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The Great War of Our Time: The CIA's Fight Against Terrorism--From al Qa'ida to ISIS
Brand New Deliver In 6-18 Working Days
384 pages, Hardcover
Published May 12, 2015
148 people are currently reading
1715 people want to read
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October 24, 2021
This memoir was way too slow and way too personal. I don’t care about his drive to work or anything about his kids; nothing personal, dude, it’s just not interesting or pertinent. He hugged Lou Panetta twice in one night? His wife's dress to a gala? Who the f4ck cares?
Next he was way too easy on himself and the CIA for what was the greatest intelligence failure in USA history, our phony war with Iraq. He was way too apologetic for George Bush who, even in this favorable memoir, came out looking stupid and out of the loop—not positives for a U.S. president.
I take particular exception to something he writes early on in the book. He describes a few al Qaeda personnel saying, “These operatives were very dangerous.” This same language was used by right-wingers of the Guantanamo prisoners traded for the U.S. soldier Bowe Bergdahl. They may have been seasoned fighters but they weren’t any more dangerous than thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands of Muslim fanatics out to do us harm. It’s not like they were nuclear physicists or biochemical engineers capable of manufacturing WMD. Hyperbole should not be a tool of a CIA analyst.
His views on the Edward Snowden affair are completely and utterly moronic. His says that Americans will die as the result of his actions. I would say that many, many Americans have already died because of the actions of the leaders of our government, especially the GW Bush administration. CIA tactics have created extremists out of fence-sitters. He is also quick to point blame at "rogue reservists" at Abu Graib, as if a bunch of E-4 flunkies created our despicable policy at this prison.
Next he was way too easy on himself and the CIA for what was the greatest intelligence failure in USA history, our phony war with Iraq. He was way too apologetic for George Bush who, even in this favorable memoir, came out looking stupid and out of the loop—not positives for a U.S. president.
I take particular exception to something he writes early on in the book. He describes a few al Qaeda personnel saying, “These operatives were very dangerous.” This same language was used by right-wingers of the Guantanamo prisoners traded for the U.S. soldier Bowe Bergdahl. They may have been seasoned fighters but they weren’t any more dangerous than thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands of Muslim fanatics out to do us harm. It’s not like they were nuclear physicists or biochemical engineers capable of manufacturing WMD. Hyperbole should not be a tool of a CIA analyst.
His views on the Edward Snowden affair are completely and utterly moronic. His says that Americans will die as the result of his actions. I would say that many, many Americans have already died because of the actions of the leaders of our government, especially the GW Bush administration. CIA tactics have created extremists out of fence-sitters. He is also quick to point blame at "rogue reservists" at Abu Graib, as if a bunch of E-4 flunkies created our despicable policy at this prison.
June 4, 2015
Reads like a Chilling and all too Real Thriller
After seeing former CIA Deputy Director and Author Michael Morell speak on a news show I sought out his book though with some reservations. I worried it would be too overtly political, too technical or just plain boring. None of my fears turned out to be valid. The writing is amazing; very clear and engaging and most important Morell always brings the individuals’ personality and character to the forefront which makes their motivations clear and no matter how unsympathetic human.
Obviously this is not a book that will help its readers sleep well at night other than to know there are some very capable people standing between America and some #(!* scary folks. One of the most instructive chapters was toward the end where Morell provides a mock (but true) terrorist assessment similar to what he and his cohorts give to the President. It helped me gain a handle on whom and what we are dealing with. I’m sure Morell is a skilled writer on his own but I have a feeling his co-author, Bill Harlow, provided some excellent input because the book reads like an all too real thriller.
After seeing former CIA Deputy Director and Author Michael Morell speak on a news show I sought out his book though with some reservations. I worried it would be too overtly political, too technical or just plain boring. None of my fears turned out to be valid. The writing is amazing; very clear and engaging and most important Morell always brings the individuals’ personality and character to the forefront which makes their motivations clear and no matter how unsympathetic human.
Obviously this is not a book that will help its readers sleep well at night other than to know there are some very capable people standing between America and some #(!* scary folks. One of the most instructive chapters was toward the end where Morell provides a mock (but true) terrorist assessment similar to what he and his cohorts give to the President. It helped me gain a handle on whom and what we are dealing with. I’m sure Morell is a skilled writer on his own but I have a feeling his co-author, Bill Harlow, provided some excellent input because the book reads like an all too real thriller.
March 9, 2023
I've read many books like this. I'd place Morell's right about in the middle of he pack in terms of its informative quality. What sets this book apart, for better and worse, is that its focus and perspective is upon the intersection of Morrell's time with the CIA with the events he witnessed while there. In other words, this is part autobiography, part terrorism history and context.
I found this approach both additive and reductive. For instance, two of the most compelling parts of the book are Morell's recollections of 9/11 while aboard Air Force One with the President and his discussion of Enhanced Interrogation Techniques. Both are MORE interesting than usual because of the close personal detail Morell provides. What's missing, however, and was somewhat disappointing given the book's subtitle, was a more distanced and comprehensive analysis of the histories and ideologies of al Qaeda and ISIS. The best book which provides THAT type of information is Lawrence Wright's AMAZING The Looming Tower.
In any case, glad I read this. It won't be the first book I return to for reference, but it informed my opinions on the NSA and on Enhanced Interrogation Techniques.
I found this approach both additive and reductive. For instance, two of the most compelling parts of the book are Morell's recollections of 9/11 while aboard Air Force One with the President and his discussion of Enhanced Interrogation Techniques. Both are MORE interesting than usual because of the close personal detail Morell provides. What's missing, however, and was somewhat disappointing given the book's subtitle, was a more distanced and comprehensive analysis of the histories and ideologies of al Qaeda and ISIS. The best book which provides THAT type of information is Lawrence Wright's AMAZING The Looming Tower.
In any case, glad I read this. It won't be the first book I return to for reference, but it informed my opinions on the NSA and on Enhanced Interrogation Techniques.
June 12, 2015
This was a great read on the intelligence needed to keep our country safe and the increased threat level of terrorist adamant
on bringing down America. It is also a good read about the difficulty of the presidency and the fact that the last two presidents from differing parties took their job very seriously, that the politicalization/polarization is harming this country.
Finally, for me a life long public servant, Mr Morell is proud of his public service and the public servants he served with. This holds true for all levels of government employees. The constant belittling of public employees by politicians and the public is demoralizing to those that serve. Public employees are like all other employees, they want and try to do the best job possible. Exceptions, sure, like any place but dedicated people.
on bringing down America. It is also a good read about the difficulty of the presidency and the fact that the last two presidents from differing parties took their job very seriously, that the politicalization/polarization is harming this country.
