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The New Threat From Islamic Militancy
From Syria to Somalia, from Libya to Indonesia, from Yemen to the capitals of Europe, Islamic militancy appears stronger, more widespread and more threatening than ever. ISIS and other groups, such as Boko Haram, together command significant military power, rule millions and control extensive territories. Elsewhere Al-Qaeda remains potent and is rapidly evolving. Factions and subsidiaries proliferate worldwide, and a new generation of Western Jihadists are emerging, joining conflicts abroad and attacking at home. Who are these groups and what do they actually want? What connects them and how do they differ? How are we to understand their tactics of online activism and grotesque violence?
Drawing on almost two decades of frontline reporting as well as a vast range of sources, from intelligence officials to the militants themselves, renowned expert Jason Burke cuts through the mass of opinion and misinformation to explain dispassionately and with total clarity the nature of the threat we now face. He shows that Islamic militancy has changed dramatically in recent years. Far from being a ‘medieval’ throwback, it is modern, dynamic and resilient. Despite everything, it is entirely comprehensible.
The New Threat is essential reading if we are to understand our fears rather than succumb to them, to act rationally and effectively, and to address successfully one of the most urgent problems of our time.
Drawing on almost two decades of frontline reporting as well as a vast range of sources, from intelligence officials to the militants themselves, renowned expert Jason Burke cuts through the mass of opinion and misinformation to explain dispassionately and with total clarity the nature of the threat we now face. He shows that Islamic militancy has changed dramatically in recent years. Far from being a ‘medieval’ throwback, it is modern, dynamic and resilient. Despite everything, it is entirely comprehensible.
The New Threat is essential reading if we are to understand our fears rather than succumb to them, to act rationally and effectively, and to address successfully one of the most urgent problems of our time.
290 pages, Hardcover
First published July 2, 2015
21 people are currently reading
517 people want to read
About the author
Jason Burke
32 books42 followersJason Burke (born 1970) is a British journalist and the author of several non-fiction books. A correspondent covering Africa for The Guardian, he is currently based in Johannesburg, having previously been based in New Delhi as the same paper's South Asia correspondent.
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Displaying 1 - 27 of 27 reviews
August 4, 2016
If I had one book to give someone interested in understanding ISIS and the threats we now face from Islamic militancy, it would be this one. Published in August 2015, this book includes material through the summer of that year, but also digests and explains some of the earlier reports coming out of Syria, the Middle East, and South Asia. Burke also addresses the threat of home-grown terrorism that is most real to Western communities and governments.
Burke began reporting on events relating to the change in the Islamic character of the Middle East and South Asia as a journalist in the 1990s and he has refined his understanding of the changes in those regions ever since. His grasp is both deep and wide—he wishes he could have included more about the movement in South and Southeast Asia because, in his conclusions at the end, he believes that could be the next area to source individuals committed to jihad.
Burke reiterates over the course of his narrative that terrorism is meant to force leaders to act quickly, make mistakes, and take action they ordinarily would not do, destabilizing their governments. Terror is meant to make individuals disrupt their daily routines, causing follow-on economic repercussions. And terror is meant to cause the populace to polarize: people to question their relationships, fear their neighbors, challenge their government, and consider violence. One might argue terror has already caused irremediable changes in the fabric of world society. Burke replies that we must become resilient, savvy, and knowledgeable. Terrorism in the Middle East may have already run its course, but the seeds are everywhere.
The book is not long, and those of you already well-schooled in the history of ISIS may not feel you need to reread the beginning, though I found Burke’s finesse added a depth to my own understanding of the region, besides being the tightest, clearest history I’ve yet seen. Burke adds to the work done previously by making cogent comment on others’ conclusions. For years I’d been wondering about the families of suicide bombers, their apparent acquiescence causing me to question my own understanding of family ties. Burke addresses this directly:
Burke takes issue with the notion of ‘lone wolf,’ arguing that the similarities of the public statements of those with wearing this label use many of the same words and concepts, implying an underlying global community that extends far beyond their individual actions. “These men were formed, conditioned and prepared for their ultimate acts over years, if not decades, by an entire culture of extremist activism.”
An interesting outcome of the Arab Spring, Burke notes, is that several relatively Westernized pro-democracy activists turned to Islamic militancy when they were disillusioned during the fifty months from 2011 to 2015 when regimes collapsed, governments failed, and the international community did little to stave off deprivation for citizens facing war or displacement. He speaks of the gangland ethos among converts to Islamic militancy, the ‘jihadi cool,’ and 'jihad meets The Sweeney meets the gangsta.’ There is exploitable weakness there, for both the converts and for the main terror group.
In the final chapter on the future of terror, Burke discusses several completely fascinating long-term surveys or polls done in huge swathes of Islamic territory. The U.S.-based Pew Center published one in 2013 which revealed that support for suicide bombing remains limited, concerns about extremism are high, and levels of support for Al Qaeda remain low, but that perceptions of Western society are are increasingly negative, including views of Christians and Jews. On the Western side, we don't need to go further than our newspapers and TV reports to know that perceptions of Muslims are tanking.
