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The Most Dangerous Enemy: A History of the Battle of Britain
Already hailed as the standard work, The Most Dangerous Enemy is an authoritative history of the British battle that galvanized the public imagination and symbolized the destiny of a nation. But in this rigorous re-investigation of the Battle of Britain, Stephen Bungay tells a story full of revelations. Whether assessing the development of radar or the relative merits of the Spitfire, Hurricane, and Messerschmitt, he uncovers the unexpected truth behind many time-honored myths. Not only a major work of modern history but also a truly compelling narrative, The Most Dangerous Enemy confirms the Battle of Britain as a crucial event in European history.
512 pages, Paperback
First published August 5, 2000
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 86 reviews
August 4, 2020
"Achtung, Indianer!" A solid introduction to the Battle of Britain. A look at both sides from the politicians and the strategic goals down to the major forces that fought, the geography and airspace, the machines, the tactics and finally the men who fought and died or lived. Bungay covers every relevant aspect of the battle clearly, logically and with humor or serious commentary as the scene demands. The RAF and the Luftwaffe are both covered in enough detail to satisfy the WWII expert yet makes it all easy to understand for the novice. A permanent place on my WWII shelf-I just need to find a HC to replace my slightly tattered softcover. 5 Stars
December 29, 2014
Though many books have been written on the Battle of Britain since the end of the Second World War, Stephen Bungay's book offers some fresh insights on the Battle.
Using material from both British and German sources, Bungay shows that the Luftwaffe, despite its impressive show of strength from Poland to the defeat of France in June 1940, was not capable of waging a strategic bombing campaign against Britain which could have defeated it. An invasion of Britain could only have succeeded through a concerted effort of the German Army, Navy, and Luftwaffe.
Furthermore, the German leadership was not wholly confident that Germany could defeat Britain. For a short time after France had fallen, it had hoped that Britain would be conciliatory to Germany and sue for peace. But when it became clear that Britain would fight, the Luftwaffe adapted a series of shifting tactics to neutralize and destroy RAF Fighter Command.
First, there were the attacks on shipping in the English Channel and radar stations. Then the Luftwaffe shifted over to attacks on RAF airbases, which, had they been more consistently carried out, might well have "neutered" RAF Fighter Command. Instead, Hitler, in a pique of anger over Britain having dropped bombs on Berlin, set the Luftwaffe to bombing London. This gave RAF Fighter Command the breathing space it needed to rest, refit, and take on the Luftwaffe in larger numbers. (Bungay shows that throughout the Battle, British aircraft production increased significantly relative to German aircraft production.)
Germany, full of hubris in the summer of 1940, made the mistake of underestimating the capacity of the RAF to challenge the Luftwaffe and Britain's will to fight for its survival.
The book is well-written, comprehensive, easy to read, and comes HIGHLY RECOMMENDED.
Using material from both British and German sources, Bungay shows that the Luftwaffe, despite its impressive show of strength from Poland to the defeat of France in June 1940, was not capable of waging a strategic bombing campaign against Britain which could have defeated it. An invasion of Britain could only have succeeded through a concerted effort of the German Army, Navy, and Luftwaffe.
Furthermore, the German leadership was not wholly confident that Germany could defeat Britain. For a short time after France had fallen, it had hoped that Britain would be conciliatory to Germany and sue for peace. But when it became clear that Britain would fight, the Luftwaffe adapted a series of shifting tactics to neutralize and destroy RAF Fighter Command.
First, there were the attacks on shipping in the English Channel and radar stations. Then the Luftwaffe shifted over to attacks on RAF airbases, which, had they been more consistently carried out, might well have "neutered" RAF Fighter Command. Instead, Hitler, in a pique of anger over Britain having dropped bombs on Berlin, set the Luftwaffe to bombing London. This gave RAF Fighter Command the breathing space it needed to rest, refit, and take on the Luftwaffe in larger numbers. (Bungay shows that throughout the Battle, British aircraft production increased significantly relative to German aircraft production.)
Germany, full of hubris in the summer of 1940, made the mistake of underestimating the capacity of the RAF to challenge the Luftwaffe and Britain's will to fight for its survival.
The book is well-written, comprehensive, easy to read, and comes HIGHLY RECOMMENDED.
March 29, 2016
A solid overview of the fight for areal suppremacy prior to the Nazi invasion of England. The daily actions are reported in considerable detail, sometimes a bit too much for my taste, but intersected by informed chapters on doctrine, radar, machines and men.
Bungay sometimes puts his points too bluntly and a few statements border on Anglophile, while he shows himself to be capable of sound reasoning when he notices how the importance of Fighter Command dawns on Kesselring, or, intriguingly, how the Blitz on London in the later stage of the battle was the manifestation of a combined strategy of RAF attrition & of an economic stranglehold on Britain.
- "Sealion was a bad plan. eagle, barely a plan at all, amounted to little more than flying over England, dropping bombs on various things and shooting down any fighters which came up as a result" - "the Battle of Britain took the course it did because the major decision-makers in the Luftwaffe did not know or understand what was actually going on."
Bungay sometimes puts his points too bluntly and a few statements border on Anglophile, while he shows himself to be capable of sound reasoning when he notices how the importance of Fighter Command dawns on Kesselring, or, intriguingly, how the Blitz on London in the later stage of the battle was the manifestation of a combined strategy of RAF attrition & of an economic stranglehold on Britain.
- "Sealion was a bad plan. eagle, barely a plan at all, amounted to little more than flying over England, dropping bombs on various things and shooting down any fighters which came up as a result" - "the Battle of Britain took the course it did because the major decision-makers in the Luftwaffe did not know or understand what was actually going on."
February 24, 2014
The Most Dangerous Book: A Distortion of the Battle of Britain
To begin with the positives, this book is well researched and well written. In particular I enjoyed the chapter dedicated to the development of the Spitfire and Hurricane. Unfortunately that is where the positives end, there is nothing new in this book.
After 20 pages I was almost ready to give up on this book, however I persevered only to find my disappointment grew and grew. I bought the book based on reviews and recommendations from people constantly saying that this is the one true book on the Battle of Britain ... it has almost achieved biblical status amongst some circles. When I reached page 200 I realised that I had only read a handful of pages relating to actual events during the battle the rest was about how Churchill was the main factor in Britain's victory, how inefficient and incompetent the German's were and in general how the British and their allies were destined to win no matter what. It became more and more obvious that the author had a pre-determined agenda to prove how bad the Luftwaffe was. This is where the extensive research comes into its own, in finding the most appropriate evidence to support the authors theory, discounting evidence that contradicts it and misrepresenting information and facts to suit.
For example the topic of combat claims is raised, on the one hand the author states that this is understandable on the part of the RAF due to the "fog of war" then suggests that Luftwaffe over claims were in part due to fraudulent reporting. There is no evidence provided to back up either claim whether it is correct or not. The author also states that over-claims are regularly 2:1 but with clever manipulation (something the author is good at) it can be proved that the RAF over claims were almost 3:1 (from 10th July to 11th August the author says that there were 216 German aircraft destroyed in combat; actual RAF claims for the same period including confirmed, unconfirmed and duplicate claims is somewhere in the region of 600).
