La strada della vittoria

by Richard Overy

The Allied victory in 1945 - though comprehensive - was far from inevitable. By 1942 almost the entire resources of continental Europe were in German hands and Japan had wiped out the western colonial presence in Asia. Democracy appeared to have had its day.

In this remarkable study, Richard Overy provides a reinterpretation of the war through an account of the decisive military campaigns that created the astonishing revival in Allied fortunes. He also explores the deeper factors that determined success and failure: industrial stength, fighting ability, the skills of leaders and the moral contrasts between the two sides.

Today the modern world is once more in the throes of painful transformation. It is essential to establish why and how the last great war was won. Richard Overy casts a brilliant light on the most important turning-point of the modern age.

Genres: History, Nonfiction, World War II, War, Military History, Military Fiction, American History

Paperback

First published July 31, 1995

About the author

Richard James Overy is a British historian who has published extensively on the history of World War II and the Third Reich.

Educated at Caius College, Cambridge and awarded a research fellowship at Churchill College, Professor Overy taught history at Cambridge from 1972 to 1979, as a fellow of Queens' College and from 1976 as a university assistant lecturer. In 1980 he moved to King's College London, where he became professor of modern history in 1994. He was appointed to a professorship at the University of Exeter in 2004.

His work on World War II has been praised as "highly effective in the ruthless dispelling of myths" (A. J. P. Taylor), "original and important" (New York Review of Books) and "at the cutting edge" (Times Literary Supplement.)[

Reviews

[Perato · Rating 3 out of 5]

I read the revised edition and the book still felt "old". I wasn't a big fan, but nonetheless could be useful to somebody.

The book is quite often cited in many popular histories since it offers some sort of easy access to some numbers. Yet as someone who has read my share of WW2 books, thought that this book hasn't aged very well. The first 200 pages(50% of the book) is just mostly telling different battles of WW2, so if you have read anything about the war, it's most likely repetition. There are some mistakes in these parts, yet the coverage is mostly good for the mentioned battles, although there are occasionally too much detail for a work this size.

The latter 200 pages are good deliberation on the subject named in the title, Overy approaches the subject from many different angles, mainly material(both quantity and quality), moral and leadership. Yet even there's some inconsistencies, especially with the leadership. Also the book is very tightly focused on Britain, USA and Soviets vs. Germany. Japan and Italy are mostly neglected, although he tries to argue why so.

Then again I felt that the argument was somewhat counterpoint to his major point. Overy argued that Italy and Japan had very limited effect on war because of material and this was the reason for his focus on Germany, YET his major argument is that material didn't win the war. If leadership and moral are major factors, maybe go deeper to leadership, moral and morality of Italians and Japanese. Also there's very much lack of anything about China which also makes the book feel somewhat old. He's also citing some dubious sources(Backque) and cites Werth a lot for his Soviet parts.

There's plenty of good here for anyone who's not familiar with the topic, he explains major battles, then goes on to explain the major arguments on why the Allies won. The errors mentioned aren't that big in size and one get's quite good coverage of WW2 without going to in depth to all the battles and events. It's a starting point, but not the best one.

[Dvd (#) · Rating 5 out of 5]

25/02/2018 (*****)

Letto tutto d'un fiato, posso confermare le ottime recensioni qui presenti.

Saggio estremamente dettagliato e di ampio (ampissimo) respiro, documentatissimo ma anche notevolmente lucido nelle analisi. Non è una storia della II GM, ma piuttosto una puntigliosa critica analitica del suo sviluppo militare e dei riflessi socio-economici che questi comportarono sui paesi interessati: da qui nasce la banale domanda che Overy si fa fin dal titolo, ossia perché gli Alleati vinsero la guerra (e viceversa perché non la persero).

La risposta ovvia, e altrettanto banale, è che gli Alleati non potevano perdere una guerra moderna, fatta di freddi numeri e statistiche di produttività, in cui erano in smisurato vantaggio. Questo, che è e rimane senza dubbio vero, lo si dice però col famoso (e fuorviante) senno di poi. A un certo punto, suppergiù intorno al '40-'41-'42 la vittoria alleata era tutt'altro che sicura. Coi tedeschi a due passi da Mosca e, insieme agli italiani, a quattro passi dal canale di Suez e coi giapponesi dilaganti nel Sud-Est asiatico privo di difesa e coi mercantili anglo-americani affondati a mucchi nell'Atlantico. Qui Overy ci elenca le peculiarità che resero possibili la resistenza e la controffensiva, che sarà devastante: maggiore organizzazione e razionalizzazione logistica (nella produzione industriale in serie come nell'utilizzo di materie prime e nuove tecnologie), leadership migliore (attraverso creazioni di stati maggiori manageriali di grande dimensione, competenza specialistica e snellezza burocratica), vantaggio morale (indubbio, e fondamentale sul fronte interno).

Poi ci sono i numeri, brutali e inappellabili: se la GB da sola non aveva la minima possibilità di vincere la guerra, quando i tedeschi inopinatamente attaccano la Russia e non riescono a piegarla del tutto con una guerra lampo, sul piatto della bilancia alleato viene a posarsi il gigantesco peso sovietico (che, credo io, sarebbe stato sufficiente da solo a sconfiggere i tedeschi) che la fa immediatamente (e nettamente) pendere dalla loro parte; quando poi entrano in campo gli USA, potremo dire che si ribalta il tavolo.

Curioso il caso degli USA, prima potenza economica del mondo e principale forza navale mondiale ma, nel '39-'40, addirittura insignificanti dal punto di vista militare, ma che (pag. 478 del libro) erano passati nel '45 a dodici milioni di uomini nelle forze armate, più di 70 mila unità navali e almeno 73 mila aerei. Cifre pazzesche.

Ecco, Overy - anche giustamente - ci dice di diffidare dai numeri, che da soli non riescono a spiegare un fatto complesso come vincere o perdere una guerra di tali dimensioni. E' vero. L'innovazione, la capacità di improvvisare nel pieno della crisi, la resilienza (industriale ma anche morale), la gestione produttiva e strategica furono senza dubbio aspetti fondamentali che spiegano perché gli Alleati vinsero, ma senza dubbio i freddi numeri sulla produttività industriale sovietica e - ancora di più - americana parlano più di intere biblioteche.

Negli anni del conflitto i giapponesi riescono a produrre 7 portarei; gli americani, nello stesso periodo, ne varano 90 (novanta).

Per l'Asse vincere la guerra divenne quasi proibitivo nel momento in cui entrò in scena anche l'URSS che, pur se impreparata e indebolita dalle purghe staliniane, possedeva risorse umani e industriali, nonché tecnologiche, tali da travolgere inevitabilmente il nemico alla lunga. Nel momento in cui gli americani passano dal ruolo passivo di fornitori al ruolo attivo di cobelligeranti, poi, la situazione diventa assolutamente impari.

Un paradosso notevole è quello tedesco. La figura di Hitler è assolutamente centrale, soprattutto perché senza la sua figura sarebbe stato impensabile l'innesco della guerra (che, stavolta veramente, nessuno voleva visto lo spaventoso - e ancora fresco - ricordo dei massacri della Grande Guerra); tuttavia la sua guida si rivelò totalmente deleteria per la condotta militare del conflitto, continuamente condita di tremendi errori strategici. Ciò nonostante resta sbalorditivo come l'esercito tedesco sia riuscito a reggere, praticamente da solo, per quasi 5 anni un conflitto di queste dimensioni contro colossi del genere. Nessun altro paese al mondo, con l'esclusione degli USA e qualunque cosa si pensi dei tedeschi, avrebbe potuto resistere nello spaventoso logorio umano e materiale del fronte orientale. I tedeschi -ieri, oggi e penso domani - mi atterriscono e mi stupiscono insieme, negativamente e positivamente, e non riesco a farmene una idea generale che mi soddisfi in pieno: ogni tanto mi chiedo se, ancora oggi, siano la massima risorsa o il massimo pericolo del continente.

Anche la guerra giapponese è paradossale. Un paese con una industria, all'epoca, di piccole dimensioni (di parecchio inferiore a quella italiana, per dire) che riesce con la pura forza di un esercito disciplinatissimo (oltre i limiti del fanatismo) e di una sola forza armata su tre (la marina) di idonee dimensioni, a fagocitare letteralmente tutta l'Asia del Sud-Est.

Rimane l'Italia, buttata in una guerra assolutamente non gradita dalla popolazione a un livello di impreparazione tale da ritenere criminale, anche solo e esclusivamente per quello, chiunque la volle, da Mussolini (e Vittorio Emanuele, che al solito tacque e lasciò fare) in giù. Casta militare compresa.

Resta il fatto, come Overy nota molto bene, che alla fine l'unico vero e assoluto vincitore della guerra furono gli USA, che si rivelarono per quello che sono ancora oggi: la più grande potenza militare e economica che si sia mai vista al mondo. L'URSS, i cui sacrifici furono di gran lunga i maggiori fra tutti quelli patiti dalle nazioni in campo, ottenne di riflesso con la vittoria anche l'obbligo di bere la coppa avvelenata del duello a distanza con gli americani per l'egemonia mondiale, che si rivelò alla fine letale per la sua stessa esistenza. La GB perse l'impero, entrò in una spirale economica declinante salvo rilanciarsi dagli anni '80 in poi come villaggio globale della finanza mondiale (finchè dura) e avamposto americano in Europa. Viceversa Germania Giappone e Italia vissero un incredibile boom economico che le trasformò nel giro di 20 anni in grandi potenze industriali.

Credo che noi europei occidentali dovremo dire mille volte grazie ai russi. Fu principalmente col loro sangue e con i loro sacrifici che fascismo e soprattutto nazismo vennero sconfitti; e fu ancora dalla loro oppressione durante la dittatura sovietica post-bellica che nacque in occidente lo spauracchio comunista, in risposta del quale gli stati europei (col beneplacito americano) diedero definitivamente il là a quella straordinaria conquista che fu la socialdemocrazia (e lo stato sociale, ovviamente).

E ringraziamo pure gli americani, di cui siamo certamente obbeddienti e proni vassalli, per la settantennale pace che hanno finora assicurato in Europa (loro e esclusivamente loro, via NATO). Critichiamo giustamente il loro dominio assoluto - e spesso deleterio, soprattutto in campo culturale - ma non dimentichiamo nemmeno che lo sviluppo pacifico europeo è dovuto prevalentemente alla loro presenza nel continente e al loro ruolo di mediatori e padri-padroni.

Se se ne tornassero oltreoceano domani, onestamente la vedrei molto grigia....

[Ensiform · Rating 5 out of 5]

Just as the title indicates, this is a thorough examination of how WWII, the outcome of which was decidedly uncertain before late 1943 or so, ended the way it did. Overy is a masterful and convincing historian, who over the course of 330 pages lays out a cogent argument based on everything from economy and materiel production to the warped philosophy of the Axis powers. It’s impossible to distill the mass of fascinating information into a paragraph, but there are a few main points that especially ring true.

The first is, of course, the industrial production of the USA and USSR, unmatched by any of the Axis powers. Overy argues that America’s capitalist society and the Soviet centralized dictatorship where ideally suited to maximize their vast resources, while Hitler’s less focused, more competitive dictatorship failed to make the most of Germany’s limited resources. A telling example is when Hitler’s armies took Soviet oil fields, but then had no engineers to make the oil available to Germany, so it made no change in their production. Overy further argues that the Allied powers made simple, reliable, mass-produced weapons, and kept a healthy ratio of mechanics on hand. The opposite was true of the Germany industrial complex, which was fixated on ever newer technologies, so obsolescence and difficulty of repair became issues as the war progressed. Overy concludes that even Germany’s much-vaunted missile program, which was inarguably years ahead of anything the Allies had, was “a lost cause” for these reasons: impressive, yes, but not a war-winner.

The second main theme is the rapid learning curve of the allied powers, who learned from their many early defeats and focused intently on producing only what was needed to win. The Germans and Japanese, by contrast, had a very slow learning curve, and coasted on early victories, believing that their militaristic will-to-power philosophy made victory a foregone conclusion This learning curve extended to every facet of the war – improvements in bombing, defense, codes, and so on ensured the Allies’ early losses were not often repeated.

The final main theme that run through the whole book, though it’s not made as explicit as the others, is the mindset of the various leaders. Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin had many philosophical and strategical differences, but were able to work in lock step for the single goal of destroying Nazism utterly. Hitler had no such restraint, unable to maintain even the farce of an alliance with Stalin until the war in the west had been concluded. Stalin, for all his faults, promoted reliable men, wanted to hear the unvarnished truth about how the war was progressing, and allowed himself to be overruled when it came to important strategic decisions. Hitler, famously, removed officers who told him bad news and insisted on micro-managing the war. Perhaps the best example of how much this hurt Germany was Hitler’s insistence on treating the Normandy landings lightly, thinking they were only a ruse, until it was far too late. In all, this is an inexhaustibly fascinating book, one sure to promote argument among WWII buffs for its calm, reasoned analysis and sometimes unexpected conclusions.

[Ray · Rating 3 out of 5]

We know that the allies won the war but was this always on the cards?

This book explores the underlying themes of the war in terms of production, leadership, morale, morals and the like. It argues that whilst the outcome was often in question during the dark days of 1940 and 1941, ultimately the sheer weight of the allies economies would prevail. That is not to say that the war was not a challenge, it was difficult to meld the efforts of the three principal allies (sorry France), each with its own objectives and political culture, across disparate theatres of war.

The sheer might of US industry and Russian manpower meant that the war was efectively lost when the Wehrmacht failed to take Moscow in 41. This was not helped by the patent idiocy of Hitler declaring war on the US to show solidarity with a feeble Japanese ally, nor by his micromanagement of the war effort.

