China’s Communist Party seized power in 1949 after a long period of guerrilla insurgency followed by full-scale war, but the Chinese revolution was just beginning. China Under Mao narrates the rise and fall of the Maoist revolutionary state from 1949 to 1976―an epoch of startling accomplishments and disastrous failures, steered by many forces but dominated above all by Mao Zedong. Mao’s China, Andrew Walder argues, was defined by two distinctive institutions established during the first decade of Communist Party a Party apparatus that exercised firm (sometimes harsh) discipline over its members and cadres; and a socialist economy modeled after the Soviet Union. Although a large national bureaucracy had oversight of this authoritarian system, Mao intervened strongly at every turn. The doctrines and political organization that produced Mao’s greatest achievements―victory in the civil war, the creation of China’s first unified modern state, a historic transformation of urban and rural life―also generated his worst the industrial depression and rural famine of the Great Leap Forward and the violent destruction and stagnation of the Cultural Revolution. Misdiagnosing China’s problems as capitalist restoration and prescribing continuing class struggle against imaginary enemies as the solution, Mao ruined much of what he had built and created no viable alternative. At the time of his death, he left China backward and deeply divided.
On the one hand: I mean it was fine. Walder says explicitly that he's a sociologist from the outset, and that really shines through in the "shock by numbers" parts of Mao's regime. The banal horror of the Great Leap Forward especially comes through here, and so does the arbitrariness of the purges. Death in China is just cheaper than it is in the US.
On the other: The strict sociological focus makes the Hundred Flowers Campaign and especially the Cultural Revolution bits fall a little flat, because those were more about complex melodramatic egos at work in the upper echelons of the Chinese government. Obviously they were also entries into the whole "Mao runs roughshod over everything bc idealism I guess" thing, but not elaborating much on who was actually making his tighty whities bunch up (besides THE REVOLUTION, ALWAYS) during those two very political struggles made the book lose focus. You just can't really write a book that covers the Cultural Revolution without embracing the high drama of it all.
An aside: I am so fucking pissed at all the philosophers trying to rehabilitate Maoism like!!! No one in the mainstream has decided that maybe Stalinism has some salvageable bits after all but god damn Sinaboo Alain Badiou
I am fascinated by stories about people who were instrumental in making a dream into a reality and then trying to sustain that dream, only to watch it fall to pieces. Both Stalin and Mao fit that picture. It is good to find a book that tries to tell that story without harping on ideas of megalomania, atrocious decision making, and madness. Yeah, the whole revolution was never going to succeed, and the attempts to maintain it had disastrous consequences, but it is important to see the whole thing for what it was, that is an attempt to keep a dream alive beyond reason, and that is something we should learn from and apply to our own lives. Informative and interesting!
Sharp, informative, fairly thorough (and critical) analysis of Chinese economic and political history under Mao. Walder is more of a sociologist by training than an historian, and he does not seem to know the Chinese sources in the original. So his originality may be hampered by that. Still, a very useful book for those (like me) who are not experts in the field.
If you're a newcomer to the history of China in the Mao-era, this book is my first recommendation. If you've already read widely in the period, this book will still serve to enlighten, clarify, and challenge your beliefs.
Walder draws out the logic behind the chaos of the early PRC, carefully tracing how Mao's reactionary goals and clever stop-gap solutions drew the Chinese people deeper and deeper into the morass. This is going to be one of my top recommendations for those who are curious about what happened, and why. I'm of course partial due to Walder's mix of sociology and history.
I don't know if I have much enlightening to say about this book, other than it has set me up for my coming reading on the Cultural Revolution.
Next up, Yang Jisheng's The World Turned Upside Down.
Clearly lacking in the Cultural Revolution segments (I have Walder's copy of Fractured Rebellion in queue), but a thorough breakdown of the flaws in Mao's rule. Highly critical, focused primarily on economic and human cost, but I'll give credit for acknowledging the growth that DID happen over the period (increase in life expectancy, health outcomes, education reforms, etc). My biggest issues lie in his characterizations of Mao without much to back it up. The strengths in the book are drawing direct lines between Mao's directives and policies to the suffering in the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution, but then Walder seems to take a step too far in attributing choices to insecurity or paranoia without providing similar evidence. The most damning critique is of Mao relying too heavily upon 1920s Stalinist concepts, particularly the extreme rigidity of party dogma and that 1930s Soviet economy was THE definition of socialism. This book can be summarized by the famous Chen Yun quote "Had Mao died in 1956, his achievements would have been immortal. Had he died in 1966, he would still have been a great man but flawed. But he died in 1976, there's nothing we can do about it."