Another example relates to German intelligence reports at the beginning of the battle and how this proves the Germans were incompetent. The author takes four points raised in a report produced on 16th July whereas the report actually includes more than twenty separate statements. Having read a translation of the report it is clear that the author has chosen carefully which parts to summarise and in the process twisting the facts to suit his theory:
From the book - "Both the Hurricane and Spitfire were inferior to the Bf109F (which was not yet in production) and only a skilfully handled Spitfire was better than the Bf110."
From the report - "In view of the combat performance and the fact that they are not yet equipped with cannon guns both types are inferior to the Me109, while the individual Me110 is inferior to skilfully handled Spitfires."
It must be remembered that from combat experience the German's would be partially correct in this assumption, the only time the two types had met in serious combat was over France and Belgium and following the Battle of France the performance of both the Hurricane and Spitfire were increased by improving the propellers and introducing a higher grade fuel.
From the book - "The number of operational airfields in Southern England was severely limited."
From the report - "In the ground organisation there is a considerable number of airstrips in the southern part of the island and in some areas of the north. However, only a limited number can be considered as operational airfields with modern maintenance and supply installations. In general, the well-equipped airfields are used as take-off and landing bases, while the numerous smaller airfields located in the vicinity serve as alternate landing grounds and rest bases."
In my opinion the German report is correct and the version in the book is a misrepresentation of what appears in the report. The report says there were a considerable number of airstrips with only a limited number being operational ... there may have been 40 or 50 airfields identified in the south but only 9 of those were sector stations, the main operational hubs. This is a limited number just 20-25%. The author has summarised this by saying the Germans believed there were a SEVERLY limited number which is incorrect.
From the book - "The British aircraft industry was producing 180-300 frontline fighters a month (the true figure for July was 496) and would decrease."
From the report - "At present the British aircraft industry produces 180-300 first line fighters and 140 first line bombers a month. In view of the present conditions relating to production (the appearance of raw material difficulties, the disruption or breakdown of production and factories owing to air attacks, the increased vulnerability to air attack owing to the fundamental reorganisation of the aircraft industry now in progress), it is believed that for the time being output will decrease rather than increase."
I believe the estimates regarding British fighter production are not wrong as such, just outdated. If the June figures for production are available (the latest at the time of the report) the average production rate over the previous six months would have been 250 fighters per month, if production figures were only available from May (the first month the British broke through the 300 per month mark) then the average over the previous six months would have been 190 fighters per month. By throwing in the production figure for July, a figure that no one could have known at the time of the report, the author of the book is manipulating the evidence, yet again, to prove his theory. As for the decrease in production predicted by the Germans this did actually happen and it would not be until Feb 1941 that the production rates would be back up to the figure achieved in July 1940. The average production rate of fighters for the six months following July were in the region of 420 per month.
In document WP (40) 427: Second Report on the Ministry of Aircraft production it states for September 1940 "We lost 300 machines as compared with August output" in relation to production of all aircraft types. It also goes on to say that one of the biggest worries is not from direct attack but from the time lost during air raid warnings where some factories were losing 50% of their production time.
From the book - "Command at all levels was inflexible, with fighters being rigidly tied to their home bases, and station commanders were non-flyers (most flew regularly)."
From the report - "Command at high level is inflexible in its organisation and strategy. As formations are rigidly attached to their home bases, command at medium level suffers mainly from operations being controlled in most cases by officers no longer accustomed to flying (station commanders). Command at low level is generally energetic but lacks tactical skill."
The above seems to be a good assessment of the experience gained in the skies above France, the main source of the Luftwaffe's knowledge at the time of the report. It was also contrary to the way the Germans did things. As history would prove, this rigidity in the command and control structure would be one of the RAF's greatest assets. To the Luftwaffe this concept was alien and therefore, in their eyes at least, flawed. Why the author of the book had to emphasise the incorrect statement that station commanders were non-flyers is just another example of his need to bend the truth to suit his theory. The German report says that station commanders are no longer accustomed to flying NOT that they were non-flyers. In fact this is true, station commanders rarely took part in operational flying except as observers. The Germans felt this was a weakness because it meant that those devising the everyday tactics were out of touch. What they didn't realise was that once the enemy was sighted it was the low level commanders (the squadron and flight leaders) that determined how the enemy should be engaged. They were the ones adapting and modifying the tactics as their experience grew.
The above examples are mainly taken from just one page of the book but are representative of the many, many areas of the text that show the authors true intentions. I have called this book "The Most Dangerous Book" because I believe it purposely misleads the reader.
Buy this book by all means, it is a reasonable read and well written but please, please, please I urge all who buy it, DO NOT make this the one book on the Battle of Britain that you own and take the analysis offered with a pinch of salt. There are far better sources of information out there and relying on this book will give you a false perspective on the events of the Summer and Autumn of 1940. Try the Battle of Britain Historical Society website for example, a much more rounded, unbiased account of events or the book "Battle of Britain: A day-to-day chronicle, 10 July-31 October 1940" by Patrick Bishop.
To begin with the positives, this book is well researched and well written. In particular I enjoyed the chapter dedicated to the development of the Spitfire and Hurricane. Unfortunately that is where the positives end, there is nothing new in this book.
After 20 pages I was almost ready to give up on this book, however I persevered only to find my disappointment grew and grew. I bought the book based on reviews and recommendations from people constantly saying that this is the one true book on the Battle of Britain ... it has almost achieved biblical status amongst some circles. When I reached page 200 I realised that I had only read a handful of pages relating to actual events during the battle the rest was about how Churchill was the main factor in Britain's victory, how inefficient and incompetent the German's were and in general how the British and their allies were destined to win no matter what. It became more and more obvious that the author had a pre-determined agenda to prove how bad the Luftwaffe was. This is where the extensive research comes into its own, in finding the most appropriate evidence to support the authors theory, discounting evidence that contradicts it and misrepresenting information and facts to suit.
For example the topic of combat claims is raised, on the one hand the author states that this is understandable on the part of the RAF due to the "fog of war" then suggests that Luftwaffe over claims were in part due to fraudulent reporting. There is no evidence provided to back up either claim whether it is correct or not. The author also states that over-claims are regularly 2:1 but with clever manipulation (something the author is good at) it can be proved that the RAF over claims were almost 3:1 (from 10th July to 11th August the author says that there were 216 German aircraft destroyed in combat; actual RAF claims for the same period including confirmed, unconfirmed and duplicate claims is somewhere in the region of 600).
Another example relates to German intelligence reports at the beginning of the battle and how this proves the Germans were incompetent. The author takes four points raised in a report produced on 16th July whereas the report actually includes more than twenty separate statements. Having read a translation of the report it is clear that the author has chosen carefully which parts to summarise and in the process twisting the facts to suit his theory:
From the book - "Both the Hurricane and Spitfire were inferior to the Bf109F (which was not yet in production) and only a skilfully handled Spitfire was better than the Bf110."
From the report - "In view of the combat performance and the fact that they are not yet equipped with cannon guns both types are inferior to the Me109, while the individual Me110 is inferior to skilfully handled Spitfires."