An interesting read about the logistics of war rather than a direct narrative of the battlefield. War for accountants perhaps. Enjoyable.

[Roger Burk · Rating 5 out of 5]

It is amazing that Overy can write one medium-sized book that makes one rethink WWII. This is a high-level strategic look at the war, but still concrete and specific--sometimes tactical details had strategic consequences. Here is a sampling of Overy's arguments.

Everyone knows that the Allies had the advantage in industrial capability, but Overy points out that that was only one factor among many. Germany actually had the industrial advantage throughout 1941 but did not capitalize on it. Paradoxically, the Germans were handicapped because industry was subordinated to the Army. Officers kept demanding new designs with the latest updates, resulting in small production runs and constant logistics and maintenance problems. No new German aircraft design during the war was a strategic success. In contrast, the Russian and American industrial organizers made decent designs in the huge quantities required to win the war.

The greatest miracle of the war was the Russian evacuation of their heavy industry ahead of the German invasion. Without that, they could not have carried on the war. It was Bolshevism that gave them the ability--the Communist government had a couple decades of experience controlling heavy industry from Moscow, so they knew what had to be done. And Stalin's personality cult gave Russia the necessary unity of purpose.

The German and Japanese warrior ethos actually worked against them. They sent all their efficient staff officers to the front instead of using them as staffers. The Allies valued and used good staff officers. The Americans could make top commanders out of soldiers who had never seen combat--Marshall and Eisenhower.

The Anglo-American bombing campaign was one of the key factors in winning the war. It drew the Luftwaffe into a war of attrition they could not win, thus ensuring that the lodgment in Normandy could be defended.

The war was mostly against Germany. 85% of the American effort was expended in Europe, and only 15% in the Pacific. The industrial bases of Italy and Japan were very limited compared to Germany (or the Allies, of course). And Hitler was particularly hated, even before the war, even though it was Japan and Italy who had first embarked on wars of conquest, and even though the full murderousness of Naziism was not yet known. The peculiar barbarity and odiousness of his doctrines made a difference.

[Thomas Edmund · Rating 5 out of 5]

Continuing my dive into WWII resources, the next book my Uncle lent me was 'Why the Allies Won'. It's actually really fascinating as it challenges some of the 101 arguments for this question, while also expanding and explaining how these winning factors came about.

Not to be gatekeepy or pretentious, but I would recommend this tome for people who have done the basic deep dives, either through documentaries or books and have the standard WWII knowledge (i.e. the key battles, the basic ebb and flow of the conflict and the major path to ally victory). I say this not because you won't understand the book, but you won't really get that detail from this one.

What you will get is an amazing amount of insight into the winning factors, ranging from psychology, tactics, economics, even ethics. The strongest part of the argument is Overy explaining how victory was something like a nuclear chain reaction - there probably wasn't actually one factor that led to victory and/or had their only been one factor then the victory would have looked different. For an easy to explain example the nature of the Allies leaning into a bombing campaign didn't so much win the war for them, but did diminish the Nazi air-force leading to a much much stronger position for the Russian front, and the eventual Normandy invasion. But part of the bombing emphasis was Britain and the States needed to show Russia they were still doing something (Stalin was desperate for a 'second front' but the others were not ready to invade so promised more intensive bombing of Germany).

Anyways - this book is very tomeish and detailed its not a flashy fun read, but it really insightful and interesting, not just for historians but also understanding warfare, politics and even human nature at times. I do note with some irony one chapter is devoted to "ethics" but is highly focussed on propaganda LOL.

[Meirav Rath · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellent book. Not only does it shatter quite a few myths, it also answer the key question that is often regarded as obvious; why the allies won, really. Each chapter is very informative and interesting and the book as a whole, I think, is a must as a gateway to the second world war.

[Miltiadis Michalopoulos · Rating 4 out of 5]

This study shows convincingly that WWII was actually a close thing. The main reason behind the Allied victory was not their potential superiority in material weapons and manpower, but their determination to win the second war. To quote Overy: "The Allies won the Second World War because they turned their economic strength into effective fighting power, and turned the moral energies of their people into an effective will to win". If the Allies were not determined to win they would have certainly lost the war. A very well written study.

[Chuck · Rating 3 out of 5]

In this book, Overy says, "The Allies won the Second World War because they turned their economic strength into effective fighting power, and turned the moral energies of their people into an effective will to win." In essence, Overy is countering the argument from material determinism which states that the outcome of the war was all but inevitable because of the overwhelming advantage in manpower and industrial production possessed by the Allies. I didn't feel that Overy made his case. I tend to agree with the determinists, and I agree with historians like John Ellis who wrote that Hitler lost the war as soon as he declared war on Russia. He then compounded that error by declaring war on the United States.

[Chris Miller · Rating 3 out of 5]

An interesting and somewhat persuasive monograph by a seemingly balanced British writer. He has an abundance of facts and information that is presented in a mostly interesting way. He does have a tendency to get bogged down in places, but even these episodes are rare and not off-putting. With regard to the balanced crack, he does not have any problems with addressing the whole Churchill, warts and all, but seems to be a dyed-in-the-wool member of the Monty Protective Society. Oh, St. Monty cleared the Hun out of North Africa and was the Eastern anchor for Normandy providing the “broad shoulder” for protecting the landing force. Part of this is the nature of the book, but the fact substantial questions have been raised over the last 70 years regarding his competence and drive deserve some comment. In addition, Bill Slim and the CBI are missing in their entirety. Their sacrifices have to be one of the reason the allies won.

[David · Rating 4 out of 5]

An excellent book, and one that makes you think. Virtually every paragraph Overy writes could be expanded into an essay of its own, or indeed a whole other book. Overy's synthesis of the voluminous archive material is simply masterful, and he cuts through the fog of war, and the conflicting analysis' of the war, with lucid prose and convincing arguments. While I'm no expert, I've read a lot about WWII, and I find much of his argument persuasive. If you're looking for a book explaining why the Allies won - not how, but why - you can't go wrong here.

I reviewed this book on my blog back in December, 2007. Read more here:
http://whatsnew-dc.blogspot.com/2007/...

[Edmond Dantes · Rating 4 out of 5]

Conferma e Negazione di una teoria. Basta avere un PIL più forte del nemico per vincere la Guerra. Aiuta, è vero, ma non è sufficiente, vedi Vietnam o Afganistan, se non è supportato da una volontà morale di combattere e, in secondo luogo, da una catena di comando eccellente. Paradossalmente, per la vulgata comune questo fu ottenuto dalle democreazie occidentali (e dai Russi) ma non dai tedeschi il cui "caporale boemo" come lo definiva Hindemburg aveva il vizio di entrare troppo nei dettagli tecnici - che non conosceva...
Mi ha colpito un patragrafo : i tedeschi si stavano già preparando alla guerra degli anni '50 : missili, Jet etc...; peccato che nel frattempo non costruivano le armi per il conflitto che stavano combattendo.
Un' appunto : qualche tabella in più avrebbe fatto comodo.