Finally, for me a life long public servant, Mr Morell is proud of his public service and the public servants he served with. This holds true for all levels of government employees. The constant belittling of public employees by politicians and the public is demoralizing to those that serve. Public employees are like all other employees, they want and try to do the best job possible. Exceptions, sure, like any place but dedicated people.
August 3, 2015
While much of the information has already been presented elsewhere, this is an interesting, engaging and insightful memoir of Morell’s CIA career, and the underlying theme appears to be the CIA’s central role in the war against al-Qaeda following 9/11. Morell describes many of the successes, failures, challenges, and opportunities in a straightforward, readable fashion. As you may already know from other books, Morell was President Bush’s personal CIA briefer for much of that presidency, and his account of 9/11 and the aftermath is vivid and gripping. “There are two times when you need to worry about terrorists,” Morell writes. “When you pick up their chatter and when you don’t---which means, of course, that you worry all the time.” The rest of the book deals with the Agency’s counterterrorism role in the aftermath of the attacks, and how its action took on a more aggressive, paramilitary nature during that time.
Morrell is fairly sympathetic to both Presidents Bush and Obama and appreciative of the weight of their offices and their role in expanding US counterterrorism capabilities. Morell seems to have genuinely liked Bush, while his relationship with Obama was more formal, albeit more personally engaging than some accounts suggest. Other players are not treated kindly, such as Vice President Cheney and his staff, who pressed the CIA to confirm some sort of link between Saddam and al-Qaeda when CIA analysts repeatedly told them they could find no significant signs of cooperation. According to Morrell, “the view that hard-liners in the Bush administration forced the intelligence community into its position on WMD is just flat wrong. No one pushed. The analysts were already there and they had been there for years before Bush came to office.” He notes that the CIA and pretty much the entire intelligence community agreed that Saddam had WMD, a view that went back to the Clinton administration and was shared by other intelligence agencies, the UN, and even Saddam’s own generals. Given that Saddam had kicked UN weapons inspectors out of the country in 1998, much of the intelligence on the issue was quite dated. Morell notes that intelligence resources available for Iraq were quite strained since Clinton had charged the Agency with the additional mission of regime change in 1998; it did not, however, assign additional people to this mission. “Congressional oversight committees are briefed on covert actions, and they sometimes provide additional funding, but they do not raise the Agency’s personnel ceiling just because there is a new plan. So the folks who could have been trying to figure out how to collect intelligence from Saddam’s inner circle to discover Saddam’s plans, intentions and capabilities with regard to weapons of mass destruction were diverted to find generals willing to overthrow him.” Apparently, Saddam thought that the US would eventually discover his lack of WMDs and that they would then lift the sanctions and refrain from an invasion.
He is also critical of other figures, such as McCain, Lindsey Graham, and Porter Goss. Morell calls Goss’s tenure “the worst during my three decades of service,” although he blames Goss’s aides more than Goss himself. He appears to have genuinely appreciated the work of Panetta, Hayden, and Petraeus (while noting that the Agency rank and file did not always feel the same way, especially about Petraeus). Morell asserts that the CIA was successful in thwarting al-Qaeda attacks following 9/11, but is also critical of many encountered shortcomings by the intelligence community as a whole (including CIA and NSA). Interestingly, he notes that, at the time of the Edward Snowden’s revelations regarding NSA surveillance, most Wall Street firms had better security than that agency. Regarding the Arab Spring, Morell notes that Agency analysts often struggled to understand what was happening, relying too heavily on governments in the region and not enough on independent street-level sources and media outlets, although it is unclear to Morell what difference the Agency’s failure made in the long run.
From reading the book it also seems like the level of cooperation between the CIA and the special operations community was one the great successes of the era, and he generously praises the skill and dedication of these men and women. Contrary to the old cliche about CIA-approved Agency memoirs, Morrell is quite straightforward about intelligence failures like the pre-Arab Spring Middle East and about the inner workings of the intelligence bureaucracy. Morell’s account of the Benghazi attacks is quite defensive but well-reasoned (this part of the book can get tedious and Morell even advises the reader to skip it). The book also glosses over controversies like the torture debate and the Camp Chapman attack (and maybe to a lesser degree the WMD fiasco). He is fairly critical of the recently released Senate report on the Agency’s interrogation program, which might be off-putting if you agree with the report’s findings, but will probably make sense if you happen to agree with the mostly ignored minority report and CIA response. Morell also addresses the drone debate, writing that claims of significant civilian casualties due to these strikes are “highly exaggerated,” and mainly the result of al-Qaeda propaganda. While many argue that these strikes simply create more terrorists than they kill, Morrell notes that there is simply no way to prove this claim and that bin Laden’s own documents indicate that al-Qaeda’s leadership believed that the strikes severely degraded its ability to carry out attacks.
As is usual for this genre, Morell regales the reader with all kinds of interesting insider tidbits about working for the Agency. Apparently, CIA analytical pieces are often poorly written, confusing, or badly argued. When Morell was Tenet’s executive assistant, he often took it upon himself to rewrite them. Also, most CIA covert operations do, in fact, leak, but according to Morell, most of these leaks come from the White House, not Congress. Also, the CIA’s August 6, 2001 PDB has now become famous, mainly for its title. Many sources also claim that Bush responded to the PDB with “Alright, you’ve covered your ass now.” But, according to Morell, this was simply a joking reference; also, Morell writes that he was simply addressing some of Cheney’s and Rumsfeld’s concerns on whether or not the constant bin Laden-related threat reporting was a deception or not. Bush has claimed that he personally requested the briefing, and Morell confirms this in his memoir.
Morell writes that “Politicians are so fixated on scoring points and thinking in terms of partisan advantage that they project these same attitudes and behaviors on public servants. They have a hard time remembering that we serve Democrats and Republicans with the same professionalism and dedication.”
According to Morell, 9/11 was not a failure of imagination. He mentions the various specific examples of lapses by CIA, FBI, and NSA personnel that contributed to the failure to prevent the attacks; whether a different course could have prevented it remains unknowable. He also points to overlooked shortcomings like the lack of funding and the failure to implement recommendations by previous investigations into airline incidents. He points out that it is unclear whether the American people would have supported these measures in the pre-9/11 era.