It must be remembered that from combat experience the German's would be partially correct in this assumption, the only time the two types had met in serious combat was over France and Belgium and following the Battle of France the performance of both the Hurricane and Spitfire were increased by improving the propellers and introducing a higher grade fuel.
From the book - "The number of operational airfields in Southern England was severely limited."
From the report - "In the ground organisation there is a considerable number of airstrips in the southern part of the island and in some areas of the north. However, only a limited number can be considered as operational airfields with modern maintenance and supply installations. In general, the well-equipped airfields are used as take-off and landing bases, while the numerous smaller airfields located in the vicinity serve as alternate landing grounds and rest bases."
In my opinion the German report is correct and the version in the book is a misrepresentation of what appears in the report. The report says there were a considerable number of airstrips with only a limited number being operational ... there may have been 40 or 50 airfields identified in the south but only 9 of those were sector stations, the main operational hubs. This is a limited number just 20-25%. The author has summarised this by saying the Germans believed there were a SEVERLY limited number which is incorrect.
From the book - "The British aircraft industry was producing 180-300 frontline fighters a month (the true figure for July was 496) and would decrease."
From the report - "At present the British aircraft industry produces 180-300 first line fighters and 140 first line bombers a month. In view of the present conditions relating to production (the appearance of raw material difficulties, the disruption or breakdown of production and factories owing to air attacks, the increased vulnerability to air attack owing to the fundamental reorganisation of the aircraft industry now in progress), it is believed that for the time being output will decrease rather than increase."
I believe the estimates regarding British fighter production are not wrong as such, just outdated. If the June figures for production are available (the latest at the time of the report) the average production rate over the previous six months would have been 250 fighters per month, if production figures were only available from May (the first month the British broke through the 300 per month mark) then the average over the previous six months would have been 190 fighters per month. By throwing in the production figure for July, a figure that no one could have known at the time of the report, the author of the book is manipulating the evidence, yet again, to prove his theory. As for the decrease in production predicted by the Germans this did actually happen and it would not be until Feb 1941 that the production rates would be back up to the figure achieved in July 1940. The average production rate of fighters for the six months following July were in the region of 420 per month.
In document WP (40) 427: Second Report on the Ministry of Aircraft production it states for September 1940 "We lost 300 machines as compared with August output" in relation to production of all aircraft types. It also goes on to say that one of the biggest worries is not from direct attack but from the time lost during air raid warnings where some factories were losing 50% of their production time.
From the book - "Command at all levels was inflexible, with fighters being rigidly tied to their home bases, and station commanders were non-flyers (most flew regularly)."
From the report - "Command at high level is inflexible in its organisation and strategy. As formations are rigidly attached to their home bases, command at medium level suffers mainly from operations being controlled in most cases by officers no longer accustomed to flying (station commanders). Command at low level is generally energetic but lacks tactical skill."
The above seems to be a good assessment of the experience gained in the skies above France, the main source of the Luftwaffe's knowledge at the time of the report. It was also contrary to the way the Germans did things. As history would prove, this rigidity in the command and control structure would be one of the RAF's greatest assets. To the Luftwaffe this concept was alien and therefore, in their eyes at least, flawed. Why the author of the book had to emphasise the incorrect statement that station commanders were non-flyers is just another example of his need to bend the truth to suit his theory. The German report says that station commanders are no longer accustomed to flying NOT that they were non-flyers. In fact this is true, station commanders rarely took part in operational flying except as observers. The Germans felt this was a weakness because it meant that those devising the everyday tactics were out of touch. What they didn't realise was that once the enemy was sighted it was the low level commanders (the squadron and flight leaders) that determined how the enemy should be engaged. They were the ones adapting and modifying the tactics as their experience grew.
The above examples are mainly taken from just one page of the book but are representative of the many, many areas of the text that show the authors true intentions. I have called this book "The Most Dangerous Book" because I believe it purposely misleads the reader.
Buy this book by all means, it is a reasonable read and well written but please, please, please I urge all who buy it, DO NOT make this the one book on the Battle of Britain that you own and take the analysis offered with a pinch of salt. There are far better sources of information out there and relying on this book will give you a false perspective on the events of the Summer and Autumn of 1940. Try the Battle of Britain Historical Society website for example, a much more rounded, unbiased account of events or the book "Battle of Britain: A day-to-day chronicle, 10 July-31 October 1940" by Patrick Bishop.
June 27, 2021
The Battle of Britain stands out among the long list of military clashes for a number of reasons. A struggle for air superiority over the skies of southern England, it was the first battle ever waged entirely in the skies. By successfully holding off the Luftwaffe’s aerial onslaught, the British forestalled an invasion in 1940, guaranteeing that the Germans would face a two-front war when Hitler focused the Nazi war machine on the Soviet Union the following year.
Many accounts of the battle have been written, from memoirs by the pilots to narratives from academic historians. In this respect Stephen Bungay’s qualifications stand out; a former business consultant and insurance executive, he brings a different approach to examining the conflict. Taking the fall of France as his starting point, he intersperses his narrative of the battle (which is largely free of the management jargon that might be expected given his background) with chapters examining various factors in the struggle, from the performances of the planes deployed to the command structures of the two sides. Here he draws upon both his training and his command of German to provide a more balanced assessment of the two sides. What emerges is a provocative argument that the German effort was hopeless, requiring exhausted pilots to achieve statistically unrealistic ratios of combat victories in conditions that favored their opponents.
Such an unusual conclusion might fly in the face of the mythology surrounding the famous “Few”, yet Bungay’s analysis is persuasive in marshaling the numbers to prove its point. Combined with a thorough summary of the campaign, it makes this book the best overview of the Battle of Britain. If there is a flaw, it lies in Bungay’s rather narrow scope of study, as he only takes into account events from the 1930s onward and largely overlooks the many studies of the “first Battle of Britain” that could have shed light on many of the attitudes participants brought to the campaign. Yet this is a minor flaw in what is otherwise an excellent study of a pivotal struggle of the Second World War.
Many accounts of the battle have been written, from memoirs by the pilots to narratives from academic historians. In this respect Stephen Bungay’s qualifications stand out; a former business consultant and insurance executive, he brings a different approach to examining the conflict. Taking the fall of France as his starting point, he intersperses his narrative of the battle (which is largely free of the management jargon that might be expected given his background) with chapters examining various factors in the struggle, from the performances of the planes deployed to the command structures of the two sides. Here he draws upon both his training and his command of German to provide a more balanced assessment of the two sides. What emerges is a provocative argument that the German effort was hopeless, requiring exhausted pilots to achieve statistically unrealistic ratios of combat victories in conditions that favored their opponents.
Such an unusual conclusion might fly in the face of the mythology surrounding the famous “Few”, yet Bungay’s analysis is persuasive in marshaling the numbers to prove its point. Combined with a thorough summary of the campaign, it makes this book the best overview of the Battle of Britain. If there is a flaw, it lies in Bungay’s rather narrow scope of study, as he only takes into account events from the 1930s onward and largely overlooks the many studies of the “first Battle of Britain” that could have shed light on many of the attitudes participants brought to the campaign. Yet this is a minor flaw in what is otherwise an excellent study of a pivotal struggle of the Second World War.
