What do you think?
Rate this book
Eating People Is Wrong, and Other Essays on Famine, Its Past, and Its Future
New perspectives on the history of famine―and the possibility of a famine-free world
Famines are becoming smaller and rarer, but optimism about the possibility of a famine-free future must be tempered by the threat of global warming. That is just one of the arguments that Cormac Ó Gráda, one of the world's leading authorities on the history and economics of famine, develops in this wide-ranging book, which provides crucial new perspectives on key questions raised by famines around the globe between the seventeenth and twenty-first centuries.
The book begins with a taboo topic. Ó Gráda argues that cannibalism, while by no means a universal feature of famines and never responsible for more than a tiny proportion of famine deaths, has probably been more common during very severe famines than previously thought. The book goes on to offer new interpretations of two of the twentieth century’s most notorious and controversial famines, the Great Bengal Famine and the Chinese Great Leap Forward Famine. Ó Gráda questions the standard view of the Bengal Famine as a perfect example of market failure, arguing instead that the primary cause was the unwillingness of colonial rulers to divert food from their war effort. The book also addresses the role played by traders and speculators during famines more generally, invoking evidence from famines in France, Ireland, Finland, Malawi, Niger, and Somalia since the 1600s, and overturning Adam Smith’s claim that government attempts to solve food shortages always cause famines.
Thought-provoking and important, this is essential reading for historians, economists, demographers, and anyone else who is interested in the history and possible future of famine.
Famines are becoming smaller and rarer, but optimism about the possibility of a famine-free future must be tempered by the threat of global warming. That is just one of the arguments that Cormac Ó Gráda, one of the world's leading authorities on the history and economics of famine, develops in this wide-ranging book, which provides crucial new perspectives on key questions raised by famines around the globe between the seventeenth and twenty-first centuries.
The book begins with a taboo topic. Ó Gráda argues that cannibalism, while by no means a universal feature of famines and never responsible for more than a tiny proportion of famine deaths, has probably been more common during very severe famines than previously thought. The book goes on to offer new interpretations of two of the twentieth century’s most notorious and controversial famines, the Great Bengal Famine and the Chinese Great Leap Forward Famine. Ó Gráda questions the standard view of the Bengal Famine as a perfect example of market failure, arguing instead that the primary cause was the unwillingness of colonial rulers to divert food from their war effort. The book also addresses the role played by traders and speculators during famines more generally, invoking evidence from famines in France, Ireland, Finland, Malawi, Niger, and Somalia since the 1600s, and overturning Adam Smith’s claim that government attempts to solve food shortages always cause famines.
Thought-provoking and important, this is essential reading for historians, economists, demographers, and anyone else who is interested in the history and possible future of famine.
248 pages, Hardcover
First published March 1, 2015
3 people are currently reading
187 people want to read
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews
January 19, 2023
This was intended for a more academic audience than I am. Several essays carefully debunk positions I've never heard of. Also he takes you through every variable in his regression analysis at one point. At any rate, here are some points I learned:
- Cannibalism of already-dead people during famines is widespread and normal under the circumstances. Most observers are sympathetic on hearing of it. Murder for the sake of cannibalism under famine conditions is much rarer and it is unclear who its perpetrators tend to be. (Not from this book, but from other anthropology reading: cannibalism is not uncommon outside of famines, cross-culturally, but it is always for spiritual/social reasons in those cases, and involves the consumption of either deceased family members or enemies vanquished in war.)
- Markets mostly continue to function under famine conditions and probably help alleviate famines by redistributing food . However, especially before the 20th century, transport was too slow to help very much. Despite famines often being blamed on foodsellers hoarding food, hoarding isn't common.
- The Great Bengal Famine of 1943 was made significantly worse by (local) politicians spending an absurdly long time refusing to acknowledge that there was a shortage rather than a misallocation of food, (neighboring) politicians banning exports to Bengal out of fear, (international) politicians refusing aid because of racism and because they did not want to divert resources from WWII, and wartime conditions interfering with fishing, transport, and communications. Winston Churchill.
- Famine victims used to die mainly of infectious diseases. Since the mid-20th century, improved sanitation means that famine victims usually die directly of starvation.
- It's hard to calculate mortality from famines (and other slow-moving disasters, for that matter - you might remember the fights over COVID death rates back in 2020). The method used is usually to calculate excess mortality, but you have to establish a baseline and figure out what to do about mortality displacement. And, of course, the number people come up with has a lot to do with their ideology.
- Mao didn't realize there was widespread famine until 1960. (It started in 1959.) The famine was largely manmade and unintentional.
- The relative lack of market mechanisms during the Great Leap Forward probably didn't help matters.
- Famines are much less severe now – what we call famines might not have even registered in the 18th century. Charities founded as famine relief have tended to expand their mission, because if you want things like "salaried employees" you need to have some steady sources of funding. Incidentally, this is why charities would really like you to make monthly donations instead. I don't know why I never made that connection.
- Cannibalism of already-dead people during famines is widespread and normal under the circumstances. Most observers are sympathetic on hearing of it. Murder for the sake of cannibalism under famine conditions is much rarer and it is unclear who its perpetrators tend to be. (Not from this book, but from other anthropology reading: cannibalism is not uncommon outside of famines, cross-culturally, but it is always for spiritual/social reasons in those cases, and involves the consumption of either deceased family members or enemies vanquished in war.)
- Markets mostly continue to function under famine conditions and probably help alleviate famines by redistributing food . However, especially before the 20th century, transport was too slow to help very much. Despite famines often being blamed on foodsellers hoarding food, hoarding isn't common.
- The Great Bengal Famine of 1943 was made significantly worse by (local) politicians spending an absurdly long time refusing to acknowledge that there was a shortage rather than a misallocation of food, (neighboring) politicians banning exports to Bengal out of fear, (international) politicians refusing aid because of racism and because they did not want to divert resources from WWII, and wartime conditions interfering with fishing, transport, and communications. Winston Churchill.
- Famine victims used to die mainly of infectious diseases. Since the mid-20th century, improved sanitation means that famine victims usually die directly of starvation.
- It's hard to calculate mortality from famines (and other slow-moving disasters, for that matter - you might remember the fights over COVID death rates back in 2020). The method used is usually to calculate excess mortality, but you have to establish a baseline and figure out what to do about mortality displacement. And, of course, the number people come up with has a lot to do with their ideology.
- Mao didn't realize there was widespread famine until 1960. (It started in 1959.) The famine was largely manmade and unintentional.
- The relative lack of market mechanisms during the Great Leap Forward probably didn't help matters.
- Famines are much less severe now – what we call famines might not have even registered in the 18th century. Charities founded as famine relief have tended to expand their mission, because if you want things like "salaried employees" you need to have some steady sources of funding. Incidentally, this is why charities would really like you to make monthly donations instead. I don't know why I never made that connection.
June 3, 2015
Famine cannibalism is nothing new. It is strange that there is so little evidence for it in the Great Irish Famine.
The traditionalist focus on 'hoarding' and 'speculation' is mistaken. Food markets do not end famines, as optimists contend, but they do not make them worse. The Bengal Famine of 1943–44 was made worse by limited market integration and by failed state policy. The contemporary focus on 'hoarding' excused food withholding on the part of both the provincial and the imperial government.
The European famines of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries were partially mitigated by market integration. The author shows that the coefficient of variation in food prices across regions falls during famine periods in France, Finland, and Ireland, suggesting arbitrage and a working market mechanism. But in certain famines, such as the Bengal famine, the coefficient of variation rises, suggesting market segmentation. The Irish calumny against food markets during the Great Famine is misguided; during the famine, food exports fell and food imports rose, as one would expect. It was not enough. The problem was one of entitlements: the Irish could not afford to eat.
Dikotter and Yang overestimate excess mortality during the Great Leap Forward period. They are not demographers. They rely on the abnormally- and perhaps implausibly-low 1957 mortality rate as a baseline against which to measure excess mortality. Better mortality baselines suggest a death toll perhaps half as large.
Dikotter and Becker are too quick to pin the blame on Mao. He was reckless but he was not intentional and malicious with respect to peasant deaths. Yang is on firmer ground when he says that the Maoist system worsened the famine through pervasive misreporting, requisitions, beatings, and blocks on marketing and trade.
The author also suggests that Maoist public health programs more or less eliminated infectious disease. As in the Leningrad Famine of 1941–44, most peasants died of simple starvation, whereas during traditional famines, peasants had died of starvation-induced disease. That did not happen during the Great Leap Forward.
Famine seems to have disappeared, NGO propaganda notwithstanding. Even the North Korean famine appears to have been not much more that a damp squib. Infant mortality rates were about as high in North Korea in 1997 than they are in India and Bangladesh today.
Eliminating famine has been easy. Eliminating hunger will be much harder.
The traditionalist focus on 'hoarding' and 'speculation' is mistaken. Food markets do not end famines, as optimists contend, but they do not make them worse. The Bengal Famine of 1943–44 was made worse by limited market integration and by failed state policy. The contemporary focus on 'hoarding' excused food withholding on the part of both the provincial and the imperial government.
The European famines of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries were partially mitigated by market integration. The author shows that the coefficient of variation in food prices across regions falls during famine periods in France, Finland, and Ireland, suggesting arbitrage and a working market mechanism. But in certain famines, such as the Bengal famine, the coefficient of variation rises, suggesting market segmentation. The Irish calumny against food markets during the Great Famine is misguided; during the famine, food exports fell and food imports rose, as one would expect. It was not enough. The problem was one of entitlements: the Irish could not afford to eat.
Dikotter and Yang overestimate excess mortality during the Great Leap Forward period. They are not demographers. They rely on the abnormally- and perhaps implausibly-low 1957 mortality rate as a baseline against which to measure excess mortality. Better mortality baselines suggest a death toll perhaps half as large.
Dikotter and Becker are too quick to pin the blame on Mao. He was reckless but he was not intentional and malicious with respect to peasant deaths. Yang is on firmer ground when he says that the Maoist system worsened the famine through pervasive misreporting, requisitions, beatings, and blocks on marketing and trade.
The author also suggests that Maoist public health programs more or less eliminated infectious disease. As in the Leningrad Famine of 1941–44, most peasants died of simple starvation, whereas during traditional famines, peasants had died of starvation-induced disease. That did not happen during the Great Leap Forward.
Famine seems to have disappeared, NGO propaganda notwithstanding. Even the North Korean famine appears to have been not much more that a damp squib. Infant mortality rates were about as high in North Korea in 1997 than they are in India and Bangladesh today.
Eliminating famine has been easy. Eliminating hunger will be much harder.
January 6, 2024
i downloaded this thinking it was another book, but i love learning about the irish potato famine so i kept reading.
July 30, 2021
Great quantitative analysis, but very academic
There is a lot of great demographic data and analysis in this book related to famines. However, the book isn’t that well written in general and especially so for the non-academic reader. A flowing narrative would have been better than lazily compiling essays together and calling it a book.
There is a lot of great demographic data and analysis in this book related to famines. However, the book isn’t that well written in general and especially so for the non-academic reader. A flowing narrative would have been better than lazily compiling essays together and calling it a book.
June 22, 2023
An excellent and fascinating group of essays about various academic and historical narratives surrounding famines. Maybe not for a first-comer to some of these time periods (It's especially pointless to read the 4th chapter without reading Tombstone and Mao's Great Famine)
April 12, 2016
In this collection of essays, Ó Gráda discusses the issue of cannibalism in human history. Distinguishing from ritual cannibalism, he focusses on hunger cannibalism, in which people are driven to eat the dead out of necessity rather than custom. It is largely a work of economic history, and includes longer looks at the Great Leap Forward in China as well as the Great Bengal Famine in India.
Read
September 11, 2015363.809 O112 2015
April 23, 2017
I think I missed the point of this book. Long list of famines and people eating each other dating back 1000 years, often all in the same sentence.
Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews