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Potsdam: The End of World War II and the Remaking of Europe
The definitive account of the 1945 Potsdam the historic summit where Truman, Stalin, and Churchill met to determine the fate of post-World War II Europe
After Germany's defeat in World War II, Europe lay in tatters. Millions of refugees were dispersed across the continent. Food and fuel were scarce. Britain was bankrupt, while Germany had been reduced to rubble. In July of 1945, Harry Truman, Winston Churchill, and Joseph Stalin gathered in a quiet suburb of Berlin to negotiate a lasting a peace that would finally put an end to the conflagration that had started in 1914, a peace under which Europe could be rebuilt.
The award-winning historian Michael Neiberg brings the turbulent Potsdam conference to life, vividly capturing the delegates' Truman, trying to escape from the shadow of Franklin Roosevelt, who had died only months before; Churchill, bombastic and seemingly out of touch; Stalin, cunning and meticulous. For the first week, negotiations progressed relatively smoothly. But when the delegates took a recess for the British elections, Churchill was replaced-both as prime minster and as Britain's representative at the conference-in an unforeseen upset by Clement Attlee, a man Churchill disparagingly described as "a sheep in sheep's clothing." When the conference reconvened, the power dynamic had shifted dramatically, and the delegates struggled to find a new balance. Stalin took advantage of his strong position to demand control of Eastern Europe as recompense for the suffering experienced by the Soviet people and armies. The final resolutions of the Potsdam Conference, notably the division of Germany and the Soviet annexation of Poland, reflected the uneasy geopolitical equilibrium between East and West that would come to dominate the twentieth century.
As Neiberg expertly shows, the delegates arrived at Potsdam determined to learn from the mistakes their predecessors made in the Treaty of Versailles. But, riven by tensions and dramatic debates over how to end the most recent war, they only dimly understood that their discussions of peace were giving birth to a new global conflict.
After Germany's defeat in World War II, Europe lay in tatters. Millions of refugees were dispersed across the continent. Food and fuel were scarce. Britain was bankrupt, while Germany had been reduced to rubble. In July of 1945, Harry Truman, Winston Churchill, and Joseph Stalin gathered in a quiet suburb of Berlin to negotiate a lasting a peace that would finally put an end to the conflagration that had started in 1914, a peace under which Europe could be rebuilt.
The award-winning historian Michael Neiberg brings the turbulent Potsdam conference to life, vividly capturing the delegates' Truman, trying to escape from the shadow of Franklin Roosevelt, who had died only months before; Churchill, bombastic and seemingly out of touch; Stalin, cunning and meticulous. For the first week, negotiations progressed relatively smoothly. But when the delegates took a recess for the British elections, Churchill was replaced-both as prime minster and as Britain's representative at the conference-in an unforeseen upset by Clement Attlee, a man Churchill disparagingly described as "a sheep in sheep's clothing." When the conference reconvened, the power dynamic had shifted dramatically, and the delegates struggled to find a new balance. Stalin took advantage of his strong position to demand control of Eastern Europe as recompense for the suffering experienced by the Soviet people and armies. The final resolutions of the Potsdam Conference, notably the division of Germany and the Soviet annexation of Poland, reflected the uneasy geopolitical equilibrium between East and West that would come to dominate the twentieth century.
As Neiberg expertly shows, the delegates arrived at Potsdam determined to learn from the mistakes their predecessors made in the Treaty of Versailles. But, riven by tensions and dramatic debates over how to end the most recent war, they only dimly understood that their discussions of peace were giving birth to a new global conflict.
336 pages, Hardcover
First published May 5, 2015
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868 people want to read
About the author
Michael S. Neiberg
36 books55 followersMichael S. Neiberg is the Stimson Chair of the Department of National Security and Strategy at the US Army War College. He has also taught at the U.S. Air Force Academy and the University of Southern Mississippi.
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March 16, 2021
To the victors go the spoils.
Near the end of world war II, with Germany defeated and Japan near capitulation, leaders from United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union met in a pleasant, mostly unmolested suburb of Berlin to discuss what Europe and the world would look like after the last bombs fell.
Historian Michael S. Neiberg stated about his 2015 account, that it would not be a line-item story about who said what when, but rather an exploration of this time when the prevailing powers sought to form a lasting peace following the calamitous war.
Central to this understanding was the idea that there had not really been two world wars, but a conflict that began fomenting in the early 1900s, escalated into confrontation in 1915, de-escalated in 1919, and then simmered into violent rage in the late 30s. The meeting at Potsdam sought to avoid the pitfalls and mistakes made by the agreements of Versailles in 1919.
Noteworthy to Potsdam was that Roosevelt, the American president for an unprecedented twelve years and a global leader, had just died and his successor, Harry Truman, was a relatively untested and unprepared statesman who only a few months earlier had been a senator from Missouri. Likewise, Winston Churchill attended the first half of the conference as the British Prime Minister but was then ousted and replaced by Clement Atlee. Joseph Stalin described by Neiberg as a cagey and well-prepared negotiator led a group of Soviet statesmen who used every element of the meeting to Russian advantage.
Ambitious and well written, this is told with personality and with empathy to both the men who participated in the summit and the larger global impact that would be produced.
Near the end of world war II, with Germany defeated and Japan near capitulation, leaders from United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union met in a pleasant, mostly unmolested suburb of Berlin to discuss what Europe and the world would look like after the last bombs fell.
Historian Michael S. Neiberg stated about his 2015 account, that it would not be a line-item story about who said what when, but rather an exploration of this time when the prevailing powers sought to form a lasting peace following the calamitous war.
Central to this understanding was the idea that there had not really been two world wars, but a conflict that began fomenting in the early 1900s, escalated into confrontation in 1915, de-escalated in 1919, and then simmered into violent rage in the late 30s. The meeting at Potsdam sought to avoid the pitfalls and mistakes made by the agreements of Versailles in 1919.
Noteworthy to Potsdam was that Roosevelt, the American president for an unprecedented twelve years and a global leader, had just died and his successor, Harry Truman, was a relatively untested and unprepared statesman who only a few months earlier had been a senator from Missouri. Likewise, Winston Churchill attended the first half of the conference as the British Prime Minister but was then ousted and replaced by Clement Atlee. Joseph Stalin described by Neiberg as a cagey and well-prepared negotiator led a group of Soviet statesmen who used every element of the meeting to Russian advantage.
Ambitious and well written, this is told with personality and with empathy to both the men who participated in the summit and the larger global impact that would be produced.
December 20, 2020
Michael S. Neiberg's "Potsdam" is an incredible detailed, yet readable account of what is one of the most important meetings of modern world history. Highly worth the read. Five out of Five stars for sure.
November 16, 2020
Michael Neiberg's book is a fascinating history of the Potsdam Conference, which goes far beyond simply recounting what the statesmen at Potsdam said to one another during the conference meetings. Rather, it uses the meeting to explore larger themes.
For instance, argues the author, Potsdam was not the start of a new era of history, but the end of another. In the minds of the men who met in Potsdam in July 1945 "to put the pieces of the world back together," the war that ended in 1945 had begun in 1914, not in 1939. British Foreign Secretary Sir Anthony Eden spoke not of two separate world wars, but one Thirty Years’ War. "The delegates at Potsdam lived with ghosts that haunted the Cecilienhof Palace in the picturesque neighborhood where the meeting took place," writes Neiberg. The palace, built during World War I as a retreat for the German crown prince and his wife, served as a living reminder of the failures of statesmen at the end of that war: the Germans, so convinced of their imminent victory, built the palace while simultaneously devoting enormous resources to fighting a world war.
Yet, the "ghosts" of the Cecilienhof Palace "paled in their power to haunt compared with the ghosts of the Palace of Versailles," continues Neiberg. Everyone at Potsdam saw the Versailles Treaty as a horrible warning from history of the failures of making peace. They all believed that the mistakes of 1919 had directly led to the outbreak of war twenty years later. While the American president, Harry Truman, greatly admired one of the architects of that treaty, Woodrow Wilson – he had even taken his oath of office under a portrait of Wilson – he, nevertheless, saw the treaty as Wilson’s greatest failure. He opened the Potsdam Conference by reminding his fellow statesmen of the “many flaws” that the treaty had produced and warned the delegates to learn from that experience or risk repeating it. No one at Potsdam disagreed with Truman on that score.
The task in front of the three allied leaders and their staffs was nothing less than giving Europe peace and stability, something it had not known since the catastrophic 1914. According to Neiberg, all three men, as well as their advisers, had had their worldviews formed during WWI. For Stalin, the Russian Revolution and the bloody Russian Civil War further proved that the transition from war to peace could present as many challenges as warfare itself. If the Big Three of Potsdam failed as their predecessors in Versailles had, then Europe would know not a future of peace but another age of strife, death, and more war.
The three men had different postwar visions, based on the strategic interests and historical experiences of their nations in the first half of the twentieth century, which had seen revolutionary changes. World War I had eliminated the most powerful monarchies of Europe and "left in their wake a struggle between democracy, fascism, and communism to control the political and economic future of the continent." World War II destroyed fascism, as well as such traditional powers as Germany, Italy, and France. Even Britain, nominally one of the war’s great victors, sat on the edge of bankruptcy and at dire risk of losing the empire that had sustained its great-power status. In place of the traditional powers of Europe now came the United States and the Soviet Union. The former had largely turned away from Europe in 1919 and might still do so again in 1945. The latter, a revolutionary regime "fresh from a bloody but triumphal victory", presented a terrible nightmare to some and an alluring future to others. In either case, the future of Europe no longer belonged exclusively, or even primarily, to Western Europeans themselves, concludes Neiberg.
The Western statesmen at Potsdam did all they could to dissociate their conference from the "unmitigated disaster" they all saw when they looked back at 1919, explains Neiberg. That they had gathered to negotiate an end to a catastrophic world war was proof enough of the futility of the Treaty of Versailles. Everyone, it seemed, brought his own criticism of the treaty, and the process that produced it, to Potsdam. To some, the problem was the process itself: the treaty had emerged from "a series of awkward compromises, trade-offs, and misunderstandings". Thus, explains Neiberg, many of the statesmen in 1945 came to the conference wanting it not to produce a definitive treaty with specific policies for which they or their successors might later have to answer, but rather to be a symbol to the world that the Big Three stood together and would work in unison to produce a more just and peaceful future.
Yet an old "ghost" haunted Potsdam – the ghost of the appeasement of the 1938 Munich conference. Many American and British diplomats had already begun to see in Soviet behavior, especially the USSR’s "highly selective" implementation of the agreements made at the Yalta Conference of February 1945, echoes of Germany’s aggressive behavior in the 1930s. The Munich example carried with it a powerful reminder of the costs of appeasement, and implied that the Americans and British should use a firmer hand in their initial postwar dealings with the Russians.
Whether or not the "ghosts" remained relevant to the problems the world faced in 1945, no one at Potsdam could avoid them, argues the author. They reminded the delegates of the cataclysmic failures of the men who had gone before them. "Virtually every decision the statesmen of 1945 made they made through the prism of events like the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and the appeasement symbolized by the Munich Agreement of 1938," asserts Neiberg.
And these events did not come from a distant past. Unlike the men of 1919, everyone seated around the conference tables at Potsdam had personally watched the murderous events of 1914–1939 unfold. Some had even played key roles in them. Winston Churchill, for example, had staunchly opposed his own government’s appeasement policy in the late 1930s, as had others in the British delegation at Potsdam. To them, especially, the "ghosts" of Munich and an expansive Bolshevik Russia haunted the halls of Potsdam.
As Michael Neiberg further reveals, the Potsdam conference was also a "fascinating laboratory" of sorts. When Franklin Delano Roosevelt died in April 1945, he left "an enormous void in American policy," argues Neiberg. Roosevelt had conducted most of the key elements of American wartime diplomacy himself, often shutting out his new vice president, Harry Truman, who badly needed as much help as FDR could have given him. While Roosevelt had a vast reservoir of knowledge and, much more importantly, the deep respect of statesmen across the globe, the newbie Truman, "worried even those observers who came to like and respect him." Admiral William Leahy, who accompanied him to Potsdam and assumed much of the responsibility for helping him there, thought Truman so unprepared for his new role that he could not “see how the complicated critical business of the war and the peace can be carried forward by a new President who is so completely inexperienced in international affairs.”
The British government went through a similar process: British elections, with results tabulated in the middle of the Potsdam Conference, stunningly voted Winston Churchill’s Conservative Party out of office in favor of the opposition Labour Party. Like FDR, Churchill had a deep understanding of many of the key issues and enjoyed a reputation as one of the most powerful and influential men in the world, explains Neiberg. His departure mid-conference left the far less imposing Clement Attlee, who had served as Churchill’s deputy prime minister in a coalition government but had rarely been involved in key strategic decisions, to wade through. Churchill liked to deride Attlee with characteristically witty insults, such as calling him a “sheep in sheep’s clothing.” Attlee, like Truman, came to Potsdam with far less of a profile on foreign affairs than his illustrious predecessor, having made his name as an advocate of the poor and working classes. "Attlee’s slogan, 'With cake for none until all have bread,' could not have sounded less Churchillian," comments the author.
Yet, writes Neiberg further, for all these fundamental changes in personality, the policies of the Americans and the British changed remarkably little. Neither Truman nor Attlee made radical changes to their country’s main positions. According to Neiberg, this continuity in policy only underscores the role that history plays in the shaping of policy – Truman, Attlee, and the other members of the delegations at Potsdam all shared the same "nightmares" of their generation: World War I, the failed Treaty of Versailles, the Great Depression, the rise of fascism, and the outbreak of World War II.
While the Soviet Union did not go through a similar transition at the top, Stalin’s paranoia and his concern about not only his own hold on power, but his own mortality as well, made the Russians "the hardest element to read at Potsdam because of the opaqueness of the Russian system even today and the high level of paranoia within the system itself," explains the author.
Neiberg makes no attempt to assess winners and losers at Potsdam; nor does he assign credit or blame for any events that later resulted from it. Rather, he seeks to explain the conference by placing it in the context not just of 1945, but of the entire period of war and conflict from 1914 to 1945.
Potsdam: The End of World War II and the Remaking of Europe is an outstanding work, so comprehensive, masterfully written, and insightful that I cannot summarize it properly in a review. From fascinating peeks into the personalities of each of the Big Three (“There was no waste of word, gesture, nor mannerism. It was like talking to a perfectly coordinated machine," Harry Hopkins noted of Stalin, who had spent countless hours strategizing for the upcoming meeting at Potsdam despite the fatigue that had set in after four years of war, and had ordered the preparation of psychological profiles of Churchill and Truman in order to, just like in Yalta, be the best prepared.) to diplomatic blunders that worsened the relations with the USSR (such as Truman's disastrous pre-Potsdam meeting with Molotov that convinced the latter the era of cooperation with the West had ended) to sketches of each of the three great powers' post-war policies, Michael Neiberg's work is highly impressive in style and research and unique in approach to the subject, as well as interspersed with many valuable photographs.
Words cannot describe how absorbed I was in this book – it is one of the easiest five stars I've given this year. Most definitely recommendable.
For instance, argues the author, Potsdam was not the start of a new era of history, but the end of another. In the minds of the men who met in Potsdam in July 1945 "to put the pieces of the world back together," the war that ended in 1945 had begun in 1914, not in 1939. British Foreign Secretary Sir Anthony Eden spoke not of two separate world wars, but one Thirty Years’ War. "The delegates at Potsdam lived with ghosts that haunted the Cecilienhof Palace in the picturesque neighborhood where the meeting took place," writes Neiberg. The palace, built during World War I as a retreat for the German crown prince and his wife, served as a living reminder of the failures of statesmen at the end of that war: the Germans, so convinced of their imminent victory, built the palace while simultaneously devoting enormous resources to fighting a world war.
Yet, the "ghosts" of the Cecilienhof Palace "paled in their power to haunt compared with the ghosts of the Palace of Versailles," continues Neiberg. Everyone at Potsdam saw the Versailles Treaty as a horrible warning from history of the failures of making peace. They all believed that the mistakes of 1919 had directly led to the outbreak of war twenty years later. While the American president, Harry Truman, greatly admired one of the architects of that treaty, Woodrow Wilson – he had even taken his oath of office under a portrait of Wilson – he, nevertheless, saw the treaty as Wilson’s greatest failure. He opened the Potsdam Conference by reminding his fellow statesmen of the “many flaws” that the treaty had produced and warned the delegates to learn from that experience or risk repeating it. No one at Potsdam disagreed with Truman on that score.