November 23, 2013
-Exhaustivo pero ameno.-
Género. Ensayo.
Lo que nos cuenta. Extenso repaso del enfrentamiento entre Alemania y Gran Bretaña sobre los cielos de esta última durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial, con exposición clara de los importantes antecedentes políticos británicos que marcaron los derroteros del combate, de la visión militar del asunto que tenía Alemania, de los equipos con los que se luchó tanto desde el punto de vista técnico como del de planificación, y finalmente la narración de la propia lucha salpicada de datos y análisis de quienes tomaron las decisiones más importantes pero también de los que lucharon, sufrieron y murieron.
¿Quiere saber más de este libro, sin spoilers? Visite:
http://librosdeolethros.blogspot.com/...
Género. Ensayo.
Lo que nos cuenta. Extenso repaso del enfrentamiento entre Alemania y Gran Bretaña sobre los cielos de esta última durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial, con exposición clara de los importantes antecedentes políticos británicos que marcaron los derroteros del combate, de la visión militar del asunto que tenía Alemania, de los equipos con los que se luchó tanto desde el punto de vista técnico como del de planificación, y finalmente la narración de la propia lucha salpicada de datos y análisis de quienes tomaron las decisiones más importantes pero también de los que lucharon, sufrieron y murieron.
¿Quiere saber más de este libro, sin spoilers? Visite:
http://librosdeolethros.blogspot.com/...
August 29, 2011
Battle of Britain is probably the most covered topic in military aviation literature and there must be literally hundreds of titles covering the topic in English language alone. Through the years I have managed to read quite a few of them and I can say that 'The Most Dangerous Enemy' is without a doubt the best of them. First of all, author manages to stay focused and balanced both in his narrative and analysis of events. Both antagonists get same amount of coverage, while critique and prize are dealt out where appropriate, regardless of the side. Furthermore, the book is perfectly balanced in another respect - personal experiences, technological aspects of the conflict and overview of large scale events are dealt with in separate chapters with focus on single well-defined topic. It may sound strange based solely on my description, but this writing technique seems perfectly suited for coverage of Battle of Britain. It allows the reader to keep solid track of the events as they unfolded, understand the high level decisions and at the same time never lets him forget the human costs and sacrifices required by both sides.
For those that are familiar with this clash between Luftwaffe and RAF some seventy years ago, I'd recommend this book for a different reason - conclusions of Stephen Bungay regarding the Battle, its outcome and consequences may be controversial and challenge traditional opinions, but I dare to say that they deserve some afterthought.
If there is any criticism that this book deserves then it's the fact that, if one is to draw conclusions from the references, the author relied predominantly on English sources. Also, I found it a bit annoying that Stephen Bungay seems to have problems with deciding in how to present foreign pilots in RAF service and their role in the Battle of Britain.
For those that are familiar with this clash between Luftwaffe and RAF some seventy years ago, I'd recommend this book for a different reason - conclusions of Stephen Bungay regarding the Battle, its outcome and consequences may be controversial and challenge traditional opinions, but I dare to say that they deserve some afterthought.
If there is any criticism that this book deserves then it's the fact that, if one is to draw conclusions from the references, the author relied predominantly on English sources. Also, I found it a bit annoying that Stephen Bungay seems to have problems with deciding in how to present foreign pilots in RAF service and their role in the Battle of Britain.
July 26, 2010
The hardcover edition is a large format (like a coffee table book) but is appropriate because of the excellent illustrations and photos from the Battle of Britain. Bungay's constructed the book as a day-by-day account of the battle, introducing us to people on both sides and how they would fight and die or fight and live.
The author's appraisal was that "the Battle of Britain was not a near-run thing. The Luftwaffe never came close to achieving any of its confused objectives." However, the Luftwaffe pilots had superior tactical skills due to experience and more flexible tactics in dogfighting.
Bungay gives credit to ten people for engineering the British win:
1. Major-General E.B. Ashmore, who set in place the Observer Corps during World War I, giving commanders 23 years later a plotting and reporting system, a map grid, telephone network and gun lines.
2/3. Henry Tizard and Robert Watson-Watt, who pioneeered radio direction-finding, enabling accurate interception strategies.
4. Sydney Camm: design of the Hurricane, an inexpensive and robust fighter that was the backbone of the force in 1940.
5: Reginald Mitchell: designer of the agile Spitfire, an airplane that was capable of handling the 8-machine guns required for aerial fighting. Mitchell would die of cancer in 1937 before production of the first Spitfire.
6: Ernest Hives: developer of the Merlin engine at Rolls-Royce, he also drove the production reforms to get the engine produced in volume.
7. Ralph Sorley: who pushed for heavier armament in the Hurricane and Spitfire, which proved decisive.
8. Hugh Dowding: who put in place the operational command system to track German air attacks and managed resources to maximize damage to the attackers. Bungay also credits him with developing the night-fighting capability missing during the Battle of Britain.
9. Winston Churchill: for deciding to fight the battle, then push to breakdown resource impediments at key points during the war.
10. Keith Park: as leader of Fighter Command, the person most responsible for tactics during the battle. "Even today, with hours of leisure to ponder decisions that he took in minutes, and with full knowledge of hindsight and what the other side were doing, it is hard to find ways of improving on his conduct of operations."
This is a first-class piece of history, in part because he tells dozens of personal stories and is able to disperse some of the fog of war by reviewing operational notes of both sides from each day's fighting.
The author's appraisal was that "the Battle of Britain was not a near-run thing. The Luftwaffe never came close to achieving any of its confused objectives." However, the Luftwaffe pilots had superior tactical skills due to experience and more flexible tactics in dogfighting.
Bungay gives credit to ten people for engineering the British win:
1. Major-General E.B. Ashmore, who set in place the Observer Corps during World War I, giving commanders 23 years later a plotting and reporting system, a map grid, telephone network and gun lines.
2/3. Henry Tizard and Robert Watson-Watt, who pioneeered radio direction-finding, enabling accurate interception strategies.
4. Sydney Camm: design of the Hurricane, an inexpensive and robust fighter that was the backbone of the force in 1940.
5: Reginald Mitchell: designer of the agile Spitfire, an airplane that was capable of handling the 8-machine guns required for aerial fighting. Mitchell would die of cancer in 1937 before production of the first Spitfire.
6: Ernest Hives: developer of the Merlin engine at Rolls-Royce, he also drove the production reforms to get the engine produced in volume.
7. Ralph Sorley: who pushed for heavier armament in the Hurricane and Spitfire, which proved decisive.
8. Hugh Dowding: who put in place the operational command system to track German air attacks and managed resources to maximize damage to the attackers. Bungay also credits him with developing the night-fighting capability missing during the Battle of Britain.
9. Winston Churchill: for deciding to fight the battle, then push to breakdown resource impediments at key points during the war.
10. Keith Park: as leader of Fighter Command, the person most responsible for tactics during the battle. "Even today, with hours of leisure to ponder decisions that he took in minutes, and with full knowledge of hindsight and what the other side were doing, it is hard to find ways of improving on his conduct of operations."
This is a first-class piece of history, in part because he tells dozens of personal stories and is able to disperse some of the fog of war by reviewing operational notes of both sides from each day's fighting.
June 4, 2014
…a tour de force. Quite simply the best account of the Battle of Britain ever written. The research, writing, and the analysis is superb. Bungay presents a nuanced critique backed by massive amounts of data that not only relates what happened but why, and the implications. He dispels many of the myths surrounding the battle. I especially enjoyed his analysis of the leadership, strategy, and tactics, of BOTH sides of the conflict. This is an extremely well-balanced account that gives essentially as much attention to the Germans as it does to the British.
November 14, 2024
My second Battle of Britain in the last few years, both revising the myths attached to it.
From memory comparing the two, this one deals with the politics both before and after the war, with a realistic view on where it left the country after WW2.
Both books go into detail of the positions of both combatants before the start and their tactics and readiness and their positions as the battle develops.
Recommended
From memory comparing the two, this one deals with the politics both before and after the war, with a realistic view on where it left the country after WW2.
Both books go into detail of the positions of both combatants before the start and their tactics and readiness and their positions as the battle develops.
Recommended
July 4, 2017
Brilliantly researched, bloody well written, superb analysis. The only caveat to the 5 stars is that you need to love your WW2 air battles.
December 7, 2018
Very thorough and well-researched. Gives a balanced view of the events and well-argued opinions of the main players.
March 15, 2011
"The Most Dangerous Enemy: An Illustrated History of the Battle of Britain" is spectacular. It merits a five-star rating. It is in a large-format of 11.9 x 9.8 x 1.1 inches. The quality of the book is immaculate. If you are a history buff with an interest in the Battle of Britain this is the book for you. The book is divided into three sections: Part 1: Build-up, Part 2: Battle, and Part 3: Aftermath. It takes you on a journey of understanding. You learn of the organization of the air forces. You learn about the various types of aircraft. You learn of the radar and air defenses as well as air craft production. The detail of the information is astounding.
The book has over 150 photographs. This includes a large number of rare color photos. The book is a treasure full of color maps and diagrams. There are a number of excellent "sidebar" features as well. Using numerous first-hand experience stories Mr. Bungay brings this critical story from history alive in an exciting way. The quality and quantity of the photographs alone is reason enough to purchase the book. He has many never before published pictures of planes, aircraft pilots, and pivotal military leaders. The diagrams of aerial fights add clarity to the story they illustrate.
Well done Stephen Bungay. The book will be an excellent addition to any history buff's library. Any World War II European Theater veteran will enjoy seeing and owning the book. It would make a great addition to school and community libraries.
Reviewers note: I did not compare Stephen Bungay's "The Most Dangerous Enemy: An Illustrated History of the Battle of Britain" with the original release by Stephen Bungay of "The Most Dangerous Enemy: A History of the Battle of Britain". That is not the purpose of this review. The non-illustrated "original" book is the definitive reference work that stands. It is the classic on the subject. "The Most Dangerous Enemy: An Illustrated History of the Battle of Britain" is spectacular and deserves to join its predecessor as the illustrated definitive work on the Battle of Britain. Well done Mr. Stephen Bungay!
The book has over 150 photographs. This includes a large number of rare color photos. The book is a treasure full of color maps and diagrams. There are a number of excellent "sidebar" features as well. Using numerous first-hand experience stories Mr. Bungay brings this critical story from history alive in an exciting way. The quality and quantity of the photographs alone is reason enough to purchase the book. He has many never before published pictures of planes, aircraft pilots, and pivotal military leaders. The diagrams of aerial fights add clarity to the story they illustrate.
Well done Stephen Bungay. The book will be an excellent addition to any history buff's library. Any World War II European Theater veteran will enjoy seeing and owning the book. It would make a great addition to school and community libraries.
Reviewers note: I did not compare Stephen Bungay's "The Most Dangerous Enemy: An Illustrated History of the Battle of Britain" with the original release by Stephen Bungay of "The Most Dangerous Enemy: A History of the Battle of Britain". That is not the purpose of this review. The non-illustrated "original" book is the definitive reference work that stands. It is the classic on the subject. "The Most Dangerous Enemy: An Illustrated History of the Battle of Britain" is spectacular and deserves to join its predecessor as the illustrated definitive work on the Battle of Britain. Well done Mr. Stephen Bungay!
June 4, 2013
In the postscript the author writes: 'Perhaps you too, especially if you are not British, should not completely forget about the Battle of Britain. For this, if anything of ours, is worth your memory'
Stephen Bungay has done a marvelous job of aiding our memory with his encyclopedic account of those tense months during the summer and early autumn of 1940, where 'the few' decisively blunted German attempts so subdue Great Britain. With immaculate research and complete control of the source material he provides a blow-by blow account of the many daily battles. In addition the reader is also introduced to the political decisions stretching back to WW1 that framed and created the conditions for the battle. Most importantly the narration and analysis is also an evident source of passion for the author, who provides compelling and touching portraits of the many civilian and military lives deeply affected by the events.
If any proposals for improvement are to be provided then it seems that more insight could be provided into the intelligence cycle (what was known versus assumed and how was the knowledge brought to bear). In terms of maintaining the overview perhaps more analysis of the actual concept of the opposing operational plans would be helpful, for example in the context of Warden's five rings framework. As to the retelling the the events of the individual days, the September 15th chapter is a model as it is supported by excellent maps.
Nonetheless this among the top-ten military history books I have read and I would strongly recommend to anyone who should not completely forget about the Battle of Britain.
Stephen Bungay has done a marvelous job of aiding our memory with his encyclopedic account of those tense months during the summer and early autumn of 1940, where 'the few' decisively blunted German attempts so subdue Great Britain. With immaculate research and complete control of the source material he provides a blow-by blow account of the many daily battles. In addition the reader is also introduced to the political decisions stretching back to WW1 that framed and created the conditions for the battle. Most importantly the narration and analysis is also an evident source of passion for the author, who provides compelling and touching portraits of the many civilian and military lives deeply affected by the events.
If any proposals for improvement are to be provided then it seems that more insight could be provided into the intelligence cycle (what was known versus assumed and how was the knowledge brought to bear). In terms of maintaining the overview perhaps more analysis of the actual concept of the opposing operational plans would be helpful, for example in the context of Warden's five rings framework. As to the retelling the the events of the individual days, the September 15th chapter is a model as it is supported by excellent maps.
Nonetheless this among the top-ten military history books I have read and I would strongly recommend to anyone who should not completely forget about the Battle of Britain.
October 9, 2025
Wow you can't do better than this fir a derailed yet concise and readable history of the Battle of Britain. While at times the book tends to over emphasize the importance of the Battle and eulogizes Churchill repeatedly there is no denying it's balanced and on the things that matter it captures and presents all sides of the story. However besides being well written what really sets the book apart is the unsentimental but detailed analysis of the numbers especially production and attrition rates. The statistical analysis really explodes a number of myths about the battle and really adds layers to the analysis. If that sounds dry to you however don't be put off as this is an extremely well written book and even the numbers are written in a compelling narrative manner which keeps you involved in the human stories also. I hesitate to mention more simply to avoid spoilers as there are so many interesting new stories you will find out as you go through this. As I said it's extremely readable in a compelling narrative style but always supported by facts and great analysis. I cannot recommend it enough.
