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Russia's Gamble: The Domestic Origins of Russia's Attack on Ukraine
In February 2022, Russia launched a full-scale military assault on Ukraine, aimed at re-establishing Russian control over the Ukrainian state, economy and society, similar in many ways to the Soviet period. This goal, however, was not achieved, and most likely will not be achieved in the future. Rather, the Russian “special military operation” has resulted in extraordinary disasters and losses for Russia, for Ukraine, and for the entire world.
This book examines the origins of the Russian assault on Ukraine and offers an explanation of why it has not achieved its aims. Why did Russian elites and leaders propose, prepare for and implement the assault on Ukraine in such a poorly prepared and heavily destructive way? In seeking to answer these questions, Gel’man focuses on Russia’s domestic agenda and its dynamics after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The personalist nature of the Russian authoritarian political regime, its vulnerability to bad governance, major misperceptions by the Russian elites and leadership, and reliance of the Kremlin upon previous experience of Russian impunity were all key factors that led to Russia’s fateful decision to attack Ukraine and have continued to shape Russia’s mistake-ridden conduct of the war since then. Gel’man also considers what lessons can be learned from Russia’s military assault for understanding the global agenda and for the study of domestic and international politics in the twenty-first century.
This book, written by a leading expert on Russian politics, will be of great value to students and scholars in politics and to anyone interested in Russia and in the causes and consequences of the war against Ukraine.
This book examines the origins of the Russian assault on Ukraine and offers an explanation of why it has not achieved its aims. Why did Russian elites and leaders propose, prepare for and implement the assault on Ukraine in such a poorly prepared and heavily destructive way? In seeking to answer these questions, Gel’man focuses on Russia’s domestic agenda and its dynamics after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The personalist nature of the Russian authoritarian political regime, its vulnerability to bad governance, major misperceptions by the Russian elites and leadership, and reliance of the Kremlin upon previous experience of Russian impunity were all key factors that led to Russia’s fateful decision to attack Ukraine and have continued to shape Russia’s mistake-ridden conduct of the war since then. Gel’man also considers what lessons can be learned from Russia’s military assault for understanding the global agenda and for the study of domestic and international politics in the twenty-first century.
This book, written by a leading expert on Russian politics, will be of great value to students and scholars in politics and to anyone interested in Russia and in the causes and consequences of the war against Ukraine.
175 pages, Kindle Edition
First published June 16, 2025
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About the author
Vladimir Gel'man
20 books8 followersDistinguished Professor, Political Sciences and Sociology; Aleksanteri Institute at the Finnish Centre for Russian and Eastern European Studies
European University at St. Petersburg; University of Helsinki
European University at St. Petersburg; University of Helsinki
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Displaying 1 of 1 review
November 4, 2025
(The English review is placed beneath the Russian one)
Во-первых, автор правильно отмечает, что неуспех блицкрига уже превратил всю эту путинскую затею с захватом Украины в одну большую ошибку. Как мне кажется, уже в первые недели (максимум, в первый месяц), когда стал очевиден провал быстрого завоевания Украины, нужно было заканчивать всю эту авантюру и договариваться, представив всё это как некое «недоразумение». Чем дольше идёт этот военный конфликт, тем сильнее обе стороны проигрывают. С моей точки зрения, сегодня ни одна из сторон, какого бы она итога не достигла, не может считаться победительницей. Поэтому желание Путина додавить Украину видится мне, как правильно замечает автор, поведением игрока в казино, который уже проиграл кучу денег, но по психологически причинам не может остановиться.
Meanwhile, the chances of Russia’s military victory in the war – including but not limited to takeover of major cities and overthrow of the Ukrainian political leadership – have declined over time, and for these reasons the “special military operation” against Ukraine should be considered a major failure.
<…>
In a way, Russia’s approach to pursuing the “special military operation” was quite similar to certain kinds of gambling behavior: instead of accepting the hard reality of modest losses in the game and quitting at a certain point, the addict raises the stakes over and over again, in a cycle that becomes virtually unstoppable.
Во-вторых, интересна, хотя и не нова идея, что российские власти смотрят на мир, в котором правит элита, а не народ, а выборы являются исключительно ширмой, фасадом, фикцией. Всё решает элита, которая работает по тому же принципу что и российская элита. С этой точки зрения они думали договориться с элитой других стран, как это произошло с Виктором Орбаном, однако в реальности западное общество влияет на элиту, так же как элита влияет на общество. Это значит, что если общество западных стран посчитало, что их страны должны встать на сторону Украины, то элита не сможет противодействовать такому решению народа. В России же, даже если большинство населения против каких-то действий руководства страны, российская власть редко когда руководствуется этим. В итоге, неудача завоевания Украины состояла ещё в том, что Кремль не учёл фактор западного общественного мнения, которое в реальности может влиять на тамошних политиков.
First, the Russian ruling class considers the international arena to be the equivalent of a global oligarchy. According to this view, the international order is based upon the dominance of several key stakeholder countries, who act as major veto players and control other countries via various political, economic, and military levers. The international order is stable as long as key stakeholders formally and/or informally agree on their zones of control over other countries and do not breach these agreements.
В третьих, автор считает, что за вторжением в Украину стоит не только один Путин, а вся или большая часть российской элиты, которая на примере расстрела Белого дома Ельциным и удачной военной капании в Чечне увидела, что силовым путём можно решить все или почти все проблемы. Однако лично я считаю, что решение напасть на Украину было личным решением Путина и, возможно, нескольких его самых ближайших сподвижников, т.к. единственная причина по которой он решился на такой шаг было желание продемонстрировать элитам и населению РФ, что он, т.е. Путин, всё ещё остаётся единственный сильным политиком, который «поднимает Россию с колен». Но возможно прав автор.
His destructive ideas about the possibility and desirability of the military assault, in a way, reflected the visions, preferences, and desires of the Russian elites.
<…>
The main lessons were related to the fact that once successful coercion was justified domestically and met little resistance internationally, the extensive use of this instrument became the default option for Russian politics and policy-making, while compromise solutions were pushed off the agenda.
<…>
Russia’s successful revenge, which was able to restore the coercive capacity of the state and achieved the conquest of Chechnya, contributed to the further rise of militarism among elites, both domestically and internationally. This success dramatically changed the Russian elites’ perceptions, as they were persuaded that use of force was the most efficient and powerful instrument of politics.
Ещё одним важным фактором было отсутствие реакции со стороны стран Запада, что послужило появление у российской элиты чувства неуязвимости, вседозволенности. В итоге она почувствовала себя новой советской элитой, которая так же посылала танки в восточную Европу и делала это относительно успешно (по крайне мере в военном плане).
However, with the feeling of impunity, especially after the annexation of Crimea in 2014, which had been proposed by Putin almost unilaterally and greatly endorsed by the Russian elites, the arrangement of preferences in decision-making under conditions of uncertainty shifted toward risk-taking. This shift not only contributed to the expectation that next time everything would be the same and that the Russian invincibility of the past would continue indefinitely into the future.
<…>
Russia’s rulers believed that they would never be punished, either legally or politically.
<…>
Russian leadership could expect that potential Western sanctions due to the “special military operation” in Ukraine would remain largely personal, symbolic, and easy to bypass (as they were after the annexation of Crimea in 2014), and would not harm key sectors of the Russian economy.
<…>
In a way, the Kremlin became a victim of its previous successes, as its impunity was expected to continue virtually forever.
Причин такого поведения элит множество, среди которых желание восстановить прежний престиж страны, который имелся у СССР, отсутствие институтов коллективного принятия ключевых политических решений, что имелось в том же Советском Союзе.
The Soviet one-party regime was highly institutionalized and often too inflexible, while the personalist political regime in present-day Russia suffered from its deinstitutionalization.
<…>
The Soviet decision to invade Czechoslovakia was collectively endorsed by the Politburo, and its implementation was conducted by civilian and military executives in a systematic way. In addition, the Kremlin built coalitions of allies internationally (on the level of the Warsaw Pact) and within the target country (on the level of the pro-Moscow faction in the Presidium).
Однако возможно главной причиной является возвышение силовиков, которые стали доминировать во всех политических сферах, а так же методы их работы были выбраны в качестве основных политических инструментов, к коим можно отнести политические убийства как внутри страны, так и за её пределами, силовое подавление политических акций, политический террор и репрессии оппозиции и, разумеется, военные кампании как главный инструмент внешней политики.
Under the conditions of Putin’s personalized patronage and strengthening of clientelist linkages over time, top siloviki officials became less and less constrained and less and less accountable and tended to turn their respective agencies into personal fiefdoms.
Что касается завершения войны, то автор не считает, что такое возможно пока Путин остаётся президентом России. Как я понял автора, в России нет запроса со стороны элит на серьёзные политические изменения, включая уход Путина, так как это может привести к фатальным для них последствиям, что в свою очередь означает, что война будет идти и дальше, а обе страны – саморазрушаться.
Not only top elites (including, but not limited to siloviki), but also rank-and-file state officials and civil servants are strongly motivated to avoid potential major changes in Russia, which may be unacceptable for them because of the risks of losing wealth, status, or even their freedom if not their lives.
<…>
Russia’s assault on Ukraine may be perceived as a tipping point for long-term developmental failure, which may result in the irreversible decay of the country.
-----
Firstly, the author correctly notes that the failure of the blitzkrieg has already turned Putin's whole plan to seize Ukraine into one big mistake. In my opinion, in the first few weeks (at most, in the first month), when it became clear that the rapid conquest of Ukraine had failed, it was necessary to end this whole adventure and come to an agreement, presenting it all as some kind of “misunderstanding.” The longer this military conflict goes on, the more both sides lose. From my point of view, neither side can be considered the winner today, regardless of the outcome. Therefore, Putin's desire to crush Ukraine seems to me, as the author correctly notes, like the behavior of a casino player who has already lost a lot of money but cannot stop for psychological reasons.
Meanwhile, the chances of Russia’s military victory in the war – including but not limited to takeover of major cities and overthrow of the Ukrainian political leadership – have declined over time, and for these reasons the “special military operation” against Ukraine should be considered a major failure.
<…>
In a way, Russia’s approach to pursuing the “special military operation” was quite similar to certain kinds of gambling behavior: instead of accepting the hard reality of modest losses in the game and quitting at a certain point, the addict raises the stakes over and over again, in a cycle that becomes virtually unstoppable.
Secondly, it is interesting, though not new, that the Russian authorities view the world as being ruled by the elite rather than the people, and that elections are merely a smokescreen, a facade, a fiction. Everything is decided by the elite, which operates on the same principle as the Russian elite. From this point of view, they thought they could come to an agreement with the elite of other countries, as happened with Viktor Orbán, but in reality, Western society influences the elite just as the elite influences society. This means that if Western societies believe that their countries should side with Ukraine, the elite will not be able to oppose such a decision by the people. In Russia, even if the majority of the population is against certain actions taken by the country's leadership, the Russian authorities rarely take this into account. Ultimately, another reason for the failure to conquer Ukraine was that the Kremlin did not take into account the factor of Western public opinion, which, in reality, can influence politicians there.
First, the Russian ruling class considers the international arena to be the equivalent of a global oligarchy. According to this view, the international order is based upon the dominance of several key stakeholder countries, who act as major veto players and control other countries via various political, economic, and military levers. The international order is stable as long as key stakeholders formally and/or informally agree on their zones of control over other countries and do not breach these agreements.
Thirdly, the author believes that Putin is not alone in being responsible for the invasion of Ukraine, but rather the entire Russian elite, or at least a large part of it, which, following Yeltsin's shelling of the White House and the successful military campaign in Chechnya, saw that all or almost all problems could be solved by force. However, I personally believe that the decision to attack Ukraine was Putin's personal decision and, possibly, that of a few of his closest associates, since the only reason he decided to take such a step was to demonstrate to the elites and the population of the Russian Federation that he, i.e. Putin, is still the only strong politician who can “lift Russia from its knees.” But perhaps the author is right.
His destructive ideas about the possibility and desirability of the military assault, in a way, reflected the visions, preferences, and desires of the Russian elites.
<…>
The main lessons were related to the fact that once successful coercion was justified domestically and met little resistance internationally, the extensive use of this instrument became the default option for Russian politics and policy-making, while compromise solutions were pushed off the agenda.
<…>
Russia’s successful revenge, which was able to restore the coercive capacity of the state and achieved the conquest of Chechnya, contributed to the further rise of militarism among elites, both domestically and internationally. This success dramatically changed the Russian elites’ perceptions, as they were persuaded that use of force was the most efficient and powerful instrument of politics.
Another important factor was the lack of response from Western countries, which gave the Russian elite a sense of invulnerability and permissiveness. As a result, it felt like the new Soviet elite, which had also sent tanks to Eastern Europe and done so relatively successfully (at least in military terms).
However, with the feeling of impunity, especially after the annexation of Crimea in 2014, which had been proposed by Putin almost unilaterally and greatly endorsed by the Russian elites, the arrangement of preferences in decision-making under conditions of uncertainty shifted toward risk-taking. This shift not only contributed to the expectation that next time everything would be the same and that the Russian invincibility of the past would continue indefinitely into the future.
<…>
Russia’s rulers believed that they would never be punished, either legally or politically.
<…>
Russian leadership could expect that potential Western sanctions due to the “special military operation” in Ukraine would remain largely personal, symbolic, and easy to bypass (as they were after the annexation of Crimea in 2014), and would not harm key sectors of the Russian economy.
<…>
In a way, the Kremlin became a victim of its previous successes, as its impunity was expected to continue virtually forever.
There are many reasons for this behavior on the part of the elites, including the desire to restore the former prestige of the country that the USSR enjoyed, and the absence of institutions for collective decision-making on key political issues, which existed in the Soviet Union.
The Soviet one-party regime was highly institutionalized and often too inflexible, while the personalist political regime in present-day Russia suffered from its deinstitutionalization.
<…>
The Soviet decision to invade Czechoslovakia was collectively endorsed by the Politburo, and its implementation was conducted by civilian and military executives in a systematic way. In addition, the Kremlin built coalitions of allies internationally (on the level of the Warsaw Pact) and within the target country (on the level of the pro-Moscow faction in the Presidium).
However, perhaps the main reason is the rise of the security forces, which have come to dominate all political spheres, and the methods they use have been chosen as the main political instruments, which include political assassinations both inside and outside the country, the violent suppression of political actions, political terror and repression of the opposition, and, of course, military campaigns as the main instrument of foreign policy.
Under the conditions of Putin’s personalized patronage and strengthening of clientelist linkages over time, top siloviki officials became less and less constrained and less and less accountable and tended to turn their respective agencies into personal fiefdoms.
As for ending the war, the author does not believe this is possible while Putin remains president of Russia. As I understand the author, there is no demand among the Russian elite for serious political change, including Putin's departure, as this could have fatal consequences for them, which in turn means that the war will continue, and both countries will continue to destroy themselves.
Not only top elites (including, but not limited to siloviki), but also rank-and-file state officials and civil servants are strongly motivated to avoid potential major changes in Russia, which may be unacceptable for them because of the risks of losing wealth, status, or even their freedom if not their lives.
<…>
Russia’s assault on Ukraine may be perceived as a tipping point for long-term developmental failure, which may result in the irreversible decay of the country.
Во-первых, автор правильно отмечает, что неуспех блицкрига уже превратил всю эту путинскую затею с захватом Украины в одну большую ошибку. Как мне кажется, уже в первые недели (максимум, в первый месяц), когда стал очевиден провал быстрого завоевания Украины, нужно было заканчивать всю эту авантюру и договариваться, представив всё это как некое «недоразумение». Чем дольше идёт этот военный конфликт, тем сильнее обе стороны проигрывают. С моей точки зрения, сегодня ни одна из сторон, какого бы она итога не достигла, не может считаться победительницей. Поэтому желание Путина додавить Украину видится мне, как правильно замечает автор, поведением игрока в казино, который уже проиграл кучу денег, но по психологически причинам не может остановиться.
Meanwhile, the chances of Russia’s military victory in the war – including but not limited to takeover of major cities and overthrow of the Ukrainian political leadership – have declined over time, and for these reasons the “special military operation” against Ukraine should be considered a major failure.
<…>
In a way, Russia’s approach to pursuing the “special military operation” was quite similar to certain kinds of gambling behavior: instead of accepting the hard reality of modest losses in the game and quitting at a certain point, the addict raises the stakes over and over again, in a cycle that becomes virtually unstoppable.
Во-вторых, интересна, хотя и не нова идея, что российские власти смотрят на мир, в котором правит элита, а не народ, а выборы являются исключительно ширмой, фасадом, фикцией. Всё решает элита, которая работает по тому же принципу что и российская элита. С этой точки зрения они думали договориться с элитой других стран, как это произошло с Виктором Орбаном, однако в реальности западное общество влияет на элиту, так же как элита влияет на общество. Это значит, что если общество западных стран посчитало, что их страны должны встать на сторону Украины, то элита не сможет противодействовать такому решению народа. В России же, даже если большинство населения против каких-то действий руководства страны, российская власть редко когда руководствуется этим. В итоге, неудача завоевания Украины состояла ещё в том, что Кремль не учёл фактор западного общественного мнения, которое в реальности может влиять на тамошних политиков.
First, the Russian ruling class considers the international arena to be the equivalent of a global oligarchy. According to this view, the international order is based upon the dominance of several key stakeholder countries, who act as major veto players and control other countries via various political, economic, and military levers. The international order is stable as long as key stakeholders formally and/or informally agree on their zones of control over other countries and do not breach these agreements.
В третьих, автор считает, что за вторжением в Украину стоит не только один Путин, а вся или большая часть российской элиты, которая на примере расстрела Белого дома Ельциным и удачной военной капании в Чечне увидела, что силовым путём можно решить все или почти все проблемы. Однако лично я считаю, что решение напасть на Украину было личным решением Путина и, возможно, нескольких его самых ближайших сподвижников, т.к. единственная причина по которой он решился на такой шаг было желание продемонстрировать элитам и населению РФ, что он, т.е. Путин, всё ещё остаётся единственный сильным политиком, который «поднимает Россию с колен». Но возможно прав автор.
His destructive ideas about the possibility and desirability of the military assault, in a way, reflected the visions, preferences, and desires of the Russian elites.
<…>
The main lessons were related to the fact that once successful coercion was justified domestically and met little resistance internationally, the extensive use of this instrument became the default option for Russian politics and policy-making, while compromise solutions were pushed off the agenda.
<…>
Russia’s successful revenge, which was able to restore the coercive capacity of the state and achieved the conquest of Chechnya, contributed to the further rise of militarism among elites, both domestically and internationally. This success dramatically changed the Russian elites’ perceptions, as they were persuaded that use of force was the most efficient and powerful instrument of politics.
Ещё одним важным фактором было отсутствие реакции со стороны стран Запада, что послужило появление у российской элиты чувства неуязвимости, вседозволенности. В итоге она почувствовала себя новой советской элитой, которая так же посылала танки в восточную Европу и делала это относительно успешно (по крайне мере в военном плане).
However, with the feeling of impunity, especially after the annexation of Crimea in 2014, which had been proposed by Putin almost unilaterally and greatly endorsed by the Russian elites, the arrangement of preferences in decision-making under conditions of uncertainty shifted toward risk-taking. This shift not only contributed to the expectation that next time everything would be the same and that the Russian invincibility of the past would continue indefinitely into the future.
<…>
Russia’s rulers believed that they would never be punished, either legally or politically.
<…>
Russian leadership could expect that potential Western sanctions due to the “special military operation” in Ukraine would remain largely personal, symbolic, and easy to bypass (as they were after the annexation of Crimea in 2014), and would not harm key sectors of the Russian economy.
<…>
In a way, the Kremlin became a victim of its previous successes, as its impunity was expected to continue virtually forever.
Причин такого поведения элит множество, среди которых желание восстановить прежний престиж страны, который имелся у СССР, отсутствие институтов коллективного принятия ключевых политических решений, что имелось в том же Советском Союзе.
The Soviet one-party regime was highly institutionalized and often too inflexible, while the personalist political regime in present-day Russia suffered from its deinstitutionalization.
<…>
The Soviet decision to invade Czechoslovakia was collectively endorsed by the Politburo, and its implementation was conducted by civilian and military executives in a systematic way. In addition, the Kremlin built coalitions of allies internationally (on the level of the Warsaw Pact) and within the target country (on the level of the pro-Moscow faction in the Presidium).
Однако возможно главной причиной является возвышение силовиков, которые стали доминировать во всех политических сферах, а так же методы их работы были выбраны в качестве основных политических инструментов, к коим можно отнести политические убийства как внутри страны, так и за её пределами, силовое подавление политических акций, политический террор и репрессии оппозиции и, разумеется, военные кампании как главный инструмент внешней политики.
Under the conditions of Putin’s personalized patronage and strengthening of clientelist linkages over time, top siloviki officials became less and less constrained and less and less accountable and tended to turn their respective agencies into personal fiefdoms.
Что касается завершения войны, то автор не считает, что такое возможно пока Путин остаётся президентом России. Как я понял автора, в России нет запроса со стороны элит на серьёзные политические изменения, включая уход Путина, так как это может привести к фатальным для них последствиям, что в свою очередь означает, что война будет идти и дальше, а обе страны – саморазрушаться.
Not only top elites (including, but not limited to siloviki), but also rank-and-file state officials and civil servants are strongly motivated to avoid potential major changes in Russia, which may be unacceptable for them because of the risks of losing wealth, status, or even their freedom if not their lives.
<…>
Russia’s assault on Ukraine may be perceived as a tipping point for long-term developmental failure, which may result in the irreversible decay of the country.
-----
Firstly, the author correctly notes that the failure of the blitzkrieg has already turned Putin's whole plan to seize Ukraine into one big mistake. In my opinion, in the first few weeks (at most, in the first month), when it became clear that the rapid conquest of Ukraine had failed, it was necessary to end this whole adventure and come to an agreement, presenting it all as some kind of “misunderstanding.” The longer this military conflict goes on, the more both sides lose. From my point of view, neither side can be considered the winner today, regardless of the outcome. Therefore, Putin's desire to crush Ukraine seems to me, as the author correctly notes, like the behavior of a casino player who has already lost a lot of money but cannot stop for psychological reasons.
Meanwhile, the chances of Russia’s military victory in the war – including but not limited to takeover of major cities and overthrow of the Ukrainian political leadership – have declined over time, and for these reasons the “special military operation” against Ukraine should be considered a major failure.
<…>
In a way, Russia’s approach to pursuing the “special military operation” was quite similar to certain kinds of gambling behavior: instead of accepting the hard reality of modest losses in the game and quitting at a certain point, the addict raises the stakes over and over again, in a cycle that becomes virtually unstoppable.
Secondly, it is interesting, though not new, that the Russian authorities view the world as being ruled by the elite rather than the people, and that elections are merely a smokescreen, a facade, a fiction. Everything is decided by the elite, which operates on the same principle as the Russian elite. From this point of view, they thought they could come to an agreement with the elite of other countries, as happened with Viktor Orbán, but in reality, Western society influences the elite just as the elite influences society. This means that if Western societies believe that their countries should side with Ukraine, the elite will not be able to oppose such a decision by the people. In Russia, even if the majority of the population is against certain actions taken by the country's leadership, the Russian authorities rarely take this into account. Ultimately, another reason for the failure to conquer Ukraine was that the Kremlin did not take into account the factor of Western public opinion, which, in reality, can influence politicians there.
First, the Russian ruling class considers the international arena to be the equivalent of a global oligarchy. According to this view, the international order is based upon the dominance of several key stakeholder countries, who act as major veto players and control other countries via various political, economic, and military levers. The international order is stable as long as key stakeholders formally and/or informally agree on their zones of control over other countries and do not breach these agreements.
Thirdly, the author believes that Putin is not alone in being responsible for the invasion of Ukraine, but rather the entire Russian elite, or at least a large part of it, which, following Yeltsin's shelling of the White House and the successful military campaign in Chechnya, saw that all or almost all problems could be solved by force. However, I personally believe that the decision to attack Ukraine was Putin's personal decision and, possibly, that of a few of his closest associates, since the only reason he decided to take such a step was to demonstrate to the elites and the population of the Russian Federation that he, i.e. Putin, is still the only strong politician who can “lift Russia from its knees.” But perhaps the author is right.
His destructive ideas about the possibility and desirability of the military assault, in a way, reflected the visions, preferences, and desires of the Russian elites.
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The main lessons were related to the fact that once successful coercion was justified domestically and met little resistance internationally, the extensive use of this instrument became the default option for Russian politics and policy-making, while compromise solutions were pushed off the agenda.
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Russia’s successful revenge, which was able to restore the coercive capacity of the state and achieved the conquest of Chechnya, contributed to the further rise of militarism among elites, both domestically and internationally. This success dramatically changed the Russian elites’ perceptions, as they were persuaded that use of force was the most efficient and powerful instrument of politics.
Another important factor was the lack of response from Western countries, which gave the Russian elite a sense of invulnerability and permissiveness. As a result, it felt like the new Soviet elite, which had also sent tanks to Eastern Europe and done so relatively successfully (at least in military terms).
However, with the feeling of impunity, especially after the annexation of Crimea in 2014, which had been proposed by Putin almost unilaterally and greatly endorsed by the Russian elites, the arrangement of preferences in decision-making under conditions of uncertainty shifted toward risk-taking. This shift not only contributed to the expectation that next time everything would be the same and that the Russian invincibility of the past would continue indefinitely into the future.
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Russia’s rulers believed that they would never be punished, either legally or politically.
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Russian leadership could expect that potential Western sanctions due to the “special military operation” in Ukraine would remain largely personal, symbolic, and easy to bypass (as they were after the annexation of Crimea in 2014), and would not harm key sectors of the Russian economy.
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In a way, the Kremlin became a victim of its previous successes, as its impunity was expected to continue virtually forever.
There are many reasons for this behavior on the part of the elites, including the desire to restore the former prestige of the country that the USSR enjoyed, and the absence of institutions for collective decision-making on key political issues, which existed in the Soviet Union.
The Soviet one-party regime was highly institutionalized and often too inflexible, while the personalist political regime in present-day Russia suffered from its deinstitutionalization.
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The Soviet decision to invade Czechoslovakia was collectively endorsed by the Politburo, and its implementation was conducted by civilian and military executives in a systematic way. In addition, the Kremlin built coalitions of allies internationally (on the level of the Warsaw Pact) and within the target country (on the level of the pro-Moscow faction in the Presidium).
However, perhaps the main reason is the rise of the security forces, which have come to dominate all political spheres, and the methods they use have been chosen as the main political instruments, which include political assassinations both inside and outside the country, the violent suppression of political actions, political terror and repression of the opposition, and, of course, military campaigns as the main instrument of foreign policy.
Under the conditions of Putin’s personalized patronage and strengthening of clientelist linkages over time, top siloviki officials became less and less constrained and less and less accountable and tended to turn their respective agencies into personal fiefdoms.
As for ending the war, the author does not believe this is possible while Putin remains president of Russia. As I understand the author, there is no demand among the Russian elite for serious political change, including Putin's departure, as this could have fatal consequences for them, which in turn means that the war will continue, and both countries will continue to destroy themselves.
Not only top elites (including, but not limited to siloviki), but also rank-and-file state officials and civil servants are strongly motivated to avoid potential major changes in Russia, which may be unacceptable for them because of the risks of losing wealth, status, or even their freedom if not their lives.
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Russia’s assault on Ukraine may be perceived as a tipping point for long-term developmental failure, which may result in the irreversible decay of the country.
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