The task in front of the three allied leaders and their staffs was nothing less than giving Europe peace and stability, something it had not known since the catastrophic 1914. According to Neiberg, all three men, as well as their advisers, had had their worldviews formed during WWI. For Stalin, the Russian Revolution and the bloody Russian Civil War further proved that the transition from war to peace could present as many challenges as warfare itself. If the Big Three of Potsdam failed as their predecessors in Versailles had, then Europe would know not a future of peace but another age of strife, death, and more war.
The three men had different postwar visions, based on the strategic interests and historical experiences of their nations in the first half of the twentieth century, which had seen revolutionary changes. World War I had eliminated the most powerful monarchies of Europe and "left in their wake a struggle between democracy, fascism, and communism to control the political and economic future of the continent." World War II destroyed fascism, as well as such traditional powers as Germany, Italy, and France. Even Britain, nominally one of the war’s great victors, sat on the edge of bankruptcy and at dire risk of losing the empire that had sustained its great-power status. In place of the traditional powers of Europe now came the United States and the Soviet Union. The former had largely turned away from Europe in 1919 and might still do so again in 1945. The latter, a revolutionary regime "fresh from a bloody but triumphal victory", presented a terrible nightmare to some and an alluring future to others. In either case, the future of Europe no longer belonged exclusively, or even primarily, to Western Europeans themselves, concludes Neiberg.
The Western statesmen at Potsdam did all they could to dissociate their conference from the "unmitigated disaster" they all saw when they looked back at 1919, explains Neiberg. That they had gathered to negotiate an end to a catastrophic world war was proof enough of the futility of the Treaty of Versailles. Everyone, it seemed, brought his own criticism of the treaty, and the process that produced it, to Potsdam. To some, the problem was the process itself: the treaty had emerged from "a series of awkward compromises, trade-offs, and misunderstandings". Thus, explains Neiberg, many of the statesmen in 1945 came to the conference wanting it not to produce a definitive treaty with specific policies for which they or their successors might later have to answer, but rather to be a symbol to the world that the Big Three stood together and would work in unison to produce a more just and peaceful future.
Yet an old "ghost" haunted Potsdam – the ghost of the appeasement of the 1938 Munich conference. Many American and British diplomats had already begun to see in Soviet behavior, especially the USSR’s "highly selective" implementation of the agreements made at the Yalta Conference of February 1945, echoes of Germany’s aggressive behavior in the 1930s. The Munich example carried with it a powerful reminder of the costs of appeasement, and implied that the Americans and British should use a firmer hand in their initial postwar dealings with the Russians.
Whether or not the "ghosts" remained relevant to the problems the world faced in 1945, no one at Potsdam could avoid them, argues the author. They reminded the delegates of the cataclysmic failures of the men who had gone before them. "Virtually every decision the statesmen of 1945 made they made through the prism of events like the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and the appeasement symbolized by the Munich Agreement of 1938," asserts Neiberg.
And these events did not come from a distant past. Unlike the men of 1919, everyone seated around the conference tables at Potsdam had personally watched the murderous events of 1914–1939 unfold. Some had even played key roles in them. Winston Churchill, for example, had staunchly opposed his own government’s appeasement policy in the late 1930s, as had others in the British delegation at Potsdam. To them, especially, the "ghosts" of Munich and an expansive Bolshevik Russia haunted the halls of Potsdam.
As Michael Neiberg further reveals, the Potsdam conference was also a "fascinating laboratory" of sorts. When Franklin Delano Roosevelt died in April 1945, he left "an enormous void in American policy," argues Neiberg. Roosevelt had conducted most of the key elements of American wartime diplomacy himself, often shutting out his new vice president, Harry Truman, who badly needed as much help as FDR could have given him. While Roosevelt had a vast reservoir of knowledge and, much more importantly, the deep respect of statesmen across the globe, the newbie Truman, "worried even those observers who came to like and respect him." Admiral William Leahy, who accompanied him to Potsdam and assumed much of the responsibility for helping him there, thought Truman so unprepared for his new role that he could not “see how the complicated critical business of the war and the peace can be carried forward by a new President who is so completely inexperienced in international affairs.”
The British government went through a similar process: British elections, with results tabulated in the middle of the Potsdam Conference, stunningly voted Winston Churchill’s Conservative Party out of office in favor of the opposition Labour Party. Like FDR, Churchill had a deep understanding of many of the key issues and enjoyed a reputation as one of the most powerful and influential men in the world, explains Neiberg. His departure mid-conference left the far less imposing Clement Attlee, who had served as Churchill’s deputy prime minister in a coalition government but had rarely been involved in key strategic decisions, to wade through. Churchill liked to deride Attlee with characteristically witty insults, such as calling him a “sheep in sheep’s clothing.” Attlee, like Truman, came to Potsdam with far less of a profile on foreign affairs than his illustrious predecessor, having made his name as an advocate of the poor and working classes. "Attlee’s slogan, 'With cake for none until all have bread,' could not have sounded less Churchillian," comments the author.
Yet, writes Neiberg further, for all these fundamental changes in personality, the policies of the Americans and the British changed remarkably little. Neither Truman nor Attlee made radical changes to their country’s main positions. According to Neiberg, this continuity in policy only underscores the role that history plays in the shaping of policy – Truman, Attlee, and the other members of the delegations at Potsdam all shared the same "nightmares" of their generation: World War I, the failed Treaty of Versailles, the Great Depression, the rise of fascism, and the outbreak of World War II.
While the Soviet Union did not go through a similar transition at the top, Stalin’s paranoia and his concern about not only his own hold on power, but his own mortality as well, made the Russians "the hardest element to read at Potsdam because of the opaqueness of the Russian system even today and the high level of paranoia within the system itself," explains the author.
Neiberg makes no attempt to assess winners and losers at Potsdam; nor does he assign credit or blame for any events that later resulted from it. Rather, he seeks to explain the conference by placing it in the context not just of 1945, but of the entire period of war and conflict from 1914 to 1945.
Potsdam: The End of World War II and the Remaking of Europe is an outstanding work, so comprehensive, masterfully written, and insightful that I cannot summarize it properly in a review. From fascinating peeks into the personalities of each of the Big Three (“There was no waste of word, gesture, nor mannerism. It was like talking to a perfectly coordinated machine," Harry Hopkins noted of Stalin, who had spent countless hours strategizing for the upcoming meeting at Potsdam despite the fatigue that had set in after four years of war, and had ordered the preparation of psychological profiles of Churchill and Truman in order to, just like in Yalta, be the best prepared.) to diplomatic blunders that worsened the relations with the USSR (such as Truman's disastrous pre-Potsdam meeting with Molotov that convinced the latter the era of cooperation with the West had ended) to sketches of each of the three great powers' post-war policies, Michael Neiberg's work is highly impressive in style and research and unique in approach to the subject, as well as interspersed with many valuable photographs.
Words cannot describe how absorbed I was in this book – it is one of the easiest five stars I've given this year. Most definitely recommendable.
November 20, 2017
Neiberg's book on the Potsdam Conference not only describes the decisions that were made at this meeting after the war in Europe had ended, but also goes into detail about the mindset that each of the Big Three delegates had coming into the conference. Truman, Stalin, Churchill and Atlee had all experienced WWI and none wanted to repeat the mistakes of the Versailles Treaty of 1919. Neiberg frames the conference as an end to the 1914 thru 1945 time period rather than as an end to WWII in Europe. Very enlightening book - highly recommended for those interested in WWI and WWII.
February 10, 2015
An excellent read. I wish more history books were written this well. What I especially noted was the lack of criticism based on future events. By relying on diaries and memo's, and other paperwork from the time, we get a picture of what the leaders were trying to avoid, such as another repeat of the disastrous Versailles treaty. And that they still saw the USSR as an ally, not as the cold war adversary it would/was/had already become. If you are at all interested in WW@, I would say that this is essential reading.
September 3, 2015
Must be me: I'm not captured. Seems to be going over old ground for anyone who has read Bloodlands. And although a clear writer, he's hardly thrilling.
Ok, second half was better. The key point is that Potsdam now is viewed only retrospectively. In 1945, most participants thought the conference a success--primarily because it avoided the mistakes of Versailles.
"[T]he fundamental importance of the Potsdam Conference [was] it did solve the central problems of the 1914-1945 period as the leaders of 1945 understood them. Those issues, notably Franco-German relations, the ethnic makeup of Eastern Europe, the borders of Poland, and the role of Germany in the new Europe, did not drive the problems that came after 1945. The dynamic of the Cold War--with its bipolarity, the role of superpower-based alliance systems, and the concomitant decolonization of Africa and Asia--still carried legacies of the 1914-1935 period, of course, but they sprang from an essentially different dynamic."
Ok, second half was better. The key point is that Potsdam now is viewed only retrospectively. In 1945, most participants thought the conference a success--primarily because it avoided the mistakes of Versailles.
"[T]he fundamental importance of the Potsdam Conference [was] it did solve the central problems of the 1914-1945 period as the leaders of 1945 understood them. Those issues, notably Franco-German relations, the ethnic makeup of Eastern Europe, the borders of Poland, and the role of Germany in the new Europe, did not drive the problems that came after 1945. The dynamic of the Cold War--with its bipolarity, the role of superpower-based alliance systems, and the concomitant decolonization of Africa and Asia--still carried legacies of the 1914-1935 period, of course, but they sprang from an essentially different dynamic."
March 11, 2019
A wonderful survey of the Potsdam Conference, not in a standard day by day account, but done in the shadow of the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. Mr. Neiberg chronicles the conference in a way that doesn't just say what happens, but also explains why the decisions were made and how it affected both the past and the present. I feel that he took a lot of time to write this because of not only explaining what happened, but also having to reflect on not only the past but the future too. He does a good job too in avoiding a clear bias for one side or the other, focusing on showing the causes and effects on what decisions were made at the conference. Overall a great read.
July 16, 2021
I should have read this book years ago; however, "when the student is ready, the teacher will appear". The setting of this book took place a year before I was born, so I have lived in its shadow ever since. The Potsdam Conference took place in Potsdam, Germany, a suburb of Berlin, and involved The Big Three, the United States, Britain and Russia. The conference was to plan for rebuilding Europe and redrawing European boundaries in anticipation of the end of WWII. Ironically the players shifted during this short period. The only leader to last from the first to the end was Joseph Stalin. Franklin Roosevelt died in office and was succeeded by vice president Harry Truman. Winston Churchill was voted out of office during the conference and was succeeded by Clement Attlee. The Russians were mystified at how the leaders who had prosecuted the war could be so easily replaced. It is a credit to democracy. The book is not boring or hard to read. It lends great insight into how negotiations take place at a summit. Despite the world tensions of the last 75 years, the Potsdam Conference must be viewed as a success. First, the goal was to avert WWIII, which has been accomplished. The second goal was not to repeat the disastrous Treaty of Versailles, which had been made just 26 years earlier. The United States was still at war with Japan and hoping to gain Russia's support in prosecuting that war. That was proven not to be needed. While President Truman was sailing home to the United States aboard the USS Augusta, he received a radio report that the atomic bomb had dropped on Hiroshima.
August 4, 2025
The woke left can’t stop me from finding Stalin’s antics hilarious.
August 5, 2021
The Potsdam Conference was a pivotal moment in the shaping of the post-World War Two environment. The meeting between England, the Soviet Union, and the United States (the so-called Big Three) in the German town of Potsdam provided high stakes and ample dramatical grist for author Michael S. Neiberg to elaborate on.
Neiberg’s book orbited around Joseph Stalin, Winston Churchill, and Harry Truman; their advisors also played key roles as the victorious nations met southwest of Berlin. Truman had recently risen to the office of president following Franklin Roosevelt’s sudden death, and the strong relationship between FDR and the other Big Three leaders left the novice Truman with the difficult task of quickly establishing a rapport with two larger than life men (FDR had been present at the previous conferences in Tehran and Yalta).
The book makes clear that hanging above the conference was the memory of the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, a meeting which divided the spoils of World War One.
Russia had not been present at that meetup, having quit the war in 1917 in the throes of their revolution. Widely viewed as a failed peace conference, the leaders and their advisers wanted to avoid the past mistakes which laid the groundwork for a second world war twenty years after the meeting in Paris.
The Cold War was in its embryonic stage during 1945, and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s rabidly anti-Soviet stance further complicated trust between the parties. Truman was willing to listen to his advisers (including Russia hawk Charles E. Bohlen and others like George Kennan who advocated a more even handed approach) while Averell Harriman and Anthony Eden were mainstays at Churchill’s side. James Byrnes was a former political rival of Truman’s who had been passed over for vice-president in ‘44, but he was neutralized when Truman picked this close friend of FDR as his Secretary of State. The overwhelming foreign policy situation Truman was thrown into, and the extent to which he was unprepared for it at the time of assuming office, made for a major subplot.
Although the city of Potsdam had been largely untouched during the war, 1945 Berlin (which was right up the road) was in absolute ruins. This visual lent urgency to the post-European War conference, underscoring how herculean the task would be of aiding the Germans while simultaneously punishing those responsible for the bloodshed. The war in Japan was still ongoing during the July and early August Potsdam conference, adding another complicating factor to the negotiations.
Initially, Truman held out hope of Soviet help against Japan and held the secret of the recently tested atomic bomb close to the vest. Only as Stalin's postwar intentions became clear did the American president begin to recalibrate the type of order he himself envisioned for Europe's future.
Stalin is shown to be playing a long game at the conference. Aware of the devastation his country was dealt by the Germans, he knew the Soviet Union would require time to rebuild before it could stand on equal terms with the capitalist West. His ideology is shown as giving him confidence that the Soviets would end up being the winners in the long run, while the amount of destruction visited on his people made him sensitive of any slights from Churchill or Truman. The book provides statistics showing just how stark Russia’s suffering was: 14% of their prewar population had been lost compared to less than 1% each for England and the United States.
A tense initial meeting between Truman and Russia’s Vyacheslav Molotov did little to reassure Stalin that FDR’s replacement would be sympathetic to claims the Soviets might make at Potsdam. In fact, a 1941 quote in the New York Times by then-Senator Truman to the effect that America might as well let Germany and Russia kill each other had poisoned the well between the two men early on. The quiet Soviet and the down-to-earth U.S. president managed to give the outward appearance of friendship while Churchill’s longwindedness managed to grate on Truman’s nerves. Churchill’s Conservative party was actually defeated in an election during the middle of the Potsdam conference, creating the awkward situation of his exit from the bargaining table and the arrival of Labour’s Clement Attlee in his place. The Russians are shown to be puzzled at how democracy works, shocked that a leader of Churchill’s stature could be switched out with such ease.
The conference itself comes as almost an anticlimax. Debates over what to do about Poland and how to divide up the postwar map could have received more analysis, as there was a lot left on the table which the book failed to examine. The drive of the Russians to act as conquerors and the West to allow for more natural, democratic developments in their sphere were two impossible to miss elements. The author did his best to lay out the facts and let them speak for themselves. He did not take a pro-London/Washington or pro-Moscow line when laying out claims that were made or when analyzing why key players made the choices they did.
This book does nice work informing about the Potsdam Conference, and the crucial leaders and the broader context of their decisions are laid out in an easy to grasp manner. It could have gone further when it came to details on the conference and seemed rushed toward the end, but the overall body of work is respectable and possesses a strong narrative flow.
-Andrew Canfield Denver, Colorado
Neiberg’s book orbited around Joseph Stalin, Winston Churchill, and Harry Truman; their advisors also played key roles as the victorious nations met southwest of Berlin. Truman had recently risen to the office of president following Franklin Roosevelt’s sudden death, and the strong relationship between FDR and the other Big Three leaders left the novice Truman with the difficult task of quickly establishing a rapport with two larger than life men (FDR had been present at the previous conferences in Tehran and Yalta).
The book makes clear that hanging above the conference was the memory of the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, a meeting which divided the spoils of World War One.
Russia had not been present at that meetup, having quit the war in 1917 in the throes of their revolution. Widely viewed as a failed peace conference, the leaders and their advisers wanted to avoid the past mistakes which laid the groundwork for a second world war twenty years after the meeting in Paris.
The Cold War was in its embryonic stage during 1945, and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s rabidly anti-Soviet stance further complicated trust between the parties. Truman was willing to listen to his advisers (including Russia hawk Charles E. Bohlen and others like George Kennan who advocated a more even handed approach) while Averell Harriman and Anthony Eden were mainstays at Churchill’s side. James Byrnes was a former political rival of Truman’s who had been passed over for vice-president in ‘44, but he was neutralized when Truman picked this close friend of FDR as his Secretary of State. The overwhelming foreign policy situation Truman was thrown into, and the extent to which he was unprepared for it at the time of assuming office, made for a major subplot.
Although the city of Potsdam had been largely untouched during the war, 1945 Berlin (which was right up the road) was in absolute ruins. This visual lent urgency to the post-European War conference, underscoring how herculean the task would be of aiding the Germans while simultaneously punishing those responsible for the bloodshed. The war in Japan was still ongoing during the July and early August Potsdam conference, adding another complicating factor to the negotiations.
Initially, Truman held out hope of Soviet help against Japan and held the secret of the recently tested atomic bomb close to the vest. Only as Stalin's postwar intentions became clear did the American president begin to recalibrate the type of order he himself envisioned for Europe's future.
Stalin is shown to be playing a long game at the conference. Aware of the devastation his country was dealt by the Germans, he knew the Soviet Union would require time to rebuild before it could stand on equal terms with the capitalist West. His ideology is shown as giving him confidence that the Soviets would end up being the winners in the long run, while the amount of destruction visited on his people made him sensitive of any slights from Churchill or Truman. The book provides statistics showing just how stark Russia’s suffering was: 14% of their prewar population had been lost compared to less than 1% each for England and the United States.
A tense initial meeting between Truman and Russia’s Vyacheslav Molotov did little to reassure Stalin that FDR’s replacement would be sympathetic to claims the Soviets might make at Potsdam. In fact, a 1941 quote in the New York Times by then-Senator Truman to the effect that America might as well let Germany and Russia kill each other had poisoned the well between the two men early on. The quiet Soviet and the down-to-earth U.S. president managed to give the outward appearance of friendship while Churchill’s longwindedness managed to grate on Truman’s nerves. Churchill’s Conservative party was actually defeated in an election during the middle of the Potsdam conference, creating the awkward situation of his exit from the bargaining table and the arrival of Labour’s Clement Attlee in his place. The Russians are shown to be puzzled at how democracy works, shocked that a leader of Churchill’s stature could be switched out with such ease.
The conference itself comes as almost an anticlimax. Debates over what to do about Poland and how to divide up the postwar map could have received more analysis, as there was a lot left on the table which the book failed to examine. The drive of the Russians to act as conquerors and the West to allow for more natural, democratic developments in their sphere were two impossible to miss elements. The author did his best to lay out the facts and let them speak for themselves. He did not take a pro-London/Washington or pro-Moscow line when laying out claims that were made or when analyzing why key players made the choices they did.
This book does nice work informing about the Potsdam Conference, and the crucial leaders and the broader context of their decisions are laid out in an easy to grasp manner. It could have gone further when it came to details on the conference and seemed rushed toward the end, but the overall body of work is respectable and possesses a strong narrative flow.
-Andrew Canfield Denver, Colorado
December 1, 2020
Potsdam
1. A) It’s the only conference between the three superpowers which discussed exclusively the post war world. The previous ones (Yalta,Tehran, etc) focused on military strategy. B) Also, Potsdam happened in the utterly defeated Germany. C) it’s the only conference that leadership of both America & Britain changed. Stalin was the only one present in the helm consistently who was there till his death 8 years later.
2. Stalin: Stalin descended into Germany as a conqueror. He even asked to get the czar train to ride on it. Even when he went walking he had 600 soldiers protection. Stalin felt he paid the biggest price to defeat Hitler as opposed to the US & Britain. Stalin was really sad when he heard the death of FDR. Stalin’s foreign minister Molotov who played the bad cop in the conference said the successor Truman doesn’t match the experience & intellect of FDR. (I was thinking of SCOTUS justice Holmes comment about FDR: “he has a second rate intellect but a first rate temperament.” But historians have said even though FDR didn’t have the bookish intellect he had a learning mind through listening). Stalin didn’t want to compromise on the boundaries of Poland with US & Britain. Stalin studied the psychological profiles of the other leaders.
3. Truman: When VP Truman got the call from the WH (right after FDR death) he said Jesus Christ and general Jackson (I knew he liked Jackson but not knew to the par of Jesus Christ 😂). Truman felt inadequate for the transition. He did not like to be in Europe even for few weeks in Germany (Wilson was in Europe for 6 months after WW1). Truman tried to not replicate the mistakes of WW1 Versailles treaty. When Churchill tried to sit close to Truman to show that how he is close to the US, Truman moved his chair closed to Stalin, so Stalin doesn’t feel that US & Britain are ganged up against him.
4. Churchill: Churchill said coming to agreement with the new American potus is like proposing marriage to his sister every time! Churchill felt despondent and started to drink a lot and later picked up painting. Churchill was defeated in the election that in the midst of the conference newly elected PM Atlee came to the conference. Many American photographers didn’t know who he was and didn’t photograph him. Atlee himself said to the British king that he didn’t knew that he or his labor party would win! Churchill knowing the atomic bomb potential becomes confident that he could push the soviet in policies!
5. Germany: Germany was utterly destroyed that people were living underground without power, water, etc. smoke came out of ground to show cooking is going on. WW1 destruction of Germany was sparse compared to the WW2. German Women marred their faces to look unattractive to the soviet soldiers who with vengeance raped every women and nailed some of them to their doors! Cigarettes were used as currency.
6. George F Kennan: The genius behind the “long telegram” which gave the US the policy to deal with the soviets for the rest of the Cold War. He said with Russians “you have to buy the horse twice” and that is they would agree to terms but wouldn’t act on it. (I’ve read many books of Kennan and his biography to understand how he became an expert of soviet mind but in short: Ambassador Kennan lived mostly in Russia than in America and understood an average Russian mind).
7. Atomic Bomb: Truman knew the success of the Hiroshima bomb when his ship was just 700 NMiles from Virginia shore on his return voyage to the US. Truman used the bomb to threaten Stalin indirectly when they were discussing Poland. Truman didn’t know that Stalin already had all the info of the bomb through spies and had asked his scientists to build one.
8. Reparations and recovery: Wilson was pushing the victors to not ask Germany for too much reparations and economist Keynes argued the same because it could fire back and it did with Hitler’s WW2. This time Truman tried to avert those mistakes of indemnification burden on beleaguered Germans but want to create a recovery for Germany.
1. A) It’s the only conference between the three superpowers which discussed exclusively the post war world. The previous ones (Yalta,Tehran, etc) focused on military strategy. B) Also, Potsdam happened in the utterly defeated Germany. C) it’s the only conference that leadership of both America & Britain changed. Stalin was the only one present in the helm consistently who was there till his death 8 years later.
2. Stalin: Stalin descended into Germany as a conqueror. He even asked to get the czar train to ride on it. Even when he went walking he had 600 soldiers protection. Stalin felt he paid the biggest price to defeat Hitler as opposed to the US & Britain. Stalin was really sad when he heard the death of FDR. Stalin’s foreign minister Molotov who played the bad cop in the conference said the successor Truman doesn’t match the experience & intellect of FDR. (I was thinking of SCOTUS justice Holmes comment about FDR: “he has a second rate intellect but a first rate temperament.” But historians have said even though FDR didn’t have the bookish intellect he had a learning mind through listening). Stalin didn’t want to compromise on the boundaries of Poland with US & Britain. Stalin studied the psychological profiles of the other leaders.
3. Truman: When VP Truman got the call from the WH (right after FDR death) he said Jesus Christ and general Jackson (I knew he liked Jackson but not knew to the par of Jesus Christ 😂). Truman felt inadequate for the transition. He did not like to be in Europe even for few weeks in Germany (Wilson was in Europe for 6 months after WW1). Truman tried to not replicate the mistakes of WW1 Versailles treaty. When Churchill tried to sit close to Truman to show that how he is close to the US, Truman moved his chair closed to Stalin, so Stalin doesn’t feel that US & Britain are ganged up against him.
4. Churchill: Churchill said coming to agreement with the new American potus is like proposing marriage to his sister every time! Churchill felt despondent and started to drink a lot and later picked up painting. Churchill was defeated in the election that in the midst of the conference newly elected PM Atlee came to the conference. Many American photographers didn’t know who he was and didn’t photograph him. Atlee himself said to the British king that he didn’t knew that he or his labor party would win! Churchill knowing the atomic bomb potential becomes confident that he could push the soviet in policies!
5. Germany: Germany was utterly destroyed that people were living underground without power, water, etc. smoke came out of ground to show cooking is going on. WW1 destruction of Germany was sparse compared to the WW2. German Women marred their faces to look unattractive to the soviet soldiers who with vengeance raped every women and nailed some of them to their doors! Cigarettes were used as currency.
6. George F Kennan: The genius behind the “long telegram” which gave the US the policy to deal with the soviets for the rest of the Cold War. He said with Russians “you have to buy the horse twice” and that is they would agree to terms but wouldn’t act on it. (I’ve read many books of Kennan and his biography to understand how he became an expert of soviet mind but in short: Ambassador Kennan lived mostly in Russia than in America and understood an average Russian mind).
7. Atomic Bomb: Truman knew the success of the Hiroshima bomb when his ship was just 700 NMiles from Virginia shore on his return voyage to the US. Truman used the bomb to threaten Stalin indirectly when they were discussing Poland. Truman didn’t know that Stalin already had all the info of the bomb through spies and had asked his scientists to build one.
8. Reparations and recovery: Wilson was pushing the victors to not ask Germany for too much reparations and economist Keynes argued the same because it could fire back and it did with Hitler’s WW2. This time Truman tried to avert those mistakes of indemnification burden on beleaguered Germans but want to create a recovery for Germany.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
January 23, 2021
The goal of this book is to explain the Potsdam conference by explaining the goals, hopes, fears, and intentions of the main actors at that conference. This is done brilliantly and in a very engaging manner. In this book, the author intends to show two basic thesis--the first one is that the participants successfully avoided the failures of the Versailles treaty at the end of the First World War as well as the Munich negotiation, and the second one is that President Truman carried out his negotiations following the diplomatic strategy of FDR. Neiberg successfully argues both of these thesis
I read this book basically as a check on the validity of the readings I had done in the past. I wanted to know if there was break between FDR and Truman on Soviet diplomacy, as well as the effect of the atomic testing intended bombing on the negotiations themselves. Most of my assumptions about Truman proved incorrect. He clearly continued FDR's policy of attempting to create distance with the UK--or at least to create more distance than Churchill would have liked. Furthermore, he also appears to have been open to some amount of openness to being allies with the USSR. It is clear that the cold war was not foreordained or predicted at this point. Gore Vidal's hypothesis that the use of the atomic bomb was more directed at Russia in some ways appears to be unfounded but in others correct. It does not appear that nuclear attack on Japan has designed to in some ways hurt the Soviet Union, but it does appear that US leaders were not averse to incidental strategic benefits in keeping the Russians out of China and the Japanese mainland. Furthermore, it does appear that the failing to discuss the nuclear bomb with Stalin at the conference probably started a larger rift between the USSR and the west.
While this book improved my opinion of Truman, it confirmed a strong suspicion of Churchill. He does not appear to ever have been negotiating the end of the war in good faith. This is clear from his desire to abandon the sectoral arrangement in Germany the second western armies attacked the remains of the German army in the planned Soviet zone. His idea of Eastern Europe as behind the Iron Curtain was created pretty much simultaneously with Eisenhower's withdrawal into the US/UK sectors upon the defeat of Germany. It is not clear that Churchill can be trusted to be honest with regard to cold war issues, and everything he seems to do or think appears to be in furtherance of greater British power.
One important note: the author is up front about the fact that he is not providing a blow by blow of the conference, but attempting to place the conference in a larger context. This is to be taken seriously. I was somewhat frustrated when the book kept going on and on setting up the conference. It was getting closer and closer to the end without actually getting to the conference itself. By the end, I felt the author dealt with the most important issues (Germany, Poland, and Japan) pretty well. Nevertheless, this is most clearly not a blow by blow account of the conference.
I read this book basically as a check on the validity of the readings I had done in the past. I wanted to know if there was break between FDR and Truman on Soviet diplomacy, as well as the effect of the atomic testing intended bombing on the negotiations themselves. Most of my assumptions about Truman proved incorrect. He clearly continued FDR's policy of attempting to create distance with the UK--or at least to create more distance than Churchill would have liked. Furthermore, he also appears to have been open to some amount of openness to being allies with the USSR. It is clear that the cold war was not foreordained or predicted at this point. Gore Vidal's hypothesis that the use of the atomic bomb was more directed at Russia in some ways appears to be unfounded but in others correct. It does not appear that nuclear attack on Japan has designed to in some ways hurt the Soviet Union, but it does appear that US leaders were not averse to incidental strategic benefits in keeping the Russians out of China and the Japanese mainland. Furthermore, it does appear that the failing to discuss the nuclear bomb with Stalin at the conference probably started a larger rift between the USSR and the west.
While this book improved my opinion of Truman, it confirmed a strong suspicion of Churchill. He does not appear to ever have been negotiating the end of the war in good faith. This is clear from his desire to abandon the sectoral arrangement in Germany the second western armies attacked the remains of the German army in the planned Soviet zone. His idea of Eastern Europe as behind the Iron Curtain was created pretty much simultaneously with Eisenhower's withdrawal into the US/UK sectors upon the defeat of Germany. It is not clear that Churchill can be trusted to be honest with regard to cold war issues, and everything he seems to do or think appears to be in furtherance of greater British power.
One important note: the author is up front about the fact that he is not providing a blow by blow of the conference, but attempting to place the conference in a larger context. This is to be taken seriously. I was somewhat frustrated when the book kept going on and on setting up the conference. It was getting closer and closer to the end without actually getting to the conference itself. By the end, I felt the author dealt with the most important issues (Germany, Poland, and Japan) pretty well. Nevertheless, this is most clearly not a blow by blow account of the conference.
November 22, 2021
Pe 28 iunie 1919, ziua în care mare parte din restul lumii marca semnarea Tratatului de la Versailles, care a pus, oficial, capăt Primului Război Mondial, un căpitan din armata americană pășea spre altarul bisericii de cartier, ca să se însoare cu iubita lui. Chiar dacă se remarcase în timpul războiului și își dovedise calitățile de conducător pe câmpul de luptă, nu intenționa să facă o carieră în armată. Și, în acest moment al vieții lui, nu avea nici o dorință specială de a intra în politică. În schimb, el și un alt veteran de război luaseră o concesiune ca să deschidă un magazin de haine bărbătești. Războiul se terminase. În viitor, spera el, avea să-și petreacă timpul gândindu-se la familie și la afacere, nu la război. Mai mult decât în orice altă zi, gândurile lui erau cât se putea de departe de războaie și de tratatele de pace cu care se încheiau acestea. De cealaltă parte a Oceanului Atlantic, în aceeași zi, un controversat politician britanic își savura a doua șansă. Umilit și obligat să demisioneze cu câțiva ani în urmă, avea, acum, din nou un cuvânt greu de spus în ceea ce privea politicile de apărare ale Marii Britanii, ca secretar de stat pentru război și aviație. Preocupat de lumea de după război și îngrijorat de ascensiunea bolșevismului în stil sovietic, el
pledase pentru o operațiune aliată prin care să fie trimiși soldați britanici, americani și japonezi în nordul Rusiei, în sprijinul „albilor“ proțariști care luptau în Războiul Civil rus. Îi displăcea Tratatul de la Versailles, pe care îl numea „absurd și monstruos“, în mare parte deoarece credea că slăbea prea mult Germania. O Germanie dezarmată, se temea el, ar fi lăsat în Europa un vid de putere letal, pe care bolșevicii puteau căuta să îl umple. Cum voia să vadă bolșevismul „tăiat de la rădăcină“, el considera Tratatul de la Versailles o ocazie ratată de a reface lumea de după război. Încă din 1920, a început să ceară revizuiri majore ale Tratatului în favoarea Germaniei, din cauza „cererilor nerezonabile“ pe care le făcea doar germanilor, singura contragreutate posibilă, pe continentul european, la rușii care erau poate și mai periculoși. Când a venit vremea să scrie, și el, un tratat postbelic, a insistat pentru respingerea Tratatului de la Versailles ca model.
pledase pentru o operațiune aliată prin care să fie trimiși soldați britanici, americani și japonezi în nordul Rusiei, în sprijinul „albilor“ proțariști care luptau în Războiul Civil rus. Îi displăcea Tratatul de la Versailles, pe care îl numea „absurd și monstruos“, în mare parte deoarece credea că slăbea prea mult Germania. O Germanie dezarmată, se temea el, ar fi lăsat în Europa un vid de putere letal, pe care bolșevicii puteau căuta să îl umple. Cum voia să vadă bolșevismul „tăiat de la rădăcină“, el considera Tratatul de la Versailles o ocazie ratată de a reface lumea de după război. Încă din 1920, a început să ceară revizuiri majore ale Tratatului în favoarea Germaniei, din cauza „cererilor nerezonabile“ pe care le făcea doar germanilor, singura contragreutate posibilă, pe continentul european, la rușii care erau poate și mai periculoși. Când a venit vremea să scrie, și el, un tratat postbelic, a insistat pentru respingerea Tratatului de la Versailles ca model.
April 30, 2023
I finished Michael Neiberg’s, Potsdam: The End of World War II and the Remaking of Europe. The book goes into the period which transition from Franklin Roosevelt to Harry Truman and from Winston Churchill to Clement Atlee and how the decisions reached at The Yalta Conference impacted the decisions reached from this time through Potsdam.
A common theme is drawing comparisons between the post World War I world and The Versailles Treaty and the end of World War II and how the big three in each were trying to deal with the same issues
The major issues were assigning war guilt, dealing with potential reparations, post-war boundaries, and ethnic minority issues, specifically around the creation of Poland and the prior and new boundaries of Poland after both wars.
Truman, Churchill, and Stalin are trying to avoid the failures of Versailles, which are widely believed to have spawned the Second World War, dealing with the displaced persons, e.g., Germans, Poles, and Eastern European minorities
They were also trying to how China, Italy, and France fit into the post-war leadership and European security, specifically in Western Europe.
The other major issues are getting the Soviet Union to fulfill the promise to joining the war effort against Japan, the discussion surrounding the policy of unconditional surrender and to to modify it to hasten the Japanese surrender while allowing them to save face and the impact of the atomic bomb on Japan’s surrender.
It is a great book that I rate as a five-star book and only 292 pages of reading. It is great to read such a focused book on an important subject that is still relevant today.
A common theme is drawing comparisons between the post World War I world and The Versailles Treaty and the end of World War II and how the big three in each were trying to deal with the same issues
The major issues were assigning war guilt, dealing with potential reparations, post-war boundaries, and ethnic minority issues, specifically around the creation of Poland and the prior and new boundaries of Poland after both wars.
Truman, Churchill, and Stalin are trying to avoid the failures of Versailles, which are widely believed to have spawned the Second World War, dealing with the displaced persons, e.g., Germans, Poles, and Eastern European minorities
They were also trying to how China, Italy, and France fit into the post-war leadership and European security, specifically in Western Europe.
The other major issues are getting the Soviet Union to fulfill the promise to joining the war effort against Japan, the discussion surrounding the policy of unconditional surrender and to to modify it to hasten the Japanese surrender while allowing them to save face and the impact of the atomic bomb on Japan’s surrender.
It is a great book that I rate as a five-star book and only 292 pages of reading. It is great to read such a focused book on an important subject that is still relevant today.
December 12, 2022
Postdam tells the story of the conference that brought the end of the Second World War in Europe. It presents the challenges of 1945 as seen by those leaders through the lenses of 1919 and Versailles. If anything, it goes to show the importance of history in decision making and, perhaps more importantly, the dangers of interpreting the past too literally.
Potsdam is rather seen as the end of an era, of a conflict that began in 1914, than the beginning of a new conflict, the Cold War. To this end, the book provides plenty of well researched evidence to support that the three leaders present tried to learn from past mistakes and work towards a safer future. However, tensions between “the West” and Soviets are always present, and the too literal interpretation of history lead to mutual distrust and misunderstanding. If anything, for as much as the leaders tried to end the conflict that started in 1914 and bring an era to a close, they also tried to undermine each other’s position and impose agreements that benefited them and only them. To that end, this book shows us the dangers of making peace not with the enemy, but with the allies. Because for as much as all the participants tried to make peace with Germany, their different views and mutual distrust made them negotiate against each other.
Overall, a great book for understanding the history of the Cold War, as well as the end of the Second World War and the “old order” in Europe.
Potsdam is rather seen as the end of an era, of a conflict that began in 1914, than the beginning of a new conflict, the Cold War. To this end, the book provides plenty of well researched evidence to support that the three leaders present tried to learn from past mistakes and work towards a safer future. However, tensions between “the West” and Soviets are always present, and the too literal interpretation of history lead to mutual distrust and misunderstanding. If anything, for as much as the leaders tried to end the conflict that started in 1914 and bring an era to a close, they also tried to undermine each other’s position and impose agreements that benefited them and only them. To that end, this book shows us the dangers of making peace not with the enemy, but with the allies. Because for as much as all the participants tried to make peace with Germany, their different views and mutual distrust made them negotiate against each other.
Overall, a great book for understanding the history of the Cold War, as well as the end of the Second World War and the “old order” in Europe.
July 26, 2020
I am reading this book during the 75th anniversary of the Potsdam conference that was held from July 17 through August 2, 1945. These peace talks officially ended European theatre of World War II. The conference started with the big three, the Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin, the newly sworn-in President Harry Truman from the United States, and the defeated incumbent Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Winston Churchill. (Churchill would be replaced both as Prime Minister and at the Potsdam Conference by Clement Attlee.)
The book starts with a background of the main figures of the conference, noted above, with a focus on the unexpected rise of Harry Truman as President of the US. Less is discussed about Stalin, other than the distrust that his country felt towards the other conference representatives.
The primary goal of the three men, as well as China and France who completed the Council of Foreign Ministers, was to ensure that the same mistakes that were made in the Paris Treaty of 1919 ending World War 1 would not be repeated. In most cases, they were successful. However, some of these compromises helped spark the Cold War that would continue over the next 50 years.
The book starts with a background of the main figures of the conference, noted above, with a focus on the unexpected rise of Harry Truman as President of the US. Less is discussed about Stalin, other than the distrust that his country felt towards the other conference representatives.
The primary goal of the three men, as well as China and France who completed the Council of Foreign Ministers, was to ensure that the same mistakes that were made in the Paris Treaty of 1919 ending World War 1 would not be repeated. In most cases, they were successful. However, some of these compromises helped spark the Cold War that would continue over the next 50 years.
August 24, 2021
The author does a great job in explaining the issues and decisions at one of the biggest events that has shaped the modern world. Hard to conceive that the inner circle of FDR who knew how bad his health was hardly gave a second thought to who would be his vice president. That Winston Churchill who brought Great Britain through the war got voted out of office during the conference and that the successful test of the Atomic Bomb happened during the conference. The author emphasizes the mistakes of the Treaty of Versailles that ended WWI played a big role in the philosophy of the United States and Great Britain. They did not want to make the same mistakes of creating a weak Germany, even though many called for the harshest punishment. Neiberg also points out that the Big Three worked on settling the enormous efforts of their time and that no one thought of it as the start of the Cold War at that time. Almost an afterthought was dividing both Korea and Vietnam and giving little thought to Jewish resettlement. Issues that ended up having huge Global consequences. Very concise book and great overview of the importance of the Potsdam conference.
January 30, 2023
Michael Neiberg's "Potsdam: The End of World War II and the Remaking of Europe" postulates that WW II was the climax of a Thirty-Years War that began in 1914. Upermost in the minds of conferees, especially those from the West, was to avoid the mistakes of the 1919 Paris peace conference and solve the problems of the European war first raised at Yalta six months earlier. That they did, Neiberg asserts, by recognizing Soviet gains/influence in Poland and elsewhere in Eastern Europe. While the ethnic and border problems in Central Europe were not new, those arising from the not yet completed war against Japan were. The successful test of atomic weapons while Potsdam conference was going on gave the West, so they thought, an ace in the hole that turned out to be a double edged sword, since the Soviets were only a handful of years behind in building a weapon of their own. A measured and enlightening look a conference that has been overshadowed - if not forgotten - by Yalta. Nice character sketches of the participants.
July 1, 2018
I'd give this one three-and-a-half.
I really was impressed with Neiberg's "Dance of the Furies," which made me rethink 1914.
He approaches the Potsdam Conference as the end of the 30 years crisis that started in 1914 instead of seeing Potsdam as the start of the Cold War.
Fair enough, but I was dissatisfied.
There really was very little on the Soviets here. Truman and his road to Potsdam was very well developed, as was the British side of things. However, Neiberg seemed content to depict Stalin as a guy willing to make a deal and Molotov as "Mr. Nyet."
It bothered me that Neiberg seemed to accept uncritically the judgement of Joseph Davies, FDR's second ambassador to Moscow. Granted, Davies can't be held responsible for the criminal stupidities of the 1943 film of his memoir "Mission to Moscow," but Neiberg is the first historian to take Davies seriously as an expert on Soviet affairs in many a year.
The book is well-written, but I just can't get behind it 100%.
I really was impressed with Neiberg's "Dance of the Furies," which made me rethink 1914.
He approaches the Potsdam Conference as the end of the 30 years crisis that started in 1914 instead of seeing Potsdam as the start of the Cold War.
Fair enough, but I was dissatisfied.
There really was very little on the Soviets here. Truman and his road to Potsdam was very well developed, as was the British side of things. However, Neiberg seemed content to depict Stalin as a guy willing to make a deal and Molotov as "Mr. Nyet."
It bothered me that Neiberg seemed to accept uncritically the judgement of Joseph Davies, FDR's second ambassador to Moscow. Granted, Davies can't be held responsible for the criminal stupidities of the 1943 film of his memoir "Mission to Moscow," but Neiberg is the first historian to take Davies seriously as an expert on Soviet affairs in many a year.
The book is well-written, but I just can't get behind it 100%.
April 17, 2018
Potsdam: the final peace talk to end WWII where newly sworn-in President Harry Truman, Stalin, and defeated incumbent Winston Churchill met to try to solve the outstanding problems of Europe and Japan after the Yalta Conference. Truman being new to global politics and Churchill losing an election mid-conference allowed Stalin to get many of his demands vis a vis Europe; especially Poland and Germany.
This book by Neiberg doesn't do an all around great job at presenting the conference, although it really focuses on the impact a green Truman and departing Churchill had on the proceedings. In addition, Japan was a hot topic at the conference. America wanted Russia to officially declare war on Japan (as was agreed upon at Yalta), however with the successful testing of the Atomic Bomb, it wasn't necessary. Hiroshima occurred whilst Truman was departing Europe by boat.
This book by Neiberg doesn't do an all around great job at presenting the conference, although it really focuses on the impact a green Truman and departing Churchill had on the proceedings. In addition, Japan was a hot topic at the conference. America wanted Russia to officially declare war on Japan (as was agreed upon at Yalta), however with the successful testing of the Atomic Bomb, it wasn't necessary. Hiroshima occurred whilst Truman was departing Europe by boat.
September 28, 2020
I like to listen to a audiobook as I try drive to make good use of time. This one was illuminating. Roosevelt, Truman, Churchill and Stalin played out the end of World War II with so many changes I never knew or thought about. how much help would be given up or taken, what of the people with new masters were to do , how much would the West bend to the east and vice versa. this is a awesome historical read that will give you some of the reasons of how Postwar WW I Europe was as catalyst that was only the fanning of international flames that made WW II inevitable. My takeaway was a better understanding of the chess masters that some were better than others as well as a cause and effect. It gave me better incite on the plight of Poles, Germans and Jews after the war and their longing for nationalistic representation while foregoing postwar consequences.
March 31, 2021
Potsdam was an enlightening look at all the factors at play as World War II drew to a close and how events at that time contributed to the budding Cold War. With Stalin's suspicious nature, Truman's unpracticed turn as an international politician, and Churchill's erratic behavior, seeds of future conflict came into being. I like how Neiberg related Potsdam back to the Treaty of Versailles and pointed out the many parallels as well as the connection between the two. He provided a lot of good back story on the three major players and other important characters, but at times I felt that he went into less detail with the Soviets. I could not tell if that was due to personal bias or the information he had available to him. I also wish there would have been maps in addition to the pictures to help readers understand how and why locations mattered so much during and after World War II. Otherwise, I feel that I learned a lot more than I ever thought there was to know about Potsdam. I feel now that when I used to teach, I greatly underserved this important meeting.
October 24, 2023
"A military historian analyzes the significance of the final conference of the World War II allies.
In July 1945, the leaders of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union met in the Berlin suburb of Potsdam to determine policy for the occupation of Europe and the conclusion of the war against Japan. The conference was originally expected to include the “Big Three” of the Teheran and Yalta conferences, but Franklin Roosevelt had died and been succeeded by the inexperienced Harry Truman, and in midconference, Churchill was unexpectedly turned out of office and replaced by the Labour Party chief Clement Attlee. Stalin was therefore the best prepared of the three and held most of the cards as his armies occupied Eastern Europe and much of Germany. "
In July 1945, the leaders of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union met in the Berlin suburb of Potsdam to determine policy for the occupation of Europe and the conclusion of the war against Japan. The conference was originally expected to include the “Big Three” of the Teheran and Yalta conferences, but Franklin Roosevelt had died and been succeeded by the inexperienced Harry Truman, and in midconference, Churchill was unexpectedly turned out of office and replaced by the Labour Party chief Clement Attlee. Stalin was therefore the best prepared of the three and held most of the cards as his armies occupied Eastern Europe and much of Germany. "
September 7, 2021
Great and detailed analysis of the background and events leading up to this conference, and the position and personal position of the 3 leaders involved.
You'd often see the pictures from this conference and wonder where is Churchill, who was replaced as PM by Attlee while this was ongoing - well this book gives you full background on that and the reactions of the other leaders to it and its implications.
Really enjoyed this book, and only thing I'd say is that I wish there was a couple more chapters on the aftermath of this events and what eventually lead to the Cold War, but perhaps I just need to find that other book on that topic now.
You'd often see the pictures from this conference and wonder where is Churchill, who was replaced as PM by Attlee while this was ongoing - well this book gives you full background on that and the reactions of the other leaders to it and its implications.
Really enjoyed this book, and only thing I'd say is that I wish there was a couple more chapters on the aftermath of this events and what eventually lead to the Cold War, but perhaps I just need to find that other book on that topic now.
September 1, 2023
Maybe my rating is unfair as my expectations were different. I have struggled to find a book on the subject and so had high hopes.
Mr Neiberg does a great job of introducing the characters, setting the scene and the timelines. The ghosts in the room in terms of Versailles and the impact upon the most recent conflict are well explained and linked to the factors that led up to the Second World War.
I think I expected more in depth information on the meetings that took place and how the conference was constituted but that’s fine, this was my misunderstanding.
I know more than I did. I enjoyed the book and it was devoured. Thank you Mr Neiberg.
Mr Neiberg does a great job of introducing the characters, setting the scene and the timelines. The ghosts in the room in terms of Versailles and the impact upon the most recent conflict are well explained and linked to the factors that led up to the Second World War.
I think I expected more in depth information on the meetings that took place and how the conference was constituted but that’s fine, this was my misunderstanding.
I know more than I did. I enjoyed the book and it was devoured. Thank you Mr Neiberg.
August 16, 2018
I really appreciate Neiberg's attention to detail and his ability to use the Potsdam Conference has a locus while pointing out all other factors/crises that happened just before, during, and just after. The fact that he talked about the personalities of the attendees, which made me connect to them better, and understand and be more present for this piece of history. This book should be used in high schools to teach about this most pivotal moment in history. It also read really quickly! A+!
October 27, 2018
A well written account of the Potsdam Conference
The author writes with admirable objectivity. This is no textbook, but it is certainly not overtly novelistic. Yalta has decided many issues, but Potsdam was also if great importance. The most dramatic events were the arrival of Truman after the death of Roosevelt and the extraordinary replacement of Churchill by Attlee in the middle of the conference. However, there was much continuity and neither man was a fool. The decisions of this conference are still with us.
The author writes with admirable objectivity. This is no textbook, but it is certainly not overtly novelistic. Yalta has decided many issues, but Potsdam was also if great importance. The most dramatic events were the arrival of Truman after the death of Roosevelt and the extraordinary replacement of Churchill by Attlee in the middle of the conference. However, there was much continuity and neither man was a fool. The decisions of this conference are still with us.
September 25, 2017
Neiberg argues that the Big 3 didn't see Potsdam as the start of the Cold War (or even as a last chance to avoid one), but rather as an opportunity to solve the European problems that had led to two devastating wars. Thus, their decisions were guided more by a sense of history than foreshadowings of the future. This is a highly readable book, with plenty of explanatory material for those not already familiar with the conference and its participants. Definitely worth reading!
October 31, 2019
Tremendous details
This book brings to life tremendous details and key characters in a pivotal point in world history. It is well worth the read. The audiobook pairs well with kindle edition.
This book brings to life tremendous details and key characters in a pivotal point in world history. It is well worth the read. The audiobook pairs well with kindle edition.
May 12, 2022
This was so informative in terms of learning more about WW II and the meeting at Potsdam which took place at the end, the use of the atomic bomb against Japan, the redistribution of territories in the various countries, etc.
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