*Incredible* history of Maoist China. This book isn't just a list of events, but also deeply analytical and sociological in explaining how Mao's interventions ended up backfiring and how micro-level individual actors' interests produced the disastrous macro-level outcomes of the Mao era. Cannot recommend this book enough.
China is a nation with a rich cultural heritage and history. Around the beginning of the nineteenth century, things began to go awfully awry for the Celestial Empire which ruled it. Unable to cope with the cut-throat deals of colonialist powers, it swallowed racial pride and had to follow the line dictated by western powers. A large part of its territory was annexed by Japan in the twentieth century. Chinese people’s historic struggle to evict the Japanese was fought by the Nationalists under Chiang Kaishek and Communists under Mao Zedong. After Japan was defeated, Mao’s troops established the first communist state in Asia. This was in true respect the first modern state China had ever had. But, the 27 years from Mao’s power grab to his demise rocked China through a series of upheavals orchestrated by the great leader, including the Hundred Flowers, Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. Millions perished and an even larger number was displaced from their families in the turmoil generated in the wake of these vicious programs. Altogether, Chinese society and economy were in a bad shape when Mao left the scene. It took Deng Xiaoping to make a screeching U-turn in economic policy to place China back on rails. This book examines Mao Zedong’s disastrous policies and how he very nearly derailed his party and the Chinese revolution itself. Andrew G Walder is a professor of political science at the Freeman-Spogli Institute of International Studies. He is a specialist on the sources of conflict, stability and change in communist regimes and their successor states. His publications on China range from political and economic organization of the Mao era to changing patterns of stratification, social mobility and political conflict in the post-Mao era.
The very first sentence of the book succinctly puts the tenor of Mao’s regime as “the first quarter century of communist rule in China was dramatic and disastrous”. Discipline is stressed over and over in revolutionary organizations which eventually degenerate to abuse of authority when the leader commands unquestioned obeisance from cadres. Adding bureaucratic dictatorship in the party and government to this heady mix, what we get is the recipe for a disaster of global proportions. Mao’s disconnect from the people is evident the moment he ascended the throne. When Khrushchev denounced Stalin after his death, Mao thought his own evaluation by the people would be far more benevolent. His ‘Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom’ campaign initially encouraged the people to come out in the open with criticism of the party and its leadership. But the hate and invective Mao received in return upset his calculations and he soon recalled the program after hunting the rebels down for their deviant thought.
Mao’s disastrous ‘Great Leap Forward’ (1958-60) was designed to surpass Britain in industrial production in 15 years. So blind was he to actual performance on the ground that the perceived ‘enthusiastic support’ from the masses persuaded him to revise the target to within 7 years and surpass the U.S. in 15 years. Technical experts were evicted from factories and party bureaucrats assumed their place. National output of steel in 1957 was 5 million tons, but overzealous party secretaries pledged 11 million tons for the next year when even a conservative figure of 5.8 million was ambitious. Needless to say, the actual production of quality steel was even lower than the first figure. Peasants were organized into collective farms and they were often diverted to industrial production during the slack farming season. Personal liberty and self-respect were pronounced bourgeois values and hence counterrevolutionary. Families were ordered to turn over their personal possessions to communes. Cooking was communal in which many families took part. Farmers were organized into brigades on military lines. They were required to work at least 28 days in a month. All were required to rise with the morning bugle call, take meals together and go to sleep at the same time. Private housing was replaced with communal barracks segregated by genders, with children housed in a separate building. Families were thus forcefully separated and practically lived under a form of modern slavery. Party officials having no exposure to agricultural practices advised close planting and deep ploughing of the land, which decimated its productivity. Even when famine raged, China exported grain to Soviet Bloc as loan repayments. Industrial output fell and the deluge of poor quality products led to depression. It is estimated that nearly 30 million people died due to famine and the deep fall in industrial output lasted half a decade.
Walder’s narrative stands out for two prime reasons – it summarizes the factors that made Chairman Mao different from other leaders of the Socialist Bloc and the causes for the miserable living standards seen in all communist states. At considerable variance with Marxist theory that extolled dictatorship of the proletariat, Mao turned his attention to rural revolution. This helped his party to have closer ties and involvement with peasants in the countryside. It also saved the burden of fighting against the occupying Japanese forces usually stationed in cities, leaving the Nationalist troops under Chiang Kaishek to engage the enemy. Kaishek’s troops bore the brunt of the Japanese onslaught so that even their eventual victory came at a crippling cost in terms of men, material and other resources. Mao implemented land reform measures as soon as the party assumed power. Families of landowners and large farmers were evicted from their possessions without any compensation and their land was redistributed among the poor. However, the joy of the landless getting ownership of productive land all on a sudden was short-lived. The land was usurped by the government and conglomerated into collective farms managed by the party leaders. Inhabitants were not allowed to leave the farms. The grain they produced had to be sold at government procurement stations at low prices fixed by the party. If anybody dared to lift a finger against the program, they were rounded up, tortured and sometimes executed labeling them as reactionaries. Troubled with the excessive number of executions, Mao once put an upper limit of 0.1% for executions as a percentage of people arrested. Fanatic cadres took this as a target to be adhered to! Prisons were unable to manage the continuous stream of the accused, who were then sent to labour camps and farms for manual labour. Miserable conditions in these places ensured a high death rate.
Observers to Soviet-sponsored economies frequently mentioned their appalling living standards at the same time employing an impressive sector of heavy industry. Walder demystifies this paradox. Stalin’s socialist growth machine failed everywhere it was applied. Huge investments in heavy industries dictated high rates of savings and selective investment. Non-essential sectors like consumer goods, textiles and automobiles were relegated to the backburner. The private sector was not allowed entry even in these low-priority areas. Farmers were paid low prices for grain. Such cheap food was sold in cities where industrial wages could then be artificially held down. The money saved in this exercise was then channeled into industrial investment. This led to corruption in a command economy and falling living standards. Rationing, shortages and substandard housing and public infrastructure prevailed in the communist countries. Bureaucratically administered economies in these states utterly rejected market mechanisms. A disciplined and unitary party organization extended its tentacles deep into the society and economy.
Mao was a creative thinker in politics and a tinkerer too. His ideas were very daring even to the level of being reckless. As soon as the ill effects of Great Leap Forward somewhat died down, he came up with another grand scheme of open rebellion within the party in which free criticism and censure against functionaries in party and bureaucracy was allowed to pinpoint class enemies and revisionists. In a nationwide purge that came to be called the ‘Cultural Revolution’, millions of rebels detained, questioned, forced to confess, tortured and sometimes executed their leaders. University professors and teachers were especially targeted for maltreatment by their own students. The purpose of the Cultural Revolution was to remove people in authority taking the capitalist road. Standard treatment included public humiliation, beatings at the hands of rebel groups, brief imprisonment in makeshift cells and long stints of manual labour in factories or the countryside. What Mao didn’t anticipate was the splintering of the rebels into rival groups over petty points of ideology. Civil war broke out between factions which grew to alarming proportions when Mao ordered the army to hand over military-grade weapons to rebels. The Chairman seemed to revel in an orgy of blood and violence! The army was eventually called in and entrusted with civil administration. As the military rule stabilized the atmosphere, Mao again became upset and ordered power back to revolutionary committees. At this point, his health failed and his slow downward slide began. After his death, power fell to Deng Xiaoping who immediately reversed Mao’s policies and guided China towards progress in 1978. The rest is history.
The personality cult of Mao developed during the height of Cultural Revolution mocked the entire Marxist-Leninist ideology when Mao was elevated to the status of a quasi-divine being. A campaign of ‘Boundless Loyalty’ to Mao was staged across China. Worship of Mao reached ridiculous depths. Workers in factories assembled in front of a portrait of Mao and ‘asked for instructions’ for the day. During the shift, they’d read Mao quotations posted on the walls to boost their enthusiasm for work. When changing shifts, they exchanged Mao quotes and at the end of the working day, they’d once again turn to Mao’s portrait and ‘report back’ (p.278).
The book is very well researched and structured in an objective way. As the Chinese Communist party itself now tries to downplay the Mao era, truth can safely be credited with the author’s account. A good number of photographs of the period are included as also a commendable bibliography section and a huge number of notes. The reading is effortless, but a bit of repetition is slightly off-putting.
Mao still implement centralized planned economy out of step of Eastern europeans who were moving away from planned economy and stalin's path, after Starlin passed away in 1951; a starlin style party from early phase strict discipline conducive to CCP's popularity to post 1949 a career path and perceived as corrupt and party-control by the people and strict discipline led to false reports (for fear of being disciplined by the party leaders); mao's dogmatism, unwillingness to let go of class struggle, NOT adaptable (unlike earlier portrayal of his thought), led to the disaster of CR, the unintended consequences of his dogmatism.
This is a high-quality analytical history of Mao-era China before 1976. Andrew Walder has a series of original and innovative research on the micro-history of the Cultural Revolution. So if you are not a newcomer to the CCP history, I would highly recommend charters 9-14. Walder's narrative and analysis of the dynamics of CR are very sharp and insightful. He streamlines the CR history into different periods and clearly lays out the logic and consequences of these complicated scenarios with decent examples and data.
"An estimate of 1.1 to 1.6 million dead during the five years from 1966 to 1971. These same sources suggest that three-fourths of these deaths were generated by the actions of revolutionary committees or the armed forces, primarily after the first months of 1968, and well over half—at least 600,000—were generated by the Cleansing of the Class Ranks alone."
It is sobering to realize that the draconian campaign to restore order after a nationwide insurgency that Mao himself had fomented generated far greater numbers of dead and other kinds of victims than the upheaval itself.
A comprehensive history on the reign of China's first red emperor, Mao Zedong. This is probably the single best book on Maoist China, tracing the history of the social institutions and events that gave birth to the regime on the mainland today, despite said regime's forgetfulness.
Tracing every single spasm and seizure that the party inflicted, from "Rectification campaigns" to "Revolutionary committees", each chapter here serves as a standalone article focusing on a specific time period, in roughly chronological order. This is a dense book to get through, but an extremely useful reference for the time period, edited into one cohesive whole.
May history never repeat such atrocities as these.
A really good introduction to Maoist China aimed at a general readership with no prior background. That said, there’s probably something in here for subject matter enthusiasts too, if only as a well-written refresher which presents the material in a fresh and compelling way. I would say this is the best general history of the period since Maurice Meisner’s: “Mao’s China and After.”
While the whole thing is good, Walter really comes into his own in the Cultural Revolution sections, which is his area of expertise.
A complete breakdown on the politics and policies and their impact on the masses during Mao Zedong's rule on over People's Republic of China (PRC). An analytical look on his rise, his turbulent tenure and semi-downfall. Although it is a written for academics, it is not too dense for those interested in the history of the PRC, Chinese Communist Party and Mao's policies.
Was very lucky to read this while taking Professor Walder's course on Mao era China (and by the way, he's an excellent lecturer who is convivial and good to his students). A good book for a general overview of China during this period, that comes with some of Dr Walder's sharp insights on Mao's politics, leadership, and worldview.
Polemical and against the collective forgetting of history induced by the narrative of the rise of China. Walder never engages with leftist scholarship on modern China though ( no references of Arif Dirlik, Maurice Meisner, Rebecca Karl, etc.) But I don’t know enough of the Chinese studies world to judge.
Solid coverage of the Mao years for interested non-experts. If there’s one thing Walder does best it’s showing how Mao’s plans went horribly wrong while at the same time not showing him as simply a mad-man or a fool—there was a political logic to his crimes that can be missed, depending on how you explain the Great Leap or the Cultural Revolution.
Overall a good book that helped me become more knowledgeable on the topic. I knew very little about it prior. It is a confusing subject with a lot of back and forward policies, conflicting factions and lots of names. The book did a great job up until the cultural revolution where I felt that it felt like word soup after that point. Once you got lost it felt impossible to keep up.
A very detailed look at the turbulent history of China under Mao. Highly relevant lecture for historical context but also for anyone visiting or studying China today. The impact of the described events can still be felt in contemporary China.
Pretty dry at times but I learned a lot. I didn't know much about Mao or the CCP aside from the very broad story, so while this survey helped fill things in for me it might be too brief for someone who already knows about this period.
+ The history of Maoist China from a sociological perspective. The bibliography contains a wealth of relevant books for further reading.
- The author cites mostly secondary english source.
- The author's view about Maoist China is basically a bureaucratic authoritarian Soviet-type country burdened by Maoist capricious policies. This makes the author's narrative a little bit narrow-minded.