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The Once and Future King: The Rise of Crown Government in America
This remarkable book shatters just about every myth surrounding American government, the Constitution, and the Founding Fathers, and offers the clearest warning about the alarming rise of one-man rule in the age of Obama.
Most Americans believe that this country uniquely protects liberty, that it does so because of its Constitution, and that for this our thanks must go to the Founders, at their Convention in Philadelphia in 1787.
F. H. Buckley’s book debunks all these myths. America isn’t the freest country around, according to the think tanks that study these things. And it’s not the Constitution that made it free, since parliamentary regimes are generally freer than presidential ones. Finally, what we think of as the Constitution, with its separation of powers, was not what the Founders had in mind. What they expected was a country in which Congress would dominate the government, and in which the president would play a much smaller role.
Sadly, that’s not the government we have today. What we have instead is what Buckley calls Crown the rule of an all-powerful president. The country began in a revolt against one king, and today we see the dawn of a new kind of monarchy. What we have is what Founder George Mason called an “elective monarchy,” which he thought would be worse than the real thing.
Much of this is irreversible. Constitutional amendments to redress the balance of power are extremely unlikely, and most Americans seem to have accepted, and even welcomed, Crown government. The way back lies through Congress, and Buckley suggests feasible reforms that it might adopt, to regain the authority and respect it has squandered.
Most Americans believe that this country uniquely protects liberty, that it does so because of its Constitution, and that for this our thanks must go to the Founders, at their Convention in Philadelphia in 1787.
F. H. Buckley’s book debunks all these myths. America isn’t the freest country around, according to the think tanks that study these things. And it’s not the Constitution that made it free, since parliamentary regimes are generally freer than presidential ones. Finally, what we think of as the Constitution, with its separation of powers, was not what the Founders had in mind. What they expected was a country in which Congress would dominate the government, and in which the president would play a much smaller role.
Sadly, that’s not the government we have today. What we have instead is what Buckley calls Crown the rule of an all-powerful president. The country began in a revolt against one king, and today we see the dawn of a new kind of monarchy. What we have is what Founder George Mason called an “elective monarchy,” which he thought would be worse than the real thing.
Much of this is irreversible. Constitutional amendments to redress the balance of power are extremely unlikely, and most Americans seem to have accepted, and even welcomed, Crown government. The way back lies through Congress, and Buckley suggests feasible reforms that it might adopt, to regain the authority and respect it has squandered.
416 pages, Paperback
First published April 8, 2014
About the author
F.H. Buckley
15 books24 followersFrancis H. Buckley: Son of F.J. & H.B. Buckley; M. Esther Goldberg; child Sarah.
BA, McGill University 1969
LLB, McGill University 1974
LLM, Harvard University 1975
Exec Dir/Assoc Dean of Geo Mason Law & Economics Center & Foundation Law Prof who's taught there since '89 & was Visiting Olin Fellow at the U of Chicago Law School in '88/9. Shimer College trustee. Twice visiting professor at the Sorbonne/ Paris II, in fall '07 he was visiting professor at the Institut d'études politiques de Paris. He writes on law & economics & has published in journals, including the Journal of Legal Studies, the International Review of Law, Crisis & Economics & Public Choice. He's defended free markets before the American Enterprise Inst. His books include Fair Governance (Oxford '09), The Morality of Laughter (Michigan '03) & Just Exchange: A Theory of Contract (Routledge '05).
Geo Mason's Law & Economics Center, focusing on issues like tort reform, declines releasing fundraising & donor information. Documents released by the Community Rights Counsel, including some released as part of the nat'l tobacco settlement, show that its officials asked R.J. Reynolds Tobacco for $20,000 for its federal judges program, according to a Reynolds internal email. The center received $40,000 from Philip Morris from '96-99 & was listed among "key allies". It also received $40,000 from Exxon Mobil Foundation in '04. Buckley said their policy of silence as re donors is best for all. He declined to say where the seminars take place, citing security reasons: "We've been advised that there are more ethical problems if you disclose than if you don't."