Of course, Morell also addresses Benghazi. He denies the assertion that the CIA base in Benghazi was involved in shipping arms to Syrian rebels. Due to violence in the Libya at the time, the CIA had improved its security over time, but the State Department TMF did not, for reasons unclear to Morell. He denies the charge that there was any advance warning of the attack. While he characterizes the attack as an act of terrorism, he finds no evidence that they were planned in advance, especially given the attackers’ poor armament, looting, and vandalism. He does, however, believe that the attack on the CIA annex was more organized. Republicans accused Morell of lying under oath during the hearings over the incident. Morrell asserts that the controversy over the incident being a protest or an organized attack was the result of a simple error by a CIA editor, and that the CIA’s analyst thought the attack was terrorism from the beginning. He describes various mistakes made by the CIA’s offices of public and congressional affairs, who took the lead (inappropriately, in Morell’s view) in coordinating the talking points. He writes that the evidence regarding Ansar al-Sharia’s involvement was classified at the time. He also denies that the White House played a significant role in editing the talking points. He notes that the initial talking points blamed the attack on the video, even though the CIA disagreed. He states that the “stand-down order” controversy was simply a delay made by the Benghazi base chief due to the lack of assistance by local Libyan militias. He notes that many of the administration's’ critics simply got their facts wrong regarding Morell’s role in drafting the talking points, noting that “the administration’s critics were doing exactly what they accused the administration of doing.” Morell advises future CIA officers to refrain from “the talking point business” and that the best remedy for messes like Benghazi is immediate, full transparency. He notes that the Benghazi furor failed to highlight what should have been an obvious concern---protecting diplomats overseas, and Morell’s recommendations regarding this problem make sense.
Morell describes the interplay between the Senate and the CIA regarding the torture investigation, noting that the Republicans on the committee pulled their staff off the review team due to the Democrats’ refusal to interview any of the program’s participants. Of course, the investigation started due to Jose Rodriguez’s destruction of the interrogation tapes; Morell considered Rodriguez’ actions inappropriate given his superiors’ direct orders to preserve the tapes. This set in motion the chain of events leading to the Senate investigation. According to Morell, Feinstein wanted to hold the endorsement vote in December so Republican Olympia Snowe could vote in favor; thus it could not be called a “party line” vote by pundits. According to Morell, “the SSCI staff that produced the Committee’s study did a great disservice to the committee, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the country. It appears to me that the staffers wrote the report that they thought their political masters wanted to see.” Morell goes on to point out some factual, logical, and contextual errors, calling the report “one of the worst pieces of analysis that this thirty-three-year veteran of analysis at CIA has ever seen.” He goes on to note several arguments against the report’s credibility; if you’ve read the CIA’s response or the minority report, these will probably be familiar (documents that, Morrell notes, the media almost completely ignored).
Morrell also addresses controversy over the NSA surveillance and Edward Snowden’s role in that episode. He suggests that Snowden had contact with the Russian and Chinese intelligence services before releasing his trove of NSA secrets; he writes that he is not permitted to go into details. Morell writes that Snowden was “not smart enough to realize when and how he might be being used.” Morell argues that all of the NSA’s actions were fully approved by the White House, the DNI, and Congress. He also writes that the NSA had neglected to secure its software or compartmentalize its organization; loopholes that Snowden took full advantage of. He also recalls some of the amateurish, over-the-top news reports following Snowden’s revelations, many of which suggested it was literally phone-tapping, even though it was actually metadata collection. According to Morell, the NSA did not commit any illegal offenses or abuses of power under the 215 program. Morrell also cites Snowden’s January 2009 chatroom activity as “The TrueHOOHA” to suggest that Snowden is a bit of a hypocrite regarding the leaking of classified information (Morell also accuses Snowden of having an “enormous ego”). According to Morell, “the vast amount of information he stole and disclosed to journalists had nothing to do with privacy,” and that “the media and international organizations have relentlessly pumped hot air into his inflated self-esteem,” an entirely believable characterization.
In one instance Morell refers to “India’s May 1988" test of a nuclear weapon when he means 1998.
Interesting, thoughtful, well-organized and often riveting. The book is more big-picture than detail-oriented (probably because of classification issues), but well worth a read.
Morrell is fairly sympathetic to both Presidents Bush and Obama and appreciative of the weight of their offices and their role in expanding US counterterrorism capabilities. Morell seems to have genuinely liked Bush, while his relationship with Obama was more formal, albeit more personally engaging than some accounts suggest. Other players are not treated kindly, such as Vice President Cheney and his staff, who pressed the CIA to confirm some sort of link between Saddam and al-Qaeda when CIA analysts repeatedly told them they could find no significant signs of cooperation. According to Morrell, “the view that hard-liners in the Bush administration forced the intelligence community into its position on WMD is just flat wrong. No one pushed. The analysts were already there and they had been there for years before Bush came to office.” He notes that the CIA and pretty much the entire intelligence community agreed that Saddam had WMD, a view that went back to the Clinton administration and was shared by other intelligence agencies, the UN, and even Saddam’s own generals. Given that Saddam had kicked UN weapons inspectors out of the country in 1998, much of the intelligence on the issue was quite dated. Morell notes that intelligence resources available for Iraq were quite strained since Clinton had charged the Agency with the additional mission of regime change in 1998; it did not, however, assign additional people to this mission. “Congressional oversight committees are briefed on covert actions, and they sometimes provide additional funding, but they do not raise the Agency’s personnel ceiling just because there is a new plan. So the folks who could have been trying to figure out how to collect intelligence from Saddam’s inner circle to discover Saddam’s plans, intentions and capabilities with regard to weapons of mass destruction were diverted to find generals willing to overthrow him.” Apparently, Saddam thought that the US would eventually discover his lack of WMDs and that they would then lift the sanctions and refrain from an invasion.
He is also critical of other figures, such as McCain, Lindsey Graham, and Porter Goss. Morell calls Goss’s tenure “the worst during my three decades of service,” although he blames Goss’s aides more than Goss himself. He appears to have genuinely appreciated the work of Panetta, Hayden, and Petraeus (while noting that the Agency rank and file did not always feel the same way, especially about Petraeus). Morell asserts that the CIA was successful in thwarting al-Qaeda attacks following 9/11, but is also critical of many encountered shortcomings by the intelligence community as a whole (including CIA and NSA). Interestingly, he notes that, at the time of the Edward Snowden’s revelations regarding NSA surveillance, most Wall Street firms had better security than that agency. Regarding the Arab Spring, Morell notes that Agency analysts often struggled to understand what was happening, relying too heavily on governments in the region and not enough on independent street-level sources and media outlets, although it is unclear to Morell what difference the Agency’s failure made in the long run.
From reading the book it also seems like the level of cooperation between the CIA and the special operations community was one the great successes of the era, and he generously praises the skill and dedication of these men and women. Contrary to the old cliche about CIA-approved Agency memoirs, Morrell is quite straightforward about intelligence failures like the pre-Arab Spring Middle East and about the inner workings of the intelligence bureaucracy. Morell’s account of the Benghazi attacks is quite defensive but well-reasoned (this part of the book can get tedious and Morell even advises the reader to skip it). The book also glosses over controversies like the torture debate and the Camp Chapman attack (and maybe to a lesser degree the WMD fiasco). He is fairly critical of the recently released Senate report on the Agency’s interrogation program, which might be off-putting if you agree with the report’s findings, but will probably make sense if you happen to agree with the mostly ignored minority report and CIA response. Morell also addresses the drone debate, writing that claims of significant civilian casualties due to these strikes are “highly exaggerated,” and mainly the result of al-Qaeda propaganda. While many argue that these strikes simply create more terrorists than they kill, Morrell notes that there is simply no way to prove this claim and that bin Laden’s own documents indicate that al-Qaeda’s leadership believed that the strikes severely degraded its ability to carry out attacks.
