It certainly cannot be said about this book that its author, Gordon Thomas, isn’t completely taken with the subject at hand. Writing with a schoolboy’s fascination for the murky parallel world of international espionage, Gideon’s Spies is a book full of smoke-filled rooms, institutional treachery, and ruthless men and women operating in cunning ways that would make the most hardened of criminals take pause. He describes a world where no one can be trusted, where deception is revered as an art form, and where your dance partner not only calls the tunes, but also gets to decide when it’s lights out in the ballroom.
While entertaining to read, Gideon’s Spies is by no means the serious work of history that its subtitle (A Secret History of the Mossad) might imply. Throughout, Thomas’ book suffers from the fact that the line between exactitude and exaggeration is never clear. Some of the adventures he documents, such as the farcical account of how Adolf Eichmann was nabbed off of an Argentinean street, were straightforward and convincing, but many others read like seamless fiction, all the more easily invented decades removed from the actual events. Additionally, there is no shortage of conspiracy theories in the book, from Mossad’s potential involvement in the death of Princess Diana and Dodi Al-Fayed in 1997 to a rogue CIA team’s supposed involvement in the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988. In both cases, and others, Thomas provides scant evidence that the theories are anything more than the product of vivid imagination. But poor sourcing and unchecked speculation is only part of the frustration that flows from this book.
The numerous stories of both intelligence failures and successes were sometimes difficult to follow, with Thomas preferring to use a continuous series of chronologically chaotic asides to deliver historical context to his readers. While the book does give a good accounting of the scope and range of nearly half a century of Israeli intelligence operations, it glaringly fails to convey the critical connection between the Mossad’s intelligence efforts and Israel’s national security. Instead it is a tale of exploits and mishaps that often appear only marginally related to national security interests and sometimes even counterproductive to Israel’s democratic values. If taken at face value, the extent to which disinformation is used to further political goals is troubling and bodes ill for the idea that a free and independent media can serve as a useful check on state power, whether in Jerusalem, London, or Washington.
The story of media baron and apparent Mossad informer Robert Maxwell provides the most startling example. Despite there being little direct evidence, Thomas weaves a fascinating tale of a media empire financed by fraudulent business practices and wealthy Israeli investors motivated by equal parts profit and patriotism. When Mordechai Vanunu, a Moroccan Jew that had worked in Israel’s nuclear facilities at Dimona from 1977 to 1986, emigrates from Israel and decides to tell the world about its nuclear activities, it is Maxwell that first informs Tel Aviv and then promptly runs a front page article seeking to discredit Vanunu in his London Daily Mirror when it becomes clear that Vanunu had sold his story to a rival London newspaper. Eventually, however, Maxwell and his sordid business dealings would become a public relations liability to Israel, and according to Thomas, it was at that point that Mossad made quick work of him on a Yacht off the coast of the Canary Islands, making his death appear to be a suicide.
In another story of the expendability of the individual for the greater organizational good, Thomas writes about the case of Ismail Sowan, a Palestinian first recruited by the Mossad as a teenager in the West Bank because of his unusually sympathetic views towards Israel. It was Sowan’s desire to go to college that led him to agree to accept Mossad’s offer, but it was the idealistic notion that he would be furthering peace efforts between the two peoples that really excited him. After first working as a diplomatic courier in Europe, Sowan was told to go to Lebanon and join the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). His successful infiltration of the group and eventual assignment at its London headquarters provided Tel Aviv with a valuable source of reportage about the PLO’s illicit activities to promote terror around the world. But when a series of counterfeit blank British passports destined for the Israeli embassy turned up in a phone booth and the murder of a prominent Palestinian political cartoonist went awry, Israel needed a way to shore up its relationship with London. Implicating Sowan in the murder and then leading British authorities to his supposed stash of arms and explosives worked to perfection. Despite Sowan’s protestations that he was working with the very organization that had set him up and handed him over to UK authorities, he was sentenced to 18 years in prison.
The most troubling aspect of Gideon’s Spies, however, may be Thomas’ account of numerous so-called sayanim, or “volunteer Jewish helpers” in locales around the world. Some of them, he notes, do no more than buy local clothing to be sent to Israel so that Mossad agents will have authentic clothing when working under deep cover. In other instances, however, he notes that some of these volunteers are connected to the U.S. media and instructed to plant stories with false information. His claim that the sayanim represent “the historical cohesiveness of the world Jewish community” and that “regardless of allegiance to his or her country… [these volunteers] recognize a greater loyalty: the mystical one to Israel” (pg. 54), is a reckless one. Such a characterization perpetuates the anti-Semitic myth of Jewish dual-loyalty. Individuals of any nationality may feel strong ties to childhood, ancestral, or cultural homelands, but to suggest that members of the Jewish diaspora play such a prominent role in Israeli intelligence gathering activities risks inciting paranoia and giving credence to a harmful canard.
The value of this book lies in its ability to convey the potential for abuse when public policy is crafted without regard to the role of the public. While the scope for debate on individual actions is necessarily limited, the goals and macro-strategies of intelligence gathering must be the product of robust democratic dialogue and its implementation should never be completely obscured from the public view. Intelligence organizations should never do the bidding of individual politicians, nor should they operate without impunity when laws are broken. Doing so risks creating an extralegal arm of state power and calls into question the very basis of democratic governance. It also provides a poignant reminder that in an open society privacy is the exception to the rule and not the other way around.
© Jeffrey L. Otto, Sept. 28, 2009