[Gram · Rating 3 out of 5]

A decent & succinct view of why the Allies defeated Nazi Germany and Japan. Covers everything from the economics of mass production of weapons to the morality of the Allies' reasons for fighting Hitler.

[Michael Burnam-Fink · Rating 4 out of 5]

Why the Allies Won is a strong, if somewhat repetitive book, that tells the story of the great Allied victory, while also somewhat contradicting its stated thesis. Overy tries to argue against Whiggish triumphalism and point to the contingency of key battles, and the costly process of learning to fight that lead to turning point victories in 1943, rather than simply gesturing at the immense material imbalance in favor of the Allies and the weaknesses of the Axis command structure. Yet in closing, those two factors are determinate.

The major campaigns are the Battle of the Atlantic, Stalingrad-Kursk, the combined bomber offensive, and finally the invasion of Normandy. In each of these, the Allies went from taking hefty loses, to parity, to eventually achieving an attrition that ripped the heart out of Axis resistance, leading to a long, bloody, and yet inevitable conclusion.

The basic fact is that the Allies outproduced the Axis by an order of magnitude in all the key inputs of modern warfare: ships, tanks, artillery, aircraft. Certainly, numerical parity wasn't enough to lead to victory. The Allies often had parity in disastrous early battles. But when the US is launching hundreds of major warships in a year versus a few dozen for the Japanese, well, there's only one way that struggle will go. Overy also gives the majority of credit to the resilience and sacrifice of the Russian people, who gave most of the blood that defeated the Nazis. Though this was not a simple matter of unending hordes, the Red Army skillful concentrated force and used misdirection to achieve local supremacy with each offensive, in classic Clausewitzian style.

Most surprising to me in terms of new info was the shocking inefficiency of the Nazi war machine. The Nazis were perhaps 25% to 50% efficient at turning the same amounts of raw materials into tanks and planes as the Allies. This is especially impressive, given that the Soviet Union had to evacuate most of its heavy industry and rebuild east of the Urals. The Nazis attempted to rationalize production in 1943, but by then the combined bomber offensive added enough friction to ensure that numbers would never meet their necessary targets.

On the political side, only opposition to Hitler held together the odd bedfellows of Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin. Hitler's megalomania and refusal to delegate or take advice meant that German strategy became haphazard and poorly coordinated. The MilHist thread on the SomethingAwful forums uses the phrase "gay black Hitler" to describe the necessary conditions for a Nazi victory. A reasonable Hitler with reasonable war aims would simply have not had started the war. Imperial Japanese high command knew the war was lost by 1943, 1944 at the latest, but were unable to coherently advance a position for surrender that might have avoided the mass destruction of Japanese cities via strategic and nuclear bombing.

Certainly, there were points that hinged on the smallest things, yet would a reversal have changed things? The Battle of Midway hinged on ten bombs hitting Japanese carriers. But the mass of Essexes would have sailed into the Pacific in 1944 even if Enterprise and Hornet had joined Yorktown on the bottom, and the Kido Butai had triumphed. A victory at Stalingrad or Kursk would have seen another defensive line a few hundred kilometers back. The Battle of the Atlantic and the strategic bomber offensive were both fundamentally attritional, and while new weapons and doctrine turned the tide in both cases, it was the production margain that ensured the Axis never got back up after. Normandy was the chanciest one. Eisenhower's decision to have D-Day proceed on June 6 was a daring break in bad weather. If he'd picked the next opportunity on June 19th, the shocking storm of that day would have wrecked the landing. Perhaps political will for a second landing would not have been there, but I'm skeptical that one more defeat would have broken the Allies.

[Martin Koenigsberg · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is a really good book that I enjoyed a great deal. You can tell the author is an academic, because this is one big and superbly written "compare and contrast' essay on WWII, where the Axis is measured to the Allies- and found totally wanting. Overy goes over most of the important factors in the war- and shows you that in all areas save Tactics and in a few cases Equipment, the Allies were superior to the Axis- and usually by a wide margin. And yet the war was a "damn close run thing", that required all the efforts of all the Allies, flat out , for 6 years.

While this is is not, and does not claim to be, a full history of the war itself, it's a good single volume for anyone who wants to understand the basics and why the results were what they were. Overy goes for the most important choke points of the war- events like The Battle of the Atlantic, Stalingrad, the Bomber campaigns, and D-Day, among others, and relates how and why they impacted the war. He goes into the Chasm between the sides politically, economically and industrially and how that played out . He also goes into the moral differences in the combatant, and the total racial war waged on the OstFront. As a real expert on Soviet History, he's one of the better sources to read about the moral ambiguity of Soviet Authoritarianism in a death grip with Fascist Authoritarianism. Its riveting stuff.

The junior reader will be well served by tackling this tome as it is really good at bringing order to one's view of the War that made the modern world. The writing is not adult for most. For the Gamer/Modeller/Military enthusiast, this is a GREAT book for background, but not a contributor to Scenarios/Dioramas. On the other hand, it will really help the reader to understand why moves were made and how the military events impacted the political and cultural legacy we live now. A strong recommendation for any reader.

[Rejeev Divakaran · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book discusses the factors that influenced the winning of Allies in the second world war. Even though many of the books on WWII covers this topic this book is exclusively on this topic. It covers this quite well. It analyzed how the balance of power shifted in the eastern front, Atlantic, and battle for air supremacy.
One aspect I felt not discussed in an unbiased manner (maybe due to its political correctness) is the power of fanatic nationalism (or ideology). How fanatic supporters affected Germany, Russia, and Japan vs compared with more rational, liberal individualistic people of America, Britain, and France.

[Jachin Friday · Rating 4 out of 5]

Very good overview of the Second World War, lays out a strong case for why Allied victory, while not inevitable, was due to a set of specific factors that came increasingly to favor the Allies as the war went on. Very German-focused, highly critical of the Nazis in general and Hitler specifically, focused on things like quality of leadership, material production, and military strategy as the main cruxes for why the Americans, British, and Soviets won the war.

[Davi Gimenes · Rating 4 out of 5]

The book historically speaking is rich with information, the book also introduces various topics about WW2 in an interesting way, the only reason it didn't have a 5 stars was that it may be a bit boring and lacks in connection from topic to topic and also the lack of captivation of the reader.

[Stephen Harrison · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is a great book that explains exactly what the title says. Overy is one of the top experts on WWII and goes into great detail and nuance about why the Allies won. His main argument is that it was not a single factor but a combination of factors that allowed Allied victory. The conventional explanation of outproducing the Axis is accurate, but only part of the story. Another conventional story about Hitler being a military moron is also accurate, but can't explain the entire war. Instead, Overy includes aspects of innovation, both technical and tactical, in the air and sea wars that shifted the balance. He also emphasizes the moral aspect, or fighting spirit, and the fact that sometimes the Allies were just lucky. (Success at Midway was a mix of preparation, leadership and ten bombs, out of the hundreds dropped, finding their mark. He shows how the advantages built up on one another to give the Allies greater advantages. For example, Allied bombing of Germany only began to tell on German production in the last year or so of the war, but fighters were pulled from the eastern front because of the threat, relaxing some of the pressure on the Soviets. And he leaves no doubt that the core of the Axis was Germany, which meant that the Soviets were the key players in defeating the Axis, because they did most of the heavy lifting against Germany.

