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Ukraine Crisis: What It Means for the West
The aftereffects of the February 2014 Uprising in Ukraine are still reverberating around the world. The consequences of the popular rebellion and Russian President Putin’s attempt to strangle it remain uncertain. In this book, Andrew Wilson combines a spellbinding, on-the-scene account of the Kiev Uprising with a deeply informed analysis of what precipitated the events, what has developed in subsequent months, and why the story is far from over. Wilson situates Ukraine’s February insurgence within Russia’s expansionist ambitions throughout the previous decade. He reveals how President Putin’s extravagant spending to develop soft power in all parts of Europe was aided by wishful thinking in the EU and American diplomatic inattention, and how Putin’s agenda continues to be widely misunderstood in the West. The author then examines events in the wake of the Uprising—the military coup in Crimea, the election of President Petro Poroshenko, the Malaysia Airlines tragedy, rising tensions among all of Russia's neighbors, both friend and foe, and more. Ukraine Crisis provides an important, accurate record of events that unfolded in Ukraine in 2014. It also rings a clear warning that the unresolved problems of the region have implications well beyond Ukrainian borders.
247 pages, Kindle Edition
First published November 4, 2014
29 people are currently reading
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About the author
Andrew Wilson
12 books17 followersAndrew Wilson is reader in Ukrainian studies at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College, London.
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Displaying 1 - 13 of 13 reviews
January 2, 2025
(The English review is placed beneath the Russian one)
Довольно неплохой обзор политического кризиса 2014 года между Россией и Украиной. Всё описанное автором уже множество раз появлялось в зарубежной прессе и зарубежных книгах на данную тему. Сегодня уже любой американец может наизусть назвать основные темы, которые рассматриваются в каждой подобной книге: две революции в Украине, правление Януковича и его свержение, появление "зелёных человечков" в Крыму и последующая аннексия, война на востоке Украины (включая сбитие гражданского самолёта). Вот, собственно, вся суть книги. Сегодня уже чуть ли не любой гражданин хоть немного интересующийся этой темой может воспроизвести этот стандартный список тем. И да, содержание не сильно поменялось, т.е. автор предлагает критический взгляд не только действий РФ, но и Украины. В этом смысле книга похожа на недавно изданную книгу Putin's Revenge: Why Russia Invaded Ukraine.
Zbigniew Brzezinski once said that it was based on a category mistake: its real goal was not to change countries like Ukraine, but to change Russia, by civilising the whole region from a distance – and transforming the periphery would not be possible without changing Russia.
Какое необычное и интересное заявление такой же интересной и символичной фигуры. Зная, что в России к данному господину всегда относились с большим чуть ли не трепетом, возникает ощущение, что именно это увидели люди из кремлёвских окон, когда наблюдали "цветные революции" по всему периметру РФ.
Moscow adapted its policy to compete with the EU in Ukraine and the other Eastern Partnership states through what it thought were EU-style means, though Russia has a very warped view of ‘soft power’ . It concentrated on covert methods, such as bribing local politicians, setting up pro-Russian front parties and sending shadowy funding to new pro-Russian non-governmental organisations (NGOs).
Путинские пропагандисты любят называть такой вот подход "реал политик", что переводится с кремлёвского как "не мы первые начали" или whataboutism.
The key to understanding modern Russia is to realise that it is run by some very weird people. In the 1990s they were known as ‘political technologists’, ultra-cynical political manipulators who created a fake democracy because Boris Yeltsin couldn’t build a real one, and who distracted the population with carefully scripted drama because the energy wealth had temporarily stopped flowing. The difference under Putin was that the Kremlin established a monopoly of manipulation, not just that the money from oil and gas started piling up again.
Поразительно точная оценка ельцинско-путинскому режиму. А теперь зададимся вопросом, стал ли проводить Ельцин такую же прозападную политику, если бы цена нефти стоила как при Путине или он так же "свалился" бы в антизападную и империалистическую риторику? Как показывает пример с Чечнёй, Приднестровьем и пр., Ельцин, скорее всего, проводил бы подобную же политику "России встающей с колен". Проблема Ельцина была в том, что, во-первых, он всё же должен был изображать из себя демократа, а во-вторых, нефть стоила около 30$, а не 140$. Впрочем, возможно при Ельцине не было бы Норд-Оста и Беслана, но то, что была бы авторитарная страна, это определённо. Возможно, Ельцин был бы более мягким автократом, чем Путин, но он определённо был бы именно автократом, а не демократическим лидером.
