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336 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2014
The New Dialectics is different from the old Marxian dialectics (or Diamat), which was concerned primarily with the influence of Hegel on Marx's theory of history, and the eventual triumph of socialism. The New Dialectics, by contrast, is concerned mainly with the influence of Hegel's logic on Marx's theory in Capital of capitalism, as a given historically specific society; hence it is also called 'systematic dialectics' (as opposed to 'historical dialectics'). Different authors have different interpretations of Hegel's logic and systematic dialectics, but they all agree that Hegel's logic is important for understanding Marx's theory in Capital. The aim of this book is to contribute to this new line of research.
It is well known that Marx interpreted Hegel's logic as idealist (following the general interpretation of Hegel's logic at the time, especially Feuerbach), and he claimed that he 'inverted' Hegel's logic in his own theory (in the Postface to the second German edition of Capital):
"My dialectical logic is, in its foundation, not only different from the Hegelian, but exactly opposite to it. For Hegel, the process of thinking, which he even transforms into an independent subject, under the name of 'the Idea', is the creator of the real world, and the real world is only the external appearance of the idea. With me the reverse is true: the ideal is nothing but the material world reflected in the mind of man, and translated into forms of thought...
The mystification which the dialectic suffers in Hegel's hands by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general forms of motion in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It must be inverted, in order to discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell."
But the other half of the story is that Hegel is relevant for Marx not in spite of, but rather because of his idealist ontology: 'capital is a very peculiar object, grounded in a process of real abstraction in exchange in much the same way as Hegel's dissolution and reconstruction of reality is predicated on the abstractive power of thought. It is in this sense that it may be shown that there is a connection between Hegel's "infinite" and Marx's "capital"'. The isomorphism between Hegel's logic and the actuality of capital is valid, and – Arthur concludes the homology with the Idea is precisely a reason for criticising it as an inverted reality where self-moving abstractions have the upper hand over human beings.