In an age when books titled “DESTINED FOR WAR” dominate the US-China literature, this book by Thomas J. Christensen is a grounded, balanced and interesting read. It is centred on the idea that China’s rise is inevitable and US foreign policy should be directed towards encouraging China to become a “responsible stakeholder” globally. China is too big to fail, but it is also too big to fail to pull its weight. How the US should manage this balance is the focus of this book.
Christensen is trained as a scholar, but worked as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs for the George W. Bush Administration. One of the things I appreciated about this book was how well it combined the insights of international relations theory with the very real world issues discussed in the book. In this sense it serves as an example for those in the academic realm that wish to write for a policy audience. So what does he have to say?
Christensen anchors his book around a speech given by Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick in September 2005 which argued that “China needs to become a ‘responsible stakeholder’ in the international system, contributing more actively than in the past to help shore up the stability of the international system from which it has benefited so greatly.” (xxi)
Given his fondness for the speech and his role in the Bush administration one suspects that he may have had some role in writing it. Nevertheless, it serves Christensen well in making several key points throughout the book. He notes that no one has an interest in a destabilized China – it is too well integrated into the global economy and the results would be disastrous. However, China’s rise means that it can play the role of “spoiler” in international affairs, preventing certain international actions it sees as antithetical to its interests. This includes humanitarian intervention, something the PRC views with great suspicion.
This is complicated by the tendency of China’s leading thinkers to take a zero-sum game view of power: China’s rise must require US decline and vice versa. Christensen notes with some regret that John Mearshiemer, with his zero-sum/realpolitik view of the world tends to be the preferred American academic in China – or certainly seen as the most honest. Christensen pushes back hard against this idea, noting that no other state has benefited more from the US-lead order than China and that the US has done the most to accommodate its rise.
As Christensen notes the number one priority of the Communist Party of China is stability: the Chinese people put up with certain restrictions on liberty so long as their standards of living continue to rise. As such the CPC must look stable, strong and mirror the narratives of the PRC’s founding – it cannot look as if it is an instrument of the West. However, Christensen is careful not to lump the “PRC” into a single entity or actor. He notes that despite state censorship that there are many debates within China over both domestic and international policy. He notes for example that there are moderates who do battle with “hypernationalists”. Ultimately, many Chinese foreign policies and actions are driven by domestic priorities and the debate between these different actors.
Therefore, there is a tension in China between pragmatism and what Christensen calls “post-colonial nationalism”. Typically, this leads to China doing things that are only clearly in its interest. China will not “help” the US or global community of its own volition. Although the standard of living in China has improved dramatically, it is still a very poor country in many ways. In this sense it is also not surprising that there is very little support for foreign aid within China, unless it is tied to specific concrete goals that advance the state’s interest.
Unfortunately, this means that unlike the United States in the post-1945 period, this means that China is not eager to play a global leadership role where there may be certain costs involved. In particular, it rejects the post-Cold War military humanitarian missions, is suspicious of global forums and may be becoming more interested in creating its own institutions (AIIB, One Belt/One Road) than playing a greater leadership role in the ones we have.
This is where Christensen’s prescriptions come in. Noting US strengths in almost every sector vis-à-vis China, he argues that the US must come up with a strategy that is sensitive to Chinese anxieties, brings China into a global leadership role, but defends US allies from bullying. In short, he advocates finding ways to channel, not contain China’s rise, advance cooperation on global problems but also maintaining a regional military and diplomatic presence that is aimed at protecting states that may be victims of Chinese bullying on certain issues, especially over sovereignty disputes.
Christensen is clear that this is a tough task – in keeping with a zero-sum view, Chinese commentators view the call to global leadership as a ruse to get China to foot the bill for something that will benefit the West rather than China or help advance the US-lead global order. But this challenge (which gives the book its title) is urgent and vital for the US to manage successfully.
Ultimately, “The China Challenge” feels like two books in one. Unlike most academic books, Christensen wisely puts the policy advice and prescriptions at the beginning and (except for an epilogue and afterward to the second edition) the history of US-China relations in the back. This is not necessarily a criticism, but what is good for policy makers is that they can probably get what they want out of the book in the first 165 pages.
I would have liked to have seen more on how the US could work with other Western allies in the region to promote regional stability. Non-regional powers are not really discussed. Is that because they are not interested? Or not really represented in the region? Or just outside the scope of the book? Christensen is right to be cautious about creating the sense that China is being “surrounded” or “contained” (although he notes there are circumstances where this is an important diplomatic tool – especially on North Korea). Nevertheless, more on how the US should work with Western allies on achieving its goals in East Asia might have been interesting.
I also think there could have been more on the TPP as a regional instrument. Even if it is now dead (something he couldn’t have known at the time), how might it have been useful? What was at stake? Was it an economic or a security agreement? And should China have been eventually invited and involved? It was a pretty big thing to die on the rocks of the 2016 US election (even if it may live on in some form). I would like to have had more of Christensen’s perspective on it.
Nevertheless, what makes this book an important read is the authority with which Christensen writes. He has spent time in China, has good sources there and his experience in the US government make him well placed to write this book. While he is happier taking aim at Democratic administrations (Clinton and Obama) and praising Republican ones (Bush and Bush), he is extremely fair in his analysis and his moderate criticisms are well justified.
Also, usefully, Christensen is very good on the DPRK issue, even if the events of 2017 have overtaken parts of the book. But Christensen does well to explain China’s alliance with North Korea in more than realpolitik terms – the Korean War has a special place in PRC history. Mao has received some criticism in the modern PRC, but the Korean war bolsters Mao’s image as a patriot and strategist in helping to hold-off the US/Western aggression. These emotional ties are important to consider beyond narrow strategic considerations.
Finally, although The China Challenge was written in the pre-Trump era, its discussion of problems, future challenges and potential prescriptions and strategies remain relevant. Even if the Trump White House is likely to do the exact opposite of everything that Christensen says, this doesn’t make his diagnosis or advice any less relevant. Indeed, it’s just a shame that the gang at 1600 is not going to be likely to listen.