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Pan-Asianism and Japan's War 1931-1945
The book explores the critical importance of Pan-Asianism in Japanese imperialism. Pan-Asianism was a cultural as well as political ideology that promoted Asian unity and recognition. The focus is on Pan-Asianism as a propeller behind Japan's expansionist policies from the Manchurian Incident until the end of the Pacific War.
290 pages, Hardcover
First published December 15, 2007
77 people want to read
About the author
Eri Hotta
6 books21 followersEri Hotta, born in Tokyo and educated in Japan, the United States, and the United Kingdom, has taught at Oxford and at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, specializing in international relations. She was also a research fellow at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies in Tokyo.
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Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
January 12, 2014
In this book the author, Eri Hotta, explored the notion of Pan-Asianism and its relation to Japan’s wars in Asia between 1931 and 1945. First of all, it is important to understand what Pan-Asiansim stands for and the author did a very good job of dissecting the term, not semantically, but really explaining how Japanese of that era looked at Japan in relation to the rest of Asia, particularly China. It turns out that Pan-Asianism in Japan was not just an ideology about the unity of Asians, in fact there were three major strands of Pan-Asianism: the Teaist strand, the Sinic strand and finally the Meishuron strand which eventually became the most dominant strand. The Meishuron strand believed that Asia was weak and should stand together to counter Western imperialism with Japan as the leader of the movement.
There was a reason why this strand displaced the other two as the dominant strand. India, incorporated by the Teaists as a partner in the enterprise was unclear in their position vis-à-vis anti-imperialism. There were surely those who fought for independence from Great Britain (e.g., Subhas Chandra Bose) but many more Indians appeared to be fine with the status quo. China, an obvious partner in the enterprise and even treated as equals by the Teaists and the Sinics, was suffering greatly under the Western powers, especially after the Boxer Rebellion. But she was a torn and fragmented country with no unifying government. One can hardly expect China to play a significant role in the rise of Asia. It is therefore left to the most developed and stable country then, Japan, to take the lead.
An obvious question that one would ask would be whether Pan-Asianism, especially the Meishuron strand, caused Japan’s war. The author made no such claims but demonstrated how the adoption of Meishuron affected how the war and post-battle treatment of the conquered were carried out, both at the macro and the micro levels. At the macro level, in the early stages it led Japan to feel that they could not count on China to act as an effective partner, if not to check the Soviet Union’s likely southern expansion then at least as a buffer for a while. Japan therefore had to do it herself, and coupled with the need for room to house its expanding population and need for resources, found the occupation of Manchuria to be a perfect solution.
At the micro level, it explained the behaviours of the Japanese soldiers and commanders towards the peoples under their occupation. Firstly there must be a pent-up frustration amongst the Japanese soldiers towards the people they conquered because Japan was trying to bring respect to Asia, liberating these countries from the Western Imperialists, paying the price with blood, and yet facing a perplexingly hostile reception from fellow Asians. Secondly in the view of this strand, Japan and Japanese are superior, as seen by their ability to ‘liberate’ the other Asians, and these ‘sub-humans’ can be treated as such.
However in assigning herself this responsibility, the author demonstrated clearly the paradoxical Japanese psyche that was prevalent at that time where on one hand Japan felt a sense of superiority and mission in relation to her other Asian neighbours, but on the other felt inferior and victimised by the West, described by the author as a “curious blend of arrogance and self-consciousness” (pg. 207). The perceived sense of victimisation can be traced to their humiliation by the West in the wake of the Treaty of Portsmouth and the Washington Conference when they realised the ‘Hobbesian nature’ (pg. 53) of world affairs. The sense of superiority on the other hand was a result of their realisation of their advancement in comparison to their neighbours as mentioned above. This psyche became a justification in many Japanese’ minds resulting in a sense of righteousness in their subsequent behaviours in the occupied territories.
While this book is centred around the theme of Pan-Asianism, the author also touched on the other factors that played equally important roles in the war including the role that the Soviet Union played (albeit briefly), the losing of control of the military, the internal fighting within the factions of the military, and most important of all, the dead ends that Japan eventually found herself in after attacking Pearl Harbor. Despite these, the author never let Pan-Asianism out of sight and in the end led one to ask whether it also had a role in Japan’s defeat. To this the author showed that there were perhaps two pitfalls that eventually led to Japan’s failure.