As is usual for this genre, Morell regales the reader with all kinds of interesting insider tidbits about working for the Agency. Apparently, CIA analytical pieces are often poorly written, confusing, or badly argued. When Morell was Tenet’s executive assistant, he often took it upon himself to rewrite them. Also, most CIA covert operations do, in fact, leak, but according to Morell, most of these leaks come from the White House, not Congress. Also, the CIA’s August 6, 2001 PDB has now become famous, mainly for its title. Many sources also claim that Bush responded to the PDB with “Alright, you’ve covered your ass now.” But, according to Morell, this was simply a joking reference; also, Morell writes that he was simply addressing some of Cheney’s and Rumsfeld’s concerns on whether or not the constant bin Laden-related threat reporting was a deception or not. Bush has claimed that he personally requested the briefing, and Morell confirms this in his memoir.
Morell writes that “Politicians are so fixated on scoring points and thinking in terms of partisan advantage that they project these same attitudes and behaviors on public servants. They have a hard time remembering that we serve Democrats and Republicans with the same professionalism and dedication.”
According to Morell, 9/11 was not a failure of imagination. He mentions the various specific examples of lapses by CIA, FBI, and NSA personnel that contributed to the failure to prevent the attacks; whether a different course could have prevented it remains unknowable. He also points to overlooked shortcomings like the lack of funding and the failure to implement recommendations by previous investigations into airline incidents. He points out that it is unclear whether the American people would have supported these measures in the pre-9/11 era.
Of course, Morell also addresses Benghazi. He denies the assertion that the CIA base in Benghazi was involved in shipping arms to Syrian rebels. Due to violence in the Libya at the time, the CIA had improved its security over time, but the State Department TMF did not, for reasons unclear to Morell. He denies the charge that there was any advance warning of the attack. While he characterizes the attack as an act of terrorism, he finds no evidence that they were planned in advance, especially given the attackers’ poor armament, looting, and vandalism. He does, however, believe that the attack on the CIA annex was more organized. Republicans accused Morell of lying under oath during the hearings over the incident. Morrell asserts that the controversy over the incident being a protest or an organized attack was the result of a simple error by a CIA editor, and that the CIA’s analyst thought the attack was terrorism from the beginning. He describes various mistakes made by the CIA’s offices of public and congressional affairs, who took the lead (inappropriately, in Morell’s view) in coordinating the talking points. He writes that the evidence regarding Ansar al-Sharia’s involvement was classified at the time. He also denies that the White House played a significant role in editing the talking points. He notes that the initial talking points blamed the attack on the video, even though the CIA disagreed. He states that the “stand-down order” controversy was simply a delay made by the Benghazi base chief due to the lack of assistance by local Libyan militias. He notes that many of the administration's’ critics simply got their facts wrong regarding Morell’s role in drafting the talking points, noting that “the administration’s critics were doing exactly what they accused the administration of doing.” Morell advises future CIA officers to refrain from “the talking point business” and that the best remedy for messes like Benghazi is immediate, full transparency. He notes that the Benghazi furor failed to highlight what should have been an obvious concern---protecting diplomats overseas, and Morell’s recommendations regarding this problem make sense.
Morell describes the interplay between the Senate and the CIA regarding the torture investigation, noting that the Republicans on the committee pulled their staff off the review team due to the Democrats’ refusal to interview any of the program’s participants. Of course, the investigation started due to Jose Rodriguez’s destruction of the interrogation tapes; Morell considered Rodriguez’ actions inappropriate given his superiors’ direct orders to preserve the tapes. This set in motion the chain of events leading to the Senate investigation. According to Morell, Feinstein wanted to hold the endorsement vote in December so Republican Olympia Snowe could vote in favor; thus it could not be called a “party line” vote by pundits. According to Morell, “the SSCI staff that produced the Committee’s study did a great disservice to the committee, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the country. It appears to me that the staffers wrote the report that they thought their political masters wanted to see.” Morell goes on to point out some factual, logical, and contextual errors, calling the report “one of the worst pieces of analysis that this thirty-three-year veteran of analysis at CIA has ever seen.” He goes on to note several arguments against the report’s credibility; if you’ve read the CIA’s response or the minority report, these will probably be familiar (documents that, Morrell notes, the media almost completely ignored).
Morrell also addresses controversy over the NSA surveillance and Edward Snowden’s role in that episode. He suggests that Snowden had contact with the Russian and Chinese intelligence services before releasing his trove of NSA secrets; he writes that he is not permitted to go into details. Morell writes that Snowden was “not smart enough to realize when and how he might be being used.” Morell argues that all of the NSA’s actions were fully approved by the White House, the DNI, and Congress. He also writes that the NSA had neglected to secure its software or compartmentalize its organization; loopholes that Snowden took full advantage of. He also recalls some of the amateurish, over-the-top news reports following Snowden’s revelations, many of which suggested it was literally phone-tapping, even though it was actually metadata collection. According to Morell, the NSA did not commit any illegal offenses or abuses of power under the 215 program. Morrell also cites Snowden’s January 2009 chatroom activity as “The TrueHOOHA” to suggest that Snowden is a bit of a hypocrite regarding the leaking of classified information (Morell also accuses Snowden of having an “enormous ego”). According to Morell, “the vast amount of information he stole and disclosed to journalists had nothing to do with privacy,” and that “the media and international organizations have relentlessly pumped hot air into his inflated self-esteem,” an entirely believable characterization.
In one instance Morell refers to “India’s May 1988" test of a nuclear weapon when he means 1998.
Interesting, thoughtful, well-organized and often riveting. The book is more big-picture than detail-oriented (probably because of classification issues), but well worth a read.
September 12, 2018
A good defense of the CIA as a bipartisan organization supplying intelligence to the Executive branch and decent intro into how the IC works. But, still rather defensive in tone.
June 29, 2020
From being the President's Daily Briefer during President Bush to serving as CIA's Deputy Director during President Obama, Michael Morell has been inside-the-room guy during the most significant events that have either challengingly questioned the CIA for its failure or reposed the citizens' faith in the agency during the last two decades. He was by President Bush's side when the twin towers collapsed on 9/11, and he was one of the top echelons at the agency who were involved in the strictly confidential operation to take out Bin Laden in Abottabad. The time span connecting the two events have been a tumultuous period for the CIA, not least due to its harsh interrogative methods to ensure cooperation of detainees and the most notorious rendition, detention and interrogation program.