Economic policy concentrated on superficial populist measures, such as fuel and meat price freezes, rather than on tackling systemic problems, as had been briefly attempted in 2000–01. Historically, periodic economic pain has actually been good for Ukraine. The country never reformed its economy wholesale, like the Baltic States, but did just enough to survive when it was forced to – most notably when the recession of the early 1990s pushed it to the brink of collapse in 1994–95, and again after the local financial crisis in 1998–99 threatened it with bankruptcy in 2000. On the other hand, when the economy was doing well enough, politics was not conducive to reform.
Hence the great missed opportunity of the years immediately after the Orange Revolution (also, arguably, in 2010, when the new authorities’ business-friendly reform plans were quietly abandoned as the economy temporarily recovered).
Да, нежелание проводить серьёзные реформы и при этом постоянно заявлять " Україна – це Європа ", конечно поражает. Такое чувство, что все силы ушли на борьбу с правописанием из серии "в/на" и "Kyiv/Kiev". Ну, и с борьбой с русской культурой, конечно. Всё как в матушке России, где тоже все усилия тратятся на такие вот бессмысленные символические реформы в духе сменить название с Милиции на Полицию.
Dzerkalo Tyzhnya, understanding Yanukovych was always easy: ‘He wanted to be the richest man in Eastern Europe. ’The problem was well identified by leading economic and energy analyst Mykhailo Honchar: ‘Yanukovych wanted to be both president and number one oligarch. Like all those other guys – Putin, Nazarbayev and Aliyev. Except they had energy and rents to distribute. Ukraine does not.’
Очень точное определение самой сути такого явления как Янукович. Точнее и не скажешь.
According to one Ukrainian expert, ‘Kuchma was more like a medieval European monarch in the way he dealt with his “barons” ’. Yanukovych, on the other hand, acted more like an Asiatic despot: everything was organised vertically. Immediately below him was family and his inner mafia circle; then below them, various sycophants. So maybe that meant ‘Kuchma was a little bit more European’ than Yanukovych. Except that his model of government was several hundred years out of date.
Тоже интересная аналогия, правда, мне трудно понять насколько она верная, т.к. я не настолько хорошо знаю этот период современной Украины, но аналогия красивая.
In the modern ‘anti-fascist’ narrative, ‘fascism’ has long escaped the geographical bonds of Germany and Italy; the label applies to anybody who embodies the same existential threat. So all Ukrainian nationalists are fascists by definition.
Even the EU and the US, or NATO, or the West in general, are ‘fascistic’ .
Как сказано в книге "Русские", ещё в советское время любили использовать данный термин для обозначения всех тех, кто выступал против СССР. Правда нынешние российские власти поступают более хитро, ибо смешивают реальные события с явным преувеличением, как например поддержка УПА и Бандеры очень небольшой группой украинских националистов раздувается путинской пропагандой до невероятных размеров, мол, те сотрудничали с нацистами, значит якобы разделяли нацистскую идеологию, значит, и сегодня те, кто поддерживает Бандеру и УПА также якобы разделяют нацистскую идеологию. Как говорится, пропаганда должна быть простая и тотальная.
But Right Sector already looked like yesterday’s men. After posting a picture of the Eurovision Song Contest winner, bearded drag queen Conchita Wurst, under the headline ‘Do we need this kind of “Europe”?’ Right Sector was condemned for being a mirror image of Putin’s nationalists.
Похоже, автор не понял, что дело не в Правом Секторе, а в политике части украинской элиты (в которую входит, к примеру, Ющенко) взять идею украинской эмиграции о России, которая веками якобы хотела уничтожить украинскую идентичность. Если в советское время эти украинские эмигранты в Северной Америке просто писали книги о том, как якобы Советская Россия совершила геноцид украинцев, устроив голод в Украине в начале 30-ых, то теперь эта же риторика стала главной политической идеологией части украинской элиты. Возможно, эти украинские политики думали, что на таком противостоянии с Россией они смогут набрать политические очки, при этом, не навредив стране. Но, увы, у власти в то время оказался Путин, для которого политическая слабость в отношении соседей могла стоить президентского кресла.
A true reformist government might take power after the elections due in October 2014, especially if the conflict in the Donbas is minimised by then.
Many oligarchs are worried at the thought of thousands of radicalised fighters returning from the east, to press for true ‘revolution’ . Retrospective solidarity might help: having sacrificed so much, there would be strong pressure on any new government to deliver change. A new Maidan – a new round of popular protest – is always possible. Unfortunately, the more likely short-term scenario is mobilisation without reform. The October elections are likely to make parliament more patriotic, but not necessarily more reformist.
Именно это и произошло. Так необходимые реформы так и не были реализованы, а вместо этого была выбрана взаимная политика эскалации.
It's quite a good overview of the 2014 political crisis between Russia and Ukraine. Everything described by the author has already appeared many times in the foreign press and books on the subject. Today, any American can name by heart the main topics that are discussed in every such book: two revolutions in Ukraine, Yanukovych's rule and his overthrow, the appearance of “green men” in Crimea and the subsequent annexation, the war in eastern Ukraine (including the shooting down of a civilian airplane). Here is the whole essence of the book. Today, almost any citizen, even slightly interested in this topic, can reproduce this standard list of topics. And yes, the content has not changed much, i.e., the author offers a critical view not only of Russia's actions but also of Ukraine. In this sense, the book is similar to the recently published Putin's Revenge: Why Russia Invaded Ukraine.
Zbigniew Brzezinski once said that it was based on a category mistake: its real goal was not to change countries like Ukraine, but to change Russia, by civilising the whole region from a distance – and transforming the periphery would not be possible without changing Russia.
What an unusual and interesting statement by an equally interesting and symbolic figure. Knowing that, in Russia, this gentleman has always been treated with great almost awe, one gets the feeling that this is exactly what people saw from the Kremlin windows when they observed the “color revolutions” all around the perimeter of the Russian Federation.
Moscow adapted its policy to compete with the EU in Ukraine and the other Eastern Partnership states through what it thought were EU-style means, though Russia has a very warped view of ‘soft power’ . It concentrated on covert methods, such as bribing local politicians, setting up pro-Russian front parties and sending shadowy funding to new pro-Russian non-governmental organisations (NGOs).
Putin's propagandists like to call this approach “a realpolitik,” which translates from the Kremlin as “we were not the first to start” or whataboutism.
The key to understanding modern Russia is to realise that it is run by some very weird people. In the 1990s they were known as ‘political technologists’, ultra-cynical political manipulators who created a fake democracy because Boris Yeltsin couldn’t build a real one, and who distracted the population with carefully scripted drama because the energy wealth had temporarily stopped flowing. The difference under Putin was that the Kremlin established a monopoly of manipulation, not just that the money from oil and gas started piling up again.
An amazingly accurate assessment of the Yeltsin-Putin regime. Now let us ask ourselves, would Yeltsin have pursued the same pro-Western policy if the price of oil had been the same as under Putin, or would he have fallen into anti-Western and imperialist rhetoric? As the example of Chechnya, Transnistria, etc. shows, Yeltsin would most likely have pursued the same “Russia rising from its knees” policy. Yeltsin's problem was that, first of all, he still had to pretend to be a Democrat, and secondly, oil cost about $30, not $140. However, there might not have been Nord-Ost and Beslan under Yeltsin, but there would have been an authoritarian country, that's for sure. Yeltsin may have been a milder autocrat than Putin, but he definitely would have been an autocrat, not a democratic leader.
Economic policy concentrated on superficial populist measures, such as fuel and meat price freezes, rather than on tackling systemic problems, as had been briefly attempted in 2000–01. Historically, periodic economic pain has actually been good for Ukraine. The country never reformed its economy wholesale, like the Baltic States, but did just enough to survive when it was forced to – most notably when the recession of the early 1990s pushed it to the brink of collapse in 1994–95, and again after the local financial crisis in 1998–99 threatened it with bankruptcy in 2000. On the other hand, when the economy was doing well enough, politics was not conducive to reform.
Hence the great missed opportunity of the years immediately after the Orange Revolution (also, arguably, in 2010, when the new authorities’ business-friendly reform plans were quietly abandoned as the economy temporarily recovered).
Yes, the unwillingness to carry out serious reforms while constantly declaring “Ukraine is Europe” is certainly striking. The feeling is that all their energies have been spent on fighting the spelling of “in/on” and “Kyiv/Kiev”. Well, and the fight with Russian culture, of course. It's just like in Mother Russia, where all efforts are also spent on such meaningless symbolic reforms in the spirit of changing the name from Militia to Police.
Dzerkalo Tyzhnya, understanding Yanukovych was always easy: ‘He wanted to be the richest man in Eastern Europe. ’The problem was well identified by leading economic and energy analyst Mykhailo Honchar: ‘Yanukovych wanted to be both president and number one oligarch. Like all those other guys – Putin, Nazarbayev and Aliyev. Except they had energy and rents to distribute. Ukraine does not.’
It's a very accurate definition of the very essence of such a phenomenon as Yanukovych. It couldn't be more accurate.
According to one Ukrainian expert, ‘Kuchma was more like a medieval European monarch in the way he dealt with his “barons” ’. Yanukovych, on the other hand, acted more like an Asiatic despot: everything was organised vertically. Immediately below him was family and his inner mafia circle; then below them, various sycophants. So maybe that meant ‘Kuchma was a little bit more European’ than Yanukovych. Except that his model of government was several hundred years out of date.
Also, an interesting analogy, though it's hard for me to understand how true it is since I don't know this period of modern Ukraine that well, but the analogy is beautiful.
In the modern ‘anti-fascist’ narrative, ‘fascism’ has long escaped the geographical bonds of Germany and Italy; the label applies to anybody who embodies the same existential threat. So all Ukrainian nationalists are fascists by definition.
Even the EU and the US, or NATO, or the West in general, are ‘fascistic’ .
As stated in the book “The Russians”, back in Soviet times they liked to use this term to refer to all those who opposed the USSR. However, the current Russian authorities are more cunning, because they mix real events with obvious exaggeration, such as the support of the UPA and Bandera by a very small group of Ukrainian nationalists is inflated by Putin's propaganda to incredible proportions, saying that those who collaborated with the Nazis, allegedly shared Nazi ideology, so today those who support Bandera and the UPA also allegedly share Nazi ideology. As they say, propaganda should be simple and total.
But Right Sector already looked like yesterday’s men. After posting a picture of the Eurovision Song Contest winner, bearded drag queen Conchita Wurst, under the headline ‘Do we need this kind of “Europe”?’ Right Sector was condemned for being a mirror image of Putin’s nationalists.
The author doesn't seem to have realized that it's not about the Right Sector but about the policy of a part of the Ukrainian elite (which includes, for example, Yushchenko) to take the idea of Ukrainian emigration about Russia, which for centuries allegedly wanted to destroy Ukrainian identity. If, in Soviet times, these Ukrainian emigrants in North America simply wrote books about how Soviet Russia allegedly committed genocide of Ukrainians by starving Ukraine in the early 30s, now this same rhetoric has become the main political ideology of part of the Ukrainian elite. Perhaps these Ukrainian politicians thought that they could score political points from such a confrontation with Russia without harming the country. But, alas, Putin was in power at the time for whom political weakness against his neighbors could cost him the presidency.
A true reformist government might take power after the elections due in October 2014, especially if the conflict in the Donbas is minimised by then.
Many oligarchs are worried at the thought of thousands of radicalised fighters returning from the east, to press for true ‘revolution’ . Retrospective solidarity might help: having sacrificed so much, there would be strong pressure on any new government to deliver change. A new Maidan – a new round of popular protest – is always possible. Unfortunately, the more likely short-term scenario is mobilisation without reform. The October elections are likely to make parliament more patriotic, but not necessarily more reformist.
This is exactly what happened. So, necessary reforms were never implemented, rather a mutual policy of escalation was chosen.
Довольно неплохой обзор политического кризиса 2014 года между Россией и Украиной. Всё описанное автором уже множество раз появлялось в зарубежной прессе и зарубежных книгах на данную тему. Сегодня уже любой американец может наизусть назвать основные темы, которые рассматриваются в каждой подобной книге: две революции в Украине, правление Януковича и его свержение, появление "зелёных человечков" в Крыму и последующая аннексия, война на востоке Украины (включая сбитие гражданского самолёта). Вот, собственно, вся суть книги. Сегодня уже чуть ли не любой гражданин хоть немного интересующийся этой темой может воспроизвести этот стандартный список тем. И да, содержание не сильно поменялось, т.е. автор предлагает критический взгляд не только действий РФ, но и Украины. В этом смысле книга похожа на недавно изданную книгу Putin's Revenge: Why Russia Invaded Ukraine.
Zbigniew Brzezinski once said that it was based on a category mistake: its real goal was not to change countries like Ukraine, but to change Russia, by civilising the whole region from a distance – and transforming the periphery would not be possible without changing Russia.
Какое необычное и интересное заявление такой же интересной и символичной фигуры. Зная, что в России к данному господину всегда относились с большим чуть ли не трепетом, возникает ощущение, что именно это увидели люди из кремлёвских окон, когда наблюдали "цветные революции" по всему периметру РФ.
Moscow adapted its policy to compete with the EU in Ukraine and the other Eastern Partnership states through what it thought were EU-style means, though Russia has a very warped view of ‘soft power’ . It concentrated on covert methods, such as bribing local politicians, setting up pro-Russian front parties and sending shadowy funding to new pro-Russian non-governmental organisations (NGOs).
Путинские пропагандисты любят называть такой вот подход "реал политик", что переводится с кремлёвского как "не мы первые начали" или whataboutism.
The key to understanding modern Russia is to realise that it is run by some very weird people. In the 1990s they were known as ‘political technologists’, ultra-cynical political manipulators who created a fake democracy because Boris Yeltsin couldn’t build a real one, and who distracted the population with carefully scripted drama because the energy wealth had temporarily stopped flowing. The difference under Putin was that the Kremlin established a monopoly of manipulation, not just that the money from oil and gas started piling up again.
Поразительно точная оценка ельцинско-путинскому режиму. А теперь зададимся вопросом, стал ли проводить Ельцин такую же прозападную политику, если бы цена нефти стоила как при Путине или он так же "свалился" бы в антизападную и империалистическую риторику? Как показывает пример с Чечнёй, Приднестровьем и пр., Ельцин, скорее всего, проводил бы подобную же политику "России встающей с колен". Проблема Ельцина была в том, что, во-первых, он всё же должен был изображать из себя демократа, а во-вторых, нефть стоила около 30$, а не 140$. Впрочем, возможно при Ельцине не было бы Норд-Оста и Беслана, но то, что была бы авторитарная страна, это определённо. Возможно, Ельцин был бы более мягким автократом, чем Путин, но он определённо был бы именно автократом, а не демократическим лидером.
Economic policy concentrated on superficial populist measures, such as fuel and meat price freezes, rather than on tackling systemic problems, as had been briefly attempted in 2000–01. Historically, periodic economic pain has actually been good for Ukraine. The country never reformed its economy wholesale, like the Baltic States, but did just enough to survive when it was forced to – most notably when the recession of the early 1990s pushed it to the brink of collapse in 1994–95, and again after the local financial crisis in 1998–99 threatened it with bankruptcy in 2000. On the other hand, when the economy was doing well enough, politics was not conducive to reform.
Hence the great missed opportunity of the years immediately after the Orange Revolution (also, arguably, in 2010, when the new authorities’ business-friendly reform plans were quietly abandoned as the economy temporarily recovered).
Да, нежелание проводить серьёзные реформы и при этом постоянно заявлять " Україна – це Європа ", конечно поражает. Такое чувство, что все силы ушли на борьбу с правописанием из серии "в/на" и "Kyiv/Kiev". Ну, и с борьбой с русской культурой, конечно. Всё как в матушке России, где тоже все усилия тратятся на такие вот бессмысленные символические реформы в духе сменить название с Милиции на Полицию.
Dzerkalo Tyzhnya, understanding Yanukovych was always easy: ‘He wanted to be the richest man in Eastern Europe. ’The problem was well identified by leading economic and energy analyst Mykhailo Honchar: ‘Yanukovych wanted to be both president and number one oligarch. Like all those other guys – Putin, Nazarbayev and Aliyev. Except they had energy and rents to distribute. Ukraine does not.’
Очень точное определение самой сути такого явления как Янукович. Точнее и не скажешь.
According to one Ukrainian expert, ‘Kuchma was more like a medieval European monarch in the way he dealt with his “barons” ’. Yanukovych, on the other hand, acted more like an Asiatic despot: everything was organised vertically. Immediately below him was family and his inner mafia circle; then below them, various sycophants. So maybe that meant ‘Kuchma was a little bit more European’ than Yanukovych. Except that his model of government was several hundred years out of date.
Тоже интересная аналогия, правда, мне трудно понять насколько она верная, т.к. я не настолько хорошо знаю этот период современной Украины, но аналогия красивая.
In the modern ‘anti-fascist’ narrative, ‘fascism’ has long escaped the geographical bonds of Germany and Italy; the label applies to anybody who embodies the same existential threat. So all Ukrainian nationalists are fascists by definition.
Even the EU and the US, or NATO, or the West in general, are ‘fascistic’ .