Overall, this is a great book for anyone interested in WWII or military history. I like it enough that I plan on giving it to one of my students who is a WWII buff for a graduation present.



Here are my takes on the specific causes Overy goes into:

1. The battle for the oceans - this section looks at both the war in the Atlantic and Pacific. The Atlantic was focusing on shipping from the United States to Britain and was a game of cat and mouse. Each side would develop an advantage in technology or tactics that would severely hurt the enemy for a while until the enemy countered it and the situation was reversed. The end was in 1943, when additional air cover supplemented radar/sonar technology, code breaking and the tactics of convoys to make it unfeasible for u-boats to attack Allied shipping. The Pacific was won through code breaking, clever strategy, better decisions by leaders and some substantial luck. Midway was the clear turning point, but the Battle of the Coral Sea set the stage for that. What also helped in both theaters was that when the Allies lost ships, they were replaceable. Japan and Germany were outmatched industrially and had a much more difficult time replacing equipment and trained personnel.

2. Stalingrad and Kursk were the turning points in the Soviet Union. Stalingrad was lost because of superior Soviet strategy and very poor decisions by Hitler, but despite the enormous amount of German men and materiel that were captured there, Kursk was actually more important because it turned the war from a war of maneuver to a war of attrition. Crack German divisions were devastated in the attack, opening the door for a Soviet counterattack that would eventually win the war. Plus, he attributes a lot of the success to the strength of spirit in the Soviet people.

3. Bombing -Overy refutes the idea that strategic bombing didn't work in Germany. He argues that even if it didn't affect German production (which it did), it diverted resources from the Soviet front but to no avail. The diversion of resources west, by itself, would have been enough to justify strategic bombing. If nothing else, it placated Stalin's demand for a second front. But in addition to that, Allied bombing disrupted German industry and transportation, while the German attempts to stop it caused the effective destruction of the Luftwaffe. All of this led Overy to call strategic bombing a decision factor in Allied victory.

4. Operation Overlord - the main gist of Overy's analysis of Overlord is the logistical nightmare and required a lot of other things to go right. It needed: air supremacy in Europe, secrecy and the Soviet's to continue to apply pressure in the east. It was also dependent on the weather, which is not something you want to count on. In the end, it all came together in a near miraculous undertaking, but it was a lot more closely run than most people think. After the initial landing, the breakout was slowed by Hitler's decision to not retreat and regroup. This made Eisenhower furious as he chided Montgomery for his timidity, but in the long run, it played into Allied hands. Eisenhower just didn't realize it at the time.

5. Mass production - The Allies outproduced Germany and Japan (Italy barely counts) in weapons, equipment and machines. The Soviets did this with a command economy and coercion, although Overy again credits the fighting spirit of the Soviet citizens, miraculously moving it main heavy industry east to get it out of the hands of the Axis. The United States relied on the private sector and transitioned to a war economy faster than anyone, especially Hitler, believed possible. By contrast, Germany was very slow to get the hang of mass production, preferring specialized weapons in small orders. This made support very difficult (see below) and also slowed down production. They had hundreds of models of tanks, compared to four for the Soviets. By the time they figured it out, Allied strategic bombing was taking a serious toll and they were never able to get up to speed. The overall result was an overwhelming advantage in production for the Allies.

6. Engines and oil - Germany and Japan started out with a huge technical advantage in weaponry and equipment, but weren't designed for long-term fighting. Some of their support wasn't mechanized (using horses) and they had little for spare parts. The result was an inability to service the front line effectively. By comparison, the United States produced so many vehicles that it also mechanized the Soviet army. In addition, the Axis had very limited oil supplies while the Allies were extremely well-stocked. Germany focused on cutting edge technology which didn't yield much militarily during the war, but was gobbled up by Americans after it. Germany did this partly because it thought a new super weapon could turn the course of the war back in its favor. The Allies, on the other hand, largely used weapons of the 1930s, but constantly improved them, allowing them both quantity and quality. Overy discusses the atomic bomb here, but says it wasn't decisive and that Japan was on the brink of surrender anyway. That is debatable, but his larger point is that the material advantage had already backed Japan into a corner from which there was no escape, so Allied victory was already imminent without the A-bomb.

7. Leadership and unity - The Allies benefitted from unity of purpose and effective command structures. For "unity", they certainly had many differences, but they fought for a common cause and cooperated where possible. Hitler, who broke nearly every alliance he made, could never understand this, eventually putting the alliance down to a jewish conspiracy. He never realized that he was the deciding factor in cementing the Allies together. The Axis, on the other hand, were largely independent operators that liked each other rather than helped each other. Germany and Japan did not give each other support or coordinate their activities. Also, the leaders of the Allies realized they were not experts on war and could not supervise all aspects of it, so set up a command structure to rationalize decision making. Hitler made all decisions himself and refused to listen to council. The Allies systems were far from perfect, with plenty of political interference along the way, but it worked much better to have a coherent and unified war effort.

8. Moral high ground - The Allies benefitted from better morale because a) they had been attacked (although this was more ambiguous for Britain and the United States fighting Germany) and b) they were the forces of "good" vs. "evil". This contributed to many in Britain and the Soviet Union to continue to fight with enthusiasm even when it looked like they were losing. When the tide turned, the Germans and Japanese had little of the same enthusiasm. The post-war trials were a symbol of this, although they also undermined the claim to rule of law because they were legally highly suspect.

[Ushan · Rating 4 out of 5]

In 1942, the Axis Powers of World War II seemed on the verge of winning the war; in 1945, they lost, and the Allied Powers won. What happened? The most important reason was the capacity of the Soviet people to sacrifice everything, evacuate and recreate industrial infrastructure in unoccupied Ural, Siberia, Volga valley and Central Asia, continue producing tanks, airplanes and other weapons, and keep fighting. To what extent this sacrifice was voluntary, and to what done at gunpoint is really beside the point. The second most important reason was the enormous industrial capacity of the United States switching to war production. In 1943, Japanese shipyards produced 3 aircraft carriers, and in 1944, 4; American shipyards produced 90 in these years. Mass production, used so successfully for making cars before the war, was adapted to making bomber aircraft and cargo "Liberty" ships. The Allies also made better use of technology. A modern Russian handbook for high school history teachers became famous for calling Stalin "an effective manager". The real effective manager of the war was Albert Speer, the Reich Minister of Armaments; by 1944, he reduced 42 aircraft models to 5, 151 trucks to 23, a dozen anti-tank weapons to 1, and so on for all weapons. However, this was too late, when Germany was already losing the war; lack of spare parts and trained mechanics plagued the Wehrmacht. In contrast, the Soviets had 2 main models of tanks and 5 main models of aircraft. When they realized that they were losing the war with ordinary weapons, the Germans tried to win it with futuristic weapons: jet fighters, ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, while lacking banal trucks. The Americans only had one futuristic weapon, the atomic bomb, and the Soviets had none; after the war, the Americans whisked away German weaponeers such as Wernher von Braun and Hans von Ohain to make Cold War weapons for them.

