Yanks and Limeys: Alliance Warfare in the Second World War

by Niall Barr

In the mid-twentieth century the relationship between America and Britain had a chequered past. Theirs was a history of protection and oppression, of rebellion and ultimately war. But then the shared crisis of the Second World War brought Britain and America closer than ever before or since, and saw an unprecedented level of military cooperation. How was such a radical shift possible?

To uncover how this historically fraught relationship recovered from its inauspicious start, Niall Barr goes back to the origins of their shared military history in the American War of Independence and shows how these early days had ramifications for the later crucial alliance.

Picking up the tale with America’s entry into the Second World War, Niall Barr tells the story of these two armies as they fought in the largest war in history, from the uppermost echelons of the relationship between Churchill and Roosevelt right down to battlefield level and the soldiers fighting side by side for a common cause.

Genres: History, World War II, American History, Nonfiction, Military Fiction, War, Audiobook

560 pages, Hardcover

First published June 4, 2015

Reviews

[happy · Rating 4 out of 5]

With this book, Prof. Barr looks at the sometimes contentious relationship of the two great allies of World War II, Great Britain and the United States. Not only does the author look at the relationship of the two armies in World War II, in the first chapter of the book he traces the military relationship between the two countries from the very beginnings – Braddock’s Defeat in 1755 up to the beginning of the Second World War.

As the author gets into the main focus of the narrative, the World War II relationship, he brings to light the very different cultures of the two armies. Everything from pay and uniforms, staff structure and just plain personality conflicts are well drawn. He also looks at the effect the various missions the British sent to Washington DC had on the relationship. He shows an especially bright light on the British Tank mission and how it helped the US in the layout of US armor.


In looking at the problems Eisenhower had in putting together the Allied command in the Med, Prof Barr looks at everything from the differences in how the staff responsibilities were defined in the two armies, the problems of supply, British distain and distrust of American troops and commanders. One example of the supply problems was small arms ammunition. The British used a .303 cartridge and the Americans the 30-06. He cites on instance early in the war when the US gave Britain thousands of Enfield rifles that were chambered for US ammo and were unable to be issued to the British home guard because of the lack of appropriate ammo. As a result of problems like this, the supply situation was never really solved and the two armies maintained separate supply chains throughout the war. The staff issue were eventually resolved, but British distain for the American way of war was never really overcome. The Americans also had problems with the way Britain ran the war.

While looking at the higher command issues, Prof Barr illustrates the differences between how Britain wanted to fight the war and the US. The can be summed up with the US want a direct assault on France while Britain wanted to nibble of the edges. The story of how the US gained control of the strategy is a fascinating one. The author looks at the reluctance Churchill and Brooke had at giving up their control and finally their acceptance.

Finally no book on the British/American alliance can be complete without discussing Bernard Montgomery. Prof Barr does a very good job of showing Eisenhower’s brilliance in how he handled Montgomery and finally put him in his place. This discussion includes the strategic differences between the British who wanted a narrow front drive to Berlin and Eisenhower and his broad front approach. In looking at the pro and cons of each, the author surprisingly comes down on Eisenhower’s side. He basically says that the broad front enabled the alliance to withstand the Ardennes Offensive.

While not a whole lot new, esp in discussing Monty and the US commanders relationships, I found this a very solid 4 star read.

[Nooilforpacifists · Rating 4 out of 5]

Excellent rebuttal to recently read bio of Alanbrooke. The Anglo-American alliance succeeded because of its joint planning ability, says author Niall Barr, and although Brooke and Marshall share credit for that, virtually all of the cooperative spirit came from Ike. In only his second week at Allied Planning Headquarters in London, Ike addressed the staff,

"reminding his mixed audience that the Americans regarded the British as 'standoffish conceited snobs' whereas the British looked on the Americans as 'loud-mouth braggarts.' He pointed out that if we held these views and did not realize [it], it would not be possible for a Britisher and an American to work in the same office."


American GIs staying in Britain quickly got the message: "a Yank was asked how he liked England, and he said 'Sir, we like you and you like us and that's our orders, sir.'"


Barr posits a widespread, long-lasting unfamiliarity among Allied armies with battles of "encirclement." Although the Germans and Russians learned this years before on the eastern front, Clark, Bradley and Monty were slow to realize that "once enemy forces had been encircled, their destruction was a matter of time, at which point the glittering prizes of captured towns, cities and territories would be within easy reach."

Barr faults Ike for his failure in Torch to move from the shelter of Gibraltar -- cut off from both bosses and battles -- until too late. But after that, he convincingly refutes Alanbrooke's and Montgomery's claim that Ike was at most a political, not a battlefield general. That charge largely was based on Ike's failure to allow Monty's 8th Army to be the Allied Schwerpunkt for a north based-attack, across Belgium, Holland, and North Germany--in other words, much of the ground the English (and particularly the French) had battled through for 70 years. Instead, Ike adopted a "broad front" approach, probing for weakness at least three different avenues.

Though Monty thought the Nazi counter-attack of the "Bulge" demonstrated his approach would have been better, the truth is (1) Monty's failure to capture the port of Antwerp made that impractical from a supply perspective; (2) Ike never was better than during the first few days after the Bulge, calmly reshuffling units from one side of France (and one commander) to the other; and (3) an Allied Schwerpunkt somewhere would have exposed a weakness elsewhere--which the Germans were sure to have spotted, making their counter attack more likely to succeed.

It is astonishing that Montgomery never visited Ike during the European campaign; the haughty Brit forced Ike to come to him. In addition to evidence of overweening pride, it meant that -- unlike other Army and Corps commanders -- Monty didn't have a clue about Ike's strategy. No wonder he, and Brooke, kept complaining--yet, it was their own fault. According to Barr, Ike not only was the excellent political General known to history, but "the Supreme Commander" in the field, the only man capable of quickly responding to fluid tactical situations while balancing the flaws of his subordinates.

[Paul · Rating 5 out of 5]

Yanks and Limeys – An Excellent Narrative

Yanks and Limeys is the latest book from the excellent Military Historian Professor Niall Barr, who gives us a well written, well researched account of the relationship between Britain and the United States during the Second World War. Barr has written many excellent books over the years and has once again risen to the test and passed with flying colours.

Since the war in books, periodicals, journalistic pieces the Anglo-American Alliance has been examined in minute detail. Barr has decided to take a far longer look at the foundations, the missed opportunities as well as the actual Wartime Alliance. By taking it back to the eighteenth century we get a far deeper understanding because the actions of both country’s during the course of various conflicts has been examined and how it coloured the various political thought and responses. This is probably one of the areas that with Barr’s help will bring a wider context rather than the usual narrow view of Alliances. He also shows us that there was more mutual contempt than usually acknowledged, but overall in spite a War of Independence, a general respect for each other.

The examination in this book of the relationship while the theme of the book sometimes seems to be forgotten, but its core of the alliance between 1941 and 1945 is examined in the theatres of war where the alliance had to work, both in necessity and financially. Barr also reminds us that by 1941 Britain like its erstwhile Prime Minister were teetering close to financial collapse.

While Barr sees that the alliance was the most complete of any Allied country, he tends to forget about the Commonwealth, Polish; Czech soldiers were part of that common alliance. While one is able to forgive that lapse, he does investigate how the differences, tensions were allowed to colour the positives, which are often forgotten.

I was especially interested in the period between the wars when we see that neither country actually learnt anything from its alliance then. One must not forget how both countries allowed the alliance and friendship to wither on the vine, and took their collective eye off the ball politically and military thinking stunted. One example Barr gives is that of tank production and development, something Britain did not really grasp until 1936, whereas Germany had already grasped the nettle and developed their own tanks.

Something Barr does examine is the British reaction to the growing acceptance that their star and empire is on the wane and will be overshadowed by the spectacular rise of the United States, and this would be the overall price for beating Nazi Germany. Too many this was unpalatable, as the two nations passed each other, one in to debt and the breakup of its empire, while the other became the banker and the world’s policeman.

Barr also expounds the theory that Britain and her Generals did not exactly help in the relationship as the war came to a close and the race to Berlin began. I have to admit like most of Polish descent to see Montgomery being blamed for the worsening relationship between the allied Generals does not surprise me. It is about time someone pointed out that he was a prickly prima donna who passed on his failures but claimed all the success, remember he blames the Poles for Arnhem and had their commander removed and demoted. He also points out how Monty made sure that he was front and centre for the German surrender rather than the Americans.

Yanks and Limeys is an excellent examination of the relationship of the two wartime allies that comes from a difference and more nuanced position. This is so well written it was a complete pleasure to read, and lessons learnt in every chapter.

[Julian Douglass · Rating 5 out of 5]

Well written history by Mr. Barr. Does a good job of not only explaining what happened in each stage of the war, but also ties together the American and British POV without making it too boring. I also enjoy reading American History from a different perspective and this book is a good one. I enjoyed reading it and it is a great book on WWII.

[Mike Kershaw · Rating 3 out of 5]

Michael Hastings recently opined in the New York Review of Books that books on World War II are second only to cookbooks on the list of most written about subjects. In fact, he reviewed about 8 titles on World War II recently in the NYROB, including this one -- not all, apparently particularly insightful. While Niall Barr certainly treads on familiar territory with "Eisenhower's Armies", he does so in a fashion that covers what is undoubtedly a broad topic with enough specificity to make it interesting. He focuses primarily on ground forces (and the European theater) and weaves strategic, operational, tactical and technical aspects of this alliance into his story. He shows that, in an historical sense, British-American cooperation leading up to World War II was sporadic and inconsistent; American forces in World War I cooperated more closely with the French than the British and in the interwar years in particular, an American Army officer had a much better chance of attending a French or German military school than one in England. Although much of his narrative will be familiar to students of these two armies and their campaigns in Europe -- the strategic differences, the various conferences, the personality clashes, etc..., he looks beyond the most well-known aspects of the story. He explores tactical and technical cooperation within the alliance that are generally familiar only to specialists -- the British "Tank" mission to the US; tactical cooperation at Anzio and defending Antwerp from German rocket attacks, for example. By avoiding the tendency to make this solely about the great personalities that we so often focus on, he examines the many minor players -- Liaison Officers, technical specialists, commanders at the operational and tactical level -- upon whom much of the success of the alliance depended. In doing this, he highlights some of the real differences in both the objectives and the resources that both allies viewed the conflict -- making the alliance's success even more remarkable. In the end, he concludes that this most successful alliance was mostly 'born on the battlefield', had to be constantly maintained and began dissipating even before the end of hostilities. In summary, a valuable contribution to history which gives a more critical look at an alliance that many take for granted.

[Jimmy · Rating 5 out of 5]

Want to learn about the American-British alliance militarily during World War Two? This is a book worth reading! The work is fascinating and informative. It is well researched and insightful. However I must say the title of the book isn’t fully accurate; it isn’t really as much about Eisenhower’s “armies” as it is about the British and American trying to work with one another at the level of military generals because Eisenhower doesn’t become the Supreme Allied Commander until 76 percent into the book. Despite the title the book is really fascinating read still if you are looking for something about the alliance beyond the personality of Eisenhower.
I love how the book begins with a look at British and American relations way back in history even before World War Two. With so much information this book could have the subtitle “The American and British military alliance in history with particular focus of World War Two.” The survey goes way back during the time of the French Indian War in which the British worked with Colonial Americans against the French and Native Americans. Here the book’s discussion also changed my view of those colonial military warfare: The author made a point that contrary to the myth that the British is rigid and doesn’t change we see that the British army fighting in North America did change and adapted to fight the Native Americans. Then the book also gave an extended look at the British and American relations militarily during World War One. Here I learned a lot from the author as well. For instance I didn’t know until reading this book that the American Expeditionary Force was more influenced by the French than the British. Yet that doesn’t mean the United States was not reliant on the British. Since America fought World War One for only two hundred days the US was reliant on British supplies because American industrial production and shippage wasn’t able to be fully brought to bear in Europe before the War was over.
Of course the largest focus of the book was on World War Two (eighty percent of it). The book explore US and British relations even before the United States formally entered into the war with military industrial cooperation. There’s a good discussion about the impasse between the British and Americans on concerns for the configuration on the development for the fighting tank for Britain during the early years of the War before America got involved militarily. The book discusses the various distrust between the two countries and more importantly how key political and military leaders tried to forge the incredible alliance that later became the great legacy to define American and British alliance.
Of importance to military history readers is the author’s discussion about the differences between British and American military manners from the strategic outlooks, to the generalship, and also the culture of the fighting men. I learned the difference between the British and American philosophy of military command in which the British had a divided command structure versus the American preference for a singular command structure. The British would often see the Americans as inexperience while the Americans saw the British’s way with suspicion since clearly their ways must not be working if they are losing or requiring American support. Soon the Americans got their way of more singular command structure because of the growing American contribution to the war in terms of men and supplies. Marshall, the general who oversaw the entire US military was arguing for one person to command the war effort in the European theatre after America entered the war and was success to get what he requested. That command eventually would be given to Eisenhower who wonderfully handled the various personalities who were American and British generals.
A moving moment in the book for me was the account of D-Day. The book mentioned that the 1st and 29th Infantry Division as part of the first wave received 90 percent causality rates, something that is shocking for modern readers to think of today. The book also talked about the difficulty of General Montgomery with the British and his hubris which not only rub the Americans the wrong but also his fellow British. Eisenhower’s patience with Montgomery is incredible and a personal life lesson for me as well with leadership. It’s incredible that at the height of the war just the amount of men that fought in World War Two in Europe. There was 62 US divisions and 13 British Divisions. Yet with all the enormous size of the conflict there was modesty with Eisenhower in how he ended the war and didn’t want attention to be brought to himself. Towards the end of the book the author argue that despite the book’s account of the clash of personalities and disagreements between generals and politicians the legacy and focus should be collaboration and not conflict that made the alliance work and also how we must be careful that our human nature gravitate to focus on conflict as the topic of discussion. Wonderful book.

[Socraticgadfly · Rating 4 out of 5]

Solid look at how Ike managed the WWII alliance on the ground in Europe, with a brief backgrounder on his WWI and interwar experience.

Nothing really "new," so not a five-star, as with a couple of details holding it back.

Newish around the edges? Barr, while noting Monty overpromised, claimed that Normandy in general and Falaise in particular worked pretty well. He also ignored that Ike had to prod Monty to "cut off" Denmark to keep the Russkies from reaching its border.

He does also note, contra Patton and Bradley, senior US officers like William Simpson who liked Monty.

[Andrew Canfield · Rating 4 out of 5]

Eisenhower's Armies: The American-British Alliance during World War II is a superbly written book that sticks admirably to the contents of its title and subtitle.

British historian Niall Barr begins with a quick look at relations between the American and British militaries going back to the French and Indian War through the Revolutionary War through the War of 1812. He then speeds forward through the First World War, during which America broke its longstanding commitment to staying free of pan-European alliances in order to aid France and England following Germany's adoption of unrestricted submarine warfare.

While Barr makes clear that American helped to turn the tide of the war in the closing months, he does note that "American divisions had been in the line of battle only 200 days" and suffered 50,000 battle deaths compared to 900,000 for the British alone.

British generals like Henry Rawlinson were shown to often be dismissive of America's fighting capabilities, and it is largely in the context of misunderstandings between American and her British allies that the book looks at the First World War experience.

Douglas Haig and John Pershing were shown to have a strained relationship, and this seemed to center around difficulty agreeing over how and where America troops would be utilized (under their own American commanders or operating integrated under British and French generals). These sorts of disagreements at the top of the European/American chains of command foreshadowed much of the wrangling that would take place three decades later.

The interwar years were held up to be a time of disconnect between England and America's militaries. The book points out that they had little contact during this time and, thanks largely to the Depression and isolationist sentiment in the U.S. especially, were largely in a mindset of retrenchment and cost-cutting.

As Germany began to overrun his European neighbors in 1939 and 1940, however, cooperation between American and Britain's military establishments began to deepen.

Barr spends some interesting sections talking about exchanges of officials between the British and U.S. upper military echelons. This included Brigadier General Raymond E. Lee being sent by George Marshall to London and Field Marshal John Dill arriving in Washington to act as a liaison between Churchill and Roosevelt's governments.

Building on the short-lived Liberty Tank program of the Great War years, both France and England began to look to the then-neutral U.S. to produce tanks for their arsenals.

British industrialist Michael Dewar would arrive in the U.S. to get the ball rolling on contracts for tank production which, after Roosevelt's creation of the Office of Emergency Management (OEM) in 1940, began to get underway in earnest.

The ABC-1 meetings, which began in 1940, further stitched together cooperation between the Anglo-American militaries' top brass. The Victory Program and the American Special Observer Group (sent to London as a corollary to the British military liaisons already in D.C.) further brought the two nations' top military commands together.

The Pullman Standard Car Manufacturing Company would land the first tank contracts in September 1940 (for 500 tanks). The emergence of America as the arsenal of democracy would only come to full fruition with the passage of Lend-Lease, and much of the book's first quarter gets in the nuts and bolts of how this came to pass. The analysis of how the tank program got off the ground was a particularly compelling part of this early section.

It is with U.S. entry into the war-in earnest in 1942-that things really get rolling.

Operation Bolero was the buildup of U.S. military forces in Britain during the interim between Pearl Harbor and Operation Torch in November 1942, and Barr dives into how the logistics worked as well as how everyday interactions between U.S. and British service personnel unfolded. The American soldiers seemed to have much better rations and more spiffy uniforms, and the tension this often created was not helped by the fact that many wives/girlfriends of British military member were also present on the island while many of their spouses were deployed against the Axis powers.

And, despite speaking the same language, Barr even captures the disconnect that often cropped up at the higher levels of the two militaries. Differences in jargon and approaches to warfare were evident even during Bolero, further foreshadowing tensions in the Mediterranean and western European theaters.

But there were also anecdotes of how the British and Americans, despite their differences, admired traits of bravery and selflessness in their fellow Allied brethren. This admiration seemed to crop up most often at the micro level between enlisted men but with less frequency higher up the chain of command.

AFHQ (Allied Forces Headquarters) Commander General Dwight Eisenhower and his second-in-command General Bedell Smith then take on big roles during the landing of Allied forces in French North Africa. The book delves into Operation Torch and, around the same time, the British forces under Harold Alexander and Bernard Montgomery battling Axis forces under the Desert Fox, Erwin Rommel.

There are some interesting asides, including American Colonel Lucian K. Truscott being tasked with creating an American version of the British Commando forces. George Marshall had first been impressed with British Combined Operations Director Louis Mountbatten's own Commandos, and the pursuit of this ultimately would result in the birth of the Army Rangers.

The challenges around the landings in North Africa and the encirclement of Tunisia caused tension to grow between the American and British high command. The movement up the Italian boot which followed Operations Avalanche and Husky was marked by further intra-Allied infighting, and the book never loses its focus on relentless focus on how relations between the Americans and British played out under pressure.

There was tremendous division between U.S. General Patton, Sir Arthur Tedder, and Sir John Cunningham (commanders of the Allied Air and Naval divisions, respectively in the Mediterranean Theater) on one side and General Bernard Montgomery on the other with respect as how to approach how the war would be taken onto Sardinia and then into Italy.

Supreme Commander Eisenhower entered the fray from time to time, and Churchill's own meddling and indecisiveness when it came to the timing of a cross-Channel invasion made things challenging. While Operation Dragoon would eventually be pulled off in the south of France, D-Day itself seemed an almost excessively long time in the making. Barr indicated that American leaders felt that British concerns over massive casualties, an understandable holdover from the Great War, oftentimes made them too gun shy when direction action against the continent was called for.

Barr notes an unspoken view that Britain's military was soft behind American jokes about the times they had set aside, even in a theater of battle, for tea times. The meticulousness of Bernard Montgomery also came to rankle on the Americans, as his old school view of military matters led him to lean on big, set piece battles that took massive amounts of coordination to pull off. Many U.S. commanders found this plodding, take-your-time approach no longer the best course of action in mid-twentieth century warfare.

Even the Allied division levels were full of infighting in the Mediterranean theater, as U.S. Major General John Lucas frequently butted heads with his opposite, British 1st Division Commander Ronald Penney.

From Operation Olive to the fighting in Anzio, Gemmano, and at Monte Cassino, the fight through Italy was both bloody and saw near constant bickering between the staffs of the United States and England.

The Axis Powers of course had even worse dysfunction, with the Wehrmacht in Italy having to essentially take over for the largely defeated Italian Army much as they had had to do in North Africa the year prior. But this book's purpose was to exclusively look at Allied relations, so this was only mentioned in relation to events on that side.

Victory itself was not even without bickering. U.S. General Mark Clark's Fifth Army ended up the first Allies into liberated Rome, but even this generated controversy. Clark was accused of maneuvering the British out of the way in order to ensure he and his men received the headlines of being "first to Rome."

The final third of the book features both highs and lows during the push from the beaches of Normandy deep into the Reich itself. From Operations Grenade to Market Garden to the Battle of Bulge, these campaigns are looked at within the context of inter-Allied cooperation.

Chief of the British Imperial Staff Alan Brooke and Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery seemingly would have been on the same page as Supreme Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) head Dwight Eisenhower as the Allies pushed closer and closer to victory during late 1944 and early 1945.

And while they sometimes were on the same music sheet, the moments of glory were counterbalanced-as they often were in North Africa and Italy-with flashes of misunderstanding.

The brave fighting of the British in western Europe seemed in constant threat of being overshaded by the performances of strong American personalities like Generals George Patton, Courtney Hodges, William Simpson, Troy Middleton, and Omar Bradley fighting in western Europe.

Brooke and Montgomery could see that their long-respected empire was on the verge of being eclipsed by the Americans whenever the war ended, a conflict that would conclude with England owing tremendous financial and downright spiritual debts to the Americans whose efforts would once again save them from the depredations of the Huns. This surely rankled these two proud British commanders.

It was evident by 1944 that the proud British were now the junior partners in their relationship with the Americans, a circumstance they would not happily accept. This is an undercurrent that is always lurking from D-Day onward. Efforts by Montgomery to hype his British troops as the heroes at the expense of glory for the American Army played a big role in rubbing Eisenhower and Marshall the wrong way.

There was also an undercurrent of American concern that Churchill and the British had preservation of their own empire-something Americans from FDR on down realized had to be placed on the backburner in relation to victory over the Reich-too much at the forefront of their strategic thinking.

But despite this, both countries had enough in common and enough on the line to pull through when it really counted. Their abilities to coordinate together, often achieved only after a lot of arguing, outdid anything the Axis Powers could pull off in the end.

Eisenhower's Armies: The American-British Alliance during World War Two does justice to its topic. There is no way readers can complete this book without gaining a more nuanced grasp of how the military brass of the two main Allied countries worked together (and sometimes at cross purposes) during the world's biggest conflict.

From the micro level of the everyday troops to the upper echelons of command, Barr put together a narrative that looks at the good and bad of how the two countries worked together toward ultimate victory.

The bravery and heroism of both armies comes through, as does the friction that can happen even at much lower levels of cooperation between hierarchies of competing nations.

This really is a well-written and well put together work of nonfiction. It never becomes bogged down but at the same time does not skimp on details and relevant information, putting together a comprehensive look at how the Axis Powers were beaten at the hands of an imperfect, but ultimately victorious, alliance between England and the United States.

-Andrew Canfield Denver, Colorado

[M Tucker · Rating 5 out of 5]

The depth and breadth of the Anglo-American alliance during the Second World War was unprecedented in history and Niall Barr does an outstanding job of bringing that to light. This is a very well researched and well written story that examines the development and evolution of that alliance looking at both the successes and the problems that had to be overcome. The author examines relationships between the troops and the commanders and presents it all in a very entertaining manner. He is exclusively looking at the military alliance between the US Army and the British Army that began before the US became involved in the war and after the fighting began but that is not where the book begins. He begins with the French and Indian War and proceeds to investigate the evolution of the two armies up to their close working relationship during the Second World War. It is a very interesting narrative.

Mr Barr does not focus exclusively on the problems that arose at the higher echelons of command beginning in N Africa and that continued throughout the war. He goes well beyond that. However, he does illustrate how Eisenhower’s genius and ability to remain even-tempered kept the alliance together through the toughest moments. I think he does a very good job of presenting a well-balanced examination of Eisenhower’s conduct of the war. He covers Montgomery’s considerable shortcomings without completely overlooking his considerable talents. And he covers Simpson’s Ninth Army, Simpson’s cooperation with the British 21st Army Group and the snag that finally put a sour taste for the Brits in Simpson’s mouth; something that is hard to find in a World War II book. But, as I think back on his story, I think Mr Barr demonstrates that there was much more cooperation than acrimony. I did enjoy his emphasis of the importance General Sir John Dill (I believe he was posthumously promoted to Field Marshal) to the success of the alliance and the winning of the war. I have read a lot about him and he really was an extraordinarily great man.

The author packs a lot into 470 pages and I found something I was not aware of: the British Tank Mission to the US and its contribution to the development of the Sherman tank. Another surprise: a mention of the SCR-584 and its importance in shooting down the V-1's. Mr Barr does not spend much time on technology cooperation between the Brits and Yanks but it is another example of the unprecedented cooperation that began in 1940 and produced war winning results.

Mr Barr ends his tail with the telling of how the memoirs written just after the war began the controversies surrounding the major players in the conflict (Eisenhower, Montgomery, Bradley, Patton) that still continue to this day. The Eisenhower quote at the end of the book really says it all in that regard.

“While it is true that during the war we had the compelling motive of a common fear to stick together, the fact is that we had present in early 1942 and during most of that year, all of the ingredients for a profound pessimism and for mutual recrimination. In spite of the black outlook we buckled down and did the job. Extremists on both sides of the water can indulge in all the backbiting and name-calling that they please – they can never get away from the historical truth that the United States and the British Empire, working together, did a job that looked almost impossible at the time it was undertaken.”

I really did have a tremendous time with Mr Barr’s book and I recommend it highly.

[Rick Davis · Rating 5 out of 5]

At the end of the book, Niall Barr writes, "Collaboration, not conflict, was the touchstone of this alliance." The alliance Barr refers to is the one between the United States and Britain during World War II and succinctly sums up one of the points I took away from his book.

Barr brilliantly approached this subject by taking the reader to the Colonial era, the American Revolution, and the severed relationship between America and England. This was a good foundation to build upon and he continued to address the Anglo-American relationship through World War I and then the important actions between the two nations prior to America entering World War II with the British purchase of tanks and the Lend-Lease Act.

Throughout the book Barr highlights the good and the bad, and does a good job of giving credit where due and not heaping on criticism when not warranted. Given the fact that Barr hails from the United Kingdom, I wondered if he was going to be a die-hard defender of Field Marshall Montgomery. However, this was not the case, nor did he attack the man. Barr did a wonderful job of explaining the friction and cooperation that existed between British and American officers.

This is a great book for anyone studying leadership, interagency cooperation, and international cooperation.

[Evan Þ. · Rating 3 out of 5]

This's a history of how the British-American alliance in World War II worked out on the military level, with far closer cooperation than ever before between allies. In World War I, the armies largely fought different wars side-by-side; it took years for a single supreme commander to be appointed. In World War II, there were common procurement and intelligence services almost as soon as America joined the war, and a common Supreme Commander from mid-1942 on.

This book tells how that happened, and how it worked out - the arguments and the difficulties and the successes. Managing this relationship required many people's diplomatic talents. There was a good reason why Eisenhower commanded both Torch and Overlord - he had shown those rare talents in great measure.

But this telling of the story seems to compromise two ways of telling it. It doesn't give a detailed point-by-point index; it's written as a narrative for the popular press. But that narrative is compromised as a story, because - thanks to Montgomery's and Patton's jealousy, which was never struck down - we don't get a fitting deneaument to the story except the war in itself ending.

I'd recommend this book to people interested in the subject, though it could have been told better.

[Sean · Rating 5 out of 5]

In depth history and balanced view of the Anglo American cooperation in WW2. Traces the histories of the US and UK Armies from the French and Indian War to the beginning of the Cold War. Portrays Eisenhower as a first class general and strategist, striving to keep the coalition together above everything else except defeating the German army, and Montgomery, as a first class egotist and fourth rate strategist, who exasperated his British peers as well as the Americans. The author emphasized the respect of the American and British soldiers had for each other especially when they fought shoulder to shoulder in Anzio and the seamless collaboration between the 82d Airborne and the Irish Guards in seizing the bridge at Nijmegen, which is an brilliant lesson in leadership, combined arms tactics, and cooperation.

[Chet Slonina · Rating 5 out of 5]

A wonderful look into the American-British Alliance of the best and worst of friends separated by a "common language". It took a man like Eisenhower as a person who knew when to lead, when to compromise and when to give in albeit seldom. Make it known that this was a job that only Ike could have done as the similarities between the American and British Armies were no where the same in tactics, equipment and strategies. As WW II dragged on, Britain took to the backseat as the American Juggernaut became eventually prevalent and becoming top dog although at the jealous covert talk and insinuations placed by the covetous Brits who may have had an axe to grind but, sadly, as a bride left at the altar. Ike was a magician and that is what catapulted him even further in his career. A great historical read and reflection of a great leader.

[Jeff Brateman · Rating 5 out of 5]

Loved it loved it loved it! As time goes by, I think we forget and immortalize the WW2 struggle, forgetting that all the players involved were engrossed in their local and regional struggles as well. This book really plays home the importance of various levels of cooperation in large organizational merges. This was my first intro into how Montgomery and Eisenhower had to deal with their own struggles, and pressures from their respective countries.

Also, this makes a great companion book to The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, which essentially shows the power struggle from the opposite side.

[Fausto Betances · Rating 4 out of 5]

Good reading in general. A bit biased toward British influence in WWII outcome. (I didn't know it was written by a British author until pro Britain claims started to pile up). Not a bad book. Good pace.

​Takeaways
Birth of a super power, change of guard.

Balance of forces at the gates of Berlin before the war was over:
61 American divisions, 13 British, 11 French, 5 Canadian and 1 polish.

Information about the war in the east only started to become available in the 60's and 70's. That caused most of history books about WWII to focus on the allied campaigns in Western Europe as opposed to the more important East front.

[Peter Colasante · Rating 5 out of 5]

I always knew of the conflict both American and British armies faced during WWII, I didn't realize until reading this book how much the gulf between the two actually was. Barr's book brings to light just how important Eisenhower was to keep the alliance together and how much grief he took during the course of the war. It is a very interesting read that takes the reader behind the scenes of the war in the European theater.

[THOMAS WHALEN · Rating 4 out of 5]

Good history book

I enjoyed this book. It is very well researched and written, and provides good insight into the Anglo-American partnership that produced victory in WWII in Europe.

[Nishant Pappireddi · Rating 5 out of 5]

Good book about the Anglo-American alliance between the respective armies during WW2.

[Harley · Rating 4 out of 5]

I picked up this book after reading a biography of Eisenhower hoping to gain a better understanding of Eisenhower's role in World War II. Unfortunately, the title is misleading. Niall Barr attempts to document the relationship between the British military and the American military beginning with the interactions prior to the American Revolution. The last 2/3 of the book focused on World War II.

Niall Barr has spent a lot of time obviously researching the relationship between the two militaries but he puts too much of his research into the book. At times I found it boring and too detailed. He could have left out half the material and still drove his message home. I felt there was too much coverage of the various battles. (Then again, this is the first book of history about a war that I have read. If they are all like this, I won't be reading another.)

Given what I have read in this book and in the Eisenhower biography, I am amazed that the Allies even won the war. The Allies made a number of key blunders, but still managed to overcome the Germans.

The message I take from the book is that building a working relationship between two very different organizations is very difficult but it can be done. Victory came as a result of the Allies being able to work together despite their differences and their mistakes.

Business leaders who acquire or merge with other businesses should read this book to understand how difficult it is to blend different cultures.

Niall Barr is British and I think he has read more British history than American, but he is fair in his analysis. He shares both the negative and positive on both sides.

[Martin Koenigsberg · Rating 5 out of 5]

Certainly one of the three best books I have read this year(30). Taking a wonderful higher view, this book takes on the Alliance between the US and Great Britain in World War II. My only regret is that there is little mention of the Pacific war and the alliance there. But these are Eisenhower's Armies, so we get to see how the two armies intertwined and cooperated throughout the European War. I found this to be a fair look, examining the struggle between the allies as well. The classic arguments are there, Torch vs. Crossing the Channel in 1942, Sicily versus the Balkans, Northern European Thrust versus multi-front advance in 1944/45. But in each this British author gives you the reasoned background for each, the players who did the arguing, and the timeline and results... I like his thesis that Eisenhower's genius for keeping the Alliance solid and totally enmeshed was in the end more important than any one decision he made. Together, the two allies could have fulfilled any plan in a way that neither might be able to do alone... Well worth reading

[Joan Mitchell · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book gives an intimate knowledge of how the Allies of WWII worked with each other. The different generals with their differing opinions and training had to come together in very unfavorable circumstances to win on all fronts. I am not into war history but this was very interesting. The different personalities and viewpoints came together in impossible circumstances. What we are taught in our school history does not include all the implications that this book offers. I received this book from Goodreads for free.

[Scott Fasnacht · Rating 4 out of 5]

An interesting approach to studying the complex relationships behind America's alliance with Great Britain in WWII. The author adeptly blends the powerful personalities of Eisenhower's contemporaries with a highly readable historical context dating back to the French and Indian Wars. A good read for anyone interested in Eisenhower or the politics behind this important alliance.

[Richard · Rating 4 out of 5]

4.5 stars. Excellent and engaging account of the World War II alliance between the US and the UK, while at the same time describing vividly battles, strategies and personalities. The author has been very even-handed in his approach and does not pull any punches when discussing key events.

[Joe · Rating 4 out of 5]

It was well put together and the emphasis on cooperation between the commanders and troops of the American and British armies is the real message.

[Mike Roach · Rating 5 out of 5]

good deep exploration of the Anglo-American military structure of WW2. Goes beyond Monty vs Ike to show why each sustem behaved the way it did.