BA, McGill University 1969
LLB, McGill University 1974
LLM, Harvard University 1975
Exec Dir/Assoc Dean of Geo Mason Law & Economics Center & Foundation Law Prof who's taught there since '89 & was Visiting Olin Fellow at the U of Chicago Law School in '88/9. Shimer College trustee. Twice visiting professor at the Sorbonne/ Paris II, in fall '07 he was visiting professor at the Institut d'études politiques de Paris. He writes on law & economics & has published in journals, including the Journal of Legal Studies, the International Review of Law, Crisis & Economics & Public Choice. He's defended free markets before the American Enterprise Inst. His books include Fair Governance (Oxford '09), The Morality of Laughter (Michigan '03) & Just Exchange: A Theory of Contract (Routledge '05).
Geo Mason's Law & Economics Center, focusing on issues like tort reform, declines releasing fundraising & donor information. Documents released by the Community Rights Counsel, including some released as part of the nat'l tobacco settlement, show that its officials asked R.J. Reynolds Tobacco for $20,000 for its federal judges program, according to a Reynolds internal email. The center received $40,000 from Philip Morris from '96-99 & was listed among "key allies". It also received $40,000 from Exxon Mobil Foundation in '04. Buckley said their policy of silence as re donors is best for all. He declined to say where the seminars take place, citing security reasons: "We've been advised that there are more ethical problems if you disclose than if you don't."
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Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews
March 18, 2015
A thought-provoking book on three main topics:
- How a close reading of the debates of the founders indicates that our view of their attachment to "separation of powers" - especially between the president and congress - may be fundamentally flawed. The delegates to the Constitutional Convention debated the method of selecting the president on 21 different days, and took more than 30 votes regarding this, in 16 of which they had a direct roll call vote on the selection method. In 6 of these (and once unanimously!) they voted for a president appointed by Congress - similar to a parliamentary regime. In 1 vote they voted 8-2 for a president appointed by state legislators. Every vote on direct election of a president was a "no" vote. The Framers did not seem to intend as powerful a presidency as we have evolved to, despite our reverence for the "careful balance"
- How heads of government have come to be more powerful, in both parliamentary and presidential systems - essentially a return of crown government, albeit elected. To the detriment of Congress (who have come to behave badly, because their authority is weakened: a reversal of cause and effect, potentially)
- And how, in presidential systems, this trend is not balanced as well as it is in parliamentary systems: where the prime minister is not generally the "revered head of state" and is subject to rough-and-tumble challenges to his/her authority.
The author closes with some recommendations, but concludes in the end that we are likely to continue the trend to more and more powerful presidents, and to see our system's effectiveness deteriorate versus that of parliamentary governments.
Overall, I came away much less enamored with our current system in the US - as compared to, say, Canada and/or Britain - than I started with. But I would be interested in reading a rebuttal.
BTW, the author is Canadian-born, and not hyper-partisan. He has a statistical bent and fills the appendices with regression analyses of various types.
I enjoyed this thoroughly. Sorry for the short review, but not much time for writing today.
- How a close reading of the debates of the founders indicates that our view of their attachment to "separation of powers" - especially between the president and congress - may be fundamentally flawed. The delegates to the Constitutional Convention debated the method of selecting the president on 21 different days, and took more than 30 votes regarding this, in 16 of which they had a direct roll call vote on the selection method. In 6 of these (and once unanimously!) they voted for a president appointed by Congress - similar to a parliamentary regime. In 1 vote they voted 8-2 for a president appointed by state legislators. Every vote on direct election of a president was a "no" vote. The Framers did not seem to intend as powerful a presidency as we have evolved to, despite our reverence for the "careful balance"
- How heads of government have come to be more powerful, in both parliamentary and presidential systems - essentially a return of crown government, albeit elected. To the detriment of Congress (who have come to behave badly, because their authority is weakened: a reversal of cause and effect, potentially)
- And how, in presidential systems, this trend is not balanced as well as it is in parliamentary systems: where the prime minister is not generally the "revered head of state" and is subject to rough-and-tumble challenges to his/her authority.
The author closes with some recommendations, but concludes in the end that we are likely to continue the trend to more and more powerful presidents, and to see our system's effectiveness deteriorate versus that of parliamentary governments.
Overall, I came away much less enamored with our current system in the US - as compared to, say, Canada and/or Britain - than I started with. But I would be interested in reading a rebuttal.
BTW, the author is Canadian-born, and not hyper-partisan. He has a statistical bent and fills the appendices with regression analyses of various types.
I enjoyed this thoroughly. Sorry for the short review, but not much time for writing today.
August 24, 2018
A very interesting look at the growth of the president over time by comparing British and Canada with the US. I mostly liked it however his bias shows when discussing Democrat presidents while giving a pass to Republican presidents. One wonders if he believes Trump embodies this idea of a strong “elective monarch” or if he will give Trump too, a pass.
April 30, 2024
Buckley makes institutional arguments against the presidential system and separation of powers as a Canadian but ends up admitting both parliamentary and presidential systems have converged towards “crown government” due to the increasing role of the administrative state. He notes how similar the terms of office are for both presidents and prime ministers and how deadlock is not more common in presidential regimes. The United States hasn’t shared the fate of the other presidential regimes copied in the Western Hemisphere by countries without a strong rule of law or socio-economic stability. There is a greater tendency towards military spending and somewhat less spending overall.
The book is valuable in seeing the president with an independent political role more like an 18th century British monarch rather than a neutral administrator, though I see the delegation of powers from congress as the main issue. The founders thought congress would effectively decide the president as Madison intended in case of electoral deadlock until the rise of political parties. But due to the polarization and nationalization of politics, the presidency is the biggest prize and single elective office for the entire country delegated enormous authority by congress. The symbolic role as head of state combined with electoral partisanship prevents the presidency from having the same uniting quality as a monarch or governor general. The impeachment power is tied to accusations of high crimes and misdemeanors and so more charged than removal due to political differences especially given a mandate of the people. But the unitary authority granted by Article II has the potential for the presidency to become a Caesar/Bonaparte and curtail the administrative state and issue popular directives. In fact it was from a compromise with the monarchical and democratic intentions of Hamilton and Wilson respectively who wanted a stronger national government that the mode of electing the president was devised.
The founder’s motivations for the constitution were to create a stronger national government where the enumerated powers of the constitution itself rather than the legislature predominate which make comparisons to other parliamentary systems limited. The election of the president however much of a compromise intended to reflect the federal nature of the system and cannot easily be changed. The challenge of this system is that responsibility for checking of powers comes within the government itself not just from the people which would call for greater checks and balances like a line item veto. Where Buckley finds wisdom in the Madisonian system is the notion of the extended republic inspired by David Hume where the number of interests represented in government is increased which is different than separation of powers since this occurs within the legislative body whereas the other branches operate more independently of direct election. A system where each level of government is elected by the previous but subject to one above would be more what Madison intended for the president, appointed by congress or originally electors by state legislatures but progressively came undone.
The book is valuable in seeing the president with an independent political role more like an 18th century British monarch rather than a neutral administrator, though I see the delegation of powers from congress as the main issue. The founders thought congress would effectively decide the president as Madison intended in case of electoral deadlock until the rise of political parties. But due to the polarization and nationalization of politics, the presidency is the biggest prize and single elective office for the entire country delegated enormous authority by congress. The symbolic role as head of state combined with electoral partisanship prevents the presidency from having the same uniting quality as a monarch or governor general. The impeachment power is tied to accusations of high crimes and misdemeanors and so more charged than removal due to political differences especially given a mandate of the people. But the unitary authority granted by Article II has the potential for the presidency to become a Caesar/Bonaparte and curtail the administrative state and issue popular directives. In fact it was from a compromise with the monarchical and democratic intentions of Hamilton and Wilson respectively who wanted a stronger national government that the mode of electing the president was devised.
The founder’s motivations for the constitution were to create a stronger national government where the enumerated powers of the constitution itself rather than the legislature predominate which make comparisons to other parliamentary systems limited. The election of the president however much of a compromise intended to reflect the federal nature of the system and cannot easily be changed. The challenge of this system is that responsibility for checking of powers comes within the government itself not just from the people which would call for greater checks and balances like a line item veto. Where Buckley finds wisdom in the Madisonian system is the notion of the extended republic inspired by David Hume where the number of interests represented in government is increased which is different than separation of powers since this occurs within the legislative body whereas the other branches operate more independently of direct election. A system where each level of government is elected by the previous but subject to one above would be more what Madison intended for the president, appointed by congress or originally electors by state legislatures but progressively came undone.