August 1, 2019
A very detailed account of the Battle Of Britain. Too detailed for my liking. I wish the book pulled back a little more from the detail and spelled out the key themes of the book - that the British were better at producing aircraft, that their defence strategy was much superior to the German offense strategy, etc. But if you want thorough, authoritative account this is the book. Stephen Bungay has left no stone unturned.
February 20, 2015
A very informative detailed history of the Battle of Britain. A bit of a slog at times but overall enjoyable.
July 3, 2012
Heavy of fact, light on synthesis. Is there not more to writing history then listing facts?
April 10, 2023
"From the point of view of a British fighter pilot, the odds were daunting. When he was scrambled to meet a large formation, the only friendly aircraft he saw were his dozen or so companions. Squadrons like this might often wade into formations of 100 or 150 bombers and fighters, and the Germans always seemed to have more of them. He did not see what happened before or after the ten minutes or so of frantic fighting in which he was usually engaged, and did not know whether in the course of the hour it spent over England, the hostile formation might itself be attacked by a total of 100 or 150 British fighters. He just knew that he was up against it, and this, the feeling that things depended on him and his few pals, acted as a spur to his efforts. Like most soldiers, he had no idea of the overall shape of the battle he was engaged in. He had to keep going up, because there seemed to be nobody else."
A thoroughly researched and in-depth look at the Battle of Britain, The Most Dangerous Enemy goes above and beyond by providing the history of more than just that— it also gives you the history of the RAF, the history and designs of fighter planes and the development of Britain's air defence system. It also covers less hallowed ground, such as the internal rivalry between Group Commanders (11 Group and 12 Group) and between the different Commands (Coastal Command vs Fighter Command).
The Most Dangerous Enemy also provides a balanced picture through its meticulous research of the Luftwaffe fighters, and sheds light on the vacillating decisions made as to whether Operation Sea Lion was viable, and the cascading impact of this indecision on Luftwaffe strategy (or lack thereof). The book also expounds on the internal failures of the Luftwaffe, ranging from miscommunication to non-communication, and the individual struggle for glory that sets it apart from the RAF where glory and death are shared together.
The book also gives analysis on the materiel strength of each side and how the trajectory of their progress looked. It breaks down terms used in reports and explains in detail why numbers can deceive if one were to take it at face level.
Just to share from of my favourite parts of the book:
"The past is always changing. By the end of the century, 1940 had changed, and it is changing still."
"History was always present for Churchill. He understood, perhaps, that the essence of history is the present, for the present is nothing other than what the past has made it, only those most essential elements of the past being retained in the present. That is what makes them essential. One's understanding of the past is therefore a constituent part of one's understand of current events and a guide as to how to act in it. As Taylor observes, 'History was part of his life'."
The book is well-written with good pacing that leaves the reader enough time to digest and absorb information before moving on. However, the book is intense and dense, and while I won't hesitate to recommend it to an avid fan, I would not recommend this to the casual reader. Despite the interesting stories and tidbits, it can be a slog to go through; but if the reader is willing to read it through the end, it will be a highly rewarding and insightful book.
A thoroughly researched and in-depth look at the Battle of Britain, The Most Dangerous Enemy goes above and beyond by providing the history of more than just that— it also gives you the history of the RAF, the history and designs of fighter planes and the development of Britain's air defence system. It also covers less hallowed ground, such as the internal rivalry between Group Commanders (11 Group and 12 Group) and between the different Commands (Coastal Command vs Fighter Command).
The Most Dangerous Enemy also provides a balanced picture through its meticulous research of the Luftwaffe fighters, and sheds light on the vacillating decisions made as to whether Operation Sea Lion was viable, and the cascading impact of this indecision on Luftwaffe strategy (or lack thereof). The book also expounds on the internal failures of the Luftwaffe, ranging from miscommunication to non-communication, and the individual struggle for glory that sets it apart from the RAF where glory and death are shared together.
The book also gives analysis on the materiel strength of each side and how the trajectory of their progress looked. It breaks down terms used in reports and explains in detail why numbers can deceive if one were to take it at face level.
Just to share from of my favourite parts of the book:
"The past is always changing. By the end of the century, 1940 had changed, and it is changing still."
"History was always present for Churchill. He understood, perhaps, that the essence of history is the present, for the present is nothing other than what the past has made it, only those most essential elements of the past being retained in the present. That is what makes them essential. One's understanding of the past is therefore a constituent part of one's understand of current events and a guide as to how to act in it. As Taylor observes, 'History was part of his life'."
The book is well-written with good pacing that leaves the reader enough time to digest and absorb information before moving on. However, the book is intense and dense, and while I won't hesitate to recommend it to an avid fan, I would not recommend this to the casual reader. Despite the interesting stories and tidbits, it can be a slog to go through; but if the reader is willing to read it through the end, it will be a highly rewarding and insightful book.
September 12, 2020
Incredibly well written and thorough account of the Battle of Britain, perhaps the most important battle of the entire Second World War. At least von Rundstedt thought so. 80 years ago to this day, some of the hardest fights of the battle were fought over Britain, and we shouldn't forget what happened, not now, not ever.
The entire Western World were staring into the abyss during those dark summer months, when there were only 13 democracies left in the world, all of which were threatened, given time. But these weeks were perhaps the high-water mark for Great Britain - of all history, and a far cry from today's leadership, or lack of. The Spanish Armada and the armies of Napoleon cannot compare to these days of August and September 1940, because those antagonists were both civilised nations, and would not have extinguished millions, like Hitler and his cronies would and did.
This is as thorough an account that you will ever find, and if the cliché "it reads like a novel" is not appropriate - because it's not a novel, but the stark reality: people died, defending everything.
As one reads the account, it becomes clear that it was never really that close, the Luftwaffe couldn't defeat the RAF - in fact they lost the war of attrition, day in and day out, for almost the entire battle. They never stood a chance, but that wasn't because anything was left to chance. The british, the poles, the canadians, the czechs and pilots from several other nations were not only gallant and brave, but tough, hardened fighters. Those who survived long enough to learn how to surive, and give as good as you got, if not more. This was in no small way due to the effort of just a few men: of course the pilots, but above all their leaders: Winston Churchill, Hugh Dowding and perhaps most of all during the fighting itself, Keith Park. Learning about the immense and hugely important effort they made, it's almost a crime that there is not today a Churchill Square in London, featuring the statues of Park and Dowding on tall plinths in the middle of it. Because they rival both Nelson and Wellington, for their worth to not only the nation of Great Britain, but to all of humanity. We should do well to remember and honor them.
The entire Western World were staring into the abyss during those dark summer months, when there were only 13 democracies left in the world, all of which were threatened, given time. But these weeks were perhaps the high-water mark for Great Britain - of all history, and a far cry from today's leadership, or lack of. The Spanish Armada and the armies of Napoleon cannot compare to these days of August and September 1940, because those antagonists were both civilised nations, and would not have extinguished millions, like Hitler and his cronies would and did.
This is as thorough an account that you will ever find, and if the cliché "it reads like a novel" is not appropriate - because it's not a novel, but the stark reality: people died, defending everything.
As one reads the account, it becomes clear that it was never really that close, the Luftwaffe couldn't defeat the RAF - in fact they lost the war of attrition, day in and day out, for almost the entire battle. They never stood a chance, but that wasn't because anything was left to chance. The british, the poles, the canadians, the czechs and pilots from several other nations were not only gallant and brave, but tough, hardened fighters. Those who survived long enough to learn how to surive, and give as good as you got, if not more. This was in no small way due to the effort of just a few men: of course the pilots, but above all their leaders: Winston Churchill, Hugh Dowding and perhaps most of all during the fighting itself, Keith Park. Learning about the immense and hugely important effort they made, it's almost a crime that there is not today a Churchill Square in London, featuring the statues of Park and Dowding on tall plinths in the middle of it. Because they rival both Nelson and Wellington, for their worth to not only the nation of Great Britain, but to all of humanity. We should do well to remember and honor them.
July 30, 2024
I recently reviewed “The Battle of Britain” by James Holland and I am not sure just why I then went straight away and read “The Most Dangerous Enemy” by Stephen Bungay, but it was a gift from someone who knew I had an interest in the subject and they would expect me to talk to them about the book. The books are very similar in both tone and detail. I would recommend them both. Bungay spends less time on covering the Army, Navy and Air Forces of all sides but makes up for this with more statistics. As with Holland’s book, there are lots of quotes and comments by those who took part.
Again there is much emphasis on the lost opportunities by all sides, the brilliance of some commanders and the incompetence of others. There is a very interesting discussion on , Trafford Leigh-Mallory, Officer Commanding Fighter Group 12 during the Battle of Britain with his “big wing” concept and Douglas Bader’s influence on it and the way they used their political influence against the real heros of the Battle, Hugh Dowding, Air Officer Commanding, Fighter Command, the man who not only organised Britain’s air defences, but introduced the early warning RADAR system prior to war breaking out, and Keith Park, Officer Commanding Fighter Group 11, whose fighter pilots bore the brunt of the fighting. Neither Leigh-Mallory nor Bader come out in a good light: a bit of a surprise as Bader’s “Reach for the Sky” had been one of my GCE English Literature compulsory reads and I thought him such a hero.
The Battle of Britain needs to be seen in the mega view as much of what happened makes little sense otherwise and this book clears much of the fog of war.
At the end of the book the author indulges in some philosophical musings.
Again there is much emphasis on the lost opportunities by all sides, the brilliance of some commanders and the incompetence of others. There is a very interesting discussion on , Trafford Leigh-Mallory, Officer Commanding Fighter Group 12 during the Battle of Britain with his “big wing” concept and Douglas Bader’s influence on it and the way they used their political influence against the real heros of the Battle, Hugh Dowding, Air Officer Commanding, Fighter Command, the man who not only organised Britain’s air defences, but introduced the early warning RADAR system prior to war breaking out, and Keith Park, Officer Commanding Fighter Group 11, whose fighter pilots bore the brunt of the fighting. Neither Leigh-Mallory nor Bader come out in a good light: a bit of a surprise as Bader’s “Reach for the Sky” had been one of my GCE English Literature compulsory reads and I thought him such a hero.
The Battle of Britain needs to be seen in the mega view as much of what happened makes little sense otherwise and this book clears much of the fog of war.
At the end of the book the author indulges in some philosophical musings.
December 31, 2018
Very good account of the Battle of Britain - with some flaws.
Accessible, readable history of the aerial battle of attrition between the Luftwaffe and the RAF in the late summer of 1940. Bungay's book successfully presents both the technical details (dates, places, numbers involved, aircraft types, nationalities and losses) alongside the emotional and personal cost of the conflict.
For me, the particular strength of the book is the description within the opening chapters of the shifting sands of the UK's political leadership and sensibilities (Chamberlain to Churchill, Government of national unity, tensions over foreign policy) and also the dynamic of Hitler (probably) wanting to seek peace with the British quickly, thus allowing him to concentrate efforts and materials to "the East" and expand German interests beyond Poland into the USSR.
In "All Hell Let Loose", Max Hastings makes a compelling case that the USSR and China deserve far greater credit for the ultimate defeat of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan during the Second World War (his point being that they are both largely written out of Western history in this regard). However, in "The Most Dangerous Enemy" we read of the crucial (and singular effort) the British, Commonwealth and Polish aircrews made in keeping the war against Nazi Germany "alive" and its ultimate defeat possible.
Very well researched, if slightly long and repetitive in parts (an editorial rather authorial problem). Only let down by the tedious feminine metaphors applied to the main fighter aircraft (Spitfire as a "lady", Hurricane as a "Country Girl" and Messerschmidt as a "Vamp").
Accessible, readable history of the aerial battle of attrition between the Luftwaffe and the RAF in the late summer of 1940. Bungay's book successfully presents both the technical details (dates, places, numbers involved, aircraft types, nationalities and losses) alongside the emotional and personal cost of the conflict.
For me, the particular strength of the book is the description within the opening chapters of the shifting sands of the UK's political leadership and sensibilities (Chamberlain to Churchill, Government of national unity, tensions over foreign policy) and also the dynamic of Hitler (probably) wanting to seek peace with the British quickly, thus allowing him to concentrate efforts and materials to "the East" and expand German interests beyond Poland into the USSR.
In "All Hell Let Loose", Max Hastings makes a compelling case that the USSR and China deserve far greater credit for the ultimate defeat of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan during the Second World War (his point being that they are both largely written out of Western history in this regard). However, in "The Most Dangerous Enemy" we read of the crucial (and singular effort) the British, Commonwealth and Polish aircrews made in keeping the war against Nazi Germany "alive" and its ultimate defeat possible.
Very well researched, if slightly long and repetitive in parts (an editorial rather authorial problem). Only let down by the tedious feminine metaphors applied to the main fighter aircraft (Spitfire as a "lady", Hurricane as a "Country Girl" and Messerschmidt as a "Vamp").
August 20, 2018
Stephen Bungay has written a superb, insightful, and fascinating book about the Battle of Britain and the RAF during the beginning of WWII. I would recommend this fine military history to anyone who is interested in this critical time of the history of WWII. Stephen Bungay writes with precision and ease of style on all of the aspects that made up the opposing forces, German and British, including the Polish flyers in the RAF Polish squadrons. Their leadership, aircraft, logistics, tactical and strategic plans, coupled with political overtones of the time, both Hitler's and Goring's influence on the German Air Force, and the competition within the British RAF between Hugh Dowding and other leaders of the RAF, provided what was the best decisions for being successful. This is a fine study, comprehensive, insightful and useful road map to a dramatic period during WWII, where so much hung in the outcome of this aerial engagement. As is his style, and one reason I believe Stephen Bungay is so effective as a writer, he examines with a critical eye, the key personalities and their leadership, and this makes this book even more valuable in its lessons that the reader will take with them. It is well worth the investment of time to read this outstanding history by this superb author.
December 28, 2017
A marvellous account, very detailed and thorough. When Gerd von Rundstedt was asked by soviet interviewers after the war which battle he considered the most important, he answered not Stalingrad, but the Battle of Britain. It probably was. If it had been lost, the last vestige of democracy in Europe would have been extinguished, whoever prevailed of Nazi-Germany or Communist Soviet Union. There would have been no dawn, for man. A few people, most notably Churchill, Hugh Downing, Keith Park and those who developed the Spitfire, the Hurricane and the Merlin motor that powered both, made it possible to stand up to the danger. Of course they were not alone, there were thousands, engineers, Navy men and women, the Observer Corpse, the radar personell, and of course the utterly brave pilots, who did their foremost to win, not only the Battle, but the war itself. They prevailed, as we know, but how many of us know the details of the day to day operations itself, the people involved, the judgment of errors and the brilliant defense orchestrated? Let's hope one day there will be a film like "Dunkirk" that can give some notion of how mortal the danger was, how close we came to utter devastation, if not for these few.
May 22, 2023
For anyone seeking an understanding of the Battle of Britain and its reality rather than the story as told in the movies, this book deserves the highest recommendation. But that recommendation comes with a couple of provisos. What the author has done very well is to explain the human side of the battle in terms of the British and the German participants. He has also given an excellent post battle analysis, again focussed on the human and political outcomes. It does also mention some of the key scientific advances that are important to this battle. However these, and the way that both sides used them, are not as well covered as maybe they could have been - in some ways they seem to have been swept under the carpet of the people flying the planes and commanding the battle. For the reader seeking a good understanding of the battle from the political and human perspective this book is excellent and that may be enough. But for anyone wanting to fully understand it will be necessary to read further. I'd recommend reading Fighter by Len Deighton and Instruments of Darkness by Alfred Price as these will fill in the technological gaps and complete the picture. Despite my reservations - I think this book is excellent and it warrants a 5-star rating.
August 21, 2018
I read this sometime ago but thought I would do a retrospective review.
This really is a very good read.
It documents the battle and what happens behind the scenes in an interesting and engaging way.
What I really liked is the way it tried to dispel some of the myths around arial combat in that period.
It wasn't a time of chivalry and honour, there were no "White Knights" of the sky who jousted around the clouds to glorious deaths.
Quite often pilots were killed as they taxied, landed or were blasted by enemies they never even saw.
The realities of the campaign are also laied out.
Although important the Battle of Britain was never about defending the shores of Britain from a Nazi invasion fleet.
The invasion plan was pure fantasy and were never going to happen.
It also takes the time to look at the logistics of the battle, which appears to be the most crucial factors in how the campaign was waged.
This is a fascinating and well written book.
This really is a very good read.
It documents the battle and what happens behind the scenes in an interesting and engaging way.
What I really liked is the way it tried to dispel some of the myths around arial combat in that period.
It wasn't a time of chivalry and honour, there were no "White Knights" of the sky who jousted around the clouds to glorious deaths.
Quite often pilots were killed as they taxied, landed or were blasted by enemies they never even saw.
The realities of the campaign are also laied out.
Although important the Battle of Britain was never about defending the shores of Britain from a Nazi invasion fleet.
The invasion plan was pure fantasy and were never going to happen.
It also takes the time to look at the logistics of the battle, which appears to be the most crucial factors in how the campaign was waged.
This is a fascinating and well written book.
July 23, 2018
Excellent book with 1 major area of omission
This is the most comprehensive book that I’ve ever read about the Battle of Britain. However there is one surprising omission.
In the late 1930s an underground system of petrol/ gasoline pipelines were built from Liverpool to many RAF airfields. This allowed the airfields to have a steady supply of gasoline/petroleum and not be reliant on waiting for the next fuel truck to arrive. As importantly it meant that airfields did not have as many large fuel tanks as without the pipelines and this must have saved many lives since they otherwise they would’ve been hit by bombs and exploded. To this day there are no significant numbers of fuel tanks at many British airports. Also it is understated that there was no shortage of fuel. I read somewhere that the planning estimates were within 5% of the amount used!
This is the most comprehensive book that I’ve ever read about the Battle of Britain. However there is one surprising omission.
In the late 1930s an underground system of petrol/ gasoline pipelines were built from Liverpool to many RAF airfields. This allowed the airfields to have a steady supply of gasoline/petroleum and not be reliant on waiting for the next fuel truck to arrive. As importantly it meant that airfields did not have as many large fuel tanks as without the pipelines and this must have saved many lives since they otherwise they would’ve been hit by bombs and exploded. To this day there are no significant numbers of fuel tanks at many British airports. Also it is understated that there was no shortage of fuel. I read somewhere that the planning estimates were within 5% of the amount used!
May 20, 2021
Compellingly written with an occasional and welcome bit of snark and dry humour, I really enjoyed this book. Bungay covers every conceivable aspect of the battle in, what seems to me, comprehensive detail. The daily battle narratives get a little repetitive, I must say, but they are never less than crisply and colorfully recreated.
One warning: if you get the ebook edition of this book don't be fooled by what you are told about the length of the book (406 pages of narrative). Because the printed version of the book apparently uses a very large format, those "406" pages are more like 800-900 pages in a standard format book. I usually read at a pace of 300 pages a week and this behemoth took me three weeks to polish off.
One warning: if you get the ebook edition of this book don't be fooled by what you are told about the length of the book (406 pages of narrative). Because the printed version of the book apparently uses a very large format, those "406" pages are more like 800-900 pages in a standard format book. I usually read at a pace of 300 pages a week and this behemoth took me three weeks to polish off.
October 24, 2021
"The Most Dangerous Enemy" is a stunningly comprehensive history of the Battle of Britain, the war for air dominance over England between the Luftwaffe and RAF. It's exhaustively researched, and reports the air battles in detail (almost too much detail for my taste, but that's just my preference. )Bungay explains how the British plans for the air war began many years before the German assault, and makes the case that the German Luftwaffe never came close to achieving its goal of dominating the air space over England. That the RAF won a decisive victory is due to the flawless execution of the plans created by Hugh Dowding, Keith Park, and others. (For a shorter, but no less convincing, history see "The Man Who Won the Battle of Britain" by Robert Wright.)
September 24, 2024
First published in 2000, 'The Most Dangerous Enemy' is a lengthy and detailed account of the Battle of Britain, an epic air war that took place between the air forces of Britain and Germany in 1940. The details have been drawn from sources, comprehensively listed in the bibliography section. Overall, there is not a lot that is new here, but it has not often been collected in one spot. The author also draws some intelligent conclusions. My only gripe concerns the first section, entitled 'Part I: Build-Up' - on three occasions references are made to the USAF, which was not created until 1947, and was known as the USAAC during 1939-40, and I just could not understand how an aviation historian could make this error. In other respects, an excellent volume.
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