Deng Xiaoping's Long War: The Military Conflict Between China and Vietnam, 1979-1991

New Cold War History

by Xiaoming Zhang

The surprise Chinese invasion of Vietnam in 1979 shocked the international community. The two communist nations had seemed firm political and cultural allies, but the twenty-nine-day border war imposed heavy casualties, ruined urban and agricultural infrastructure, leveled three Vietnamese cities, and catalyzed a decadelong conflict. In this groundbreaking book, Xiaoming Zhang traces the roots of the conflict to the historic relationship between the peoples of China and Vietnam, the ongoing Sino-Soviet dispute, and Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping's desire to modernize his country. Deng's perceptions of the Soviet Union, combined with his plans for economic and military reform, shaped China's strategic vision. Drawing on newly declassified Chinese documents and memoirs by senior military and civilian figures, Zhang takes readers into the heart of Beijing's decision-making process and illustrates the war's importance for understanding the modern Chinese military, as well as China's role in the Asian-Pacific world today.

Genres: China, History, Nonfiction, Military Fiction, Military History, War, Asia

277 pages, Hardcover

First published May 6, 2015

Reviews

[Carlos Martinez · Rating 4 out of 5]

Surprisingly balanced and interesting account of the extremely unfortunate military conflict between China and Vietnam, starting with China's brief invasion in February 1979. Zhang has done an impressive amount of research, and is able to synthesise this into a plausible narrative: approximately, that the conflict was a near-inevitable function of the Sino-Soviet Split, China's serious security concerns, Vietnam's alignment from the early 1970s onwards with the Soviet Union, the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia, and more.

In summary: it's complicated.

Brother Enemy: The War After The War is another important account of this period, albeit with more focus on Cambodia.

[Stacy · Rating 3 out of 5]

I’d give it a solid 2.75. It is very thorough of the border conflicts of China and Vietnam. A lot of people died considering it was a battle for a few unnavigable mountains. The Cold War is all about fear. In this case, it is the fear of the Soviet Union fighting China through Vietnam and Vietnam asserting themselves through Cambodia. It was a stretch to call it ‘the longest conflict in modern Chinese history’ it was off more than it was on. It is also a stretch to write a book with predictions and interviews on the Vietnamese side with no real records available.

[Sleepy Boy · Rating 3 out of 5]

A book on a war that is often long forgotten. A war I had no real knowledge about until I read Brother Enemy which was more focused on Vietnam's expansion into Cambodia but of course included the Sino Invasions. Examines the war itself along with its socio-economic and political causes and effects. Somewhat dry, but gets an extra star just for how rare its subject is.

[Ted Tyler · Rating 5 out of 5]

An excellent read that explores the many dimensions of this important conflict between China and Vietnam. I credit Zhang Xiaoming with giving me three major ideas to chew upon: Deng's visionary thinking, how to evaluate the conflict, the role of political ideology.

First, Zhang makes a very compelling argument that Deng Xiaoping invaded Vietnam with the future in mind. He made a bold calculation that the Soviet Union would not be able to assist Vietnam and that the U.S. would be intrigued to see China stand-up to Vietnam's assertiveness in Southeast Asia. His calculation certainly paid-off and arguably was useful in creating goodwill between certain American leaders who probably were satisfied to see Vietnam be humbled. Americans often forget that the 1980s were a boom for U.S.-China relations. I think Zhang is correct to assert that Deng had hoped for closer economic and political ties with the West and that fighting Vietnam would portray China as a more attractive partner.

Second, Zhang is helping me rethink how I evaluate this conflict. Previously, I was convinced that from an operational perspective, China did not accomplish that much. And while Zhang showcases China's problems with logistics, combined armed, and fighting on unfamiliar terrain, he also shows that China did a lot right. There was certainly a lot of thought placed into how the campaign would be waged and the goals were clearly defined. Chinese soldiers fought bravely against some of Vietnam's elite, battle-tested units. Not only did they fight well, they accomplished their objectives by seizing the northern provincial capitals of Vietnam. The military accomplished all of its goals, even if it wasn't pretty. And while China's invasion didn't force Vietnam out of Cambodia, Beijing bled Hanoi dry by staging a ten-year conflict along the Sino-Vietnamese border. Vietnam's economic growth was stunted by having to support such a large defensive force for so long. And while Yunnan and Guangxi paid a high economic cost, China as a whole was economically soaring in the 1980s. China can rightly claim a strategic, geopolitical victory in the war against Vietnam.

Lastly, Zhang highlights the importance of ideology. Whether it was at the strategic level: Sino-Soviet completion for the leadership of the international communist movement, or at the tactical level: political commissars using ideology to inspire bravery amongst Chinese PLA battalions, ideology matters to China. The West is often quick to eye-roll and scoffs at Marxist-Leninism ideas and there usefulness. But what matters is how China views ideology. Many Chinese political and military leaders do view ideology as a supplement to military power. Creating and nurturing patriotism, just-war narratives, and perspectives of self-defense are important. We should not underestimate China's value of ideology. They believe this stuff works and attach great importance to it. And there is a strong argument that it does work to some extend. Significant persuasion was required to mobilize an army of uneducated, largely rural, and inexperienced soldiers AND that it was in their interest to invade a foreign country, confronting a Vietnamese military that had outlasted the French and the Americans. Ideology and its role in Chinese warfighting need not be simply dismissed.

[Phan Ba · Rating 4 out of 5]

Kết cuộc lại thì cá nhân Đặng Tiểu Bình và quyết định tiến quân vào Campuchia của Lê Duẩn là hai yếu tố quan trọng dẫn đến cuộc chiến tranh biên giới. Hai nhà độc tài đã khiến cho không biết bao nhiêu con người đã phải thiệt mạng cả ở hai bên.

[RYAN PHAM · Rating 4 out of 5]

Un jacketed hardcover

So North Vietnam manages to rearm after taking over South Vietnam and uses that gear tô take over Cambodia and Laos. The Communist world disintegrates and Vietnam sides with the Soviet Union. Communist China feels like it is surrounded by enemies and wants to punish “ungrateful” Vietnam and hates the fact that the Soviet Union used its rail lines that were overburdened during the Cultural Revolution. It then uses diplomacy to build support against Vietnam, which the rest of the world increasingly sees as an imperial power. However, China decides to invade Vietnam to clear at least one enemy from its borders, get Vietnam out of Cambodia, remind Vietnam who’s boss, and get military training. Unfortunately, the Military is not large enough and China flounders in Vietnamese jungles. Basically, it ends with China having a boot print on its face, with a low grade border conflict that lasts through the 1980s that puts economic strain on the Yunnan and Guangxi provinces that prevents their modernization until later. I sense that mistakes were made. Also, I find it strange that Mao thought that America would switch ơn a dime to befriend thêm after sợ much animosity. Well that and how Le Duan was actually a bad negotiator since he had trouble understanding why the USSR and China kept pursuing different goals instead of realizing that countries inevitably pursue their national interests.

[Mike · Rating 4 out of 5]

If you are deeply interested in the politics of the Cold War, especially the largely unknown Soviet Union vs Chinese component I highly recommend this book. It shows how the Chinese attacked Vietnam as a result of Cold War fears and fought a 10 year off and on war against their much smaller neighbor. I have long studied the Cold War, but like most people, my reading has focused on the US vs Russian part of the conflict. Reading this book gives one new insight on the opening of China and détente with Russia as both rivals jockeyed for US support against their enemy.

Having highly recommended this book I will add that this book is not for someone looking for a light quick read. It examines Chinese politics in depth and is densely packed with facts. It is also sparse on information on the Vietnamese version of events, as the author puts it, due to the inability to examine Vietnamese archives.

[James · Rating 3 out of 5]

Barely mentioned in both China and Vietnam, the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in 1979 (the Third Indochina War) epitomised the pervasive fear that defined the Cold War: in this war it was the fear of Soviet encirclement of China through Vietnam and Vietnamese hegemony in Southeast Asia, seen through the invasion by the former of Cambodia to oust Pol Pot.

Xiaoming Zhang has written the definitive history of the war and its origins from the Chinese perspective (Vietnamese archives and histories remain inaccessible). Zhang outlines the war’s origins in Chinese geopolitical concerns and lack of gratitude for aid during the war with America; he charts the progress of political and military mobilisation as well as the decade-long border conflict that followed the Chinese army’s withdrawal in March 1979.

This might be the most detailed account of the Chinese side of the war but it still is a dry and academic work, more maps and photos would have been beneficial.

[Natta Kuiski · Rating 4 out of 5]

The major fault of this book is that the author didn't have access to Vietnamese records. Considering they were one half of the conflict, that's a pretty significant issue. However, it really can't be held against the author since no one outside of the Vietnamese government, military, and select few others, do. The other option would have been to wait around for who knows how many years for Vietnam to open up their archives before writing about this subject—hardly an ideal solution, either. Given what he had to work with, I think the author did a fine job recounting and analyzing this often overlooked and underestimated conflict.

[Emmanuel-francis · Rating 2 out of 5]

A by-the-numbers retelling of one of the most important conflicts of the Cold War. It suggests that the PRC will go to war if they fear strategic encirclement. But that is the extent of its lessons for contemporary times.

The other issues that colour in its margins, namely the decrepit state of the PLA at the start of that conflict and the centrality of Deng Xiaoping in the decision to wage a long war for uncertain gains are questions that only war will answer.

[Hadrian · Rating 4 out of 5]

Operational and political history of the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in 1979 and subsequent violent border clashes to 1991. Zhang's argument, from memoirs, interviews, and available documents is that Deng Xiaoping played a central role in this war, and his motivations include implementing it a safeguard for planned economic modernization, to affect China's neighbors and strengthen China's diplomatic position, and rehabilitate the People's Liberation Army after the Cultural Revolution.

[Lucas · Rating 4 out of 5]

"Không có bạn bè hoặc kẻ thù vĩnh viễn, chỉ có lợi ích là vĩnh cửu."