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Value Grounded on Attitudes - Subjectivism in Value Theory
Does subjectivism in value theory - the view that value is grounded on attitudes - imply that when we think and talk about what is good and bad we must necessarily be thinking and talking about our desires and other attitudes? * Does value subjectivism entail that evaluative utterances are reports or expressions of the speaker"s attitude? * Are subjectivists committed to an axiology according to which only preference satisfaction is valuable for its own sake? * Are subjectivists disqualified from
talking about intrinsic value? * Is it a consequence of subjectivism that if we had different attitudes than those that we in fact have different things would be valuable? * Is subjectivism a view on which things can be good or bad only by being good or bad for particular people? * Are subjectivists committed to objectionable forms of relativism or egoism? * Is every form of idealization of attitudes in tension with the spirit of subjectivism? * Is subjectivism a bleak view on which nothing matters?
In Value Grounded on Attitudes - Subjectivism in Value Theory, Fritz-Anton Fritzson defends subjectivist views against some common objections and offers a sympathetic formulation of value subjectivism.
talking about intrinsic value? * Is it a consequence of subjectivism that if we had different attitudes than those that we in fact have different things would be valuable? * Is subjectivism a view on which things can be good or bad only by being good or bad for particular people? * Are subjectivists committed to objectionable forms of relativism or egoism? * Is every form of idealization of attitudes in tension with the spirit of subjectivism? * Is subjectivism a bleak view on which nothing matters?
In Value Grounded on Attitudes - Subjectivism in Value Theory, Fritz-Anton Fritzson defends subjectivist views against some common objections and offers a sympathetic formulation of value subjectivism.
228 pages, Hardcover
First published August 19, 2014
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July 29, 2019
Is the perennial controversy between subjectivist and objectivist theories of value ultimately nothing but a mere verbal dispute, of the kind that should not be of interest to philosophically-minded individuals? Fritz-Anton Fritzson thinks not and wants you to join him in resisting this pessimistic conclusion. In the course of his investigation, he offers many valuable insights on the nature and implications of subjectivism about value. As subjectivism is a view that is all too often prematurely dismissed after discussions of its most naive forms, these insights merit the attention of proponents and detractors alike.
Fritzson’s project is in a sense rather modest. Though he deals with several objections to value subjectivism, he does not attempt a comprehensive defense of it. Rather, his work can be seen as doing some necessary groundwork for such a defense by pinpointing the essential theoretical difference between a subjectivist theory and its objectivist rival. But such modesty is not to be mistaken for unimportance. It is scarcely unimportant to know what it is that we are disagreeing about! And, as Bastiat noted, the worst thing for a cause is not to be skillfully attacked, but ineptly defended. Subjectivists who are unaware of Fritzson’s observations are bound to provide just such a defense of their theory.
The crux of the disagreement between subjectivist and objectivist accounts is to be found in their respective analyses of the nature of value or the constitution of value. Specifically, Fritzon identifies the distinctive subjectivist claim as the claim that values are grounded on attitudes of subjects (just which subjects and just which attitudes are questions that are treated at considerable length in the book, as well as the question of the “realness” of values that are so grounded). Put another way, the subjectivist can be thought of as being committed to the rejection of values in the third-person, impersonal perspective, (“from the point of view of the universe” or, basically, from the point of view of no one), whereas the objectivist seeks (and thinks he can find) such impersonal values.
A distinction between first order and second order views is crucially important to Fritzson’s project and should be kept in mind by the reader. Roughly speaking, first order views are views about the way things are in certain concrete cases. They may tell us, for example, that a painting by Klimt actually is beautiful, that knowledge or artistic expression actually are good, or even that there is ultimately only one value like happiness (axiological monism) or several distinct values like happiness, liberty, knowledge, etc. (axiological pluralism). Second order views, by contrast, try to tell us what value is and what it means for something to be valuable, without necessarily telling us anything about what values there actually are. To use an analogy with soccer, first order views are in the business of telling us what specific formation the coach should go with in today’s match, whereas second order views are in the business of telling us what a formation is. There is absolutely no reason to expect subjectivists and objectivists to differ in their first order views.
