) was the response - not a government-in-exile leading the resistance and hoping for liberation, but the Vichy collaboration.
To the first point, Nord makes an able case that France was no less prepared for war than any other state in 1939-40 (including, interestingly, Germany), that she was not poorly armed or defeatist or done in by a fundamentally unsound strategy. Rather, France was done in by pure military incompetence during the campaign itself. Gamelin's Breda plan, the failure to recognize the massing of armor in the Ardennes for what it was (and failure to challenge basic assumptions about what the Germans would do), the failure of aged generals from Gamelin on down to see the opportunities for counterattacks and to seize them with speed and vigor, all are called out. Interestingly, Nord seems to qualify the Doughty thesis of faulty military doctrine, saying little was wrong with French military doctrine, just its execution and poor leadership. (Here here I think he is simply misunderstanding the term doctrine and what it means, because the evidence he cites of overcentralization of command and rigidity in operations - tanks attacking in a line, waiting for artillery, etc. - are all precisely doctrinal questions). But overall, at the very least he shows how empty the claims of lack of preparedness, under-investment, strategic failure (Maginot Line), or moral and societal decadence and decay are. France prepared its army well in materiel terms for war, or at least as well as could be expected; its population was, however begrudgingly, rallying to the flag and prepared to sacrifice; French troops fought bravely and - when well-led and given the opportunity - ably. Overall, the failure to recognize the deeper causes of the military and leadership failures are excusable, given they are based on the minutiae of doctrine and military bureaucratic politics, which I don't think are Nord's strong suit.
The second point, covered in the final third of the book, is the more interesting argument. Nord covers the last month from the armistice in June to the National Assembly vote in July, which granted Petain authoritarian powers and created Vichy as a government truly separate from a now-defunct Third Republic. Nord's conclusion is that the Third Republic, rather than continuing to wage war as a government-in-exile, collapsed because of its enemies, the anti-Republican elites (Petain, Laval, Weygand, and many others), who saw the opportunity to demolish a government they had always been suspicious of or outright detested, and they took it. Nord shows how the Vichy leaders developed the initial "moral decay" reasons for France's collapse, and how all of the parties - the Vichy leaders trying to establish their legitimacy, the Gaullists, and the Maquisards - all eventually had reason to embrace elements of this story, which in reality was simply a cover for the anti-Republican elites doing what they had always yearned to do when given the opportunity.
In sum, a well-argued, though curiously informally written (truly does not come across as a book written by an academic) piece.
To the first point, Nord makes an able case that France was no less prepared for war than any other state in 1939-40 (including, interestingly, Germany), that she was not poorly armed or defeatist or done in by a fundamentally unsound strategy. Rather, France was done in by pure military incompetence during the campaign itself. Gamelin's Breda plan, the failure to recognize the massing of armor in the Ardennes for what it was (and failure to challenge basic assumptions about what the Germans would do), the failure of aged generals from Gamelin on down to see the opportunities for counterattacks and to seize them with speed and vigor, all are called out. Interestingly, Nord seems to qualify the Doughty thesis of faulty military doctrine, saying little was wrong with French military doctrine, just its execution and poor leadership. (Here here I think he is simply misunderstanding the term doctrine and what it means, because the evidence he cites of overcentralization of command and rigidity in operations - tanks attacking in a line, waiting for artillery, etc. - are all precisely doctrinal questions). But overall, at the very least he shows how empty the claims of lack of preparedness, under-investment, strategic failure (Maginot Line), or moral and societal decadence and decay are. France prepared its army well in materiel terms for war, or at least as well as could be expected; its population was, however begrudgingly, rallying to the flag and prepared to sacrifice; French troops fought bravely and - when well-led and given the opportunity - ably. Overall, the failure to recognize the deeper causes of the military and leadership failures are excusable, given they are based on the minutiae of doctrine and military bureaucratic politics, which I don't think are Nord's strong suit.
The second point, covered in the final third of the book, is the more interesting argument. Nord covers the last month from the armistice in June to the National Assembly vote in July, which granted Petain authoritarian powers and created Vichy as a government truly separate from a now-defunct Third Republic. Nord's conclusion is that the Third Republic, rather than continuing to wage war as a government-in-exile, collapsed because of its enemies, the anti-Republican elites (Petain, Laval, Weygand, and many others), who saw the opportunity to demolish a government they had always been suspicious of or outright detested, and they took it. Nord shows how the Vichy leaders developed the initial "moral decay" reasons for France's collapse, and how all of the parties - the Vichy leaders trying to establish their legitimacy, the Gaullists, and the Maquisards - all eventually had reason to embrace elements of this story, which in reality was simply a cover for the anti-Republican elites doing what they had always yearned to do when given the opportunity.
In sum, a well-argued, though curiously informally written (truly does not come across as a book written by an academic) piece.
July 1, 2015
The question Philip Nord poses is a very valid one: Why does history give France such a hard time regarding the build up to World War II and it's subsequent defeat, over those of other allies like Belgium, Britain and the United States? He argues that the general historical opinion that the French were done in by their own decadence is wrong, and that it was more ineptitude on the top military and governmental level. I found many of his arguments very persuasive, particularly that the French are unfairly judged as weak and unwilling to fight the Germans once the war began. Also, I found his statement that the other allies would have done no better at the time persuasive as well. I would recommend this book to anyone who either assumes the French were soft or are curious about this particular moment in WWII history. He will NOT convince those who are determined to hate the French actions up to and during WWII. Vichy France is an ignominious thing and to his credit, Nord makes no attempt to gloss over it.
However, on the ultimate point he is making, he ends up making to many hedged arguments to support it. In the end, it feels like he is just wanting to say "Well, could YOU have done any better?" Also, his defense of the French people was severely lacking, in my opinion. Other than the occasional vague "public opinion" statement, it still feels like the French citizenry rolled over and let it all happen. This is a populace that expertly rises up and riots many times over to make changes. But they didn't do so as the Germans came rolling towards them. Or, at least that is what it seems, and Nord does not do a good enough job to counter that opinion. Hence, 3 stars.
However, on the ultimate point he is making, he ends up making to many hedged arguments to support it. In the end, it feels like he is just wanting to say "Well, could YOU have done any better?" Also, his defense of the French people was severely lacking, in my opinion. Other than the occasional vague "public opinion" statement, it still feels like the French citizenry rolled over and let it all happen. This is a populace that expertly rises up and riots many times over to make changes. But they didn't do so as the Germans came rolling towards them. Or, at least that is what it seems, and Nord does not do a good enough job to counter that opinion. Hence, 3 stars.
July 25, 2015
The title of this book works on two levels. The author explores the efforts of the French Third Republic to defend against Germany in the run up to WWII and the German invasion of 1940. He also, to a great degree, defends the much criticized Republic's efforts. France's efforts to rearm in the '30's were late but no worse than others, and arguably better. French diplomatic efforts to prevent the war were likewise no more inept or unrealistic than others. French soldiers, if not eager for combat, fought hard in most cases. They were hamstringed by a command structure incapable of responding rapidly to German advances and senior officers who failed to understand the new German tactics. And to a considerable degree the Germans benefit from just sheer luck. They gambled repeatedly and won. To compound French problems, there existed an authoritarian faction in the military and political spheres that hated the Republic and, when the time came to decide whether to capitulate to the Germans or to continue fighting, moving the government to North Africa, the authoritarians took the opportunity to destroy the Republic and install a collaborationist government under Petain.
June 10, 2015
This isn't aiming all that high, but it works on it's on terms. It's a very brief overview of what happened with an argument on why it happened.
Sometimes the author presses his arguments a bit too much (like in the first chapter about France's pre-war diplomacy). Also, he could stand to spend more time introducing the main figures. The book reads like it's intended for a general audience - so he can feel free to spend more times letting us know who the main generals and politicians are. As is, the names come at us so fast that it's hard to remember who they all are. At the very least, a glossary of them would be nice. (Hmm... I'm talking myself into lowering this down to three stars).
Sometimes the author presses his arguments a bit too much (like in the first chapter about France's pre-war diplomacy). Also, he could stand to spend more time introducing the main figures. The book reads like it's intended for a general audience - so he can feel free to spend more times letting us know who the main generals and politicians are. As is, the names come at us so fast that it's hard to remember who they all are. At the very least, a glossary of them would be nice. (Hmm... I'm talking myself into lowering this down to three stars).
to-read-tier-2
August 29, 2015tantor audiobook from may 2015
Displaying 1 - 13 of 13 reviews