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The Grounding of Positive Philosophy: The Berlin Lectures
The Berlin lectures in The Grounding of Positive Philosophy, appearing here for the first time in English, advance Schelling's final "existential system" as an alternative to modernity's reduction of philosophy to a purely formal science of reason. The onetime protégé of Fichte and benefactor of Hegel, Schelling accuses German Idealism of dealing "with the world of lived experience just as a surgeon who promises to cure your ailing leg by amputating it." Schelling's appeal in Berlin for a positive, existential philosophy found an interested audience in Kierkegaard, Engels, Feuerbach, Marx, and Bakunin. His account of the ecstatic nature of existence and reason proved to be decisive for the work of Paul Tillich and Martin Heidegger. Also, Schelling's critique of reason's quixotic attempt at self-grounding anticipates similar criticisms leveled by poststructuralism, but without sacrificing philosophy's power to provide a positive account of truth and meaning. The Berlin lectures provide fascinating insight into the thought processes of one of the most provocative yet least understood thinkers of nineteenth-century German philosophy.
- GenresPhilosophy
242 pages, Hardcover
First published July 5, 2007
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212 people want to read
About the author
Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling
542 books253 followersFriedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, later von Schelling, was a German philosopher. Standard histories of philosophy make him the midpoint in the development of German Idealism, situating him between Fichte, his mentor prior to 1800, and Hegel, his former university roommate and erstwhile friend. Interpreting Schelling's philosophy is often difficult because of its ever-changing nature. Some scholars characterize him as a protean thinker who, although brilliant, jumped from one subject to another and lacked the synthesizing power needed to arrive at a complete philosophical system. Others challenge the notion that Schelling's thought is marked by profound breaks, instead arguing that his philosophy always focused on a few common themes, especially human freedom, the absolute, and the relationship between spirit and nature.
Schelling's thought has often been neglected, especially in the English-speaking world. This stems not only from the ascendancy of Hegel, whose mature works portray Schelling as a mere footnote in the development of Idealism, but also from his Naturphilosophie, which positivist scientists have often ridiculed for its "silly" analogizing and lack of empirical orientation. In recent years, Schelling scholars have forcefully attacked both of these sources of neglect.
Schelling's thought has often been neglected, especially in the English-speaking world. This stems not only from the ascendancy of Hegel, whose mature works portray Schelling as a mere footnote in the development of Idealism, but also from his Naturphilosophie, which positivist scientists have often ridiculed for its "silly" analogizing and lack of empirical orientation. In recent years, Schelling scholars have forcefully attacked both of these sources of neglect.
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Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
May 4, 2020
This marks the eighth book of Schelling that I've read; after the last book, my frustration at not knowing the German terminology behind key concepts was starting to grow and became even more pronounced while reading this book. Schelling's German is nuanced; far more nuanced than is adequately captured or conveyed in English. Since his last lectures series, The Philosophy Of Revelation, has yet to be translated into English* (and Suny has no plans to do so anytime soon, so they tell me), it is even more incumbent upon me to learn German. Also, given the fact that Franz von Baader has yet to be translated substantially, that is yet another motivation for me to learn German and start reading these works as they were intended.
These series of lectures were to introduce Schelling's Positive Philosophy/Philosophy of Revelation group of lectures. This lecture series was followed by The Philosophy of Mythology and The Philosophy of Revelation. Much of these lectures follow the same line of thinking as his Stuttgart Seminars and his never completed Ages of the World. His scope has simply broadened. Once again, he is discoursing on modes of being and the inherent dynamics of those modes. He deals with Hegel a lot more here and gives a negative appraisal; indeed, he calls Hegel's system negative philosophy in contrast to his own positive philosophy. Indeed, Kant and Fichte are also examples of negative philosophy. This is also the first sustained discussion of Boehme I have seen in a work of Schelling's. Most people are aware of his debt to Boehme, but Schelling does try to distance himself from theosophy while praising Boehme considerably. His only argument that his system is not theosophical seems to be the fact that it IS a system and thus more methodical and systematic. I don't believe the argument undoes his relationship to theosophical thought, however. He shares too much with Boehme and others within that tradition to fundamentally distance himself from it. His positive philosophy seems to hinge on the circuitous relationship that seyn (being as verb), seyende (being as noun) and wesen (being or essence) have and how these relate to revelation and reason. Much of his discourse is impaired by inadequate English. This is NOT really the fault of the translators of his works, it is simply down to the inadequacy of the language to capture and convey the same nuance. That being said, while the translator did often include the underlying German word behind various uses of the English word being in parentheses, I wish he had done so more consistently because one often still has to intuit which German term is being used in that particular context.
Still, this is a very good book and well worth reading. My frustration did not totally rob me of the enjoyment of it. I am done with Schelling for a while; and maybe indefinitely if I am going to be dependent on learning German.
*The Philosophy of Revelation has just recently been published by Spring Publications
These series of lectures were to introduce Schelling's Positive Philosophy/Philosophy of Revelation group of lectures. This lecture series was followed by The Philosophy of Mythology and The Philosophy of Revelation. Much of these lectures follow the same line of thinking as his Stuttgart Seminars and his never completed Ages of the World. His scope has simply broadened. Once again, he is discoursing on modes of being and the inherent dynamics of those modes. He deals with Hegel a lot more here and gives a negative appraisal; indeed, he calls Hegel's system negative philosophy in contrast to his own positive philosophy. Indeed, Kant and Fichte are also examples of negative philosophy. This is also the first sustained discussion of Boehme I have seen in a work of Schelling's. Most people are aware of his debt to Boehme, but Schelling does try to distance himself from theosophy while praising Boehme considerably. His only argument that his system is not theosophical seems to be the fact that it IS a system and thus more methodical and systematic. I don't believe the argument undoes his relationship to theosophical thought, however. He shares too much with Boehme and others within that tradition to fundamentally distance himself from it. His positive philosophy seems to hinge on the circuitous relationship that seyn (being as verb), seyende (being as noun) and wesen (being or essence) have and how these relate to revelation and reason. Much of his discourse is impaired by inadequate English. This is NOT really the fault of the translators of his works, it is simply down to the inadequacy of the language to capture and convey the same nuance. That being said, while the translator did often include the underlying German word behind various uses of the English word being in parentheses, I wish he had done so more consistently because one often still has to intuit which German term is being used in that particular context.
Still, this is a very good book and well worth reading. My frustration did not totally rob me of the enjoyment of it. I am done with Schelling for a while; and maybe indefinitely if I am going to be dependent on learning German.
*The Philosophy of Revelation has just recently been published by Spring Publications
January 31, 2021
Pročitano samo 8 poglavlje, ostatak možda u budućnosti. Odlično delo, pozni Šeling je možda i najbolji Šeling, jasno se vidi uticaj na Hajdegera, s tim što je Šeling 10 puta čitljiviji.
June 20, 2025
Schelling sets out to describe where philosophy begins. He calls this starting point absolute transcendence. We don't need to agree with him. More on that later.
We should explain the context. After the diffusion of Hegelian pantheism in the Prussia of the early 19th century, the King panicked and summoned Schelling to Berlin to purge it of this "dragon seed." Remember, the Left-Hegelians represented a real challenge to the fusion of church and state; when they said that the Real was Rational, they meant it. Schelling's exorcism of the Hegelian ghost relied on a daring split between negative and positive philosophy. The former could only pertain to ideas, the latter could grasp existence. For Schelling, "the positive philosophy detaches itself from the negative philosophy in that, as I said, it lets go of the concept and retains only that which purely is, devoid of all whatness." He's quite fond of a Latin distinction, between quod and quid. In English, this is the difference between saying /that/ something exists and /what/ it is. It's easy to forget that for Schelling the stakes here are existential. But we should try not to forget, because it really does present a choice for thought, one that has consequences. Either we say no or we say yes. Saying no isn't replaced by saying yes - we transition from moving towards a goal to beginning with the goal already achieved. The second solution is compelling.
We would be hard pressed to find more than a handful of people that resist Schelling's strategy of beginning with presuppositions. Presuppositionless thought is often exhausting, but unfortunately Hegel was right: a presupposition can enable but it doesn't itself ground thought. The dialectical theory is a coherent alternative. Ungrounding is fun, but there are good reasons to prefer mediation. One of those reasons is that only when something is mediated does the inward become externally expressed. The immediate never existed and we're all better off because of it.
***
Still, Schelling's project in his later work isn't trivial even if his politics often were. Some of his earlier radical ideas survive, though they are more muted. Recall, the younger Schelling had attempted to write a positive philosophy of religious experience; he never got beyond creation. The strategy shifts, but the topic doesn't: instead of worrying about how to articulate revelation in a reasonable way he gives an account of what reasonable revelation would have to look like. Broadly, it ought to look like contingencies that turn out to be necessary. The bit he forgets to mention is that this hidden necessity has to be retrospective.
We should explain the context. After the diffusion of Hegelian pantheism in the Prussia of the early 19th century, the King panicked and summoned Schelling to Berlin to purge it of this "dragon seed." Remember, the Left-Hegelians represented a real challenge to the fusion of church and state; when they said that the Real was Rational, they meant it. Schelling's exorcism of the Hegelian ghost relied on a daring split between negative and positive philosophy. The former could only pertain to ideas, the latter could grasp existence. For Schelling, "the positive philosophy detaches itself from the negative philosophy in that, as I said, it lets go of the concept and retains only that which purely is, devoid of all whatness." He's quite fond of a Latin distinction, between quod and quid. In English, this is the difference between saying /that/ something exists and /what/ it is. It's easy to forget that for Schelling the stakes here are existential. But we should try not to forget, because it really does present a choice for thought, one that has consequences. Either we say no or we say yes. Saying no isn't replaced by saying yes - we transition from moving towards a goal to beginning with the goal already achieved. The second solution is compelling.
We would be hard pressed to find more than a handful of people that resist Schelling's strategy of beginning with presuppositions. Presuppositionless thought is often exhausting, but unfortunately Hegel was right: a presupposition can enable but it doesn't itself ground thought. The dialectical theory is a coherent alternative. Ungrounding is fun, but there are good reasons to prefer mediation. One of those reasons is that only when something is mediated does the inward become externally expressed. The immediate never existed and we're all better off because of it.
***
Still, Schelling's project in his later work isn't trivial even if his politics often were. Some of his earlier radical ideas survive, though they are more muted. Recall, the younger Schelling had attempted to write a positive philosophy of religious experience; he never got beyond creation. The strategy shifts, but the topic doesn't: instead of worrying about how to articulate revelation in a reasonable way he gives an account of what reasonable revelation would have to look like. Broadly, it ought to look like contingencies that turn out to be necessary. The bit he forgets to mention is that this hidden necessity has to be retrospective.
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