Fritzson is engaged in a project of the second order kind. But his theory is to be fundamentally distinguished from certain others endeavors of the second order kind, too. For example, a theory about the meaning of moral utterances such as “good” and “bad” is a second order theory. The two traditional camps are the cognitivists, who think that moral utterances aim at stating facts, and the non-cognitivists, who assign various non fact-stating roles to moral utterances. A subjectivist (or an objectivist) in Fritzson’s sense is not necessarily committed to any particular view here. A specific view about phenomenology - another subject matter of second order theories, dealing with the way we experience value, how value appears to us - is likewise not entailed by Fritzson’s theory, and subjectivists and objectivists may well be in complete agreement in that area.
Strict entailment is of course not the only kind of possible relation, and Fritzson does discuss how considerations raised by his analysis of subjectivism, perhaps coupled with some facts about the world around us, might make certain theories in other realms more or less broadly hospitable to a subjectivist account.
All in all, this work is packed with wonderful explanations of where the conflict between subjectivist and objectivist accounts of value really lies, as well as great discussions of intrinsic and final value, value bearers, subjects in moral theory, and the general views of traditionally important thinkers like Hobbes and Hume and more modern figures like David Gauthier, Wlodek Rabinowicz, Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, Jan Österberg, Richard Joyce, and the late John Mackie. Worth a read!
Fritzson’s project is in a sense rather modest. Though he deals with several objections to value subjectivism, he does not attempt a comprehensive defense of it. Rather, his work can be seen as doing some necessary groundwork for such a defense by pinpointing the essential theoretical difference between a subjectivist theory and its objectivist rival. But such modesty is not to be mistaken for unimportance. It is scarcely unimportant to know what it is that we are disagreeing about! And, as Bastiat noted, the worst thing for a cause is not to be skillfully attacked, but ineptly defended. Subjectivists who are unaware of Fritzson’s observations are bound to provide just such a defense of their theory.
The crux of the disagreement between subjectivist and objectivist accounts is to be found in their respective analyses of the nature of value or the constitution of value. Specifically, Fritzon identifies the distinctive subjectivist claim as the claim that values are grounded on attitudes of subjects (just which subjects and just which attitudes are questions that are treated at considerable length in the book, as well as the question of the “realness” of values that are so grounded). Put another way, the subjectivist can be thought of as being committed to the rejection of values in the third-person, impersonal perspective, (“from the point of view of the universe” or, basically, from the point of view of no one), whereas the objectivist seeks (and thinks he can find) such impersonal values.
A distinction between first order and second order views is crucially important to Fritzson’s project and should be kept in mind by the reader. Roughly speaking, first order views are views about the way things are in certain concrete cases. They may tell us, for example, that a painting by Klimt actually is beautiful, that knowledge or artistic expression actually are good, or even that there is ultimately only one value like happiness (axiological monism) or several distinct values like happiness, liberty, knowledge, etc. (axiological pluralism). Second order views, by contrast, try to tell us what value is and what it means for something to be valuable, without necessarily telling us anything about what values there actually are. To use an analogy with soccer, first order views are in the business of telling us what specific formation the coach should go with in today’s match, whereas second order views are in the business of telling us what a formation is. There is absolutely no reason to expect subjectivists and objectivists to differ in their first order views.
Fritzson is engaged in a project of the second order kind. But his theory is to be fundamentally distinguished from certain others endeavors of the second order kind, too. For example, a theory about the meaning of moral utterances such as “good” and “bad” is a second order theory. The two traditional camps are the cognitivists, who think that moral utterances aim at stating facts, and the non-cognitivists, who assign various non fact-stating roles to moral utterances. A subjectivist (or an objectivist) in Fritzson’s sense is not necessarily committed to any particular view here. A specific view about phenomenology - another subject matter of second order theories, dealing with the way we experience value, how value appears to us - is likewise not entailed by Fritzson’s theory, and subjectivists and objectivists may well be in complete agreement in that area.
Strict entailment is of course not the only kind of possible relation, and Fritzson does discuss how considerations raised by his analysis of subjectivism, perhaps coupled with some facts about the world around us, might make certain theories in other realms more or less broadly hospitable to a subjectivist account.
All in all, this work is packed with wonderful explanations of where the conflict between subjectivist and objectivist accounts of value really lies, as well as great discussions of intrinsic and final value, value bearers, subjects in moral theory, and the general views of traditionally important thinkers like Hobbes and Hume and more modern figures like David Gauthier, Wlodek Rabinowicz, Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, Jan Österberg, Richard Joyce, and the late John Mackie. Worth a read!
Displaying 1 of 1 review