One chapter I found very interesting was about the Allied bomber offensive. It failed to terrorize the German people into surrendering, and it failed to stop the increase in German war production. What it succeeded in doing was drawing the resources away first from the Eastern Front, and later also from the Western Front. In 1943-1944, German aircraft production switched to fighters from bombers, and 2/3 of German fighters were fighting Anglo-American bombers, allowing the gigantic battles on the Eastern Front to proceed without German bombing. The 88mm gun was very effective at destroying Soviet tanks; instead, 3/4 of them were aimed at Anglo-American bombers. All in all, in 1944 direct destruction of industry and diversion of manpower and resources to anti-aircraft defense together cost the Germans approximately half of their battlefront weapons and equipment. If this wasn't another front in the war, what was it?

There are also chapters on the Battle of Stalingrad, the Battle of Kursk, the invasion of France, wartime diplomacy, Allied and Axis leadership, but there are already hundreds of books on these topics. I think the most interesting chapters are about the war of economies and the war of technologies.

[Mal Warwick · Rating 5 out of 5]

A British historian asks why the Allies won World War II . . . and reaches surprising conclusions

Brace yourself. Much of what you believe about why the Allies won World War II may not be true. British historian Richard Overy challenges the received wisdom in his eye-opening revisionist interpretation of the six-year ordeal, titled simply Why the Allies Won.

For most historians, that question makes little sense. The accepted understanding among them is that two reasons stand out. First, Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union collectively mustered manpower and resources far in excess of Axis capabilities. And, second, the Nazis made the tragic error of entering into a two-front war confronting both the West and the USSR. But Overy drills down into the history of the period, arguing the reality was not so simple. He raises penetrating questions about both assumptions in this extraordinary book. It’s one of the most revealing accounts of the war I’ve ever encountered.

Not a comprehensive account

Overy’s book is not a retelling of World War II history. His arguments apply largely to the European conflict and not the equally momentous war in China and the Pacific. (There, the consensus is that Imperial Japan made the fatal error of taking on the United States and overextended itself in the vastness of the Chinese mainland.) Nor does Overy address critical topics such as the impact of intelligence, which he thinks is overestimated.

Debunking the conventional wisdom

Overy easily dismisses the assertion that the Allies won because they possessed superior resources. In fact, it was not until midway through the war in Europe that US industrial capacity came into its own, turning out hundreds of thousands of aircraft, tanks, and trucks like so many widgets. Before then, the industrial resources available to Germany at home and in the nations it occupied greatly exceeded what Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States could bring to bear.

Even then, Germany did have the capacity to produce far more weaponry and munitions than it did. But the Allies learned to mobilize and organize their economic potential more effectively than the Axis powers. Overy argues that raw resources alone weren’t decisive. It was differences in their ability to convert economic strength into military power with efficiency.

The author gives equally short shrift to the argument that when Germany elected to fight a two-front war the die was cast. Overy cites numerous examples from history, and from that of World War II itself, to debunk this claim. In fact, the US was fighting a three-front war beginning in November 1942, when British and American troops landed in North Africa in Operation Torch. Again and again history shows that fighting a two-front war has little bearing on the outcome.

The six reasons why the Allies won World War II?

Overy’s argument boils down to six principal factors:

Mobilizing and organizing industrial resources
As suggested above, the Allies won in part because they were more successful in mobilizing and organizing the industrial resources available to them, not because they simply had more available. That wasn’t even the case until 1943. Hitler had conquered most of Continental Europe with its massive industrial capacity. But as the war dragged on, the Allies produced more and more weapons and munitions than the Axis. By contrast, the output of war materiel in Germany, Japan, and Italy steadily declined beginning in 1943. And while Germany poured precious resources into the development of advanced weaponry such as jet aircraft and ballistic missiles, the Allies focused on the technology that truly sustained the war effort: airplanes, tanks, and trucks.

Capitalizing on scientific research and development
Despite Germany’s long preeminence in science and technology, the Allies simply did a better job managing the application of scientific research and development. Although beginning with a deficit in such technologies as radar and submarine design, the Allies steadily gained an advantage in such fields as radar and code-breaking. And they proved adept in directing the efforts of private industry in the US and Britain and the economy at large in the USSR toward continuous improvement into the most fundamental tools of war: ships, planes, tanks, and trucks.

Building an effective coalition
The Allied coalition triumphed because its principals—Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union—worked together more successfully than did the Axis nations. Even the Western powers’s relationship with the USSR, which was at best distant early in the war, became cooperative beginning with the Normandy Invasion. Meanwhile, the US and Britain, however tense their relations from time to time, successfully coordinated their military activities. The Axis powers never truly formed a coalition. They were on their own from the start.

Evolving tactics and strategy
Allied military leadership proved far more flexible than that of the Axis powers. While Germany persisted in the tactics that gained them such a rapid initial advantage, shifting its approach only after its loss at Stalingrad, Allied strategy and tactics steadily evolved and adapted to meet new circumstances. This flexibility proved significant especially in such areas as combined arms tactics, amphibious warfare, and strategic bombing.

Superior leadership
Allied political and military leadership proved superior to that of the Axis. In Japan, right-wing military fanatics dictated policy until the closing days of the war, abetted by a willing emperor. And Hitler proved again and again the folly of his insistence on personally running the war. In both nations, the leadership’s insistence on fighting to the death hobbled its commanders in the field. Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin all demonstrated their willingness to delegate military decision-making to professional soldiers, who made no such mistake. None of the three was perfect. Far from it. But they all proved flexible and pragmatic.

A moral advantage
The Allies gained a moral advantage as the volume of reports about Axis atrocities mounted through the years. They developed greater resilience and commitment as the war progressed. Strong morale among the British, Soviet, and American public through much of the war bolstered their governments’s pursuit of unconditional surrender.

About the author

Richard Overy is a Cambridge-educated British historian who has written extensively about World War II, Nazi Germany, and military history. He taught history at Cambridge, King’s College London, and the University of Exeter. He has written 33 books to date but is best known for Why the Allies Won.

[Zachary Barker · Rating 5 out of 5]

I have finished reading “Why the Allies Won” by Richard Overy.

“Not one man in twenty in the government realises what a grisly, dirty, tough business we are in. They think we can buy victory.” Supreme Allied Commander Dwight D. Eisenhower’s diary 1942

This is a thorough analysis of the strategies, mix of personalities and circumstances which led to the Allied side winning over the Axis side at the end of World War 2.

Nothing is inevitable in something as fluid, violent and chaotic as war. Certainly, there are conditions that can put the odds more on one side than the other, such as one side having larger resources or a larger economy, but these are not always enough to determine a war’s outcome. This is especially true years after World War 2 with great power losses in Vietnam, Algeria and Afghanistan. As the author says It is not just a case of God being on the side of the big battalions. The author therefore seeks to unpick the question of what made the difference for the Allies to win and the Axis to lose?

The arguments the author chooses to make start as wide and sweeping, but then impressively and astutely reach some sound and easy to understand conclusions. I found early on that the large chapters sometimes required patient reading to start with, but were so gripping and informative that I wasn’t daunted by their size and scope once I was hooked in.

The first half of the book focused on crucial and misunderstood theatres of the war. The Battle of the Atlantic really was the foundation for the Allied victory. Without it, men and material would simply not have been transported to Europe on the scale needed. Constant technological development, but also an aggressive approach to fight the U-Boats with sufficient escort and air cover were crucial for victory. Sometimes technological development took on the form of a duel with the other side such as when the German Navy sought to counter Allied Radar advantages.

However, one of the biggest revelations the Allies had was that the support organisations for the Armies in the field required a huge amount of organisation and input too. In this way the administration of war became indispensable to it’s prosecution. This proved to be particularly important in an age where mechanised warfare was just coming in to being. Effective mechanised forces required fuel, standardisation, support teams, plentiful tools and parts and a huge productive capacity. In the Allied side this was the domain of predominantly civilians and it outperformed the Axis, who had their production snarled up in mixed priorities and interference from the military and Nazi party figures. Some members of the Axis such as Italy and Japan had nowhere near industrial strength they needed to start with.

Much like detectives, the Allied followed the evidence when it came to assessing what strategies worked or needed to change. By following through on these observations they reaped ripple effect successes. Sometimes these started out from political accidents. For instance, British efforts on Strategic Bombing mainly continued to placate Stalin who was urging for a second front to be opened in the West earlier. Yet the more Allied Bombers that were thrown in, the greater the Allied casualties. But then a simple technical fix allowed escort fighters to become long range fighters, leading to a strategy of actively seeking fights with the Luftwaffe to whittle down German airpower. This in turn led to a lot less Luftwaffe fighters being deployed against the Soviets and against the D Day invasion since Germany’s homeland air defence was prioritised.


There are some very astute assessments of the characters of the War’s major figures, some of which had some chilling insights. I was pretty surprised and shocked to hear how much Eisenhower and Roosevelt had strong prejudices against the Germans generally and not just Hitler. The author’s portrayal of Bernard Montgomery was very fair, pointing out how his arrogance often got in the way of his colleagues seeing the true goals he was trying to achieve. I had no idea until reading this how much Churchill dreaded the coming of D Day, hence why he spent so much energy in trying to have it postponed.

This was unquestionably one of the best books I have read on the Second World War. It is brave in it’s scope, patient in laying out arguments and clear in it’s explanations. The author is measured when assessing old myths about World War 2 and addresses them with sound reasoning which challenges the reader. What I found quite astonishing was quite how much of a gamble the decisions by the Axis Powers to go to war actually were. Nazi Germany would have stood more of a chance if it went to war at the end of it’s projected rearmament date of 1942. Italy went to war based on Hitler’s decision to send Germany to war, not on how ready Italy was (it wasn’t). The Japanese went to war on a gamble that it could cripple most of the US fleet and make a victory too costly to obtain for a nation too used to peace (completely inaccurate reading). But there were things the Axis could have done to improve their chances. Hitler could have faced up to his limitations as a military leader and listened to advice from his generals. The Axis could have fully exploited the resources of the countries they conquered, but they never did. However, in the end the Allies had the clear moral case to put to their populations, the right focused strategies and new which battles they could afford to win and lose.

If I was going to suggest some possible room for improvement, I would like to have heard more discussion between the US preference for a cross Channel invasion first strategy vs the UK Mediterranean strategy. The UK got it’s way and North Africa, Sicily and Italy were liberated, but did this shorten the war or not make a difference. It is a shame this question wasn’t answered, but this was a small misfire on a book that otherwise has a true aim.

[Dave · Rating 4 out of 5]

Richard Overy's ""Why the Allies Won"" is a powerful look at the reasons why Russia, Britain and America won the Second World War, and why that victory was far from assured. He examines four crucial military campaigns -- the Eastern Front, the war in the Atlantic, the bombing of Germany and the invasion of France in 1944 -- and how these battles decided the course of the war. He also offers a fascinating look at how the Allies used their economic, political and military might to bring the war to a successful conclusion. Overy brings to light many details I had not read about before (for example, the Ford Motor Company produced more war material than the entire nation of Italy), making this book a delight to read. Highly recommended!

[Frederick · Rating 4 out of 5]

While this book is an important resource on World War Two it does not reveal anything particularly new or unique. However, the author does skillfully draw together the factors that made the victory possible for one side and defeat likely for the other. The important thing was that it could have gone the other way with just a couple of things done differently. Germany and Japan could have won, were poised to defeat the world, but key blunders were made and a lack of foresight and understanding of their own inherent weaknesses led them to failure.

Still, I do recommend this book for World War Two buffs and students of history.

[Oliver Hoover · Rating 5 out of 5]

Why the Allies Won, by Richard Overy, is a book about – quite evidently – why the Allies won World War II against the Axis. The book is a purely nonfictional one, analyzing the many facets of both the Allies and the Axis, in terms of industry, government, military force, geographical position, and ideology. So far, I have not finished the book, but that will not stop at least a partial review of this book from being done. So take this review for what it’s worth. The book is written by Richard Overy, a professor of Modern History at King’s College. He has, according to the book flap, written many papers and books on World War II, in particular the parties being written about in the book mentioned above: the Allies and the Axis. In this review, we shall evaluate the book’s arguments, writing style, and reliability.

The book’s arguments center around how it is that the Allies were able to achieve victory over the Axis in World War II. The author looks through many aspects of World War II – industry, military force, two-front campaigns, and so on – and judges that many of them did not necessarily mean that the Allies would inevitably win against the Axis. The issue of industry, as Overy argues, “comes with hindsight. The idea that the whole imperial enterprise was flawed from the outset is a post-war rationalisation”(Overy 315). He then brings up how the USSR oppressed Eastern Europe for 4 decades after World War II, which was the result of military force built up to defeat the military force of the Third Reich. Overy also argues that the two-front war argument for why Germany lost is also dubious. As he writes, “There is no necessary link between military defeat and fighting a two-front war. The United States fought a war on three fronts”(316). Overy also brings up how Germany won the two-front war in World War I by collapsing Russia, but then in a paradoxical fashion lost the one-front war with the Western Entente. Overy also dispels the idea that economics necessarily lead to military victory, citing how China *technically* had a very large economy in the 1930’s, but still suffered huge defeat and genocide at the hands of Japan. The ultimate conclusion from Overy is two-pronged: on the one hand, the Allies required great morale and political will to defeat the Axis. If this morale and will were not there, there would be no motivation to fight the bloodiest war in human history. Negotiations may have occurred, which inevitably would result in concessions to the Axis. The other prong of the matter is strictly military. As Overy compares the Allies to the Coalition partners that defeated Napoleon, he writes, “To win the war the Allies had to learn to fight more effectively… It is no coincidence that Germany was defeated during the nine-month period when all three Allies… put the main weight of their military effort together for the first time”(318). Overy concludes that it was this characteristic superiority that the Allies had over the Axis, which by contrast were exploitative and, ultimately, inefficient.

