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Насаме със себе си. Моят живот
В руската история мястото на Горбачов е уникално. Ние иахме не само "чудовища", но и съвсем "прилични" управници. Но нямахме управсик, който е внесъл в самата политика нормален човешки морал, който като Горбачов да е осъзнал дълбоко и да е почувствал, че да се потискат хората и народите, не означава: "може да има опасни политически последици". или "изисква прекалено големи разходи", а просто "не е добре". Не е имало управсик, който сам, доброволно да ограничава или да отслабва своята власт, за да даде на хората свобода. Не е имало управници, които съзнателно биха разрушавали империята, в която властват, за да дадат свобода на народите. Не е имало управници, които са готови да загубят властта и да изтърпят унижения, но да не отстъпят от поетите върху себе си морални самоограничения. И това внасяне на морал в политиката беше достатъчно, за да почне разпадането на аморалната система... За традиционното съзнание неговата епоха е епоха на разпадане и "най-крупна геополитическа катастрофа". В бъдещето на демократична русия Горбачов ще бъде главният обект на гордост от миналото. /Дмитрий Фурманов, "Независимая газета", 01.03.2011/
527 pages, Hardcover
First published February 12, 1993
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About the author
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
245 books71 followersMikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev was a Russian politician. He was the last General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the last head of state of the USSR, serving from 1985 until its collapse in 1991.
Gorbachev's attempts at reform—perestroika and glasnost—as well as summit conferences with United States President Ronald Reagan, contributed to the end of the Cold War, and also ended the political supremacy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. He was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1990. At the time of his death Gorbachev served as the leader of the Union of Social-Democrats, a political party founded after the official dissolution of the Social Democratic Party of Russia on 20 October 2007.
Gorbachev's attempts at reform—perestroika and glasnost—as well as summit conferences with United States President Ronald Reagan, contributed to the end of the Cold War, and also ended the political supremacy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. He was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1990. At the time of his death Gorbachev served as the leader of the Union of Social-Democrats, a political party founded after the official dissolution of the Social Democratic Party of Russia on 20 October 2007.
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July 12, 2023
Este livro está organizado em quatro partes, cada uma, por sua vez, organizada cronologicamente. A primeira reproduz (em discurso direto, são cópias estenográficas) uma série de encontros com chefes de estado estrangeiros, a segunda (com o horroroso título “Nos segredos do Kremlin”), inclui actas de algumas reuniões da comissão política do PCUS, a terceira contêm excertos de muitos dos discursos proferidos por Gorbatchov entre 1985, quando subiu ao poder como Secretário-Geral do PCUS, e 1991, quando teve lugar o golpe de estado. A 4ª e última parte, abre com a sua declaração de demissão do cargo de presidente e continua com textos de conferências e discursos proferidos daí em diante em inúmeros eventos.
Eu teria preferido que os vários textos tivessem sido apresentados sem separação temática, por ordem cronológica. Apesar de entender a lógica desta organização, ela obrigou-me a andar para a frente e para trás no tempo, e a encontrar explicações e contexto para muitos acontecimentos que me teriam sido muito mais úteis, se tivessem sido apresentados antes.
As partes que achei mais interessantes, foram, sem dúvida, a 1ª (pela curiosidade de ver transcritas conversas com personalidades como Margaret Thatcher, George Bush-pai, e o papa João Paulo II, para referir só alguns), e especialmente a 3ª, que só não sublinhei profusamente, porque o livro não é meu.
Na introdução, Gorbatchov faz uma auto-crítica, refletindo sobre o que correu mal e deveria ter feito melhor, ao mesmo tempo que explica as suas convicções: É porque vivi a amarga experiência do modelo de “socialismo” imposto por Estaline, o qual nada tem a ver com o socialismo, que estou definitivamente convencido do anti-humanismo e da ausência de futuro desse modelo. Mas os valores que fazem parte da ideia socialista, a justiça social, direitos e liberdades inalienáveis do homem, igualdade em direitos dos povos, paz excluindo os meios militares nas relações entre Estados, todos esses valores se harmonizam com os interesses de toda a humanidade e não podem desaparecer.
Alguns excertos da 3ª Parte:
Diligências ativas para pôr termo à corrida aos armamentos e para reduzir o seu número são as premissas indispensáveis para resolver outros problemas globais que se tornam cada vez mais urgentes: a destruição do meio-ambiente, a necessidade de encontrar novas fontes de energia, a luta contra o atraso económico, a fome e a doença. O princípio do militarismo – o armamento em detrimento do desenvolvimento – deve ceder lugar ao contrário: o desarmamento para o desenvolvimento.
(declaração de política externa pronunciada por Gorbatchov em 1986)
Ver o mundo como o seu património, proclamar arbitrariamente “zonas de interesse vital”, são pontos de vista que ainda hoje existem. E que têm como consequência a corrida ao armamento, porque se aposta a força (...). Isto faz parte dos estereótipos da antiga mentalidade, quando era considerado “legítimo” explorar os outros povos, gerir os seus recursos, dirigir tiranicamente os seus destinos.
(discurso no Forum por um mundo desnuclearizado e pela sobrevivência da humanidade, Fev. 1987)
É por exemplo evidente que a força – ou a ameaça do recurso à força – já não pode nem deve ser um instrumento de política externa. (...) Todos, e em primeiro lugar os mais fortes, devem tomar a iniciativa de limitar e excluir totalmente a utilização da força no exterior. Para mais, é hoje evidente que não é o aumento das forças militares que torna um país todo-poderoso.
(Discurso na ONU, Dez. 1988)
Se a inteligência não se conjugar de forma orgânica com a moral, a ciência contemporânea perderá o seu sentido humano. É ainda mais importante e mais crucial que o esforço do princípio moral da ciência se repercuta nos laços que ela mantém com a política. O enfraquecimento e, ainda mais, a rutura de um dos pares da tríade política-ciência-moral teriam consequências imprevisíveis para a humanidade do nosso tempo. Uma política moral respeita os direitos soberanos de todos os povos, grandes e pequenos. Uma política moral ajuda-nos a encontrar uma combinação ótima entre os interesses individuais, coletivos, nacionais e universais.
(extratos de discurso na Sorbonne, Jul. 1989)
Em primeiro ligar, um país não pode garantir a sua própria segurança em detrimento da segurança dos outros, defender os seus próprios interesses em detrimento dos interesses dos outros, pretender que sabe melhor que os outros povos e Estados de que modo é que estes povos e Estados devem gerir os seus assuntos. Reconhecer que cada povo tem o direito à livre escolha é um dos fundamentos sobre o qual se edificará a nova ordem mundial. Em segundo lugar, não se pode criar uma sociedade florescente, livre e democrática, opondo a sua própria via de desenvolvimento à dos outros. O co-desenvolvimento, a co-criação, a colaboração, são os imperativos da nossa época.
( relatório apresentado ao XXVIII congresso do PCUS, Jul. 1990)
O total controlo da propriedade do Estado, gerida, no essencial, de forma centralizada, um sistema burocrático autoritário omnipresente, o domínio global da ideologia sobre a política, o monopólio do pensamento e da ciência, um potencial industrial militarizado que açambarcava tudo o que havia de melhor, incluindo os mais válidos recursos intelectuais, o fardo insuportável das despesas militares que esmagava os ramos civis e comprometia as conquistas sociais que, apesar de tudo, tínhamos alcançado desde a revolução e de que continuamos a orgulhar-nos – eis o que era, na realidade, a situação do país.
É improdutivo avaliar a perestroika segundo o padrão imposto pelas noções que nos são familiares. E é absurdo e perigoso impor a seguinte condição: nós compreender-vos-emos e confiaremos em vós quando vocês, a União Soviética, forem inteiramente idênticos a “nós”, o Ocidente.
É uma tarefa árdua manter o método pacífico num país em que as pessoas, de geração em geração, foram educadas na ideia de que, se o outro é “contra” ou está em desacordo connosco, e nós detemos o poder ou qualquer outra força, então convirá afastá-lo, ou mesmo metê-lo na prisão. Neste país, ao longo dos séculos, tudo foi decidido, afinal, através da violência. Este facto marca de forma indelével a nossa “cultura política”, se é oportuno utilizar esta expressão.
(excertos do discurso proferido por ocasião da atribuição do Prémio Nobel da Paz, Jun 1991)
Há pessoas que se apressaram a apresentar os acontecimentos dramáticos do final dos anos 80 e princípio dos anos 90 como uma “vitória” do liberalismo económico e como o “fim da história”. Como uma prova do facto de que o liberalismo se teria imposto como a resposta universal aos principais problemas levantados pela existência do homem na sociedade, sem que restasse o mínimo espaço para qualquer outro ponto de vista, fosse ele qual fosse. (...) Sabemos bem que, confrontado com a luta dos dois grandes princípios que são a eficácia e a justiça social, o liberalismo se viu obrigado a ir buscar alguns elementos da teoria socialista. (…) Os socialistas, por seu turno, tiveram de recorrer aos métodos elaborados pelos teóricos e pelos políticos do liberalismo, sem o que, depois de conquistarem o poder, teriam sido incapazes de se manter no poder, te-lo-iam perdido. Não será este um bom argumento contra uma perspectiva de brutal oposição entre estas duas correntes? Tanto mais que estas duas correntes não são as únicas que esistem e agem no mundo.
(Comunicação no IX Congresso da Internacional Socialista, em Berlim, Set 1992)
A verdadeira escolha que a Rússia deve fazer, não é uma escolha entre a Europa e a Ásia, entre o Oeste e o Leste. É uma escolha entre estes dois termos da alternativa, que são, por um lado, democracia e abertura, e, por outro, autoritarismo (ou pior) e fechamento. Se a Rússia escolher a via do aprofundamento da democracia, tanto no domínio político como no domínio económico, ficará aberta à cooperação com o resto do mundo. Mas se as tendências autoritárias vencerem, então o país, tal como nos anos do estalinismo, voltará a isolar-se do resto do mundo e, dessa forma, sabotará as suas próprias possibilidades de desenvolvimento.
(intervenção na conferência internacional que decorreu na Fundação Gorbatchov, Dez 1992)
Eu já admirava este senhor, mas depois de ler este livro fiquei a admirá-lo ainda mais, e a pensar como a história poderia ter seguido outro rumo.
Eu teria preferido que os vários textos tivessem sido apresentados sem separação temática, por ordem cronológica. Apesar de entender a lógica desta organização, ela obrigou-me a andar para a frente e para trás no tempo, e a encontrar explicações e contexto para muitos acontecimentos que me teriam sido muito mais úteis, se tivessem sido apresentados antes.
As partes que achei mais interessantes, foram, sem dúvida, a 1ª (pela curiosidade de ver transcritas conversas com personalidades como Margaret Thatcher, George Bush-pai, e o papa João Paulo II, para referir só alguns), e especialmente a 3ª, que só não sublinhei profusamente, porque o livro não é meu.
Na introdução, Gorbatchov faz uma auto-crítica, refletindo sobre o que correu mal e deveria ter feito melhor, ao mesmo tempo que explica as suas convicções: É porque vivi a amarga experiência do modelo de “socialismo” imposto por Estaline, o qual nada tem a ver com o socialismo, que estou definitivamente convencido do anti-humanismo e da ausência de futuro desse modelo. Mas os valores que fazem parte da ideia socialista, a justiça social, direitos e liberdades inalienáveis do homem, igualdade em direitos dos povos, paz excluindo os meios militares nas relações entre Estados, todos esses valores se harmonizam com os interesses de toda a humanidade e não podem desaparecer.
Alguns excertos da 3ª Parte:
Diligências ativas para pôr termo à corrida aos armamentos e para reduzir o seu número são as premissas indispensáveis para resolver outros problemas globais que se tornam cada vez mais urgentes: a destruição do meio-ambiente, a necessidade de encontrar novas fontes de energia, a luta contra o atraso económico, a fome e a doença. O princípio do militarismo – o armamento em detrimento do desenvolvimento – deve ceder lugar ao contrário: o desarmamento para o desenvolvimento.
(declaração de política externa pronunciada por Gorbatchov em 1986)
Ver o mundo como o seu património, proclamar arbitrariamente “zonas de interesse vital”, são pontos de vista que ainda hoje existem. E que têm como consequência a corrida ao armamento, porque se aposta a força (...). Isto faz parte dos estereótipos da antiga mentalidade, quando era considerado “legítimo” explorar os outros povos, gerir os seus recursos, dirigir tiranicamente os seus destinos.
(discurso no Forum por um mundo desnuclearizado e pela sobrevivência da humanidade, Fev. 1987)
É por exemplo evidente que a força – ou a ameaça do recurso à força – já não pode nem deve ser um instrumento de política externa. (...) Todos, e em primeiro lugar os mais fortes, devem tomar a iniciativa de limitar e excluir totalmente a utilização da força no exterior. Para mais, é hoje evidente que não é o aumento das forças militares que torna um país todo-poderoso.
(Discurso na ONU, Dez. 1988)
Se a inteligência não se conjugar de forma orgânica com a moral, a ciência contemporânea perderá o seu sentido humano. É ainda mais importante e mais crucial que o esforço do princípio moral da ciência se repercuta nos laços que ela mantém com a política. O enfraquecimento e, ainda mais, a rutura de um dos pares da tríade política-ciência-moral teriam consequências imprevisíveis para a humanidade do nosso tempo. Uma política moral respeita os direitos soberanos de todos os povos, grandes e pequenos. Uma política moral ajuda-nos a encontrar uma combinação ótima entre os interesses individuais, coletivos, nacionais e universais.
(extratos de discurso na Sorbonne, Jul. 1989)
Em primeiro ligar, um país não pode garantir a sua própria segurança em detrimento da segurança dos outros, defender os seus próprios interesses em detrimento dos interesses dos outros, pretender que sabe melhor que os outros povos e Estados de que modo é que estes povos e Estados devem gerir os seus assuntos. Reconhecer que cada povo tem o direito à livre escolha é um dos fundamentos sobre o qual se edificará a nova ordem mundial. Em segundo lugar, não se pode criar uma sociedade florescente, livre e democrática, opondo a sua própria via de desenvolvimento à dos outros. O co-desenvolvimento, a co-criação, a colaboração, são os imperativos da nossa época.
( relatório apresentado ao XXVIII congresso do PCUS, Jul. 1990)
O total controlo da propriedade do Estado, gerida, no essencial, de forma centralizada, um sistema burocrático autoritário omnipresente, o domínio global da ideologia sobre a política, o monopólio do pensamento e da ciência, um potencial industrial militarizado que açambarcava tudo o que havia de melhor, incluindo os mais válidos recursos intelectuais, o fardo insuportável das despesas militares que esmagava os ramos civis e comprometia as conquistas sociais que, apesar de tudo, tínhamos alcançado desde a revolução e de que continuamos a orgulhar-nos – eis o que era, na realidade, a situação do país.
É improdutivo avaliar a perestroika segundo o padrão imposto pelas noções que nos são familiares. E é absurdo e perigoso impor a seguinte condição: nós compreender-vos-emos e confiaremos em vós quando vocês, a União Soviética, forem inteiramente idênticos a “nós”, o Ocidente.
É uma tarefa árdua manter o método pacífico num país em que as pessoas, de geração em geração, foram educadas na ideia de que, se o outro é “contra” ou está em desacordo connosco, e nós detemos o poder ou qualquer outra força, então convirá afastá-lo, ou mesmo metê-lo na prisão. Neste país, ao longo dos séculos, tudo foi decidido, afinal, através da violência. Este facto marca de forma indelével a nossa “cultura política”, se é oportuno utilizar esta expressão.
(excertos do discurso proferido por ocasião da atribuição do Prémio Nobel da Paz, Jun 1991)
Há pessoas que se apressaram a apresentar os acontecimentos dramáticos do final dos anos 80 e princípio dos anos 90 como uma “vitória” do liberalismo económico e como o “fim da história”. Como uma prova do facto de que o liberalismo se teria imposto como a resposta universal aos principais problemas levantados pela existência do homem na sociedade, sem que restasse o mínimo espaço para qualquer outro ponto de vista, fosse ele qual fosse. (...) Sabemos bem que, confrontado com a luta dos dois grandes princípios que são a eficácia e a justiça social, o liberalismo se viu obrigado a ir buscar alguns elementos da teoria socialista. (…) Os socialistas, por seu turno, tiveram de recorrer aos métodos elaborados pelos teóricos e pelos políticos do liberalismo, sem o que, depois de conquistarem o poder, teriam sido incapazes de se manter no poder, te-lo-iam perdido. Não será este um bom argumento contra uma perspectiva de brutal oposição entre estas duas correntes? Tanto mais que estas duas correntes não são as únicas que esistem e agem no mundo.
(Comunicação no IX Congresso da Internacional Socialista, em Berlim, Set 1992)
A verdadeira escolha que a Rússia deve fazer, não é uma escolha entre a Europa e a Ásia, entre o Oeste e o Leste. É uma escolha entre estes dois termos da alternativa, que são, por um lado, democracia e abertura, e, por outro, autoritarismo (ou pior) e fechamento. Se a Rússia escolher a via do aprofundamento da democracia, tanto no domínio político como no domínio económico, ficará aberta à cooperação com o resto do mundo. Mas se as tendências autoritárias vencerem, então o país, tal como nos anos do estalinismo, voltará a isolar-se do resto do mundo e, dessa forma, sabotará as suas próprias possibilidades de desenvolvimento.
(intervenção na conferência internacional que decorreu na Fundação Gorbatchov, Dez 1992)
Eu já admirava este senhor, mas depois de ler este livro fiquei a admirá-lo ainda mais, e a pensar como a história poderia ter seguido outro rumo.
January 4, 2013
I received this from my dad as a Christmas present when it was first published. At that time I had become interested in what was happening in the Soviet Union as I was taking a Soviet Cinema course at university. I read about half of the book and then abandoned it. Political memoirs are not for the faint of heart at the best of times and one from a country with a political system so different from the West can be tough going. I am pleased to say that I read this all the way through this time. Gorbachev’s Memoirs provide an inside look into the politics of the Soviet Union during Gorbachev’s life and through perestroika until the collapse of the USSR. I think this is an important book to read for anyone that is studying or interested in Soviet history, however at times I did find a bit dry.
May 5, 2015
It is rare that a visionary, a man of peaceful intentions appears as head of a state the size of the the USSR and overcoming decades of ideological conditioning attempts to defuse a volatile situation which could easily have resulted in the megadeath and overkill. Such a man is Mikhail Gorbachev.
The ongoing tragedy that is present day Russia lies in the greed and self-aggrandisement of the Yeltsin coterie. The subversion of all the Gorbachev had stood for and promoted has culminated in the current personality cult of Putin. Such a shame, such untold suffering. Such a lost opportunity for lasting peace.
The ongoing tragedy that is present day Russia lies in the greed and self-aggrandisement of the Yeltsin coterie. The subversion of all the Gorbachev had stood for and promoted has culminated in the current personality cult of Putin. Such a shame, such untold suffering. Such a lost opportunity for lasting peace.
June 27, 2009
Fascinating for one who never expected the iron curtain to come down in his lifetime. Dramatically exciting at times, such as the attempt by the old-line communists to reverse the democratization process. In light of recent developments, they are still very much involved in the effort to win back their power.
September 23, 2020
Unique in world history, it gives the full background to his life and career before he became famous. Many episodes of his career influenced his initiative to start ending the Cold War. Memoirs explains and justifies what led up to it, and what he was doing at the time.
President Putin was a KGB Major in Dresden at the time, and he was shaped by the events of German reunification which became possible due to Gorbachev being unwilling to engage in previous practices of his predecessors. Memoirs explains Gorbachev's policies and attitude of that period, and in combination with present day analysis, are essential to grasping the geopolitical nature of present day Europe and Russia.
President Putin was a KGB Major in Dresden at the time, and he was shaped by the events of German reunification which became possible due to Gorbachev being unwilling to engage in previous practices of his predecessors. Memoirs explains Gorbachev's policies and attitude of that period, and in combination with present day analysis, are essential to grasping the geopolitical nature of present day Europe and Russia.
July 26, 2008
As hard to read as it is important to read--had to really force my way through this one. What an amazing feat he pulled off though. What also struck me as amazing was how hard he and his wife worked as they made their way up through the communist party. He came from nothing. His family had to make their own clothes from hemp they were so poor. He ended up becoming the very last General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party. I am in awe of his "master manipulator" abilities in taking down the USSR. That was a lot of dangerous chess pieces to move around the chessboard without getting caught too early in the game.
November 20, 2007
The guy led the Soviet Union in its last days, and he brings an honesty in his writing that is unparalled in Russian leaders before and after him. He brought to life the tragic decisions the Politburo made toward the end, and his role in ending the Communist empire. Thrilling, if a bit long.
February 12, 2009
Interesting in understanding cold War Politics and generally how Government Bureaucracy works. Also about how to manage a country in transition. Would be good for political scientists and government bureaucrats.
December 20, 2007
I was hoping for a lot more. Of course, it could just be the translation, but it was very dry and plodding.
June 7, 2008
Interesting to read about events like chernobyl from an inside view.
March 31, 2011
Difficult to read probably due to my lack of knowledge of the events before trying to read it but good nonetheless.
November 19, 2022
Mikhail Gorbachev was one of the most influential and critical figures of the twentieth century. When I was growing up in the 1980s he was part os a set of international world leaders that seemingly had much more influence over people than the political leaders of today. Gorbachev was the last leader of he Soviet Union until its collapse in 1991. He presided over the final years of the Cold War and witnessed its thaw. He was a key advocate of détente and disarmament and sought rapprochement with the West. He brought, along with Ronald Reagan, Margaret Thatcher and François Mitterand a reduction of MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) through disarmament of nuclear weapons stockpiles and a lessening of military friction between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. These are his political memoirs and they offer a true insight into a very powerful global leader who played a significant role in world affairs at the end of the century, presiding over such key events such as the fall of the Berlin Wall and ultimately the collapse of the Soviet Union. Gorbachev had humble roots as a tractor and combine harvester driver in the Stavropol region of rural Russia. He joined the Communist Party early and was fortunate enough to go to university in Moscow from where his active role in politics flourished. He would be elected Chairman of the Communist Party in 1985 replacing a series of elderly, embedded Soviet leaders. He offered the leadership and nomenclatura a new dynamism and vitality. Living standards were low in the USSR and Gorbachev sought o revolutionise Soviet communist politics and regenerate benefits for all. His key policies for which he is most remembered are Perestroika and Glasnost. Perestroika was a realignment and a modernisation of economic policies, introducing more economic freedoms, less State control and an opening of international trade, ultimately with the USSR becoming part of the global economic system. With Conservatives who clung to Stalinesque control of the State his Perestroika was an anathema. It proved popular and gave Gorbachev international prestige though and improved foreign relations. Glasnost was an opening up of politics and accountability to the people. It again proved unpopular with the forces on the right of the Party. He headed the Politburo where the key leadership of the Soviet Union ruled the nation. From the start though, he had enemies within and ultimately these conspiratorial plots against him grew and grew until the final death throes of the entire Union. His ultimate nemesis proved to be Boris Yeltsin the future democratic President of an independent Russia. Yeltsin's self-serving, backstabbing Machiavellian manoeuvring ultimately destroyed much of Gorbachev's legacy. With the context of today's Russian war in Ukraine I did gleam some interesting information about a political fact that I was unaware of. Crimea has a native Crimean Tatar population and during Gorbachev's presidency there was friction between Crimea and its control by Ukrainian officials. The native population preferred to identify itself as part of Russia and therefore these facts lend credibility to Vladimir Putin's annexation based on historic feelings about the region. As the story progresses you get an overall feeling of the train derailing as political tensions intensify. The independence of the Baltic States from Soviet Rule is the beginning of the end and encourages the nationalist sentiments of Yeltsin's Russia and other key Soviet republics as Belorussia and Ukraine. Gorbachev shares a loving relationship with his wife Raisa and his family and their very lives are threatened by an attempted coup where he is locked in his dacha with all communications cut off and the target of a criminal attempt to subvert the rule of the USSR. After the coup, things never fully recovered and ultimately in 1991 he was forced to resign as President and this brought to en end the Soviet Union.
Gorbachev's main legacy was to the World. In the West he was viewed with much affection and was seen as someone who they could do business with yet he is often remembered inside the Soviet Union as a failure. I think that long term in historical memory his true status will be felt with the benefit of hindsight. There is much glamour in the international jet-setting of world summits, especially with Reagan and it was interesting reading about his encounter's with the United Kingdom Prime Minister Thatcher.
I think that in reading this book I have gained a much greater insight into the true mechanisations of Communist rule inside the Soviet Union and although Gorbachev sadly died only a short while ago, I felt that in completing the study of his memoirs it has significant relevance in understanding the Russia of today and what led to the global situation which we currently witness in Putin's Russia.
Gorbachev's main legacy was to the World. In the West he was viewed with much affection and was seen as someone who they could do business with yet he is often remembered inside the Soviet Union as a failure. I think that long term in historical memory his true status will be felt with the benefit of hindsight. There is much glamour in the international jet-setting of world summits, especially with Reagan and it was interesting reading about his encounter's with the United Kingdom Prime Minister Thatcher.
I think that in reading this book I have gained a much greater insight into the true mechanisations of Communist rule inside the Soviet Union and although Gorbachev sadly died only a short while ago, I felt that in completing the study of his memoirs it has significant relevance in understanding the Russia of today and what led to the global situation which we currently witness in Putin's Russia.
June 7, 2023
When I picked up this book, I was interested in learning about how the conflict between the West and the USSR developed in the late 80s until the dissolution of the latter.
There are multiple approaches to Mikhail Gorbachev's memoirs. Some people will want to read what the man himself had to say about the introduction of changes with perestroika and glasnost. Some others will want to learn about how the Cold War thawed under Gorbachev's leadership; while there will be people who will like to know more about the man himself.
Surprisingly to me, Gorbachev's memoirs are not relevant by what he says (although this is a lengthy volume), but by what he doesn't say.
In a nutshell, having been appointed supreme leader of a USSR in deep crisis, he had already recognized that profound reforms were needed if the economy and living standards of the people could be improved to be on par with their western counterparts. He then launches the perestroika and glasnost initiatives to create a more democratic and transparent political system to revitalize the country. The problem was, along with political changes, he and his cabinet also attempted changes in the running of the economy.
The year was 1985. What became pretty soon apparent to Gorbachev was the huge cadre of communist party officials whose livelihood depended on things being "as they were". Therefore, the rank-and-file members resisted to his many waves of economic changes. More worryingly for him, the higher ranking officials sabotaged and challenged his leadership.
As a result, it seems that for some 6 years, since 1985 to 1991, Gorbachev tinkered with the system trying to embed a democratic regime as per Western standards into the USSR. Different structures were tried, none of them was satisfactory to instantiate some sort of stability in the country. The political reforms degenerated into a power struggle between different republics (most notably Russia, with Yeltsin at the helm) and the centre of power.
I wrote that the memoirs were notable not because of what Gorbachev said, but for what he didn't. Gorbachev intended to preserve the USSR, while allowing for a plural political system with freedom of choice. He does say that he believed in creating a democracy within the socialist framework. But that's where his vision ends. At no point he explains fully what the realization of that vision would entail. I kept wandering, if you are willing to open the door to freedom of choice, naturally there will be a part of the society that will feel alienated by socialism or just will have different ideas. What did "socialist framework" mean to Gorbachev? As he doesn't elaborate, one must conclude he just didn't know.
I found some aspects of the memoir a fascinating read. This could well be an excellent case study of change management gone wrong. If you can skim the lengthy descriptions of the proceedings and results of the different parliamentary sessions and plenums, there's plenty of food for thought in here.
Lastly, some words about the Cold War. Gorbachev didn't intervene in West Germany taking over the GDR, purely of his conviction on letting the countries decide by themselves about their future (more or less his own words). However, he mentioned the Soviets wanted a united Germany outside of NATO. We now know that was not part of the deal, but there's more to it, I quote from the book:
"The increasing tendency for confrontation between Russia and the West over NATO's planned expansion prompted me to remind Western politicians that during the negotiations on the unification of Germany, they gave assurances that NATO would not extend its zone of operation to the east. We must tell our American friends, I wrote, that 'the policy of enlarging NATO will be considered in Russia as an attempt to isolate it. But it is impossible to isolate Russia. It would mean disregarding both history and reality.'"
For they sow the wind, and they shall reap the whirlwind.
There are multiple approaches to Mikhail Gorbachev's memoirs. Some people will want to read what the man himself had to say about the introduction of changes with perestroika and glasnost. Some others will want to learn about how the Cold War thawed under Gorbachev's leadership; while there will be people who will like to know more about the man himself.
Surprisingly to me, Gorbachev's memoirs are not relevant by what he says (although this is a lengthy volume), but by what he doesn't say.
In a nutshell, having been appointed supreme leader of a USSR in deep crisis, he had already recognized that profound reforms were needed if the economy and living standards of the people could be improved to be on par with their western counterparts. He then launches the perestroika and glasnost initiatives to create a more democratic and transparent political system to revitalize the country. The problem was, along with political changes, he and his cabinet also attempted changes in the running of the economy.
The year was 1985. What became pretty soon apparent to Gorbachev was the huge cadre of communist party officials whose livelihood depended on things being "as they were". Therefore, the rank-and-file members resisted to his many waves of economic changes. More worryingly for him, the higher ranking officials sabotaged and challenged his leadership.
As a result, it seems that for some 6 years, since 1985 to 1991, Gorbachev tinkered with the system trying to embed a democratic regime as per Western standards into the USSR. Different structures were tried, none of them was satisfactory to instantiate some sort of stability in the country. The political reforms degenerated into a power struggle between different republics (most notably Russia, with Yeltsin at the helm) and the centre of power.
I wrote that the memoirs were notable not because of what Gorbachev said, but for what he didn't. Gorbachev intended to preserve the USSR, while allowing for a plural political system with freedom of choice. He does say that he believed in creating a democracy within the socialist framework. But that's where his vision ends. At no point he explains fully what the realization of that vision would entail. I kept wandering, if you are willing to open the door to freedom of choice, naturally there will be a part of the society that will feel alienated by socialism or just will have different ideas. What did "socialist framework" mean to Gorbachev? As he doesn't elaborate, one must conclude he just didn't know.
I found some aspects of the memoir a fascinating read. This could well be an excellent case study of change management gone wrong. If you can skim the lengthy descriptions of the proceedings and results of the different parliamentary sessions and plenums, there's plenty of food for thought in here.
Lastly, some words about the Cold War. Gorbachev didn't intervene in West Germany taking over the GDR, purely of his conviction on letting the countries decide by themselves about their future (more or less his own words). However, he mentioned the Soviets wanted a united Germany outside of NATO. We now know that was not part of the deal, but there's more to it, I quote from the book:
"The increasing tendency for confrontation between Russia and the West over NATO's planned expansion prompted me to remind Western politicians that during the negotiations on the unification of Germany, they gave assurances that NATO would not extend its zone of operation to the east. We must tell our American friends, I wrote, that 'the policy of enlarging NATO will be considered in Russia as an attempt to isolate it. But it is impossible to isolate Russia. It would mean disregarding both history and reality.'"
For they sow the wind, and they shall reap the whirlwind.
August 19, 2025
Gorbachev's Memoirs, TL;DR-
A REFUSAL TO EXERCISE POWER IS AS MUCH A FAILING AS AN EXCESS OF IT.
First off, gorba is the final boss of uncles. Mikhail Sergeivich did not believe in two things:
1) The use of force
2) The use of an editor
Good god, man's tendency to repeat himself is terrifying! This book could have been a third of its size and still have said everything it did. What can I say, Russians gonna Russian amirite?
On to the meat and potatoes.
At a personal level, i admire gorba and admire him deeply, especially after reading this. He's solidly a "Good guy". The goodest of guys. As a leader... Probably one of the hardest figures of the 20th century to assess. His heart was unquestionably in the right place. He was an intelligent man, humble, kind and conscientious. But, if such a thing is possible, too conscientious. It's easy to call him naive, but no man who rose to CPSU gensec was naive. He was, if anything, worse than naive. He was idealistic to the point of outright refusing to participate in any form of realpolitik. And we all know how that cookie crumbled.
There's a frequent tendency to claim that he failed because of glasnost. That perestroika should have been carried out without glasnost, kinda like Deng's reforms. It's a stance I've taken (when I was less educated anyway). But the USSR was not China, and ethnic tensions were very real and the stalinist history of annexation laid the basis for a very different state than that of China. Besides, glasnost was not the problem. The problem was Gorba's absolute ideological refusal to take an authoritarian hardline stance... EVER. Even in the face of blatant unlawful separatism or open cronyism. You can run your local RWA that way maybe (big maybe), but that's not how any state is run. Especially not one like the USSR.
On foreign affairs, unfortunately, he showed pure naivete in dealing with the United States. Mikhail Sergeivich would have benefited greatly from being smacked upside the head by a volume of karl popper or kenneth waltz tbh. You can't just "will" structural factors into changing Gorba, this isn't an anime and you aren't fucking Naruto (idk, i haven't seen Naruto)
A refusal to exercise power is as much a failing as an excess of it. And for someone like Gorba, who constantly waxed lyrical about finding a "middle way", this really should have been obvious.
A REFUSAL TO EXERCISE POWER IS AS MUCH A FAILING AS AN EXCESS OF IT.
First off, gorba is the final boss of uncles. Mikhail Sergeivich did not believe in two things:
1) The use of force
2) The use of an editor
Good god, man's tendency to repeat himself is terrifying! This book could have been a third of its size and still have said everything it did. What can I say, Russians gonna Russian amirite?
On to the meat and potatoes.
At a personal level, i admire gorba and admire him deeply, especially after reading this. He's solidly a "Good guy". The goodest of guys. As a leader... Probably one of the hardest figures of the 20th century to assess. His heart was unquestionably in the right place. He was an intelligent man, humble, kind and conscientious. But, if such a thing is possible, too conscientious. It's easy to call him naive, but no man who rose to CPSU gensec was naive. He was, if anything, worse than naive. He was idealistic to the point of outright refusing to participate in any form of realpolitik. And we all know how that cookie crumbled.
There's a frequent tendency to claim that he failed because of glasnost. That perestroika should have been carried out without glasnost, kinda like Deng's reforms. It's a stance I've taken (when I was less educated anyway). But the USSR was not China, and ethnic tensions were very real and the stalinist history of annexation laid the basis for a very different state than that of China. Besides, glasnost was not the problem. The problem was Gorba's absolute ideological refusal to take an authoritarian hardline stance... EVER. Even in the face of blatant unlawful separatism or open cronyism. You can run your local RWA that way maybe (big maybe), but that's not how any state is run. Especially not one like the USSR.
On foreign affairs, unfortunately, he showed pure naivete in dealing with the United States. Mikhail Sergeivich would have benefited greatly from being smacked upside the head by a volume of karl popper or kenneth waltz tbh. You can't just "will" structural factors into changing Gorba, this isn't an anime and you aren't fucking Naruto (idk, i haven't seen Naruto)
A refusal to exercise power is as much a failing as an excess of it. And for someone like Gorba, who constantly waxed lyrical about finding a "middle way", this really should have been obvious.
November 29, 2020
Gah so long. The beginning, the rise to power, was interesting. But later it devolved into the self-serving claptrap so typical of these political tomes. The governmental structure of the USSR evolved to meet the needs of the personalities in that government and their changing relations. It is so strange. And I fundamentally lack pity for Russian experiences in WWII, when those Russians neglect to mention Stalin's role in empowering Hitler with the Poland partition. You've got to own your own contributions.
March 26, 2024
Apologies for distilling this down but early doors very interesting look at Russian life, middle is interesting if you like Russian agriculture. The end is worth reading. An interesting man dealing with a difficult position. Worth persevering.
December 12, 2022
Didn’t read the whole book.
June 28, 2025
enjoyed it
January 24, 2016
Ce texte retrace l'ascension de Mihaïl Gorbatchev à la tête de l'Union soviétique, sa démission à la suite de la création de la CEI, puis sa candidature à la l'élection présidentielle de Russie en 1996. N'étant ni familier de la période communiste, ni de la politique en Russie, j'ai eu parfois du mal à identifier tous les acteurs, le lexique des personnalités russes m'a été très utile. J'ai plus apprécié le récit des échanges avec les dirigeants internationaux dans la course au désarmement, mais dans l'ensemble, j'ai trouve le livre relativement long. Cela dit, je le recommande aux curieux de ce personnage de premier plan.
April 26, 2016
It's a terrible tragic .pitiful person.
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