9/11 itself had stained the agency due to its intelligence failure which resulted in this catastrophe and for all the events that took place afterwards including Snowden's leak, Benghazi attack etc, it has been the need of the time to know the answers from the leadership at CIA. Michael Morell with all his credibility seems to be one of the best insiders who can explain to the world of the CIA affairs that went south.
The author begins with explaining painstakingly about the intelligence failures that led to 9/11, and the poor analysis of intelligence regarding Saddam's possession of WMD and his ties to alQaeda. He debunks a few myths about the torture of detainees and the above mentioned rendition program run by CIA. He also clears the air about a common belief among audiences that the CIA acts on its own without any checks and balances. Besides, there's deep insight about how the agency works amid the partisan politics & constant hostility of House and Senate committees towards the agency. Most of all, the terrorist threat from alQaeda and other extremists to the US and their evolution have been the primary focal points throughout the book. The arguments are persuasive and they do not betray any partisan on the author's part. A must read!
9/11 itself had stained the agency due to its intelligence failure which resulted in this catastrophe and for all the events that took place afterwards including Snowden's leak, Benghazi attack etc, it has been the need of the time to know the answers from the leadership at CIA. Michael Morell with all his credibility seems to be one of the best insiders who can explain to the world of the CIA affairs that went south.
The author begins with explaining painstakingly about the intelligence failures that led to 9/11, and the poor analysis of intelligence regarding Saddam's possession of WMD and his ties to alQaeda. He debunks a few myths about the torture of detainees and the above mentioned rendition program run by CIA. He also clears the air about a common belief among audiences that the CIA acts on its own without any checks and balances. Besides, there's deep insight about how the agency works amid the partisan politics & constant hostility of House and Senate committees towards the agency. Most of all, the terrorist threat from alQaeda and other extremists to the US and their evolution have been the primary focal points throughout the book. The arguments are persuasive and they do not betray any partisan on the author's part. A must read!
November 2, 2017
Great information on the rise of al Qa'ida and ISIS. Listened to audiobook. Excellent narrator.
December 27, 2015
Morell has excellent anecdotes about his time in the intelligence community which he shares with the reader in an engaging, conversational tone, but his retrospective analysis of important decisions made along the way is where this book really shines.
An insider's perspective on the lead-up to and aftermath of the terror attacks of 9/11 & 7/7, the Snowden leaks, the revolutions in Libya and Egypt of the Arab Spring, the assault on Bin Laden's compound in Abbottabad Pakistan, and others offers a glimpse into the leadership styles and personalities of many officials found often in the news, as well as the events themselves.
Anyone interested in politics, national security and counter-terrorism, and statecraft will find this book to be very interesting, and should strongly consider reading The Great War of Our Time.
An insider's perspective on the lead-up to and aftermath of the terror attacks of 9/11 & 7/7, the Snowden leaks, the revolutions in Libya and Egypt of the Arab Spring, the assault on Bin Laden's compound in Abbottabad Pakistan, and others offers a glimpse into the leadership styles and personalities of many officials found often in the news, as well as the events themselves.
Anyone interested in politics, national security and counter-terrorism, and statecraft will find this book to be very interesting, and should strongly consider reading The Great War of Our Time.
July 10, 2019
This was a cool memoir to see the inner workings of the CIA today that is from an actual person who works there and not someone who thinks he knows or someone who has clearly never worked there. Mr. Morell was and still is very dedicated to his country and wants to see the nation secure from enemies foreign and domestic. The review is not based off of my personal feelings towards the CIA and the way that they have conducted the war on terror, but based on the opinions of someone who ha worked there. His views seem genuine and what e truly believes in. The biggest problem of the book comes at the end where Mr. Morell sometimes fails to see the other side of the argument. I do not believe he is aware that some of the CIA programs had pushed the limits of our constitution, and that just because on judge says so does not mean that it is written in stone. Another issue that I saw at the end of the book was he started to use a phrase that tends to come out of dictators mouths when they want to do anything they want which is " I did this for national security". Otherwise it was a fun book to read and get an inside look at the CIA.
January 4, 2019
This book was quite insightful and left me with a few takeaways. The first of which is that the CIA is not infallible. Secondly, the CIA isn't some faceless machine, but a group of human beings doing what they think is right. Lastly, terrorism is, sadly, an ongoing battle that requires leadership and a great deal of thought about those whose have chosen it as their calling. The Great War of Our Time bounced around different time frames making the writing slightly difficult to follow at times, but the overall pace of the book was satisfying and the content was certainly interesting.
July 2, 2024
I was expecting a book about the ideologies of terrorists, but instead it focused more on the CIA and politics within the agency. The end of the book was essentially a testimony to the author’s children explaining why his name was dragged through the mud in Congress regarding Benghazi.
There were a ton of great quotes in here from Bush, Obama, and other prominent CIA members. Great read!
There were a ton of great quotes in here from Bush, Obama, and other prominent CIA members. Great read!
August 5, 2019
Exceptional
January 2, 2022
Good read, learned a lot.
September 14, 2025
Best CIA book ever. It has the credibility that comes from a thirty-year career that included daily briefings of Bush 43 and leading the agency itself. It has flow and polish of prose that must cast his co-author in a good light, or maybe it’s that Morell is just that good. Written in 2015, it may be getting a bit past it now, in terms of relevancy, but I really felt Morell’s work here contributed importantly to my understanding of near history, if not of current events.
My main takeaway was the Iraq war. It’s become conventional wisdom that Bush and Cheny just wanted war with Iraq because they were looking for trouble. This conveniently ignores the fact that a majority of Americans saw things in pretty much those terms. From Morell’s perspective, on the intel side, he asserts most unequivocally that there was no pressure from the White House to invent intelligence. He cites intelligence reports and worldwide intelligence opinion to show that the intel community was quite of one mind about Saddam Hussein: he was developing WMD and was a threat to global order. They were all thinking the same things, and knowing what we know now was not an option, although he does use the word “groupthink” to explain the unanimity of views. He does a really great job of detailing the process by which various data sources are crafted by analysts into intelligence.
On the other hand, he describes in detail the crafting of the intel that went into Colin Powell’s UN speech. There, he shows how it was the Vice President’s office which was continually meddling in the prose and inserting things or interpretations not supported by credible evidence. He says that “the degree of analysis being done by political appointees was unprecedented.” For example, his analysts did not believe in the story that Hussein had tried to buy yellowcake from Niger, and thought he had put a stop to the promulgation of that fairy tale until Bush came out and said it.
On 9/11 as a whole, another big takeaway I have is where Morell quashes another too-easy conclusion, that the WTC attacks were the result of “a lack of imagination.” No, says Morell, it was not a lack of imagination, at least not a lack of imagination on the part of the intel community, who imagine all kinds of things. Rather, it was an American failure to support, to fund the kind of intelligence-gathering, and the agencies that do those things, to a level commensurate with the threat.
Similarly, another big commonplace is how the NSA was (maybe is) out of control, reading our emails and such. He sharply notes that whatever the NSA did was legal, and moreover, it did what it was asked to do by policymakers.
The theme that runs through the whole thing is immense pride in the people who make up the intelligence community. There is a notable lack of ego in this; his defense of the NSA and their professionalism in serving administration after administration to the best of their abilities is typical and bracing. The story of how the book got its title is similarly inspiring. Unfortunately I don’t recall all the details right now, but it was something like an inscription someone wrote in some kind of memorial.
Very surprised to see how relatively few reviews this has here on GR and by implication how little uptake by the reading public. In my opinion this is still an important book that should be read by anyone wishing to join the adults in discussion about intelligence matters.
My main takeaway was the Iraq war. It’s become conventional wisdom that Bush and Cheny just wanted war with Iraq because they were looking for trouble. This conveniently ignores the fact that a majority of Americans saw things in pretty much those terms. From Morell’s perspective, on the intel side, he asserts most unequivocally that there was no pressure from the White House to invent intelligence. He cites intelligence reports and worldwide intelligence opinion to show that the intel community was quite of one mind about Saddam Hussein: he was developing WMD and was a threat to global order. They were all thinking the same things, and knowing what we know now was not an option, although he does use the word “groupthink” to explain the unanimity of views. He does a really great job of detailing the process by which various data sources are crafted by analysts into intelligence.
On the other hand, he describes in detail the crafting of the intel that went into Colin Powell’s UN speech. There, he shows how it was the Vice President’s office which was continually meddling in the prose and inserting things or interpretations not supported by credible evidence. He says that “the degree of analysis being done by political appointees was unprecedented.” For example, his analysts did not believe in the story that Hussein had tried to buy yellowcake from Niger, and thought he had put a stop to the promulgation of that fairy tale until Bush came out and said it.
On 9/11 as a whole, another big takeaway I have is where Morell quashes another too-easy conclusion, that the WTC attacks were the result of “a lack of imagination.” No, says Morell, it was not a lack of imagination, at least not a lack of imagination on the part of the intel community, who imagine all kinds of things. Rather, it was an American failure to support, to fund the kind of intelligence-gathering, and the agencies that do those things, to a level commensurate with the threat.
Similarly, another big commonplace is how the NSA was (maybe is) out of control, reading our emails and such. He sharply notes that whatever the NSA did was legal, and moreover, it did what it was asked to do by policymakers.
The theme that runs through the whole thing is immense pride in the people who make up the intelligence community. There is a notable lack of ego in this; his defense of the NSA and their professionalism in serving administration after administration to the best of their abilities is typical and bracing. The story of how the book got its title is similarly inspiring. Unfortunately I don’t recall all the details right now, but it was something like an inscription someone wrote in some kind of memorial.
Very surprised to see how relatively few reviews this has here on GR and by implication how little uptake by the reading public. In my opinion this is still an important book that should be read by anyone wishing to join the adults in discussion about intelligence matters.
October 11, 2019
Excellent insights on counter terrorism and intelligence analysis at the highest echelons. Superb articulation. This book should win awards and is sure to become a classic. Bravo.
November 3, 2015
I have a great deal of respect for Mr. Morell and believe he has been and continues to be a great asset to this country. I also believe he is very capable and has a great mind, I enjoy watching him on news programs anytime I get the opportunity. That being said, I did not find this book particularly compelling. Perhaps it is because I stay up to date with much of the world events in the book or seek out Mr. Morell's appearances so often that it did not inform me as much as I thought it would. That being said, someone with little knowledge of the events occurring in the last fifteen years may find it more valuable.
I will also say that some books I've read on this topic (some of which I've reviewed) and my consumption of information on YouTube, Netflix and various podcasts did often provide some nuances that I hadn't considered. My final criticism is that I came to understand toward the end of the book (which others may understand much sooner than I did) that this book was probably pushed by the CIA to repair the damage done to its image recently. Personally, I support the CIA and think the organization does a great job protecting our country. Positively, I think Morell presents the reasons for CIA failures honestly and clearly. I also believe his recounting of what transpired in Benghazi on 9/11. It seems to me that the the controversy surrounding the incident was due to mistakes in judgment and procedure and not a cover-up. Though the lack of leadership by the President and Sec. Clinton contributed to the disaster, as did their worldview. I did find some of his comments about his testimony to various Congressional committee's puzzling. Essentially, he did have some information and was probably in a position to clarify the issues. I understand one may not be inclined to do so in a hearing, for legal, professional, or other reasons, but he may have been able to provide clarity which was lacking. Again, I do not think Mr. Morell was dishonest in any way.
Also, regarding his perspective on EITs: he "doubts that I could in good conscience tell the American people that water-boarding someone was the right thing to do." I don't think I'm reaching too far to think that CIA has directly acted or was closely involved in the deaths of people who sought to harm this country. I am very comfortable with that. But it seems strange that (if this is true) using EITs to extract info from a terrorist, which would help save American lives, is somehow morally worse than killing the terrorists. It is true that some kinds of living is worse than dying, however getting slapped or even water-boarded does not rise to that kind of depravity. However, Morell's description of the EITs and the hearings was sincere and clarifying. Overall, I did not get as much out of this book as I was hoping, but that doesn't mean that others may not.
I will also say that some books I've read on this topic (some of which I've reviewed) and my consumption of information on YouTube, Netflix and various podcasts did often provide some nuances that I hadn't considered. My final criticism is that I came to understand toward the end of the book (which others may understand much sooner than I did) that this book was probably pushed by the CIA to repair the damage done to its image recently. Personally, I support the CIA and think the organization does a great job protecting our country. Positively, I think Morell presents the reasons for CIA failures honestly and clearly. I also believe his recounting of what transpired in Benghazi on 9/11. It seems to me that the the controversy surrounding the incident was due to mistakes in judgment and procedure and not a cover-up. Though the lack of leadership by the President and Sec. Clinton contributed to the disaster, as did their worldview. I did find some of his comments about his testimony to various Congressional committee's puzzling. Essentially, he did have some information and was probably in a position to clarify the issues. I understand one may not be inclined to do so in a hearing, for legal, professional, or other reasons, but he may have been able to provide clarity which was lacking. Again, I do not think Mr. Morell was dishonest in any way.
Also, regarding his perspective on EITs: he "doubts that I could in good conscience tell the American people that water-boarding someone was the right thing to do." I don't think I'm reaching too far to think that CIA has directly acted or was closely involved in the deaths of people who sought to harm this country. I am very comfortable with that. But it seems strange that (if this is true) using EITs to extract info from a terrorist, which would help save American lives, is somehow morally worse than killing the terrorists. It is true that some kinds of living is worse than dying, however getting slapped or even water-boarded does not rise to that kind of depravity. However, Morell's description of the EITs and the hearings was sincere and clarifying. Overall, I did not get as much out of this book as I was hoping, but that doesn't mean that others may not.