The writing style is of academic quality, with a certain sense of fascination within. There is also a feeling of a teacher lecturing or reasoning out a subject to his students. Overy poses rhetorical questions throughout his paragraphs before expanding upon the idea he presents. He consistently uses counter arguments and citations to dispel traditional or otherwise easily reasoned positions on the subject matter. One of his main points argued against the ‘post-war rationalisation’ of World War II being already set from the start. After all, he argued, if that were the case and it were so clear and obvious, Hitler and his friends wouldn’t start the war. The writing style is reasoned but firm, carefully considering the opposing viewpoint before competently arguing against it. It is slightly idealistic, what with the less ‘concrete’ factors being what Overy argues helped the Allies win WWII. Overall, the book is written in a sophisticated manner that isn’t esoteric.

The reliability of the book is acceptable. The citation format is with footnotes used in various points of the writing, with the citations and an appendix for the sources in the back. Like a PhD dissertation (except roughly twice as long), there are hundreds upon hundreds of citations, both secondary and primary evidence. The secondary evidence, such as other historians or professors of history, is mainly used to show the viewpoints Overy argues against, though every now and then he uses a secondary source he agrees with. The primary sources, on the other hand, are used to support Overy’s position. These primary sources take the form of quotes, statistics, and battle strategies. The book can thus be considered trustworthy in information.

In my opinion, I would most definitely recommend the book for anyone willing to sit through hundreds of pages of detailed historical analysis. It is by no means a light book, and less of a book to read when you are bored. If you are not interested in history to begin with, you will just be more bored. In other words, don’t read this book at the airport or on the airplane. However, if you have time to spare and have a keen interest in the subject matter, Richard Overy’s book is a definite read. It is well argued, well written, and well sourced, and should be read if one wants to be intellectually stimulated.

[Rick Wong · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a good reference book as well, somewhere between beginner and expert. Overy goes into the different aspects of WW2, not just the obvious military side, but the economical, the moral side, technological, and each of the main world leaders. A couple good numbers references for papers.

[Michael Leach]

Although I am fully aware of the progress of the three fronts during WWII, this book shows them all in the same book and reveals how they were interconnected. I am taking a wild guess here, but I think this one turns out okay for the Allies

[Rick · Rating 5 out of 5]

I know a lot of military history but this book really showed events from a fresh angle.

R

[Nishant Pappireddi · Rating 5 out of 5]

This was a very informative book that talked about the various causes of Allied victory, and refuted the impression that it was inevitable because of their material wealth alone.

[Laurent Franckx · Rating 2 out of 5]

I had thoroughly enjoyed Overy's "Blood and ruins", which I consider among the best books ever written on the subject of the Second World War ( see https://www.goodreads.com/review/show... for my review).
"Why the Allies won" is now almost 30 years old, and numerous important new books have been written on that specific topic over these 3 decades. I am much less impressed by it than by Overy's recent masterpiece.
To be clear, I completely agree with Overy's rejection of deterministic explanations of the Allied victory. Especially social media such as Quora are filled with posts going like "hahaha, stupid Germans and Japanese, thinking they could beat demographic and economic superpowers, they never stood a chance". As Overy correctly argues, this type of argument completely overlooks the importance of the moral factor. For instance, it is correct that even a defeat at Midway would not have prevented the US to build a new fleet of aircraft carriers at breackneck speed and that the Japanase did not have the logistical resources to invade Hawaii, let alone the continental US. However, this overlooks the psychological impact that yet an additional defeat could have had on the American public, who, after all, was not fighting an existantial war at any point and was less likely than others to go all the way in order to win the war. A similar consideration also applies to the landings in Normandy, where a few factors could have tipped the balance in favor of the Germans. (By the ay, Overy gives Midway as an example of a battle that was won by the ostensibly weaker party, but doesn't mention the role of sheer luck in the American victory. )
However, after 400 pages, it is not clear to me what Overy's point really is. Yes, it is true that the mobilisation of industrial resources by the USSR and the US only started to be really felt on the battlefield as from 1944. But it is only then that the Axes actually started suffering disastrous defeat after disastrous defeat: 1943 was a bad year for the Axes, but complete annihilation was still far away.
Overy refers to Stalingrad as an example of the Red Army winning a victory without overwhelming numeric superiority, but forgets to mention that almost all other Soviet offensive operations between the summer of 1942 and the summer of 1943 were complete disasters (no mention is made of the "meat grinder" of Rzhev, for instance). Also, Overy's point that the Red Army did not enjoy a numeric superiority at that point is dubious in itself: it overlooks that the Red Army continuously replenished its troops in Stalingrad with barely trained conscripts, who served as cannon fodder to divert the German's attentions from what was happening at their flanks. The Germans could not afford such a personnel "policy".
The book is more convincing when he points out that the Germans wasted quite a bit of resources because the military overlooked the importance of economies of scale in the production of material, and constantly interfered in the production process to ask for marginal improvements in their weapon systems. It was also interesting to learn how, contrary to the Germans, both the US and the USSR put logistical support at the centre stage of their war effort. However, this reinforces rather than weakens the point that material superiority made the difference : it just explains that the Allies were better at getting the most out of crude resources than the Axes.
Overy is also correct to point out that, at the strategic and operational level, the Allied quickly learned from their mistakes, and that, by 1945, both the US and the Red Army had changed beyond recognition compared to their 1941. However, Overy does not mention that there is widespread agreement that, at the tactical level, the Germans overclassed their opponents until the very end. Even when, in the final stage, the Red Army enjoyed an overwhelming material superiory, its losses remained staggeringly high, which suggests serious shortcomings at the junior levels of the command chain. Superior quantities really did matter a lot.
The overall book is thus far from convincing, but still contains a lot of interesting points.
If you are already familiar with the "battle history" of World War 2, I would suggest skipping the chapters on Midway, Stalingard, Kursk, and the Battle of Normandy, and concentrate on the discussion of the battle of the Atlantic, the bombing campaigns, and on industrial and scientific mobilisation.
Note 1: Adam Tooze's more recent "The wages of destruction" (see https://www.goodreads.com/review/show... ) argues against the case that the German's mismanaged the mobilsation of their material resources. It would be interesting to see both authors debate this point.
Note 2: In "Brute Force", John Ellis makes the opposite claim as Overy, but I haven't read the book yet. Same applies to "How the War Was Won" by Phillips O'Brien. So many books, so little time.