Burke’s final chapter is one readers will not want to miss. In it Burke describes the outcomes of this history of terror—the divisions we see in our societies, the retrenchments in rights, the fear, the polarity—despite the relative lack of physical impact of terror on Western communities. “The real impact of Islamic militancy…is in the Islamic world where the monthly death toll frequently exceeds the total in the West over the past decade.” But the West has had costs: by focusing on terror we did not focus on climate change, the relationships between the West and Arab or Islamic populations have become poisonous, and our own communities have divisions that are destroying us from within. How we deal with the threats we face will define us long into the future.
This book has been shortlisted for the Orwell Prize 2016.
Burke began reporting on events relating to the change in the Islamic character of the Middle East and South Asia as a journalist in the 1990s and he has refined his understanding of the changes in those regions ever since. His grasp is both deep and wide—he wishes he could have included more about the movement in South and Southeast Asia because, in his conclusions at the end, he believes that could be the next area to source individuals committed to jihad.
Burke reiterates over the course of his narrative that terrorism is meant to force leaders to act quickly, make mistakes, and take action they ordinarily would not do, destabilizing their governments. Terror is meant to make individuals disrupt their daily routines, causing follow-on economic repercussions. And terror is meant to cause the populace to polarize: people to question their relationships, fear their neighbors, challenge their government, and consider violence. One might argue terror has already caused irremediable changes in the fabric of world society. Burke replies that we must become resilient, savvy, and knowledgeable. Terrorism in the Middle East may have already run its course, but the seeds are everywhere.
The book is not long, and those of you already well-schooled in the history of ISIS may not feel you need to reread the beginning, though I found Burke’s finesse added a depth to my own understanding of the region, besides being the tightest, clearest history I’ve yet seen. Burke adds to the work done previously by making cogent comment on others’ conclusions. For years I’d been wondering about the families of suicide bombers, their apparent acquiescence causing me to question my own understanding of family ties. Burke addresses this directly:
"Suicide bombing is neither a cheap weapon, as often said, nor the spontaneous, organic expression of the inchoate rage of a people. It is a tactic, adopted for specific strategic reasons by terrorists, and which involves the commitment of significant resources if it is going to be successful. The extremist organizations that pioneered the use of the tactic—such as Hamas, Hezbollah and the Sri Lankan Tamil Tigers—rapidly learned that few communities naturally accept the voluntary death of their teenagers. The individual who becomes a human bomb may cost an organization less than a missile but any militant hoping to reply suicide attackers needs to invest heavily and systematically in propaganda designed to build and then maintain a ‘cult of the martyr’ if they are avoid a backlash from relatives, friends and their wider circle. It is not natural for a mother or a father to celebrate the death of a child, and the idea that young men, or increasingly women, should kill themselves in order to kill others, often civilians, has to be normalized…in practical terms, meanwhile, the families of ‘martyrs’ need to be looked after; funerals organized and paid for, valedictory films produced and broadcast; a dedicated infrastructure to find, isolate and condition ‘martyrs’ set up and run. This effort must be constant and places a considerable strain on a groups’ resources. Many Islamic extremist organizations, including IS, make disproportionate use of foreign volunteers as suicide attackers. One reason may well be to make a powerful statement about the extent of their support around the globe. But another may simply be that foreigners are cheaper."Burke briefly traces the history and methods of Al-Qaeda and ISIS, their differences and similarities, and their current state of play, including their affiliates around the world. He then discusses the threat to the West, drawing on the most important conclusions of Western analysts regarding what has been called home-grown terror or “lone wolves.” He first focuses on terror incidents in Britain and Europe, which I found particularly enlightening. With regards to America, Burke focuses most intensely on the Marathon Bombers in Boston.
Burke takes issue with the notion of ‘lone wolf,’ arguing that the similarities of the public statements of those with wearing this label use many of the same words and concepts, implying an underlying global community that extends far beyond their individual actions. “These men were formed, conditioned and prepared for their ultimate acts over years, if not decades, by an entire culture of extremist activism.”
An interesting outcome of the Arab Spring, Burke notes, is that several relatively Westernized pro-democracy activists turned to Islamic militancy when they were disillusioned during the fifty months from 2011 to 2015 when regimes collapsed, governments failed, and the international community did little to stave off deprivation for citizens facing war or displacement. He speaks of the gangland ethos among converts to Islamic militancy, the ‘jihadi cool,’ and 'jihad meets The Sweeney meets the gangsta.’ There is exploitable weakness there, for both the converts and for the main terror group.
In the final chapter on the future of terror, Burke discusses several completely fascinating long-term surveys or polls done in huge swathes of Islamic territory. The U.S.-based Pew Center published one in 2013 which revealed that support for suicide bombing remains limited, concerns about extremism are high, and levels of support for Al Qaeda remain low, but that perceptions of Western society are are increasingly negative, including views of Christians and Jews. On the Western side, we don't need to go further than our newspapers and TV reports to know that perceptions of Muslims are tanking.
Burke’s final chapter is one readers will not want to miss. In it Burke describes the outcomes of this history of terror—the divisions we see in our societies, the retrenchments in rights, the fear, the polarity—despite the relative lack of physical impact of terror on Western communities. “The real impact of Islamic militancy…is in the Islamic world where the monthly death toll frequently exceeds the total in the West over the past decade.” But the West has had costs: by focusing on terror we did not focus on climate change, the relationships between the West and Arab or Islamic populations have become poisonous, and our own communities have divisions that are destroying us from within. How we deal with the threats we face will define us long into the future.
This book has been shortlisted for the Orwell Prize 2016.
April 23, 2016
A current, readable and balanced assessment of Islamic militancy.
The author - with strong journalistic connections and credentials to write this guide - provides a reasoned and well-paced overview of the beliefs, strategies and personalities who have or do run orchestrate groups such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS. There is also history and how in the last 7o years these have evolved, developed and often faded; yet also with an ever present and hardening thread adapting to circumstances and their chosen enemies.
The factions, splits and alliances [loose and formal] are well covered and provide a solid understanding of the approaches and interpretations to Islam, and the reach these groups have (not just physically in territory) but also what connects them to each other. Here it is people: those within close reach in local communities but also wider, particularly those in the West and how this has led to recruitment and attacks of varying degrees and success, including Lone Wolves. Mr Burke's arguing of these as being less singleton than suggested or reported (merely by the lone wolf's interaction with others physically and or on-line) is both convincing and simply sensible.
The text covers in date wise to mid-2015 - so with Charlie Hebdou but not of course the Paris and Brussels attacks or recent events in Africa or Yemen for example.
The book is not graphic, although it describes the atrocities committed in some cases, but ably leaves the reader in no doubt of the successes - if one views this from the militant viewpoint - as well as failures and challenges; the latter for both the militants and those that oppose them.
There are no conspiracy theories and neither is there a view that all Muslims are bad. In fact Mr Burke argues the key battleground is the grey area between the extremes: the militants trying to remove this and make it a simple Islam Caliphate versus unbeliever war or those (Muslim or not) who believe in the grey of "tolerance, diversity, understanding , discussion and debate" .
A solid, accessible and thought-provoking book.
The author - with strong journalistic connections and credentials to write this guide - provides a reasoned and well-paced overview of the beliefs, strategies and personalities who have or do run orchestrate groups such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS. There is also history and how in the last 7o years these have evolved, developed and often faded; yet also with an ever present and hardening thread adapting to circumstances and their chosen enemies.
The factions, splits and alliances [loose and formal] are well covered and provide a solid understanding of the approaches and interpretations to Islam, and the reach these groups have (not just physically in territory) but also what connects them to each other. Here it is people: those within close reach in local communities but also wider, particularly those in the West and how this has led to recruitment and attacks of varying degrees and success, including Lone Wolves. Mr Burke's arguing of these as being less singleton than suggested or reported (merely by the lone wolf's interaction with others physically and or on-line) is both convincing and simply sensible.
The text covers in date wise to mid-2015 - so with Charlie Hebdou but not of course the Paris and Brussels attacks or recent events in Africa or Yemen for example.
The book is not graphic, although it describes the atrocities committed in some cases, but ably leaves the reader in no doubt of the successes - if one views this from the militant viewpoint - as well as failures and challenges; the latter for both the militants and those that oppose them.
There are no conspiracy theories and neither is there a view that all Muslims are bad. In fact Mr Burke argues the key battleground is the grey area between the extremes: the militants trying to remove this and make it a simple Islam Caliphate versus unbeliever war or those (Muslim or not) who believe in the grey of "tolerance, diversity, understanding , discussion and debate" .
A solid, accessible and thought-provoking book.
April 17, 2016
The best part about this book is its lucid analysis of Islamic militancy, especially the emerging phenomena of lone wolf terrorism. The author, unlike many others in this field and despite his extensive knowlede of the Arab world has desisted from using too much factual data and instead relied on crisp and concise explanation of facts.
June 16, 2016
If you really want to understand more about our contemporary problems with the Islamic terrorism this is definitely a book that you should read. The author has a huge experience as a journalist in most of the war zones. This experience and a complete knowledge of history puts a light into all the struggles and conflicts of the tribals communities in all those war zones. It also explores the increasing passion of more and more young men for violence, war ideals and of being a part of a community based on atrocities and a hunger for blood.
It's not an optimistic book but it will make everything a little bit more clear.
It's not an optimistic book but it will make everything a little bit more clear.
January 8, 2022
I struggled with my thoughts about this book. I certainly found it interesting and I am generally a fan of Jason Burke's writing, especially his writing on Southern Africa. The New Threat (now 7 years old, but still relevant) is very good at answering the question "what." It is less clear however on the "why." Would I recommend this book? Yes. Perhaps one day I'll have the pleasure of a discussion with the author.
November 19, 2018
In The New Threat from Islamic Militancy analyseert oorlogscorrespondent Jason Burke de opmars van de militante islam. In hoeverre klopt het beeld van een bloedige en onstuitbare opmars van groeperingen als Al Qaida, Boko Haram en Islamitische Staat dat ons vrijwel dagelijks door de klassieke en nieuwe media wordt voorgeschoteld? Moet het Westen zich zorgen maken en zo ja, in welke mate rechtvaardigt de dreiging van de militante islam de vele miljarden die wereldwijd aan de bestrijding van het terrorisme worden gespendeerd. Naast deze vragen, kaart de auteur het belangrijkere probleem aan of de angst voor door de islam geïnspireerde terreur de steeds verdergaande inperking van democratische burgerrechten heiligt. Burke plaatst vele belangwekkende en overtuigende kanttekeningen.
Perfect Storm
De wortels van de extremistische (niet per se terroristische) islam worden door Burke helder uit de doeken gedaan. Vanaf de jaren zestig komt een aantal ontwrichtende ontwikkelingen in de islamitische wereld tezamen. Onder invloed van factoren als de bevolkingsexplosie na de Tweede Wereldoorlog, de sociaal-culturele ontheemding van grote groepen ten gevolge van de snelle verstedelijking, een structurele hoge werkloosheid (met name onder een steeds hoger opgeleide beroepsbevolking) en een snel groeiende kloof tussen arm en rijk, ontstaat er een vruchtbare voedingsbodem voor een diep gevoeld ressentiment. Voeg aan deze rampzalige mix nog de zwalkende houding van regeringsleiders tussen een weinig cultuur-eigen en geforceerd nationalisme, socialisme of kapitalisme en alle ingrediënten voor een perfect storm zijn aanwezig.
Radicale islam
De specifieke wending die bovengenoemde ontwikkeling in het Midden-Oosten nam, werd in de jaren vijftig en zestig gevoed door een islamitisch reveil verwoord in het ideeëngoed van Egyptische ideologen als Sayyed Qutb en Abdel Salem Faraj. Zij benadrukten dat de islam zich in een staat van jahiliyya (chaotische onwetendheid van voor de komst van Mohammed) bevond en pas haar goddelijke taak kon vervullen als het zich zou bevrijden van vreemde smetten. Voor deze zuivering was geen diepgaande kennis van de Koran vereist. Qutb en Faraj bepleitten een activistische islam waarbij het handelen vooral gebaseerd (en gelegitimeerd) werd op een gemythologiseerd beeld van de eerste geloofgemeenschap ten tijde van de Profeet en waarbinnen geen plaats meer was voor de eindeloze haarkloverijen van de schriftgeleerden. Qutb wordt in 1966 opgehangen, Faraj organiseert de moord op Sadat in 1981.
Omstreeks deze tijd wordt de verspreiding van het wahabisme, een ultraconservatieve een ultraconservatieve stroming binnen de islam, grootscheeps ter hand genomen door Saoedie-Arabië. Daar zag men zich bedreigd door de opkomst van het sjiitische Iran, de inval van de Sovjets in Afghanistan en een gewelddadige aanval op de Grote Moskee van Mekka. Niet alleen in de traditionele islamitische landen, maar wereldwijd worden miljarden oliedollars gestoken in het bouwen van moskeeën en het propageren van de fundamentalistische wahabistische, pro-Saoedische geloofsboodschap. Het is dit samengaan van de revolutionaire activistische islam van Qutb met het buitensporig onverdraagzame wahabisme dat de huidige escalatie welhaast onvermijdelijk maakt. Maar de cocktail wordt nog explosiever.
Mythen en geopolitiek
Nadat IS voorman Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi in de zomer van 2014 het Kalifaat uitriep, ging een door militante soennieten lang gekoesterde droom in vervulling. Eindelijk was een koppeling van een religieus ideaal met een territorium tot stand gebracht. Vanuit deze basis zouden de ware moslims de afvalligen (sjiieten) en de ongelovigen (niet-moslims) bestrijden tot en met de grote eindstrijd waarna de islam zou zegevieren. Deze apocalyptische (en zeker niet specifiek islamitische) mythe wordt breed uitgemeten in de IS-propaganda.
Het is bepaald niet de eerste mythe waar militante moslims de rechtvaardiging voor hun handelen aan ontlenen. Na het Sovjet-debacle in Afghanistan waren de mujahedinstrijders ervan overtuigd geraakt dat hun volstrekt marginale - en vaak contraproductieve - bijdrage aan het conflict, doorslaggevend was geweest. Met Allahs hulp enzovoorts. Ook de door Qutb aangehaalde en op zich spectaculaire islamitische veroveringen onder Mohammed en zijn opvolgers hebben in het denken van de militante islam een buitenproportionele en ahistorische status gekregen. De jonge islam kon zich in de zevende en achtste eeuw zo snel ontwikkelen omdat er in het Midden-Oosten een machtsvacuüm tussen het Oost-Romeins en Perzische rijk was ontstaan. Toeval dus, geen goddelijke interventie.
De opkomst van de militante islam is ook in het heden in niet geringe mate het gevolg van de geopolitieke verhoudingen zoals die zich sinds de vestiging van de theocratie in Teheran hebben ontwikkeld. Dicht aan de oppervlakte van het geweld in het gebied tussen Syrië, Turkije, Irak en Iran ligt de eeuwenoude vete tussen soennieten en sjiieten. Onverstandige westerse interventies en langdurig en kwaadaardig geblunder van de door sjiieten beheerste post-Saddam regeringen in Irak, hebben de bewoners van de nu door IS gecontroleerde gebieden lam geslagen. De haat jegens en angst voor Bagdad is groter dan die voor de militante islam. Toch zal het succes van IS afhangen of zij in staat is de Syrische en Irakese soennieten in hun Kalifaat te kunnen voorzien van enige rust, orde en comfort. Als er geen elektriciteit geleverd kan worden of het straatvuil niet wordt opgehaald, zal ook het Kalifaat tot mislukken gedoemd zijn.
Geen Lone Wolves
Moeten wij, in het democratische Westen bang zijn voor de militante islam? Burke onderscheidt verschillende bronnen van waaruit terreur verwacht kan worden. Ten eerste is daar Al Qaida dat zijn leidende positie binnen de terreurnetwerken inmiddels aan IS lijkt te hebben verloren. Desondanks vormt Al Qaida nog steeds een reëel gevaar. De groepen die zich met Al Qaida afficheren hebben traditioneel hun vizier op de 'verre vijand', met name Amerika en Europa, gericht. Zij zullen altijd in staat blijven bloedige aanslagen te plegen. IS leek zich meer te richten op de 'nabije vijand', hetgeen strookt met het belang dat zij hecht aan de lokaal geopolitieke constructie die het Kalifaat is.
De andere bron van dreiging wordt volgens Burke gevormd door meestal jonge, mannelijke moslims, opgegroeid en geradicaliseerd in de westerse landen. Onder hen bevinden zich naar de stellige overtuiging van de auteur geen zogenaamde Lone Wolves. Deze dreiging is op zich reëel en relatief nabij. Burke stelt onomwonden dat de wahabitische infrastructuur, sinds de jaren tachtig zo voortvarend door de Saoediërs in het Westen opgebouwd, een constante bron van radicalisering in zich bergt. Hoewel men inmiddels ook in Riyad met afgrijzen beziet welk monster zij in IS hebben gecreëerd, is het maar zeer de vraag of daar op korte termijn verandering gaat komen.
De sleutelvraag is natuurlijk of de angst en de dreiging van aanslagen zoals we die de afgelopen jaren in de VS en Europa hebben zien langskomen, de inperking van verworven democratische rechten billijkt. Burke constateert, niet als eerste, dat er veel te veel politieke wol wordt gesponnen om de angst onder het electoraat in stand te houden. De schade die dat onze samenleving kan berokkenen is vele malen groter dan welke terroristische aanslag zou kunnen bewerkstelligen.
Perfect Storm
De wortels van de extremistische (niet per se terroristische) islam worden door Burke helder uit de doeken gedaan. Vanaf de jaren zestig komt een aantal ontwrichtende ontwikkelingen in de islamitische wereld tezamen. Onder invloed van factoren als de bevolkingsexplosie na de Tweede Wereldoorlog, de sociaal-culturele ontheemding van grote groepen ten gevolge van de snelle verstedelijking, een structurele hoge werkloosheid (met name onder een steeds hoger opgeleide beroepsbevolking) en een snel groeiende kloof tussen arm en rijk, ontstaat er een vruchtbare voedingsbodem voor een diep gevoeld ressentiment. Voeg aan deze rampzalige mix nog de zwalkende houding van regeringsleiders tussen een weinig cultuur-eigen en geforceerd nationalisme, socialisme of kapitalisme en alle ingrediënten voor een perfect storm zijn aanwezig.
Radicale islam
De specifieke wending die bovengenoemde ontwikkeling in het Midden-Oosten nam, werd in de jaren vijftig en zestig gevoed door een islamitisch reveil verwoord in het ideeëngoed van Egyptische ideologen als Sayyed Qutb en Abdel Salem Faraj. Zij benadrukten dat de islam zich in een staat van jahiliyya (chaotische onwetendheid van voor de komst van Mohammed) bevond en pas haar goddelijke taak kon vervullen als het zich zou bevrijden van vreemde smetten. Voor deze zuivering was geen diepgaande kennis van de Koran vereist. Qutb en Faraj bepleitten een activistische islam waarbij het handelen vooral gebaseerd (en gelegitimeerd) werd op een gemythologiseerd beeld van de eerste geloofgemeenschap ten tijde van de Profeet en waarbinnen geen plaats meer was voor de eindeloze haarkloverijen van de schriftgeleerden. Qutb wordt in 1966 opgehangen, Faraj organiseert de moord op Sadat in 1981.
Omstreeks deze tijd wordt de verspreiding van het wahabisme, een ultraconservatieve een ultraconservatieve stroming binnen de islam, grootscheeps ter hand genomen door Saoedie-Arabië. Daar zag men zich bedreigd door de opkomst van het sjiitische Iran, de inval van de Sovjets in Afghanistan en een gewelddadige aanval op de Grote Moskee van Mekka. Niet alleen in de traditionele islamitische landen, maar wereldwijd worden miljarden oliedollars gestoken in het bouwen van moskeeën en het propageren van de fundamentalistische wahabistische, pro-Saoedische geloofsboodschap. Het is dit samengaan van de revolutionaire activistische islam van Qutb met het buitensporig onverdraagzame wahabisme dat de huidige escalatie welhaast onvermijdelijk maakt. Maar de cocktail wordt nog explosiever.
Mythen en geopolitiek
Nadat IS voorman Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi in de zomer van 2014 het Kalifaat uitriep, ging een door militante soennieten lang gekoesterde droom in vervulling. Eindelijk was een koppeling van een religieus ideaal met een territorium tot stand gebracht. Vanuit deze basis zouden de ware moslims de afvalligen (sjiieten) en de ongelovigen (niet-moslims) bestrijden tot en met de grote eindstrijd waarna de islam zou zegevieren. Deze apocalyptische (en zeker niet specifiek islamitische) mythe wordt breed uitgemeten in de IS-propaganda.
Het is bepaald niet de eerste mythe waar militante moslims de rechtvaardiging voor hun handelen aan ontlenen. Na het Sovjet-debacle in Afghanistan waren de mujahedinstrijders ervan overtuigd geraakt dat hun volstrekt marginale - en vaak contraproductieve - bijdrage aan het conflict, doorslaggevend was geweest. Met Allahs hulp enzovoorts. Ook de door Qutb aangehaalde en op zich spectaculaire islamitische veroveringen onder Mohammed en zijn opvolgers hebben in het denken van de militante islam een buitenproportionele en ahistorische status gekregen. De jonge islam kon zich in de zevende en achtste eeuw zo snel ontwikkelen omdat er in het Midden-Oosten een machtsvacuüm tussen het Oost-Romeins en Perzische rijk was ontstaan. Toeval dus, geen goddelijke interventie.
De opkomst van de militante islam is ook in het heden in niet geringe mate het gevolg van de geopolitieke verhoudingen zoals die zich sinds de vestiging van de theocratie in Teheran hebben ontwikkeld. Dicht aan de oppervlakte van het geweld in het gebied tussen Syrië, Turkije, Irak en Iran ligt de eeuwenoude vete tussen soennieten en sjiieten. Onverstandige westerse interventies en langdurig en kwaadaardig geblunder van de door sjiieten beheerste post-Saddam regeringen in Irak, hebben de bewoners van de nu door IS gecontroleerde gebieden lam geslagen. De haat jegens en angst voor Bagdad is groter dan die voor de militante islam. Toch zal het succes van IS afhangen of zij in staat is de Syrische en Irakese soennieten in hun Kalifaat te kunnen voorzien van enige rust, orde en comfort. Als er geen elektriciteit geleverd kan worden of het straatvuil niet wordt opgehaald, zal ook het Kalifaat tot mislukken gedoemd zijn.
Geen Lone Wolves
Moeten wij, in het democratische Westen bang zijn voor de militante islam? Burke onderscheidt verschillende bronnen van waaruit terreur verwacht kan worden. Ten eerste is daar Al Qaida dat zijn leidende positie binnen de terreurnetwerken inmiddels aan IS lijkt te hebben verloren. Desondanks vormt Al Qaida nog steeds een reëel gevaar. De groepen die zich met Al Qaida afficheren hebben traditioneel hun vizier op de 'verre vijand', met name Amerika en Europa, gericht. Zij zullen altijd in staat blijven bloedige aanslagen te plegen. IS leek zich meer te richten op de 'nabije vijand', hetgeen strookt met het belang dat zij hecht aan de lokaal geopolitieke constructie die het Kalifaat is.
De andere bron van dreiging wordt volgens Burke gevormd door meestal jonge, mannelijke moslims, opgegroeid en geradicaliseerd in de westerse landen. Onder hen bevinden zich naar de stellige overtuiging van de auteur geen zogenaamde Lone Wolves. Deze dreiging is op zich reëel en relatief nabij. Burke stelt onomwonden dat de wahabitische infrastructuur, sinds de jaren tachtig zo voortvarend door de Saoediërs in het Westen opgebouwd, een constante bron van radicalisering in zich bergt. Hoewel men inmiddels ook in Riyad met afgrijzen beziet welk monster zij in IS hebben gecreëerd, is het maar zeer de vraag of daar op korte termijn verandering gaat komen.
De sleutelvraag is natuurlijk of de angst en de dreiging van aanslagen zoals we die de afgelopen jaren in de VS en Europa hebben zien langskomen, de inperking van verworven democratische rechten billijkt. Burke constateert, niet als eerste, dat er veel te veel politieke wol wordt gesponnen om de angst onder het electoraat in stand te houden. De schade die dat onze samenleving kan berokkenen is vele malen groter dan welke terroristische aanslag zou kunnen bewerkstelligen.
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January 5, 2016Forgive the cliché: This book is essential reading. No hyperbole required.
The New Threat—“new” in the sense that the danger posed by violent Islamism is evolving—deserves the careful attention of anyone appreciating the urgency of the West recalibrating its response to that danger. The U.S.-led Global War on Terrorism, which Jason Burke aptly characterizes as “monumentally misconceived,” has definitively failed. Indeed, in anything, it has made matters worse. Even so, more than a decade after it began, that ill-fated enterprise sputters along with no likelihood of victory anywhere in sight.
So perhaps it’s time to try a different approach. Yet doing so requires first accurately gauging the problem. This Burke, a veteran journalist who over the past 20 years has reported from virtually every corner of the Islamic world, does with impressive thoroughness and clinical dispassion. That the terrorist attack suffered by Parisians in November-—further compounded by the incident in San Bernardino—elicited a response verging on hysteria may be understandable. But anyone preferring sober calculation to emotion as the basis for policy will find here much of great value.
http://www.theamericanconservative.co...
The New Threat—“new” in the sense that the danger posed by violent Islamism is evolving—deserves the careful attention of anyone appreciating the urgency of the West recalibrating its response to that danger. The U.S.-led Global War on Terrorism, which Jason Burke aptly characterizes as “monumentally misconceived,” has definitively failed. Indeed, in anything, it has made matters worse. Even so, more than a decade after it began, that ill-fated enterprise sputters along with no likelihood of victory anywhere in sight.
So perhaps it’s time to try a different approach. Yet doing so requires first accurately gauging the problem. This Burke, a veteran journalist who over the past 20 years has reported from virtually every corner of the Islamic world, does with impressive thoroughness and clinical dispassion. That the terrorist attack suffered by Parisians in November-—further compounded by the incident in San Bernardino—elicited a response verging on hysteria may be understandable. But anyone preferring sober calculation to emotion as the basis for policy will find here much of great value.
http://www.theamericanconservative.co...
August 6, 2017
Not exhaustive on the spread of ISIS as I expected. He focused more on the compilations of extremist attacks by ISIS, like an extended chronology, rather than the cause. His previous one '9/11 Wars' was much better.
October 4, 2017
In "The New Threat," Burke offers an incisive -- if a bit social science-y -- analysis of contemporary Islamic militancy. The soft and imprecise social science methodology -- based on interviews, anecdotes, and an extensive background knowledge of Islamic extremism -- is forgivable though, because quantitatively evaluating the evolving threats from Islamic militancy is difficult, if not impossible.
What Burke does, he does well. He fairly judges the West's reactions to the threat of violent Islamism, noting that many of our reactions to it -- even down to our seeming inability to even define what "terrorism" is -- is unhelpful and even counterproductive to managing the issue. Of particular importance is Burke's lengthy examination of the "lone wolf" phenomenon, which he rightly points out is a poor label for the reality of the situation. In fact, he notes, "lone wolves" are socialized to be disposed to Islamic militancy through family members, friends in petty crime, associations forged in prisons, jihadi hip-hop, and an entire internet-based subculture that, while perhaps not explicitly calling for violent attacks against unbelievers, certainly cultivates a culture in which the step to cold-blooded murder is not unlikely. "Lone wolves" these killers are not.
I would've liked to have seen more discussion of the critical "Gray Zone," which Burke argues in his closing few paragraphs is the area for thoughtful consideration and discussion that extremists (not just Islamic extremists, I would argue) are trying to eradicate through their violence, to push people to one side or the other, to polarize. I feel that the war for the "Gray Zone" is worthy of at least a chapter or two, but Burke introduces it only at the very close of this book. Even so, it leaves readers with a critical concept to ponder: am I part of our polarization problem, or am I rooted in the "Gray Zone"?
What Burke does, he does well. He fairly judges the West's reactions to the threat of violent Islamism, noting that many of our reactions to it -- even down to our seeming inability to even define what "terrorism" is -- is unhelpful and even counterproductive to managing the issue. Of particular importance is Burke's lengthy examination of the "lone wolf" phenomenon, which he rightly points out is a poor label for the reality of the situation. In fact, he notes, "lone wolves" are socialized to be disposed to Islamic militancy through family members, friends in petty crime, associations forged in prisons, jihadi hip-hop, and an entire internet-based subculture that, while perhaps not explicitly calling for violent attacks against unbelievers, certainly cultivates a culture in which the step to cold-blooded murder is not unlikely. "Lone wolves" these killers are not.
I would've liked to have seen more discussion of the critical "Gray Zone," which Burke argues in his closing few paragraphs is the area for thoughtful consideration and discussion that extremists (not just Islamic extremists, I would argue) are trying to eradicate through their violence, to push people to one side or the other, to polarize. I feel that the war for the "Gray Zone" is worthy of at least a chapter or two, but Burke introduces it only at the very close of this book. Even so, it leaves readers with a critical concept to ponder: am I part of our polarization problem, or am I rooted in the "Gray Zone"?
March 3, 2020
This is the third book I have read in the last year dealing with Islamic Militancy and Al-Qaeda, and it struck me as the best. You can tell that the author has journeyed all over the Middle East, North Africa, and Europe to talk with those affected by or involved with Islamic Militancy. The result is the most lucid account of Al-Qaeda, ISIS, and the attacks that plagued the western world in the middle of the 2010s by individuals and groups with varying degrees of relationships to those two groups. I especially appreciated the acknowledgement towards the end of the work that while these attacks demanded attention and a response, we may well look back on this "War on Terror" era and regret the fact that the conflict distracted us from issues like climate change. As a warning, the book necessarily depicts some very graphic violence.
February 17, 2017
Good analysis framework, thorough reasearch and providing a relevant historic prespective. Easy to read.
July 3, 2019
You can gather from this book that the author has been on quite a brave journey as a journalist to complete this work, allowing for great insight into the roots of an evil scourge and a predicament for civilians in many nations.
This book gives a person the necessary insight and awareness to understand current events and situations we can find ourselves in due to illegal activity within the world of radical Islamic thought. The book is a good guide for careful rational thinking to overcome our potential vulnerabilities from overseas activity and illegal activity here at home from these proscribed militant organisations and the lone wolves who commit acts of terror against innocent civilians after being radicalised.
After reading this material, it is easier to identify the types of behaviours that are dangerous and weariness is improved for the purpose of dealing with suspicious activity.
This book gives a person the necessary insight and awareness to understand current events and situations we can find ourselves in due to illegal activity within the world of radical Islamic thought. The book is a good guide for careful rational thinking to overcome our potential vulnerabilities from overseas activity and illegal activity here at home from these proscribed militant organisations and the lone wolves who commit acts of terror against innocent civilians after being radicalised.
After reading this material, it is easier to identify the types of behaviours that are dangerous and weariness is improved for the purpose of dealing with suspicious activity.
November 6, 2015
Read this on the basis of some of reading some of Burke's journalism, and knowing a bit of his reputation as a commentator on the subject. Whilst it was never less than clear or insightful I felt just the tiniest bit underwhelmed.
He is excellent on some things, like the differences between IS and Al Qaeda and on the essential modernity of militant Islam. But just occasionally it would be good to get a bit more detail (for example he refers to earlier attempts to establish an Islamic state - a few examples and some analysis would have been great. Also the focus on the threat Islamic militants are to the West seems just a little in appropriate given the terrible cost it is having in the Islamic world itself.
He is excellent on some things, like the differences between IS and Al Qaeda and on the essential modernity of militant Islam. But just occasionally it would be good to get a bit more detail (for example he refers to earlier attempts to establish an Islamic state - a few examples and some analysis would have been great. Also the focus on the threat Islamic militants are to the West seems just a little in appropriate given the terrible cost it is having in the Islamic world itself.
May 30, 2017
I feel very fortunate to have been to a lot of the places discussed in this book, prior to (or before I understood) the impact of Islamic militancy as we see it now. Ignorance is bliss, I guess.
I love Jason Burke’s neutral writing style, and I enjoyed that this book had no extreme prejudices. It was a balanced, smooth read, and very insightful. Having said that, of course it’s not an easy read by any means – but well worth it for anyone who wants to understand more about what we, as a world, are facing now.
I love Jason Burke’s neutral writing style, and I enjoyed that this book had no extreme prejudices. It was a balanced, smooth read, and very insightful. Having said that, of course it’s not an easy read by any means – but well worth it for anyone who wants to understand more about what we, as a world, are facing now.
July 27, 2016
Everyone should read this book. Amidst the grim, constant news of terrorism it is hard to get context and perspective. We often find ourselves on the one hand overloaded by detail and on the other befuddled by simplistic or shrill commentary and debate.
The New Threat explains the context of militant Islamist movements and the rise of IS. It does an excellent job of it and I recommend it as essential reading for all.
The New Threat explains the context of militant Islamist movements and the rise of IS. It does an excellent job of it and I recommend it as essential reading for all.
November 4, 2015
For all those trying to understand what is happening in the middle east, trying to assess the danger of Islamic Militancy, without the extreme prejudices of extreme right or extreme left, I can recommend this book. Jason burke provides a clear analysis of the things happening right now and gives us a peek at what we can expect in the near future.
February 23, 2016
Quite an informative book on the circumstances that create Islamic militants. It is a well reasoned and rational explanation of different types of Islamic extremism and militancy from Al Qaeda to so called "lone wolf" terrorists. Although what they are doing is terrible and wrong, we need to understand it before we can find any sort of solution. This book is good for that.
February 3, 2017
Another excellently researched and well written appraisal of current and future trends in Islamic Militancy. Should be a must read for Western Politicians.
February 6, 2016
Outstanding read. A real in-depth understanding of the background, current affairs and reasons for continuing problems
December 26, 2015
Well researched study and documentary of events.
December 29, 2015
Essential reading for this day and age..
January 16, 2016
Astonishing book
Loved it
Loved it
March 22, 2016
Sober analysis of a serious threat, not scaremongering. Drawn from both personal experience and academic research. Clear, concise and essential reading.
April 19, 2016
I enjoyed this book but was constantly reminded of just how scary ISIS, AL-Qaeda and radical ISLAM really is and the impact it is having on our world.
November 22, 2016
Some interesting insights. Could have been better reason. Noticed that write liked certain words and kept using them like spectacular.
Want to read
June 7, 2017so far a very good book. very coherent.
June 16, 2018
Solid overview. A bit overhyped though.
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