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June 15, 2015"Nelson performs the estimable work of proving that Alexander Hamilton, James Wilson, James Iredell, John Adams, and other leading Federalists were precisely as royalist in their political philosophy as Thomas Jefferson always insisted they were. (Nelson, sympathetic with the royalists, omits that he has vindicated Jefferson’s claims.)
What he does not do, however, is show that the Constitution was intended to confer prerogative powers upon the president. Part of the reason for his confusion seems to be his lack of familiarity with the Virginia republican revolutionary tradition of which Jefferson and James Madison—besides George Mason, Patrick Henry, Richard Bland, Landon Carter, and Mason’s brother Thomson—were representative. Far from the odd outlier Nelson wants to make him, Jefferson was in writing A Summary View of the Rights of British America and the draft Declaration of Independence entirely representative of them."
Kevin R.C. Gutzman reviews: http://www.theamericanconservative.co...
What he does not do, however, is show that the Constitution was intended to confer prerogative powers upon the president. Part of the reason for his confusion seems to be his lack of familiarity with the Virginia republican revolutionary tradition of which Jefferson and James Madison—besides George Mason, Patrick Henry, Richard Bland, Landon Carter, and Mason’s brother Thomson—were representative. Far from the odd outlier Nelson wants to make him, Jefferson was in writing A Summary View of the Rights of British America and the draft Declaration of Independence entirely representative of them."
Kevin R.C. Gutzman reviews: http://www.theamericanconservative.co...
April 29, 2023
This's an analysis of the growth of executive power in the United States, Britain, and Canada from the 1700's through the present (or, to be more precise, 2014 when it was written). Buckley views it as negative but inevitable, thanks to trends in government power and accountability in the modern world. He argues, however, that parliamentary systems are superior to presidential systems in keeping that powerful executive still accountable. Separation of powers is a bad thing. To show this, he contrasts examples of accountability from the United States and Canada, and also digs into the US Constitutional Convention to show that the presumptions leading them to choose separation of powers are no longer true.
This is, I believe, a valuable book. It could, however, have been an even better book if it had been more cross-partisan. Buckley's examples from modern American politics are almost all tilted to show the Democrats in a negative light. I don't disagree with any of his examples, but this still makes me hesitate to recommend it as much as I otherwise would have.
This is, I believe, a valuable book. It could, however, have been an even better book if it had been more cross-partisan. Buckley's examples from modern American politics are almost all tilted to show the Democrats in a negative light. I don't disagree with any of his examples, but this still makes me hesitate to recommend it as much as I otherwise would have.
November 17, 2024
Didn't care for this book at all. I don't think his arguments make a lot of sense. It may be just me but I do not agree with his conclusions.
April 5, 2016
George Mason University law professor Frank Buckley presents an interpretation and critique of America's political institutions that echoes concerns of his university's namesake. George Mason, in summing up the government framed by the Philadelphia convention, pronounced that it will "produce a monarchy, or a corrupt, tyrannical aristocracy." Buckley agrees, stating, "Our system of government is often described as a 'Madisonian republic,' but in fact it wasn’t one at its birth, and it certainly isn’t one now." Instead, Buckley describes a system with some of the extreme democratic features advocated by a James Wilson, and some of the extreme monarchical features advocated by an Alexander Hamilton. Buckley, Canadian by birth, retains some appreciation for the ceremonial role monarchs play as heads of state, but his central thesis is that America's government is tending toward all of the disadvantages of crown government with none of its advantages.
The reason for this is America's presidential system. Buckley goes to great lengths tracing the origins of this presidential system in the Philadelphia Convention, and argues, in sum, that though most framers had some affection for the British system of Parliamentary government, the contours of the debate led to a suboptimal outcome in the construction of a separate executive office. Madison is presented as particularly problematic, overly concerned about theorizing representation at the expense of thought about executive power, and ultimately swayed by Gouverneur Morris into support for a president who, for reasons of (the abstract theory of) separation of powers, would be elected (even if indirectly) by the people.
Having mined the Madison's records of the Convention to demolish the notion of Madisonian republicanism, Buckley also demolishes the notion that separation of powers is a principle of limited government. Drawing from comparisons with the parliamentary systems of Great Britain and Canada, Buckley makes the case that allowing the American executive branch to remain separate from the legislative branch has actually encouraged the concentration of power in executive agencies while effectively leaving the legislative branch unable to respond. In Great Britain and Canada, by contrast, parliamentary systems have led to freer and more competently governed polities.
What is more, having mined broader data sets comparing parliamentary and presidential systems, Buckley discovers that - alone among presidential systems - America enjoys a high degree of freedom. Upending the notion of American exceptionalism, Buckley argues, "What makes America exceptional is that, for more than two hundred years, it has remained free while yet presidential." In fact, he notes that what has kept America high on these lists despite its presidential system has been its relative wealth, and it's Anglo political culture. Yet he notes that America is sliding further down these lists, and points to increasing sclerosis in government - which incentivizes presidents further to concentrate power - as further threatening liberty.
Buckley is not optimistic that America can turn back the clock. He does hope, weakly, that Congress can exercise some institutional courage in responding to "crown" government, and that national referenda could be drawn on to resist presidential overreach. But neither solution focuses on the self-governing Anglo political culture that, by Buckley's finding, has sustained liberty in America. "A republic, if you can keep it." Would that we could.
The reason for this is America's presidential system. Buckley goes to great lengths tracing the origins of this presidential system in the Philadelphia Convention, and argues, in sum, that though most framers had some affection for the British system of Parliamentary government, the contours of the debate led to a suboptimal outcome in the construction of a separate executive office. Madison is presented as particularly problematic, overly concerned about theorizing representation at the expense of thought about executive power, and ultimately swayed by Gouverneur Morris into support for a president who, for reasons of (the abstract theory of) separation of powers, would be elected (even if indirectly) by the people.
Having mined the Madison's records of the Convention to demolish the notion of Madisonian republicanism, Buckley also demolishes the notion that separation of powers is a principle of limited government. Drawing from comparisons with the parliamentary systems of Great Britain and Canada, Buckley makes the case that allowing the American executive branch to remain separate from the legislative branch has actually encouraged the concentration of power in executive agencies while effectively leaving the legislative branch unable to respond. In Great Britain and Canada, by contrast, parliamentary systems have led to freer and more competently governed polities.
What is more, having mined broader data sets comparing parliamentary and presidential systems, Buckley discovers that - alone among presidential systems - America enjoys a high degree of freedom. Upending the notion of American exceptionalism, Buckley argues, "What makes America exceptional is that, for more than two hundred years, it has remained free while yet presidential." In fact, he notes that what has kept America high on these lists despite its presidential system has been its relative wealth, and it's Anglo political culture. Yet he notes that America is sliding further down these lists, and points to increasing sclerosis in government - which incentivizes presidents further to concentrate power - as further threatening liberty.
Buckley is not optimistic that America can turn back the clock. He does hope, weakly, that Congress can exercise some institutional courage in responding to "crown" government, and that national referenda could be drawn on to resist presidential overreach. But neither solution focuses on the self-governing Anglo political culture that, by Buckley's finding, has sustained liberty in America. "A republic, if you can keep it." Would that we could.
July 22, 2016
Buckley writes a fascinating book that falls a bit short in the end. I enjoyed his side-by-side-by-side comparison of the origins of the US, UK, and Canadian systems. In particular, he performs a valuable service by refocusing the ideological underpinnings of the US Constitution away from the Federalist Papers to the debates of the convention itself. The book loses steam in the second half; he catalogues the myriad ways presidentialism in the US has failed but defends parliamentary systems in generalities.
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June 19, 2016A very good book about the history of Anglophone governments
This book is a very good overview of the history of how American, British and Canadian governments evolved. The author also outlines a way Americans can roll back crown government and restore the constitution.
This book is a very good overview of the history of how American, British and Canadian governments evolved. The author also outlines a way Americans can roll back crown government and restore the constitution.
Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews