Although Luther's response was four times longer than Erasmus's Diatribe, the excerpts from Luther in this edition comprise about a fourth of the book. Luther's tone is not rhetorically persuasive, but he really does respond logically to Erasmus's points. A few major typos (e.g., fustification by faith).
Preface
vii: Erasmus (E) and Luther (L) positioned as a famous pair, such as Milton/Hobbes, Blake/Paine, and Orwell/Berlin—the exception being that E and L directly engaged with each other
viii: a primary objection to Luther's view of grace is that it provides a license to sin
Introduction
1: L thought that his work on the will along with his catechism were his best works; "E laid the egg that L hatched"; E's friends prompted him to respond
2: brief biography of E
3: brief biography of L
4: Henry VIII's response earned him the title "Defender of the Faith"; details of the responses (L's Assertions [in response to Exsurge Domine] in 1520, E in 1524, L in 1525, E in 1526 and 1527)
5: for E, Christianity is morality?; L: unbelievers can only sin [four states of man]
Erasmus: The Free Will
Ch. 1: Preface: Man and Truth
12–13: E signals his openness (and his aversion to assertions)
14: E acknowledges that all human goodness comes from God; issue of whether or not God's fore-knowledge is contingent (upon human action)
14–16: man's limited capacity to know
16/19: L cites Wycliffe (see 22 and 51)
17: E does a lot of throat-clearing and admits that his preface was a little long-winded.
19n3: E is responding to L's Assertio (1520), which was written in response to Leo X's papal bull (Exsurge Domine)
Ch. 2: Introduction: Objective Criterion for Truth
24: E complains about paradoxes (see 94, 96, 98)
26: Scripture seems to support both sides of the issue; definition of free will: "By freedom of the will we understand in this connection the power of the human will whereby man can apply to or turn away from that which leads unto eternal salvation."
Ch. 3: Old Testament Proofs Supporting the Free Will
30: in Eden our wills were free to obey God and remain in Paradise, although we would have needed special grace to attain eternal life (E: even if Scripture doesn't say this, Church Fathers do)
30–31: some confusing statements on the will's bondage and the subsequent restoration of freedom (and a seeming support of Pelagius); the mind (nous) and will are obscured/darkened/wounded/corrupted, but not extinguished/extinct
33: E separates himself from Pelagius by saying that "we owe salvation solely to God without whose grace the will of man could not be effectively free to achieve good" [sounds like L]
34: E opposes Augustine and the Reformers, who say that even "good" works by unbelievers are hated by God [see Is. 64:6 and Rom. 8:8]; reference to prevenient grace
35-36: four varieties of grace: natural, extraordinary/exciting/operative, efficient/cooperative/promoting, and sanctifying/ultimate/final
36: (distorted) non-Pelagian views of Thomas, Carlstadt, and Luther (E sees this as a progression toward determinism)
37–39: E claims that God would not command impossible things [cf. Matt. 5:48; Matt. 22:37–39; 1 Thess. 5:16–18 —> Jesus called Lazarus to come forth, yet God did all the work (John 11:43–44).]—the command seems meaningless if we are powerless to obey; E talks more about necessity in this chapter and the next
42n2: E is not Pelagian, but L is tempted to call him one
42n11: condign and congruent merit; prevenient grace
Ch. 4: New Testament Proofs Supporting the Free Will
45: the Matt. 23:37 example of Christ's desire to gather the children of Jerusalem, a hen gathers her chicks (58: see, people do resist God's will)
46–47: as E says in Ch. 3, commands seem superfluous if we can't obey them, not to mention the arbitrariness of rewards and punishments (see 51, 61, 64)
46: "faith itself is a work and the free will participates to a considerable measure in it by turning to or away from faith" (cf. 50)
49: E's language of earning rewards seems dangerous
50: E imagines a scenario in which someone is made holy against his will [this would/could never happen—when God calls someone, he comes willingly]; "the will to do good works is in itself a good work" (cf. 46)
51: L quote from Assertio: "everything takes place by absolute necessity" (no free will)
52: again, E's language of trusting in our own works seems dangerous (cf. p. 49)
Ch. 5: Apparent Proofs against the Free Will
E deals with Paraoh's hardness, God's choice of Jacob over Esau, and some passages from Isaiah
54: in discussing Pharaoh's hardness, E uses images such as the same rain producing fruit in well-tended land and thorns/thistles in neglected land, and the same sun making wax soft and clay hard
57: a master may choose to allow a wicked servant to act wickedly
58: "not every necessity excludes the freedom of the will"
59: "God is the cause of the evil of the human will only insofar as he leaves the will to itself and does not turn it aside by grace"
59–60: E doesn't think that Gen. 25 (Jacob and Esau) is about salvation [but Rom. 9 is!]; E's explanation is that God is "dampening the arrogance" of presumptuous people who think that they have achieved success in their own strength (see 61–63, 77, 79, 80, 85, 96)
60, 62, 65: E warns about too literal of an interpretation (eclipsing human effort)
61: "it is not impossible for our will to work together with the divine will for our eternal salvation
62: E uses 2 Tim. 2:20–21 to argue that we can cleanse ourselves to a degree—he says this passage awakens us to zeal and protects us from presumption and despair, whereas Is. 45/Rom. 9 (re: a potter) gets us to stop grumbling about God's grace to others
63: E says that Is. 10 (tools cannot boast) is more about a godless king who believes that his own wisdom and strength have given him success—the purpose is to dampen his arrogance; E says that Ez. 36 (hearts of stone and flesh) is metaphorical language—cf. a Latin teacher who takes away ignorance and imparts knowledge, but only if a student is industrious
64: summary of the problem: human impotence removes merit and reward, but human power removes the need for grace
64–65: E argues that passages that emphasize human effort should not be reinterpreted to mean that grace does everything [but he doesn't admit the opposite: passages that emphasize grace should not be reinterpreted to mean that humans earn salvation]
66n8: antecedent necessity (determinism) vs. consequent necessity (see 58–59)
Ch. 6: Luther's Proofs against the Free Will
67: E thinks that free will is on a throne?; "the weakness of our nature incline[s] towards sin"
68: "The tendency towards evil existing in most men does not completely cancel out the freedom of the will, even when one cannot overcome evil without the help of divine grace" [doesn't a tendency mean that the will is not completely free from all influence?]; re: the flood, E says that the interval of 120 years between the threat of the flood and the actual flood shows that God gave time for people to change their minds [it could simply be the case that God's patience is demonstrated]; E doesn't like calling pre-salvation works "evil" (see p. 34), because he wants humans to have the ability to prepare themselves for God's grace
70: "no one is forced to do evil unless he consents" [agreed]
71: "The one who guides does not necessarily force"; "When God, propitious to his people, inclines the heart of a king towards good, he is not necessarily forcing the will"; God's inclining someone toward evil is simply permitting him to follow his passions [agreed]
72: E takes John 15:5 (can't do anything without Christ) to mean that we cannot achieve our ultimate goal, but he wants to maintain that we can do something
Ch. 7: Postscript on Apparent Proofs against the Free Will
75: we contribute so little that all the glory goes to God (76, 77, 79, 80, 81, 86, 91, 92, 97)
75–76: like a mariner sailing his ship through a storm, or a farmer harvesting a crop, a father with beautiful children, a doctor restoring health, a king winning a war, ground producing fruit—we can't say that they contributed nothing [but are these really good analogies?]
76: Matt. 10:20 reduces anxiety about our having to perform well, but it can't mean that we do nothing; we must respond well to grace (not refuse it)
77: human actions involve thinking, willing, and doing —> thinking and doing are by grace alone, but we contribute something in our willing (see 91); E seems to deny sola gratia (see 92); E admits that "even the fact that [someone] consented and cooperated with divine grace is God's gift" (see the bottom of the page, and 91)
78: Phil. 2:12–13: "this passage teaches us clearly that both God and man works" [post-regeneration!]
79: E seems to suggest that it's possible to keep all of God's commandments [Pelagian]
80–81: prodigal son example (prevenient grace spurs the son to return, and he does); God credits us for not turning from His offer of grace (see 91); our "striving cooperates with divine help"
82: E doesn't like the images of a potter/clay or carpenter/axe because these objects can't cooperate (they're passive materials/tools) [but the images are biblical...]
82: "We oppose those who conclude like this: 'Man is unable to accomplish anything unless God's grace helps him. Therefore there are no good works of man.' We propose the rather more acceptable conclusion: Man is able to accomplish all things, if God's grace aids him. Therefore it is possible that all works of man be good."
Ch. 8: Summary and Conclusion
85: E urges a moderate position (see 96); those who ascribe too much to free will probably do so to encourage those who despair that they cannot do anything to change their state, while those who deny free will probably do so to avoid presumption/arrogance (see 97)
86: E acknowledges some strengths of those who deny free will (e.g., rely wholly on God, don't boast [see 98])
87: E seems to accuse L of saying that even post-regeneration good works are sin (see 94–95) [I hope L doesn't say this]; "[God] wants us to watch, to fight and to struggle for the reward of eternal life"
88: E thinks God would be unjust to show mercy to some while punishing sinners [but God doesn't owe anyone grace, and He may be gracious to whomever He wills]
88–89: bad analogy of a king giving reward to only some of his generals [sinners are rebels]; bad analogy of a chain servant who is punished for not working [we put ourselves in chains]
89: E has reservations about justification by faith alone (to him, faith and love seem mutually supporting)
90: E argues that Augustine reacted too strongly to Pelagius (cf. the Greek who cut down vineyards to avoid drunkenness)
91–92: example of a father who shows his son an apple—the boy must still make an effort; "I readily admit that our striving contributes less to the gaining of eternal life, than the boy's running at the hand of his father" [well that's good]
92: E isn't thrilled with "Whatever he has effected in us, he gives" [sounds Augustine's Confessions]; E prefers to think of grace and the human will acting simultaneously
93: E says some people admit that God works in man evil works [I don't know anyone who says this]
93–94: E offers a response that a reformer might give: Who are you to challenge God's decisions?
94: E denies that original sin destroys the human ability to please God; E describes a reformer's position on the law: all it can do is magnify God's grace by showing us what we can't do [actually, this almost does sound Lutheran—cf. the Contemporary Grace Movement]
96: exaggerations destroy progress: Luther denies purgatory and satisfaction in penance, the need to keep monastic vows, and the goodness of (RCC) ecclesiastical hierarchy
96–97: classical allusions to Achilles, Hector, and Scylla and Charybdis; exaggerations/reactions might be helpful in bending a rod back, but they're not helpful in doctrine
97: purpose of arguing for free will: justify punishing those who resist God's grace, prevent anyone from saying that God is cruel/unjust, prevent despair and presumption, and encourage good works
98: good rhetorical move of claiming to be willing to learn
Luther: The Bondage of the Will
Ch. 1: Introduction
Wow. L opens with machine gun fire. Almost surprised not to find and "Your momma" jokes.
103: L concedes that he's not eloquent; he thanks E for 1) not being rude and thereby avoiding making L angry [good grief—so this is L holding back], and 2) not saying anything new or helpful; Melanchthon has already written on this subject; L feels sorry/embarrassed for E
104: L feels confirmed in his own view by reading the bad arguments of a very smart man
Ch. 2: Refutation of Erasmus' Preface
107–8: L attacks E for not wanting to assert—L says Xns must make assertions
109–10: many things about God are obscure, but the Bible is revelation—obscure things are due to our ignorance, not its obscurity; use clear Scripture to interpret obscure Scripture
110: funny German insertion (see 118n6)
111: E admits that "free will" is ineffective (in matters of salvation) until God's grace helps it—so how is it "free"? (see 116–17); this issue is not superfluous, but rather "the very hinge upon which our disputation turns"
112: "God foreknows nothing contingently"; tyranny of papal laws (binding people to confession/satisfaction)—don't bind consciences
113: E wants peace at the expense of truth [L: Peace if possible; truth at all costs]
114: E wants to hide the bad decisions of previous councils to preserve the church's authority
115: L dismisses E's concern that L's teaching opens the floodgates of iniquity; it is humbling to rely on God's grace alone; "By necessity I do not mean compulsion. I meant what they term the necessity of immutability"
116: people sin without God's compulsion; necessity of immutability = "the will cannot change itself, nor give itself another bent"; "the human will is like a beast of burden. If God rides it, it wills and goes whence God wills; as the Psalm says, 'I was a beast of burden before thee' (Psalm 72,22). If Satan rides, it wills and goes where Satan wills. Nor may it choose to which rider it will run, nor which it will seek. But the riders themselves contend who shall have and hold it."
117: L acknowledges that our wills are free to choose within our natures [we can pick out our socks in the morning], but when it comes to issues of salvation, we cannot break free from our sinful will unless God's grace intervenes
Ch. 3: Refutation of Erasmus' Introduction
120: L mentions the church's condemnation of John Hus
121: L plans to "confute the arguments which are brought forward in support of free will," "defend our own arguments that are being attacked," and "contend for the grace of God against free will"
Ch. 4: Refutation of Erasmus' Old and New Testament Proofs Supporting the Free Will
123–24: L attacks E's definition of "free will"; a truly free will is "a will that can and does do God-ward whatever it pleases, restrained by no law and no command"—but E's definition seems to fit something like "mutable will"
124–25: "Upon the authority of E then, free will is a power of the human will which can of itself will and not will the word and work of God, by which it is to be led to those things which are beyond its capacity and comprehension"—technically, that leaves little work for grace and the Holy Spirit; E's free will is less free than the Pelagians' free will or the Sophists' free will, but he still exalts the power of choice
126: to E (re: Thomas's opinion of free will [p. 36]): "you said that free will is a power of the human will by which a man can turn towards good, whereas here you say approvingly that man without grace cannot will good. The definition affirms what its example denies. Hence there are found in your free will a yes and a no."
126–27: "the free will which you define is one, and the free will you defend is another. E, outstripping others, has now two free wills, and they militate against each other"
128: L's explanation of the law seems limited to one use of the law (not the other two uses)
129: exhortations "are intended to animate those who are already justified and have obtained mercy to be diligent in the fruits of the Spirit and of the righteousness given them, to exercise themselves in love and good works, and to bear courageously the cross and all the other tribulations of this world"
Ch. 5: Comments on Erasmus' Treatment of Passages Denying Free Will
131–32: E's way of getting around the Pharaoh and Jacob/Esau passages (pp. 53–54) is to say that they're tropes (figures of speech); Luther prefers the plain reading [is this a consistent position?]
132–33: when God works evil in people, He is simply moving them according to their fallen natures; He uses evil people as instruments, and he can turn evil to good
134: it does seem cruel (to our common sense) for God to leave people in their sin (L has been offended by the thought), yet L says that despair is near to grace [if we don't deserve grace, we're the exact people for whom Christ died]
134–35: just as we did nothing to contribute to our creation [or natural birth], so also did we do nothing to contribute to our spiritual birth (including preparing ourselves for grace)
Ch. 6: Summary on the Bondage of the Will
139: L learned the hard way that we cannot earn righteousness through works; we please God, not by our own merit/works, but by His own favor
Ch. 7: Conclusion
141: E alone has focused on the main issue