On War is a seven-year collection of columns written by the father of 4th Generation War theory while observing the U.S. invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq. It is an intriguing account of a war in progress, as seen through the eyes of a military theorist able to anticipate events with an almost prophetic degree of accuracy. Throughout the book, 4GW theory is defined, described, and refined as events in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other places demonstrate the theory’s utility in making sense of current events and predicting future ones. The inevitable failure of the New Iraqi Army and the U.S.-installed al-Maliki government is explained years in advance, as is the rise of the Islamic State and other 4th Generation forces presently battling for power in post-occupation Iraq.
Lind also makes an ominous, but compelling case for the gradual spread of 4th Generation chaos and the decline of the state throughout the world, including in the United States of America. Featuring a Foreword by the brilliant Israeli military theorist Martin van Creveld, On War is a fascinating book that is a must-read for every military professional, wargamer, and amateur student of the art of war.
In one of the key passages of the book, Lind writes: “4th Generation war is the greatest change since the Peace of Westphalia, because it marks the end of the state’s monopoly on war. All over the world, state militaries are fighting non-state opponents, and almost always, the state is losing.”
William S. Lind is one of the most significant and influential military theorists on the planet. The author of the Maneuver Warfare Handbook and a founder of 4th Generation War theory, Mr. Lind is known and respected by military personnel around the world.
I didn't know anything about the author before reading this book. Once I was well into the book, I looked him up. I can't think of a better man to tackle the theory behind the landscape of war in the 21st century than Mr. Lind.
From the publisher's website: "On War: The Collected Columns of William S. Lind 2003-2009 is a seven-year collection of columns written while observing the U.S. military’s invasion of Iraq and its subsequent occupation of that country."
Each column is a quick read, 3 or 4 pages usually, over the seven years it adds up to a little more than 800 pages.
Lind clearly defines what is meant by 4th generation warfare, it's not just guerrilla tactics, but it's war waged by non-state actors against the state's legitimacy. He explores this concept throughout his columns, focusing mainly on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, drawing the reader's attention to applied examples of this theory. He also explains 1st through 3rd generation warfare, providing examples of 2nd gen (The US Army today) and 3rd gen (The Wehrmacht during WWII).
Several things stuck out to me. He mercilessly eviscerates Republicans and Democrats, rightly calling them the Part of the Establishment. Both parties make the same mistakes for the same reasons. There's enough in here for both parties to hate. This, in turn, makes his book all the more valuable for the cultural conservative. Somehow, while being focused on war, he managed to sneak in political criticism of the American system that's logical and based on observed behavior and not just a "Other side bad!" stance all to prevalent in these times.
This work cleared up mysteries that I had been gnawing on since Bush lead the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan. To wit, why didn't we win and why are we still there. Not only did Lind answer my questions, and more, he changed my mind about supporting these wars and the premises behind them. And what our national policy should be. Count me in the camp for a defensive strategy for America.
His theory predicting human action is effective and prescient. One would do well not to casually dismiss it due to imperfections and missed targets.
I'm not a military man, I haven't spent my life studying war and war's complex history. However, I do know enough history to recognize a master in his field. Lind's columns reveal his broad understanding of history and war theory. Yet his writings are very accessible to the average reader. Peppered with humor, quick studies of human character and infused with history, this is must read for anyone remotely interested in war and the effects it has on national and international politics.
Required reading for anyone interested in 4th Generation Warfare. There's a lot of repetition since it's a collection of online columns from 2003 through 2009, but also an interesting look at the Wars on Iraq and Afghanistan, so you can see which of his predictions were proved valid (inability to create a functional state, continued lack of any kind of coherent strategy by the US) and which warnings did not come to pass (US/Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear sites leading to fighting retreat from Iraq and dire consequences).
Lind's attitudes towards some things are a product of his times, so there are some unpalatable attitudes here, but the good parts are quite worthy of digging out, and he reviews a number of other books that would be very useful reading in pursuing an interest in military theory and 4GW.
To describe William S. Lind's "On War" as a "must read" would be both clichéd and imprecise; instead, one ought to say that it is book that must be contemplated so profound are its insights and its historic significance. By collecting together all of his "On War" columns into a single book, Lind reveals both his brilliance and his limitations in predicting the future. In an age when people are quick to deny or apologize for anything that does not accord with present tastes, William Lind stands apart as man of great insight and fortitude. Likewise, "On War" helps us to situate correctly our present understanding of warfare and the crisis of the state.
Most tomes this size - it is not a short read, but always an enjoyable one - have many big ideas within them. "On War" certainly does not lack such deep and penetrating analysis of post-modern warfare, but it does not present them in a unified or systematic manner. As should be expected from a collection of columns, Lind's work shows how his own thought on the matter of warfare evolved over the last decade. Also, this work records the mistakes Lind makes in predicting the future. Nevertheless, reading his predictions that were wrong is almost as useful as the ones that are so obviously correct. For example, his warning that the USG would probably bomb Iran with horrible results illustrates the kinds of risks that US foreign policy has been running of late. Since most risks remain hidden until they cause disasters, Lind's analysis is all the more important for people who all too often gloss over the world.
Reading this work will help anyone better understand the changing nature of warfare in the world by revealing why and how US combat operations all too often assist the 4GW elements we are attempting to combat. That alone makes this work worth reading. Add to that Lind's commentary on the overall health of our country (and the state in general), and you have a book of surpassing excellence.
Frighteningly prescient. The columns in this collection were written over 10 years ago, and they predict with a fair degree of accuracy the current debacle in the Middle East, the unravelling of nation states there and the inability of traditional militaries, even very strong ones, to cope with the new forms of war we are seeing. One can disagree with some of Lind's ideas, but for the most part he is right on the money -- and his insights are very disturbing.
His military, 4GW, and US politics internals is superb. The column collection format and the time span it covers makes it a really interesting reading about US-Iraq-Afghanistan conflicts.
But the über-white christian conservative POV and the continuous rant about cultural marxism are a drag. And probably obscure some very interesting ideas and arguments in many of the columns.
Lind's version of Success of Failure "On War: The Collected Columns of William S. Lind 2003-2009", loc1730-32 (July 29, 2004):
Remember, government bureaucracies don't get more money and more power when they succeed, but when they fail. With an incentive system like that, it is fairly obvious what the rest of us are going to get more of: the consequences of intelligence failures.
This is a fascinating collection of columns written by a prominent military theorist during the progression of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. I learned a great deal about fourth-generation warfare, and why the U.S. military's actions in those countries were counterproductive.
Anything by Bill Lind on Warfare and winning at low cost just plain fascinates me. This book is packed full of ideas and strategies that will have you thinking in unconventional ways.