Как сказано в книге "Русские", ещё в советское время любили использовать данный термин для обозначения всех тех, кто выступал против СССР. Правда нынешние российские власти поступают более хитро, ибо смешивают реальные события с явным преувеличением, как например поддержка УПА и Бандеры очень небольшой группой украинских националистов раздувается путинской пропагандой до невероятных размеров, мол, те сотрудничали с нацистами, значит якобы разделяли нацистскую идеологию, значит, и сегодня те, кто поддерживает Бандеру и УПА также якобы разделяют нацистскую идеологию. Как говорится, пропаганда должна быть простая и тотальная.
But Right Sector already looked like yesterday’s men. After posting a picture of the Eurovision Song Contest winner, bearded drag queen Conchita Wurst, under the headline ‘Do we need this kind of “Europe”?’ Right Sector was condemned for being a mirror image of Putin’s nationalists.
Похоже, автор не понял, что дело не в Правом Секторе, а в политике части украинской элиты (в которую входит, к примеру, Ющенко) взять идею украинской эмиграции о России, которая веками якобы хотела уничтожить украинскую идентичность. Если в советское время эти украинские эмигранты в Северной Америке просто писали книги о том, как якобы Советская Россия совершила геноцид украинцев, устроив голод в Украине в начале 30-ых, то теперь эта же риторика стала главной политической идеологией части украинской элиты. Возможно, эти украинские политики думали, что на таком противостоянии с Россией они смогут набрать политические очки, при этом, не навредив стране. Но, увы, у власти в то время оказался Путин, для которого политическая слабость в отношении соседей могла стоить президентского кресла.
A true reformist government might take power after the elections due in October 2014, especially if the conflict in the Donbas is minimised by then.
Many oligarchs are worried at the thought of thousands of radicalised fighters returning from the east, to press for true ‘revolution’ . Retrospective solidarity might help: having sacrificed so much, there would be strong pressure on any new government to deliver change. A new Maidan – a new round of popular protest – is always possible. Unfortunately, the more likely short-term scenario is mobilisation without reform. The October elections are likely to make parliament more patriotic, but not necessarily more reformist.
Именно это и произошло. Так необходимые реформы так и не были реализованы, а вместо этого была выбрана взаимная политика эскалации.
It's quite a good overview of the 2014 political crisis between Russia and Ukraine. Everything described by the author has already appeared many times in the foreign press and books on the subject. Today, any American can name by heart the main topics that are discussed in every such book: two revolutions in Ukraine, Yanukovych's rule and his overthrow, the appearance of “green men” in Crimea and the subsequent annexation, the war in eastern Ukraine (including the shooting down of a civilian airplane). Here is the whole essence of the book. Today, almost any citizen, even slightly interested in this topic, can reproduce this standard list of topics. And yes, the content has not changed much, i.e., the author offers a critical view not only of Russia's actions but also of Ukraine. In this sense, the book is similar to the recently published Putin's Revenge: Why Russia Invaded Ukraine.
Zbigniew Brzezinski once said that it was based on a category mistake: its real goal was not to change countries like Ukraine, but to change Russia, by civilising the whole region from a distance – and transforming the periphery would not be possible without changing Russia.
What an unusual and interesting statement by an equally interesting and symbolic figure. Knowing that, in Russia, this gentleman has always been treated with great almost awe, one gets the feeling that this is exactly what people saw from the Kremlin windows when they observed the “color revolutions” all around the perimeter of the Russian Federation.
Moscow adapted its policy to compete with the EU in Ukraine and the other Eastern Partnership states through what it thought were EU-style means, though Russia has a very warped view of ‘soft power’ . It concentrated on covert methods, such as bribing local politicians, setting up pro-Russian front parties and sending shadowy funding to new pro-Russian non-governmental organisations (NGOs).
Putin's propagandists like to call this approach “a realpolitik,” which translates from the Kremlin as “we were not the first to start” or whataboutism.
The key to understanding modern Russia is to realise that it is run by some very weird people. In the 1990s they were known as ‘political technologists’, ultra-cynical political manipulators who created a fake democracy because Boris Yeltsin couldn’t build a real one, and who distracted the population with carefully scripted drama because the energy wealth had temporarily stopped flowing. The difference under Putin was that the Kremlin established a monopoly of manipulation, not just that the money from oil and gas started piling up again.
An amazingly accurate assessment of the Yeltsin-Putin regime. Now let us ask ourselves, would Yeltsin have pursued the same pro-Western policy if the price of oil had been the same as under Putin, or would he have fallen into anti-Western and imperialist rhetoric? As the example of Chechnya, Transnistria, etc. shows, Yeltsin would most likely have pursued the same “Russia rising from its knees” policy. Yeltsin's problem was that, first of all, he still had to pretend to be a Democrat, and secondly, oil cost about $30, not $140. However, there might not have been Nord-Ost and Beslan under Yeltsin, but there would have been an authoritarian country, that's for sure. Yeltsin may have been a milder autocrat than Putin, but he definitely would have been an autocrat, not a democratic leader.
Economic policy concentrated on superficial populist measures, such as fuel and meat price freezes, rather than on tackling systemic problems, as had been briefly attempted in 2000–01. Historically, periodic economic pain has actually been good for Ukraine. The country never reformed its economy wholesale, like the Baltic States, but did just enough to survive when it was forced to – most notably when the recession of the early 1990s pushed it to the brink of collapse in 1994–95, and again after the local financial crisis in 1998–99 threatened it with bankruptcy in 2000. On the other hand, when the economy was doing well enough, politics was not conducive to reform.
Hence the great missed opportunity of the years immediately after the Orange Revolution (also, arguably, in 2010, when the new authorities’ business-friendly reform plans were quietly abandoned as the economy temporarily recovered).
Yes, the unwillingness to carry out serious reforms while constantly declaring “Ukraine is Europe” is certainly striking. The feeling is that all their energies have been spent on fighting the spelling of “in/on” and “Kyiv/Kiev”. Well, and the fight with Russian culture, of course. It's just like in Mother Russia, where all efforts are also spent on such meaningless symbolic reforms in the spirit of changing the name from Militia to Police.
Dzerkalo Tyzhnya, understanding Yanukovych was always easy: ‘He wanted to be the richest man in Eastern Europe. ’The problem was well identified by leading economic and energy analyst Mykhailo Honchar: ‘Yanukovych wanted to be both president and number one oligarch. Like all those other guys – Putin, Nazarbayev and Aliyev. Except they had energy and rents to distribute. Ukraine does not.’
It's a very accurate definition of the very essence of such a phenomenon as Yanukovych. It couldn't be more accurate.
According to one Ukrainian expert, ‘Kuchma was more like a medieval European monarch in the way he dealt with his “barons” ’. Yanukovych, on the other hand, acted more like an Asiatic despot: everything was organised vertically. Immediately below him was family and his inner mafia circle; then below them, various sycophants. So maybe that meant ‘Kuchma was a little bit more European’ than Yanukovych. Except that his model of government was several hundred years out of date.
Also, an interesting analogy, though it's hard for me to understand how true it is since I don't know this period of modern Ukraine that well, but the analogy is beautiful.
In the modern ‘anti-fascist’ narrative, ‘fascism’ has long escaped the geographical bonds of Germany and Italy; the label applies to anybody who embodies the same existential threat. So all Ukrainian nationalists are fascists by definition.
Even the EU and the US, or NATO, or the West in general, are ‘fascistic’ .
As stated in the book “The Russians”, back in Soviet times they liked to use this term to refer to all those who opposed the USSR. However, the current Russian authorities are more cunning, because they mix real events with obvious exaggeration, such as the support of the UPA and Bandera by a very small group of Ukrainian nationalists is inflated by Putin's propaganda to incredible proportions, saying that those who collaborated with the Nazis, allegedly shared Nazi ideology, so today those who support Bandera and the UPA also allegedly share Nazi ideology. As they say, propaganda should be simple and total.
But Right Sector already looked like yesterday’s men. After posting a picture of the Eurovision Song Contest winner, bearded drag queen Conchita Wurst, under the headline ‘Do we need this kind of “Europe”?’ Right Sector was condemned for being a mirror image of Putin’s nationalists.
The author doesn't seem to have realized that it's not about the Right Sector but about the policy of a part of the Ukrainian elite (which includes, for example, Yushchenko) to take the idea of Ukrainian emigration about Russia, which for centuries allegedly wanted to destroy Ukrainian identity. If, in Soviet times, these Ukrainian emigrants in North America simply wrote books about how Soviet Russia allegedly committed genocide of Ukrainians by starving Ukraine in the early 30s, now this same rhetoric has become the main political ideology of part of the Ukrainian elite. Perhaps these Ukrainian politicians thought that they could score political points from such a confrontation with Russia without harming the country. But, alas, Putin was in power at the time for whom political weakness against his neighbors could cost him the presidency.
A true reformist government might take power after the elections due in October 2014, especially if the conflict in the Donbas is minimised by then.
Many oligarchs are worried at the thought of thousands of radicalised fighters returning from the east, to press for true ‘revolution’ . Retrospective solidarity might help: having sacrificed so much, there would be strong pressure on any new government to deliver change. A new Maidan – a new round of popular protest – is always possible. Unfortunately, the more likely short-term scenario is mobilisation without reform. The October elections are likely to make parliament more patriotic, but not necessarily more reformist.
This is exactly what happened. So, necessary reforms were never implemented, rather a mutual policy of escalation was chosen.
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January 6, 2016I cannot even give this book a star. I worked very hard to get past the first 20 pages, but it was far too painful. Choppy sentences, lack of a cohesive thought, typos...just horrible.
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November 23, 2014This book felt rushed in the effort to get the information out while still relevant; ideas were unpolished, the writing very "rough-draft" feeling. Some lines were painful to read:
Western Europe at least became less martial and more post-modern, whatever that meant.
Russia did not experience 1968 directly.
Further refinement of the text and critical first readers/editors could have improved this text greatly, allowing the knowledge of the writer to be demonstrated without the distraction of awkward phrasing and incomplete expression of ideas.
Western Europe at least became less martial and more post-modern, whatever that meant.
Russia did not experience 1968 directly.
Further refinement of the text and critical first readers/editors could have improved this text greatly, allowing the knowledge of the writer to be demonstrated without the distraction of awkward phrasing and incomplete expression of ideas.
November 23, 2015
Якраз для західного читача це дуже потрібна книжка для того, щоб розібратися, що сталося в Україні 2 роки тому і чим це може обернутися для Заходу. Але і для українського читача цікаво почитати про всі перепетії в Україні, про те, як клан Януковича узурпував усю владу, як "ділили" Схід і Крим, і як Росія займала все сильніші і сильніші позиції в Україні, роблячи залежною "Сімю" Януковича від російських грошей.
January 18, 2015
From Crimea annexation to the ongoing rebellion in Donbas, this book has everything u wanna know abt the Ukraine crisis & Russia's role in it. Ofcourse, west's point of view :)
October 11, 2018
Mostly valid, but the timeline is not really connected inside the book. Some events are mentioned later with a note it happened before.
August 2, 2023
The book covers a lot of ground, which is essential in showing the rest of Europe more about Ukraine's recent history. But where on earth were the editors of this book? If it is supposed to be a bit of an introduction to Ukraine and the situation after Maidan 2.0 in 2014, then there is too much that you are expected to know about timelines, people and events. Many of them are described in the book, but the chapters and the section of each chapter do not seem to follow a linear logic allowing the reader to learn as you read. It would be great if someone would take it upon themselves to update and edit the text because it is an important book for Europe and the world right now in 2023 to understand Ukraine. It's just too clumsily written as the text stands now.
March 12, 2022
Great account of what the Ukrainian crisis was about until 2014 when the Maidan Uprising ended. A lot of information to absorbe in one read but I now have a better idea of what the war in Ukraine is about. To be someone with very little political and historical understanding, I found that most people could keep track of the main ideas of the book quite easily. It is strange to read about this not too far away past and see what it’s come to be in the present moment… as if a preventable future had been written for us…
July 20, 2022
Seems like a review of newspaper coverage of post Soviet Union of the region. Lacks the depth in the analysis.
However, it’s clear that the interest of both US and West in the Cold War was only to break the USSR. They forgot to take care of the breakaway regions and countries just like what they did in Afghanistan. Whatever has followed is the aftereffects of their shortsighted political agenda
However, it’s clear that the interest of both US and West in the Cold War was only to break the USSR. They forgot to take care of the breakaway regions and countries just like what they did in Afghanistan. Whatever has followed is the aftereffects of their shortsighted political agenda
December 17, 2023
The Ukrainian crisis has shown the world that a new Cold War may be upon us. Russian President Vladimir Putin has proven that he's willing to take drastic measures to reassert Russian influence in the region, and in return, the European Union has struggled with its response.
March 6, 2022
To try to start understanding the complex situation the world is wrapped in today… five stars as a sign of support for all people who believe in “no war”.
January 14, 2026
Blinkist
الولايات المتحدة و روسيا ما هما إلا وجهان لعملة واحدة .. غطرسة و تجبر و تكبر عصابة من الأوغاد و اللصوص
الولايات المتحدة و روسيا ما هما إلا وجهان لعملة واحدة .. غطرسة و تجبر و تكبر عصابة من الأوغاد و اللصوص
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