September 12, 2015
It is fascinating to see the life of someone at the top of the nation's intelligence system and their critique with inside views. Morell has every right to defend his beliefs and he does so in a well-written manner but be under no illusion, this is from his view and he often makes the same mistakes he accuses others of.
He was briefing President Bush during 911 and had a hand in many key developments through his 30+ years of service. And he has insight on both Bush and Obama, their management and personal style as well as decision-making processes. He has respect for both men.
Morell states that there was no one, anywhere including most or all intelligence services, who believed Saddam did not have WMD? But Hans Blix warnings and statements were clear and resolute, after thousands of Iraqi inspections, he maintained there were no WMD and Blix is not even mentioned?
From his testimonies in the aftermath of the Benghazi tragedy (he takes out the Republicans for this entire hate campaign) to the defence of using "harsh interrogation techniques" (he is against waterboarding) he at least provides the thinking behind many decisions and rightly calls out those who politicize intelligence. I think most agree, when lives are at stake, drastic measures and morally awful decisions have to be taken. He disproves that "torture" is ineffective and proves the opposite and also lambasts the Democrats for the DEC 2014 Senate Intelligence Committee report which was headed by Chairman Dianne Feinstein. This is indeed very interesting as he clearly exposes the report for many, and I do mean to many to count, mistakes, errors and politically motivated conclusions.
Of course he has to label Snowden as a traitor but this does help with understanding the true threat that our cyber security faces.
Decisions were made which were wrong and this book explains the system and helps one understand what went so wrong and what worked. Well interesting, useful and informative. Morell's service to America, and to the truth, can not be more highly admired.
He was briefing President Bush during 911 and had a hand in many key developments through his 30+ years of service. And he has insight on both Bush and Obama, their management and personal style as well as decision-making processes. He has respect for both men.
Morell states that there was no one, anywhere including most or all intelligence services, who believed Saddam did not have WMD? But Hans Blix warnings and statements were clear and resolute, after thousands of Iraqi inspections, he maintained there were no WMD and Blix is not even mentioned?
From his testimonies in the aftermath of the Benghazi tragedy (he takes out the Republicans for this entire hate campaign) to the defence of using "harsh interrogation techniques" (he is against waterboarding) he at least provides the thinking behind many decisions and rightly calls out those who politicize intelligence. I think most agree, when lives are at stake, drastic measures and morally awful decisions have to be taken. He disproves that "torture" is ineffective and proves the opposite and also lambasts the Democrats for the DEC 2014 Senate Intelligence Committee report which was headed by Chairman Dianne Feinstein. This is indeed very interesting as he clearly exposes the report for many, and I do mean to many to count, mistakes, errors and politically motivated conclusions.
Of course he has to label Snowden as a traitor but this does help with understanding the true threat that our cyber security faces.
Decisions were made which were wrong and this book explains the system and helps one understand what went so wrong and what worked. Well interesting, useful and informative. Morell's service to America, and to the truth, can not be more highly admired.
September 25, 2016
Morell spent 30 years with the CIA working his way up the analyst side of the house into upper management. This is his perspective of the intelligence community and the two presidents that he served. Covering the 9/11 attacks, Benghazi, Edward Snowden, waterboarding and secret prisons, his time at the agency has spent more time in controversies, political battles on the Hill and front page news. This is Morell's love letter to the agency and his justification of their actions and his personal decisions.
Why I started this book: The title caught my eye while I was browsing thru my Overdrive libraries. I put it on hold and just recently received it.
Why I finished it: Morell is very right about how politicized National Security has become over the last twenty years. And I noticed it in myself, as I read about his time with the other party thinking "Of course you would believe that but look at the evidence against your case..." and when reading about my guys thinking "everybody can make honest mistakes in the heat of the moment. They prevented further attacks and everyone screaming differently just wants to make political hay."
Not the strongest case for the CIA or the executive branch.
Read along: Playing to the Edge: American Intelligence in the Age of Terror, Objective Troy: A Terrorist, a President, and the Rise of the Drone and Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War.
Why I started this book: The title caught my eye while I was browsing thru my Overdrive libraries. I put it on hold and just recently received it.
Why I finished it: Morell is very right about how politicized National Security has become over the last twenty years. And I noticed it in myself, as I read about his time with the other party thinking "Of course you would believe that but look at the evidence against your case..." and when reading about my guys thinking "everybody can make honest mistakes in the heat of the moment. They prevented further attacks and everyone screaming differently just wants to make political hay."
Not the strongest case for the CIA or the executive branch.
Read along: Playing to the Edge: American Intelligence in the Age of Terror, Objective Troy: A Terrorist, a President, and the Rise of the Drone and Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War.
March 16, 2017
Finally got around to reading this book, as it was recommended by a colleague. Worth the read. Didn't quite realize that it would be a memoir, but it was a good one. The author was one of the key officials within the CIA, from being the Presidential Daily Intelligence Briefer on 9/11 to the #3 man at the CIA throughout the turbulent times in the late 2000s/early 2010s. His insights into the political explosive issues of the CIA interrogation techniques/black sites and the Benghazi raid in 2012 are quite revealing. Unfortunately, he found himself in the crosshairs of both sides of the political spectrum. However, he offers a solid defense of his and the CIA's actions, cutting through the politics and partisanship. Certainly, he will not be seen as a credible defender by all, but in the midst of the partisan issues, his insight into the actions of the CIA during the counterterrorism wars starting since 9/11 are very educational. The standards of reporting and analysis, of how the CIA should present information to the President and those in power who must act on those decisions are key parts of his work. It also provided some additional information about key terrorist groups and some discussions about the current threats from ISIS as well as the older, but no less dangerous threats, from Al-Qaida. Overall, a good, solid read.
June 1, 2015
Michael Morell does a great job in this memoir, giving detail to his experiences at the CIA and summarizing the lessons to be learned from our nation's 14-year (and counting) fight against terrorism.
His thoughtful portrayal of the sacrifices and tough decisions that he and others at the top levels of the federal government made every day after 9/11 put the oft-criticized CIA and the Bush #43 administration in a new light. Morrell missed the opportunity to tell more about the early part of his career and the changes at the CIA since his first assignment in 1980. Those tales were surely cut in favor of the more recent and sensational episodes with which the mainstream reader will identify, but I would have liked to have seen them here. Thank you, Michael Morell for including a discussion of the Memorial Wall and a few of the lives to which it pays tribute.
His thoughtful portrayal of the sacrifices and tough decisions that he and others at the top levels of the federal government made every day after 9/11 put the oft-criticized CIA and the Bush #43 administration in a new light. Morrell missed the opportunity to tell more about the early part of his career and the changes at the CIA since his first assignment in 1980. Those tales were surely cut in favor of the more recent and sensational episodes with which the mainstream reader will identify, but I would have liked to have seen them here. Thank you, Michael Morell for including a discussion of the Memorial Wall and a few of the lives to which it pays tribute.
March 22, 2017
Whoa. I was not expecting to be so engrossed by this book. In fact, I called my father and told him to rent the book as soon as I returned it to the library.
Michael Morell, if you are like me and have spent many years intentionally avoiding news only to find you now NEED to understanding everything, is a former acting CIA director and deputy director. He was with President Bush on 9/11/01 working as his CIA briefer and went on to work with President Obama. He step by step takes you through declassified policy decisions and moments of history from a front row seat.
It is engaging, personal, insightful. There are some times where it feels like a lengthy justification for actions, but what a valuable thing to understand (that is, why our leaders made the decisions they did with the information they had).
The day I finished the book it was announced international flights from the middle east would no longer be allowed to carry on electronic devises larger than cell phones. This book helped me to see and understand decisions such as this and the importance of trusting our leaders and well as the importance of holding them accountable.
Michael Morell, if you are like me and have spent many years intentionally avoiding news only to find you now NEED to understanding everything, is a former acting CIA director and deputy director. He was with President Bush on 9/11/01 working as his CIA briefer and went on to work with President Obama. He step by step takes you through declassified policy decisions and moments of history from a front row seat.
It is engaging, personal, insightful. There are some times where it feels like a lengthy justification for actions, but what a valuable thing to understand (that is, why our leaders made the decisions they did with the information they had).
The day I finished the book it was announced international flights from the middle east would no longer be allowed to carry on electronic devises larger than cell phones. This book helped me to see and understand decisions such as this and the importance of trusting our leaders and well as the importance of holding them accountable.
October 6, 2025
From David Sanger:
But it is his account of the Benghazi attacks — and how the C.I.A. was drawn into the debate over whether the Obama White House deliberately distorted its account of the death of Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens — that is bound to attract attention, at least partly because of its relevance to the coming presidential election. The initial assessments that the C.I.A. gave to the White House said demonstrations had preceded the attack. By the time analysts reversed their opinion, Susan E. Rice, now the national security adviser, had made a series of statements on Sunday talk shows describing the initial assessment. The controversy and other comments Ms. Rice made derailed Mr. Obama’s plan to appoint her as secretary of state.
The experience prompted Mr. Morell to write that the C.I.A. should stay out of the business of preparing talking points — especially on issues that are being seized upon for “political purposes.” He is critical of the State Department for not beefing up security in Libya for its diplomats, as the C.I.A., he said, did for its employees.
But it is his account of the Benghazi attacks — and how the C.I.A. was drawn into the debate over whether the Obama White House deliberately distorted its account of the death of Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens — that is bound to attract attention, at least partly because of its relevance to the coming presidential election. The initial assessments that the C.I.A. gave to the White House said demonstrations had preceded the attack. By the time analysts reversed their opinion, Susan E. Rice, now the national security adviser, had made a series of statements on Sunday talk shows describing the initial assessment. The controversy and other comments Ms. Rice made derailed Mr. Obama’s plan to appoint her as secretary of state.
The experience prompted Mr. Morell to write that the C.I.A. should stay out of the business of preparing talking points — especially on issues that are being seized upon for “political purposes.” He is critical of the State Department for not beefing up security in Libya for its diplomats, as the C.I.A., he said, did for its employees.
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December 19, 2016Michael Morell spent most of his career at the CIA, serving both as Deputy Director and Acting Director. I got to know him when we served together on the five-person Review Group President Obama appointed in 2014 to recommend changes in our foreign national intelligence programs in the wake of the Snowden disclosures. In The Great War of Our Time, Morell traces in remarkable detail such extraordinary moments as 9/11 (he was with President Bush at the time), the Benghazi incident, and the capture of Bin Laden. Morell worked closely with Presidents Clinton, Bush II, and Obama, and was at the center of the American national security community for several critical decades. The book, like Morell himself, is clear, honest, direct, and illuminating. I should add that this fall Michael Morell taught three classes with me at my home with students in our Greenberg Seminar titled National Security: Liberty and Security in a Changing World. —Geoffrey R. Stone
December 4, 2017
I was looking for a history book giving me a perspective I didn't have on Al-Qaeda and ISIS. What I got was an apologist autobiography wherein I learned all about expensive dinners to celebrate job offers, that Leon Panetta likes to hug people, and about 200 pages of "you don't know what it's like and you don't know how hard our job is". Oh yeah, and he ends it with a Make a Wish Foundation story too. Did we really need a chapter on Benghazi and how we just don't get it when a chapter on, say, the history of Al-Qaeda, or of terrorism in general, would have been so much more useful?
Ultimately I learned nothing from this book, and no one that even cursorily reads the news is going to either.
Ultimately I learned nothing from this book, and no one that even cursorily reads the news is going to either.
June 21, 2015
I enjoyed the book. Well written, but it had more typos than I would expect from a major publisher. The worst was when he referred to "steal I beams". For the non engineers, it should have read "steel I beams".
He had an excellent description of what really happened in Benghazi. That should be required reading by anyone who wants to know what truly happened there without all the political posturing.
I didn't agree with him on the CIA torture issue, but he is a 33 year veteran of the CIA and is entitled to his opinions.
He had an excellent description of what really happened in Benghazi. That should be required reading by anyone who wants to know what truly happened there without all the political posturing.
I didn't agree with him on the CIA torture issue, but he is a 33 year veteran of the CIA and is entitled to his opinions.
May 30, 2015
An excellent overview and insight from one of the highest-ranking members of CIA. I found Morell's arguments concerning enhanced interrogation techniques and the use of drone strikes particularly compelling. A great read for a look into the daily life of a CIA officer, particularly as it pertains to counterterrorism operations.
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June 28, 2015Insightful
While tedious to read at times this book gives a very detailed description of all the important events on our war against terrorists. The author, Michael Morell, was in the heart of it all and tells a very accurate account without any political influence. This book dispels some misconceptions.
While tedious to read at times this book gives a very detailed description of all the important events on our war against terrorists. The author, Michael Morell, was in the heart of it all and tells a very accurate account without any political influence. This book dispels some misconceptions.
July 8, 2015
The Great War of our Time is insightful, intriguing and downright captivating! Former CIA Deputy Director Michael Morell, has given me a renewed appreciation of the CIA and their constant endeavor in the war against terrorism! God bless the many men and women who sacrifice so much to make this world a safer place.
July 9, 2015
This book provides an excellent overview of terrorism, and our response to terrorism over the past 20 years. In addition, it provides an inside look into the everyday life of our nation's heroes at the CIA.
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