The first was their surprise that China would actually resist. Japan might have expected China not to either because the Chinese were thought to be too impotent to do so or because they might really buy into the ideology of Pan-Asianism. The reality was although China could not mount a successful defence against Japan, the vast expanse of China meant the tying down of a big number of Japanese troops.
The second was while the decision makers in the military might be under no delusions of eventual defeat and were only carrying on because they had promised an East-Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and were therefore unable to dismount, there were actually others who “saw reforming implications in what they were doing” (pg. 136). The machine therefore grinded on until it was utterly destroyed by the US.
This book must be read carefully because readers from countries that suffered under Japanese occupation might be quick to dismiss it as a revisionist effort to re-present history. The reader may accuse the writer of trying to justify Japanese soldiers’ brutality by pleading that the intention was good, and the brutal ways that were used on the occupied peoples were exactly the same ones used on Japanese themselves. The author did not have the intention of excusing Japan for her treatment of the people in the occupied territories, rather, she wanted to take an open-minded look at the Pan-Asianism ideology and how it influenced Japanese attitudes and decisions during the war. That the outcome of the ideology was bad for Asia in general and Japan in particular serves as a lesson for us in not examining our own reactions to the ideology, it does not imply that any attempt to understand it is an attempt to excuse the perpetrators of a brutal and ultimately tragic war.
This book is not an easy read; the fact that I am the first reviewer since the book was published in 2007 attests to it. It was not written in a “popular history” style where the author tried to inject life into characters by describing for example “he was tossing and turning in his bed”. What this author did instead was to adopt the academic writing style, citing references where they were due, describing events as they were, and making no effort to add colour to the characters. However for those who would make the effort, they can be sure of being richly rewarded with not just knowledge of events and people, but an expanded vocabulary (of which Hotta’s range was huge) and an insight into how an expert does critical analysis. It is well worth the effort.
There was a reason why this strand displaced the other two as the dominant strand. India, incorporated by the Teaists as a partner in the enterprise was unclear in their position vis-à-vis anti-imperialism. There were surely those who fought for independence from Great Britain (e.g., Subhas Chandra Bose) but many more Indians appeared to be fine with the status quo. China, an obvious partner in the enterprise and even treated as equals by the Teaists and the Sinics, was suffering greatly under the Western powers, especially after the Boxer Rebellion. But she was a torn and fragmented country with no unifying government. One can hardly expect China to play a significant role in the rise of Asia. It is therefore left to the most developed and stable country then, Japan, to take the lead.
An obvious question that one would ask would be whether Pan-Asianism, especially the Meishuron strand, caused Japan’s war. The author made no such claims but demonstrated how the adoption of Meishuron affected how the war and post-battle treatment of the conquered were carried out, both at the macro and the micro levels. At the macro level, in the early stages it led Japan to feel that they could not count on China to act as an effective partner, if not to check the Soviet Union’s likely southern expansion then at least as a buffer for a while. Japan therefore had to do it herself, and coupled with the need for room to house its expanding population and need for resources, found the occupation of Manchuria to be a perfect solution.
At the micro level, it explained the behaviours of the Japanese soldiers and commanders towards the peoples under their occupation. Firstly there must be a pent-up frustration amongst the Japanese soldiers towards the people they conquered because Japan was trying to bring respect to Asia, liberating these countries from the Western Imperialists, paying the price with blood, and yet facing a perplexingly hostile reception from fellow Asians. Secondly in the view of this strand, Japan and Japanese are superior, as seen by their ability to ‘liberate’ the other Asians, and these ‘sub-humans’ can be treated as such.
However in assigning herself this responsibility, the author demonstrated clearly the paradoxical Japanese psyche that was prevalent at that time where on one hand Japan felt a sense of superiority and mission in relation to her other Asian neighbours, but on the other felt inferior and victimised by the West, described by the author as a “curious blend of arrogance and self-consciousness” (pg. 207). The perceived sense of victimisation can be traced to their humiliation by the West in the wake of the Treaty of Portsmouth and the Washington Conference when they realised the ‘Hobbesian nature’ (pg. 53) of world affairs. The sense of superiority on the other hand was a result of their realisation of their advancement in comparison to their neighbours as mentioned above. This psyche became a justification in many Japanese’ minds resulting in a sense of righteousness in their subsequent behaviours in the occupied territories.
While this book is centred around the theme of Pan-Asianism, the author also touched on the other factors that played equally important roles in the war including the role that the Soviet Union played (albeit briefly), the losing of control of the military, the internal fighting within the factions of the military, and most important of all, the dead ends that Japan eventually found herself in after attacking Pearl Harbor. Despite these, the author never let Pan-Asianism out of sight and in the end led one to ask whether it also had a role in Japan’s defeat. To this the author showed that there were perhaps two pitfalls that eventually led to Japan’s failure.
The first was their surprise that China would actually resist. Japan might have expected China not to either because the Chinese were thought to be too impotent to do so or because they might really buy into the ideology of Pan-Asianism. The reality was although China could not mount a successful defence against Japan, the vast expanse of China meant the tying down of a big number of Japanese troops.
The second was while the decision makers in the military might be under no delusions of eventual defeat and were only carrying on because they had promised an East-Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and were therefore unable to dismount, there were actually others who “saw reforming implications in what they were doing” (pg. 136). The machine therefore grinded on until it was utterly destroyed by the US.
This book must be read carefully because readers from countries that suffered under Japanese occupation might be quick to dismiss it as a revisionist effort to re-present history. The reader may accuse the writer of trying to justify Japanese soldiers’ brutality by pleading that the intention was good, and the brutal ways that were used on the occupied peoples were exactly the same ones used on Japanese themselves. The author did not have the intention of excusing Japan for her treatment of the people in the occupied territories, rather, she wanted to take an open-minded look at the Pan-Asianism ideology and how it influenced Japanese attitudes and decisions during the war. That the outcome of the ideology was bad for Asia in general and Japan in particular serves as a lesson for us in not examining our own reactions to the ideology, it does not imply that any attempt to understand it is an attempt to excuse the perpetrators of a brutal and ultimately tragic war.
This book is not an easy read; the fact that I am the first reviewer since the book was published in 2007 attests to it. It was not written in a “popular history” style where the author tried to inject life into characters by describing for example “he was tossing and turning in his bed”. What this author did instead was to adopt the academic writing style, citing references where they were due, describing events as they were, and making no effort to add colour to the characters. However for those who would make the effort, they can be sure of being richly rewarded with not just knowledge of events and people, but an expanded vocabulary (of which Hotta’s range was huge) and an insight into how an expert does critical analysis. It is well worth the effort.
September 26, 2014
Certainly, Pan-Asianism is a contentious topic. Contemporarily, it is viewed within a binaristic dichotomy, some lambasting the ideology as a convenient lie justifying Japan's true imperial aims, others championing the ideology as genuine resistance against Western hegemony. Of course, these two opposing viewpoints are overly simplistic and Eri Hotta does a very good job of synthesizing them, using a solid wealth of historical knowledge. Neither justifying Japan's Pan-Asianist "crusade," nor cynically dismissing the ideology, Hotta traces the origins of Pan-Asianism in a global context of "Pan-Nationalisms" (Pan-Slavism, Pan-Islamism, etc.), the desire to unify regions within imagined cultural barriers.
The story of Pan-Asianism begins with Taeism, originating in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries. Okakura Kakuzō proclaimed in his 'Ideals of the East' that "Asia is one," championing a peaceful, mutual union between the so-called "Asian" nations. A countering theory was Sinicism, focusing on a mutual alliance between Japan and China, due to their linguistic similarities. Japan's role as the regional hegemon came with the development of Meishuron Pan-Asianism. The author traces these different strands, and throughout history, focusing specifically on the Manchurian Incident and the establishment of Manchukuo, the Marco Polo Bridge Incident and the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War, and Pearl Harbor with Japan's entry to war in the Pacific, along with pre-1931 contextualization of the ideology. Hotta paints a portrait of the ideology in Imperial Japan, highlighting intellectual and political reactions to the movement, giving the reader a better understanding (but no proposed solution) to such a troubling philosophical dilemma: Can Japan's wars be justified if there was a legitimate (or perceived) struggle against larger powers?
Overall, I thought the book was quite thoroughly researched and the arguments presented are sound. However, I was slightly dismayed that Hotta focused solely on the Pan-Asianist aspect, rarely looking at other factors contributing to the development of Japan's war machine. Of course, the author never makes the claim that ideology was the sole factor that lead to Japan's wars, in fact she flat out refutes such claims, she is simply highlighting an important aspect that has been either overlooked or simply dismissed for far too long. As such, this text shouldn't be used as the end-all argument for Japan's war (just as no single text should). I would recommend reading this book alongside texts such as Harootunian's 'Overcome by Modernity,' Gluck's 'Japan's Modern Myths,' or Ching's 'Becoming Japanese.' A close reading of this text, alongside other supplements should help lead to a better understanding of the characteristics of Imperial Japan (Emperor Ideology, Nationalism, the struggle of Modernity, Imperialist/Colonialist theory, Pan-Asianism, etc.). Thus, my first complaint is hardly a complaint—rather, it's a warning for readers to be careful before making assumptions. My second complaint is personal, but as one who studies history, I felt that Hotta's ideas were theoretically lacking at some point. It would be hard to classify this text as "History," considering the author's frequent use of theory from International Relations. Of course, this is not necessarily a bad thing, I just happen to be more accustomed to seeing more philosophical references in my readings on history. Overall, I'd highly recommend reading this book, as it looks into a problem that has been rarely considered, with the stipulation that readers should read closely and to supplement this text with other materials for a deeper understanding of Japan's Imperial aims.
The story of Pan-Asianism begins with Taeism, originating in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries. Okakura Kakuzō proclaimed in his 'Ideals of the East' that "Asia is one," championing a peaceful, mutual union between the so-called "Asian" nations. A countering theory was Sinicism, focusing on a mutual alliance between Japan and China, due to their linguistic similarities. Japan's role as the regional hegemon came with the development of Meishuron Pan-Asianism. The author traces these different strands, and throughout history, focusing specifically on the Manchurian Incident and the establishment of Manchukuo, the Marco Polo Bridge Incident and the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War, and Pearl Harbor with Japan's entry to war in the Pacific, along with pre-1931 contextualization of the ideology. Hotta paints a portrait of the ideology in Imperial Japan, highlighting intellectual and political reactions to the movement, giving the reader a better understanding (but no proposed solution) to such a troubling philosophical dilemma: Can Japan's wars be justified if there was a legitimate (or perceived) struggle against larger powers?
Overall, I thought the book was quite thoroughly researched and the arguments presented are sound. However, I was slightly dismayed that Hotta focused solely on the Pan-Asianist aspect, rarely looking at other factors contributing to the development of Japan's war machine. Of course, the author never makes the claim that ideology was the sole factor that lead to Japan's wars, in fact she flat out refutes such claims, she is simply highlighting an important aspect that has been either overlooked or simply dismissed for far too long. As such, this text shouldn't be used as the end-all argument for Japan's war (just as no single text should). I would recommend reading this book alongside texts such as Harootunian's 'Overcome by Modernity,' Gluck's 'Japan's Modern Myths,' or Ching's 'Becoming Japanese.' A close reading of this text, alongside other supplements should help lead to a better understanding of the characteristics of Imperial Japan (Emperor Ideology, Nationalism, the struggle of Modernity, Imperialist/Colonialist theory, Pan-Asianism, etc.). Thus, my first complaint is hardly a complaint—rather, it's a warning for readers to be careful before making assumptions. My second complaint is personal, but as one who studies history, I felt that Hotta's ideas were theoretically lacking at some point. It would be hard to classify this text as "History," considering the author's frequent use of theory from International Relations. Of course, this is not necessarily a bad thing, I just happen to be more accustomed to seeing more philosophical references in my readings on history. Overall, I'd highly recommend reading this book, as it looks into a problem that has been rarely considered, with the stipulation that readers should read closely and to supplement this text with other materials for a deeper understanding of Japan's Imperial aims.
October 4, 2016
This is a summary of mainstream views of Pan-Asianism in Japan. Perhaps good for lecture prep. I considered assigning a chapter in class then thought there must be a little more engaging, if not so survey-ish, reading on the subject matter.
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews