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Authoritarian Russia: Analyzing Post-Soviet Regime Changes
Russia today represents one of the major examples of the phenomenon of “electoral authoritarianism” which is characterized by adopting the trappings of democratic institutions (such as elections, political parties, and a legislature) and enlisting the service of the country’s essentially authoritarian rulers. Why and how has the electoral authoritarian regime been consolidated in Russia? What are the mechanisms of its maintenance, and what is its likely future course? This book attempts to answer these basic questions.
Vladimir Gel’man examines regime change in Russia from the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 to the present day, systematically presenting theoretical and comparative perspectives of the factors that affected regime changes and the authoritarian drift of the country. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia’s national political elites aimed to achieve their goals by creating and enforcing of favorable “rules of the game” for themselves and maintaining informal winning coalitions of cliques around individual rulers. In the 1990s, these moves were only partially successful given the weakness of the Russian state and troubled post-socialist economy. In the 2000s, however, Vladimir Putin rescued the system thanks to the combination of economic growth and the revival of the state capacity he was able to implement by imposing a series of non-democratic reforms. In the 2010s, changing conditions in the country have presented new risks and challenges for the Putin regime that will play themselves out in the years to come.
Vladimir Gel’man examines regime change in Russia from the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 to the present day, systematically presenting theoretical and comparative perspectives of the factors that affected regime changes and the authoritarian drift of the country. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia’s national political elites aimed to achieve their goals by creating and enforcing of favorable “rules of the game” for themselves and maintaining informal winning coalitions of cliques around individual rulers. In the 1990s, these moves were only partially successful given the weakness of the Russian state and troubled post-socialist economy. In the 2000s, however, Vladimir Putin rescued the system thanks to the combination of economic growth and the revival of the state capacity he was able to implement by imposing a series of non-democratic reforms. In the 2010s, changing conditions in the country have presented new risks and challenges for the Putin regime that will play themselves out in the years to come.
224 pages, Paperback
First published March 31, 2015
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About the author
Vladimir Gel'man
21 books8 followersDistinguished Professor, Political Sciences and Sociology; Aleksanteri Institute at the Finnish Centre for Russian and Eastern European Studies
European University at St. Petersburg; University of Helsinki
European University at St. Petersburg; University of Helsinki
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May 21, 2016
No groundbreaking ideas about what democracy means or has meant for the Russian Federation we have not heard so far. Yet a realistic, sharp, detailed and compact overview of multiple crucial developments in order to understand the current political landscape of this country: how democratisation came into form in the Sovietskij eighties and the Russian nineties, to what extend democracy became a reality at all in the early days of the new Federation, how and in what the democratic discourse of the country has developed in the years afterwards, why authoritarianism has been greeted so enthusiastically by most of the Russian people, how and because of what Putin has manifested such a different political wave, which problems are related to the new authoritarian developments in Russia and what are the future perspectives for the Russian state and its peoples. Gul'man attempts to create as much clarity as possible about the chaotic climate of the Russian polity but never falls in the temptation of simplification. "Authoritarian Russia" is no revolution in the political thinking of post-Soviet Europe. But it is a book full with insightful presentation of the different influential factors which one should consider to have been major in Russia's modern political developments. And it offers a number of economic and political perspectives on the potential directions the Kremlin might take in the close future. Is the annexation of Crimea and the prohibition on public homosexuality signs for the start of a new dictatorship under the reign of Putin? Will the Russian state reform itself on the long term in becoming a vital democratic welfare state? Or will Russia choose a radically different direction? Gel'man does not give discrete answers to these questions but does present a valuable framework to base further political theories on.
March 18, 2024
(The English review is placed beneath the Russian one)
Сюда никто никогда не придёт
Болото окутала изморозь
Колыбельная лягушек про богоизбранность
Разлетается по берегу издавна
Так яро восхваляя высохший камыш над избами
Несмотря на то, что я согласен с выводами автора на счёт России, читать книгу оказалось скучно. Автор, как это совершенно типично для людей из бывшего СССР, пишет скучно, а сам текст сложный. Я хочу сказать, что автор намеренно использует сложные слова, чтобы у читателя сложилось ощущение, что перед ним научный трактат профессора, а не лёгкая книга об авторитарной России. Поэтому я рекомендую другие книги об авторитарной России, точнее о диктаторской путинской России.
Я знаком с идеями автор уже довольно давно, и поэтому для меня не стала новой идея, что демократия появляется не потому, что появился «хороший царь», а потому, что самые широкие слои общества потребовали у властной элиты, сначала разделение властей, потом независимый суд, ограничение по срокам пребывания у власти без возможности продления и пр. Увы, но в России уже с 1991 года ничего подобного не случилось, кто бы, что обратного не утверждал.
To put it bluntly, it is useless to blame Yeltsin or Putin for being “bad guys” and ruining Russia’s democratic hopes. In fact, their personalities are not much worse than those of many democratic politicians in various countries. But democracy does not emerge simply as a result of the good intentions of “good guys,” as many people tend to believe.
<…>
They simply pursue their own self-interest, which under certain conditions might be aligned with democracy or oppose it, depending upon their own perceptions, resources, and strategies in the struggle for power vis-à-vis other actors (who have similar intentions). Undoubtedly, institutions play a major role in choosing a prodemocratic or antidemocratic side in making political choices in the process of regime change.
<…>
In other words, during the process of regime change any major (or even minor) strategic choice made by political actors and by society at large can result in unintended consequences, and some of these might affect further directions of regime change—similarly to what often happens in chess or in arcade games.
Эти же идеи я нашёл и в недавно прочитанной книге «Мы Жизнь в эпоху безвременья», где автор также пишет о важности демократических институтов, а не о «хорошем царе».
Indeed, why is it that in 1993 Boris Yeltsin was able to fire on the opposition-dominated parliament with tanks, yet none of the presidents of the United States ever considered such a method of dealing with Congress during the periods of divided government? Why is it that in 2004 Vladimir Putin was able to eliminate more than three hundred hostages alongside the terrorists in the school in Beslan, North Ossetia, without serious criticism from Russia’s political elite or the general population? The answer is very simple: both Yeltsin and Putin met negligible resistance to these actions, and their costs were much lower than the benefits they gained afterward.
<…>
Thus, after firing on the parliament, Yeltsin was able to impose the constitution, which granted him a wide array of powers, and Putin was able to impose de facto presidential appointment of regional governors irrespective of popular vote, because neither other actors nor any institutions were able to prevent them from doing so.
Знаете, что я нашёл в этих словах? Ответ на вопрос, почему россияне в большинстве своём не выходили протестовать, когда 24 февраля 2022 года Россия вторглась в Украину. Вот он, ответ. Если даже в такие «свободные и либеральные» дни россияне промолчали, когда Путин совершил государственное преступление, то, как можно ждать от них, что в абсолютной диктатуре они решаться выйти на улицу? Конечно, началось всё это при Ельцине, а не при Путине. Автор правильно указывает, что в России можно расстрелять парламент, а потом отравить сотню людей ядовитым газом, как это произошло в Норд-Осте, и такому правителю ничего не будет. В нормальных странах такому президенту не только импичмент объявили, его бы посадили в тюрьму за преступление против своего народа, но в России убивать своих граждан можно. Конечно, дело не в кровавом Путине, а дело в том, что все слои общества промолчали. Они промолчали, когда обугленных восемнадцатилетних солдат привозили из Чечни, куда их отправил Ельцин и они молчали, когда их парламент расстреливали танками. Они молчали, когда их травили газом в Норд-Осте и когда в Беслане из танков стреляли по школе, в которой были дети. Если россияне закрыли глаза на собственных детей и на собственных граждан, то, как можно ждать от них понимания украинской трагедии? Конечно, не все россияне такие бесчувственные, но автор говорит о том необходимом количестве людей, который способен сломать систему, построив вместо диктатуры демократию. Автор говорит скорее даже не про простых людей, а про элиты (политически, экономические, культурные и военные). Вот они все промолчали. И как показала автор книги «Мы Жизнь в эпоху безвременья», российская интеллигенция даже пошла на сотрудничество с авторитарной российской властью, думая изменить её изнутри.
Democracy was not eliminated completely from their political agenda but served as a smokescreen for the project of authoritarian regime building: rather, democratic elements were deliberately and successfully utilized for antidemocratic purposes.
Собственно это и есть тот фасад, о котором писал маркиз де Кюстин. Демократический фасад, вместо реальной демократии и вместо демократических институтов. Хотите самый яркий пример? Согласно конституции, Путин не может стать президентов после 2024, ибо конституция запрещает одному и тому же человеку два раза подряд становится президентом РФ. Все об этом знают так же как знают, что изменение конституции никак не обнуляет президентские сроки Путина. Почему же конституционный суд не запрещает Путину избираться в президенты? А потому что российская конституция или даже шире – российское законодательство, это фасад, иллюзия, которая не имеет ничего общего с реальностью. Вот так и живёт Россия с нелегитимным «президентом» Путиным, который совсем скоро станет настоящим узурпатором. И это не мои слова, это так сказано в конституции. Той самой конституции, которая была на всём протяжении путинского правления. Если бы он до этих своих двух сроков убрал бы эту строчку из конституции, тогда бы он мог бы хотя бы теоретически быть президентом после 2024 года, но он правил Россией именно вместе с этой конституции, которая ограничила срок правления двумя сроками подряд. Так что автор прав, говоря, что демократия в России, включая выборы, это фасад, smokescreen.
The pattern of relationships between the state and major business leaders developed on a similar carrot-and-stick model; the Kremlin rewarded its loyalists and threatened those who claimed autonomy. The presidential administration reasserted control over the management of major state-controlled companies (first and foremost, Gazprom), while the prosecutors and the police were able to target anyone for tax evasion, violations of law during the process of privatization, and the like.
Как вы понимаете, в таких условиях никто не будет делать инвестиции, т.е. в ситуации, когда у собственника крупного бизнеса могут в любой момент отобрать бизнес, а его самого посадить в тюрьму. Возможно, именно это подорвёт путинскую Россию в её попытке выстроить независимую от внешнего мира экономику, ибо как указывают многие экономисты, Россия всё ещё работает на промышленном оборудовании доставшейся ей с советских времён. Это даёт надежду, что в один прекрасный момент всё это рухнет (прям как в том фильме «Дурак»). К сожалению, это может произойти с большими жертвами среди гражданского населения. Но таковая реальность. Страна, которая не вкладывает деньги в будущее, проиграет конкурентную гонку с другими странами. До XX века такие страны проходили процедуру поглощения (оккупированы) другими более конкурентными странами. Сегодня же такие страны просто проваливаются в бедноту и беспросветность. О чём-то подобном говорит и Игорь Липсиц.
Despite the difference in means, the goals of Putin and his associates were nearly the same as those of Vito Corleone and his clan (namely, maximizing their own power and wealth), and it is no wonder that Putin’s approach to building his winning coalition also shared some similarities to the actions of The Godfather’s characters. In both cases, the power of the dominant actor was based upon personal cronyism and patronage, and multiple clients had no room for maneuvers; there were no alternative patrons and no opportunities for collective action against “the boss.”
Это то, что не понимают многие авторы, пишущие о нынешнем российско-украинском военном конфликте, что он якобы начался из-за расширения НАТО на восток. На самом деле он начался, чтобы оправдать дальнейшее пребывание Путина у власти. У мафии нет и не может быть позиции по вопросу НАТО. Всё что волнует мафию – деньг��. Собственно бандитские 90-х и создали Путина и его друзей по кооперативу «Озеро» и именно эту политику мы и можем наблюдать глядя на нынешнюю Россию.
Even though I agree with the author's conclusions about Russia, it was boring to read the book. The author, as is typical for people from the former USSR, writes boringly, and the text itself is complicated. I want to say that the author intentionally uses complicated words to give the reader the feeling that he is reading a scientific treatise by a professor, not a light book about authoritarian Russia. Therefore, I recommend other books about authoritarian Russia, more precisely, about dictatorial Putin's Russia.
I have been familiar with the author's ideas for quite a long time, and therefore, the idea that democracy emerges not because a "good tsar" appeared but because the broadest strata of society demanded from the power elite, first the separation of powers, then an independent court, term limits without the possibility of extension, etc., is not new to me. Alas, but in Russia, since 1991, nothing of the sort has happened, no matter who claims otherwise.
To put it bluntly, it is useless to blame Yeltsin or Putin for being “bad guys” and ruining Russia’s democratic hopes. In fact, their personalities are not much worse than those of many democratic politicians in various countries. But democracy does not emerge simply as a result of the good intentions of “good guys,” as many people tend to believe.
<…>
They simply pursue their own self-interest, which under certain conditions might be aligned with democracy or oppose it, depending upon their own perceptions, resources, and strategies in the struggle for power vis-à-vis other actors (who have similar intentions). Undoubtedly, institutions play a major role in choosing a prodemocratic or antidemocratic side in making political choices in the process of regime change.
<…>
In other words, during the process of regime change any major (or even minor) strategic choice made by political actors and by society at large can result in unintended consequences, and some of these might affect further directions of regime change—similarly to what often happens in chess or in arcade games.
I found these same ideas in a book I recently read, "WE. Our Time Outside Time," where the author also writes about the importance of democratic institutions rather than a "good czar."
Indeed, why is it that in 1993 Boris Yeltsin was able to fire on the opposition-dominated parliament with tanks, yet none of the presidents of the United States ever considered such a method of dealing with Congress during the periods of divided government? Why is it that in 2004 Vladimir Putin was able to eliminate more than three hundred hostages alongside the terrorists in the school in Beslan, North Ossetia, without serious criticism from Russia’s political elite or the general population? The answer is very simple: both Yeltsin and Putin met negligible resistance to these actions, and their costs were much lower than the benefits they gained afterward.
<…>
Thus, after firing on the parliament, Yeltsin was able to impose the constitution, which granted him a wide array of powers, and Putin was able to impose de facto presidential appointment of regional governors irrespective of popular vote, because neither other actors nor any institutions were able to prevent them from doing so.
You know what I found in those words? The answer to the question of why most Russians didn't come out to protest when Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022. Here, it is the answer. If even, in such "free and liberal" days, Russians remained silent when Putin committed a state crime, how can we expect them to dare to take to the streets in an absolute dictatorship? Of course, it all started under Yeltsin, not Putin. The author correctly points out that in Russia, you can shoot the parliament and then poison a hundred people with poison gas, as happened in Nord-Ost, and nothing will happen to such a ruler. In normal countries, such a president would not only be impeached, but he would be imprisoned for a crime against his people, but in Russia, it is okay to kill its citizens. Of course, this is not about bloody Putin but that all sectors of society remained silent. They were silent when charred eighteen-year-old soldiers were brought back from Chechnya, where Yeltsin had sent them, and they were silent when their parliament was shot by tanks. They were silent when they were gassed in Nord-Ost and when tanks fired on a school with children in it in Beslan. If the Russians turned a blind eye to their own children and their own citizens, how can we expect them to understand the Ukrainian tragedy? Of course, not all Russians are so insensitive, but the author is talking about the necessary number of people who can break the system and build democracy instead of dictatorship. The author is not talking about ordinary people but about the elites (politically, economically, culturally, and militarily). Here, they all remained silent. As the author of the book "WE. Our Time Outside Time" has shown, the Russian intelligentsia even cooperated with the authoritarian Russian government, thinking to change it from within.
Democracy was not eliminated completely from their political agenda but served as a smokescreen for the project of authoritarian regime building: rather, democratic elements were deliberately and successfully utilized for antidemocratic purposes.
In fact, this is the facade that the Marquis de Custine wrote about. A democratic facade instead of real democracy and instead of democratic institutions. Do you want the most vivid example? According to the constitution, Putin cannot become president after 2024 because the constitution prohibits the same person from becoming president of the Russian Federation twice in a row. Everyone knows this, just as they know that changing the constitution does not nullify Putin's presidential term. So why doesn't the constitutional court prohibit Putin from running for president? Because the Russian constitution, or even more broadly, Russian legislation, is a facade, an illusion that has nothing to do with reality. This is how Russia lives with an illegitimate "president" Putin, who will soon become a real usurper. And it's not my words - it's what the Constitution says. The same constitution that has been in place throughout Putin's reign. If he had removed that line from the constitution before his two terms, then he could at least theoretically be president after 2024, but he ruled Russia with that very constitution, which limited his rule to two consecutive terms. So, the author is right in saying that democracy in Russia, including elections, is a facade, a smokescreen.
The pattern of relationships between the state and major business leaders developed on a similar carrot-and-stick model; the Kremlin rewarded its loyalists and threatened those who claimed autonomy. The presidential administration reasserted control over the management of major state-controlled companies (first and foremost, Gazprom), while the prosecutors and the police were able to target anyone for tax evasion, violations of law during the process of privatization, and the like.
As you understand, no one will make investments in such conditions, i.e., in a situation where the owner of a large business can be taken away from the business at any moment and put in jail. Perhaps this is what will undermine Putin's Russia in its attempt to build an economy independent of the outside world because, as many economists point out, Russia is still operating on industrial equipment inherited from Soviet times. This gives hope that, at some point, it will all come crashing down (just like in the movie "The Fool"). Unfortunately, it may come with heavy civilian casualties. But that is the reality. A country that does not invest in the future will lose the competitive race with other countries. Before the 20th century, such countries were absorbed (occupied) by other, more competitive countries. Today, such countries simply fall into poverty and hopelessness. Igor Lipsits speaks about something similar.
Despite the difference in means, the goals of Putin and his associates were nearly the same as those of Vito Corleone and his clan (namely, maximizing their own power and wealth), and it is no wonder that Putin’s approach to building his winning coalition also shared some similarities to the actions of The Godfather’s characters. In both cases, the power of the dominant actor was based upon personal cronyism and patronage, and multiple clients had no room for maneuvers; there were no alternative patrons and no opportunities for collective action against “the boss.”
This is what many authors who write about the current Russian-Ukrainian military conflict do not realize, by saying that it supposedly started because of NATO's eastward expansion. It started to justify Putin's continued stay in power. The mafia does not and cannot have a position on the NATO issue. All the mafia cares about is money. The gangster 90s created Putin and his friends in the cooperative "Lake" and it is this policy that we can observe looking at the current Russia.
Сюда никто никогда не придёт
Болото окутала изморозь
Колыбельная лягушек про богоизбранность
Разлетается по берегу издавна
Так яро восхваляя высохший камыш над избами
Несмотря на то, что я согласен с выводами автора на счёт России, читать книгу оказалось скучно. Автор, как это совершенно типично для людей из бывшего СССР, пишет скучно, а сам текст сложный. Я хочу сказать, что автор намеренно использует сложные слова, чтобы у читателя сложилось ощущение, что перед ним научный трактат профессора, а не лёгкая книга об авторитарной России. Поэтому я рекомендую другие книги об авторитарной России, точнее о диктаторской путинской России.
Я знаком с идеями автор уже довольно давно, и поэтому для меня не стала новой идея, что демократия появляется не потому, что появился «хороший царь», а потому, что самые широкие слои общества потребовали у властной элиты, сначала разделение властей, потом независимый суд, ограничение по срокам пребывания у власти без возможности продления и пр. Увы, но в России уже с 1991 года ничего подобного не случилось, кто бы, что обратного не утверждал.
To put it bluntly, it is useless to blame Yeltsin or Putin for being “bad guys” and ruining Russia’s democratic hopes. In fact, their personalities are not much worse than those of many democratic politicians in various countries. But democracy does not emerge simply as a result of the good intentions of “good guys,” as many people tend to believe.
<…>
They simply pursue their own self-interest, which under certain conditions might be aligned with democracy or oppose it, depending upon their own perceptions, resources, and strategies in the struggle for power vis-à-vis other actors (who have similar intentions). Undoubtedly, institutions play a major role in choosing a prodemocratic or antidemocratic side in making political choices in the process of regime change.
<…>
In other words, during the process of regime change any major (or even minor) strategic choice made by political actors and by society at large can result in unintended consequences, and some of these might affect further directions of regime change—similarly to what often happens in chess or in arcade games.
Эти же идеи я нашёл и в недавно прочитанной книге «Мы Жизнь в эпоху безвременья», где автор также пишет о важности демократических институтов, а не о «хорошем царе».
Indeed, why is it that in 1993 Boris Yeltsin was able to fire on the opposition-dominated parliament with tanks, yet none of the presidents of the United States ever considered such a method of dealing with Congress during the periods of divided government? Why is it that in 2004 Vladimir Putin was able to eliminate more than three hundred hostages alongside the terrorists in the school in Beslan, North Ossetia, without serious criticism from Russia’s political elite or the general population? The answer is very simple: both Yeltsin and Putin met negligible resistance to these actions, and their costs were much lower than the benefits they gained afterward.
<…>
Thus, after firing on the parliament, Yeltsin was able to impose the constitution, which granted him a wide array of powers, and Putin was able to impose de facto presidential appointment of regional governors irrespective of popular vote, because neither other actors nor any institutions were able to prevent them from doing so.
Знаете, что я нашёл в этих словах? Ответ на вопрос, почему россияне в большинстве своём не выходили протестовать, когда 24 февраля 2022 года Россия вторглась в Украину. Вот он, ответ. Если даже в такие «свободные и либеральные» дни россияне промолчали, когда Путин совершил государственное преступление, то, как можно ждать от них, что в абсолютной диктатуре они решаться выйти на улицу? Конечно, началось всё это при Ельцине, а не при Путине. Автор правильно указывает, что в России можно расстрелять парламент, а потом отравить сотню людей ядовитым газом, как это произошло в Норд-Осте, и такому правителю ничего не будет. В нормальных странах такому президенту не только импичмент объявили, его бы посадили в тюрьму за преступление против своего народа, но в России убивать своих граждан можно. Конечно, дело не в кровавом Путине, а дело в том, что все слои общества промолчали. Они промолчали, когда обугленных восемнадцатилетних солдат привозили из Чечни, куда их отправил Ельцин и они молчали, когда их парламент расстреливали танками. Они молчали, когда их травили газом в Норд-Осте и когда в Беслане из танков стреляли по школе, в которой были дети. Если россияне закрыли глаза на собственных детей и на собственных граждан, то, как можно ждать от них понимания украинской трагедии? Конечно, не все россияне такие бесчувственные, но автор говорит о том необходимом количестве людей, который способен сломать систему, построив вместо диктатуры демократию. Автор говорит скорее даже не про простых людей, а про элиты (политически, экономические, культурные и военные). Вот они все промолчали. И как показала автор книги «Мы Жизнь в эпоху безвременья», российская интеллигенция даже пошла на сотрудничество с авторитарной российской властью, думая изменить её изнутри.
Democracy was not eliminated completely from their political agenda but served as a smokescreen for the project of authoritarian regime building: rather, democratic elements were deliberately and successfully utilized for antidemocratic purposes.
Собственно это и есть тот фасад, о котором писал маркиз де Кюстин. Демократический фасад, вместо реальной демократии и вместо демократических институтов. Хотите самый яркий пример? Согласно конституции, Путин не может стать президентов после 2024, ибо конституция запрещает одному и тому же человеку два раза подряд становится президентом РФ. Все об этом знают так же как знают, что изменение конституции никак не обнуляет президентские сроки Путина. Почему же конституционный суд не запрещает Путину избираться в президенты? А потому что российская конституция или даже шире – российское законодательство, это фасад, иллюзия, которая не имеет ничего общего с реальностью. Вот так и живёт Россия с нелегитимным «президентом» Путиным, который совсем скоро станет настоящим узурпатором. И это не мои слова, это так сказано в конституции. Той самой конституции, которая была на всём протяжении путинского правления. Если бы он до этих своих двух сроков убрал бы эту строчку из конституции, тогда бы он мог бы хотя бы теоретически быть президентом после 2024 года, но он правил Россией именно вместе с этой конституции, которая ограничила срок правления двумя сроками подряд. Так что автор прав, говоря, что демократия в России, включая выборы, это фасад, smokescreen.
The pattern of relationships between the state and major business leaders developed on a similar carrot-and-stick model; the Kremlin rewarded its loyalists and threatened those who claimed autonomy. The presidential administration reasserted control over the management of major state-controlled companies (first and foremost, Gazprom), while the prosecutors and the police were able to target anyone for tax evasion, violations of law during the process of privatization, and the like.
Как вы понимаете, в таких условиях никто не будет делать инвестиции, т.е. в ситуации, когда у собственника крупного бизнеса могут в любой момент отобрать бизнес, а его самого посадить в тюрьму. Возможно, именно это подорвёт путинскую Россию в её попытке выстроить независимую от внешнего мира экономику, ибо как указывают многие экономисты, Россия всё ещё работает на промышленном оборудовании доставшейся ей с советских времён. Это даёт надежду, что в один прекрасный момент всё это рухнет (прям как в том фильме «Дурак»). К сожалению, это может произойти с большими жертвами среди гражданского населения. Но таковая реальность. Страна, которая не вкладывает деньги в будущее, проиграет конкурентную гонку с другими странами. До XX века такие страны проходили процедуру поглощения (оккупированы) другими более конкурентными странами. Сегодня же такие страны просто проваливаются в бедноту и беспросветность. О чём-то подобном говорит и Игорь Липсиц.
Despite the difference in means, the goals of Putin and his associates were nearly the same as those of Vito Corleone and his clan (namely, maximizing their own power and wealth), and it is no wonder that Putin’s approach to building his winning coalition also shared some similarities to the actions of The Godfather’s characters. In both cases, the power of the dominant actor was based upon personal cronyism and patronage, and multiple clients had no room for maneuvers; there were no alternative patrons and no opportunities for collective action against “the boss.”
Это то, что не понимают многие авторы, пишущие о нынешнем российско-украинском военном конфликте, что он якобы начался из-за расширения НАТО на восток. На самом деле он начался, чтобы оправдать дальнейшее пребывание Путина у власти. У мафии нет и не может быть позиции по вопросу НАТО. Всё что волнует мафию – деньг��. Собственно бандитские 90-х и создали Путина и его друзей по кооперативу «Озеро» и именно эту политику мы и можем наблюдать глядя на нынешнюю Россию.
Even though I agree with the author's conclusions about Russia, it was boring to read the book. The author, as is typical for people from the former USSR, writes boringly, and the text itself is complicated. I want to say that the author intentionally uses complicated words to give the reader the feeling that he is reading a scientific treatise by a professor, not a light book about authoritarian Russia. Therefore, I recommend other books about authoritarian Russia, more precisely, about dictatorial Putin's Russia.
I have been familiar with the author's ideas for quite a long time, and therefore, the idea that democracy emerges not because a "good tsar" appeared but because the broadest strata of society demanded from the power elite, first the separation of powers, then an independent court, term limits without the possibility of extension, etc., is not new to me. Alas, but in Russia, since 1991, nothing of the sort has happened, no matter who claims otherwise.
To put it bluntly, it is useless to blame Yeltsin or Putin for being “bad guys” and ruining Russia’s democratic hopes. In fact, their personalities are not much worse than those of many democratic politicians in various countries. But democracy does not emerge simply as a result of the good intentions of “good guys,” as many people tend to believe.
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They simply pursue their own self-interest, which under certain conditions might be aligned with democracy or oppose it, depending upon their own perceptions, resources, and strategies in the struggle for power vis-à-vis other actors (who have similar intentions). Undoubtedly, institutions play a major role in choosing a prodemocratic or antidemocratic side in making political choices in the process of regime change.
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In other words, during the process of regime change any major (or even minor) strategic choice made by political actors and by society at large can result in unintended consequences, and some of these might affect further directions of regime change—similarly to what often happens in chess or in arcade games.
I found these same ideas in a book I recently read, "WE. Our Time Outside Time," where the author also writes about the importance of democratic institutions rather than a "good czar."
Indeed, why is it that in 1993 Boris Yeltsin was able to fire on the opposition-dominated parliament with tanks, yet none of the presidents of the United States ever considered such a method of dealing with Congress during the periods of divided government? Why is it that in 2004 Vladimir Putin was able to eliminate more than three hundred hostages alongside the terrorists in the school in Beslan, North Ossetia, without serious criticism from Russia’s political elite or the general population? The answer is very simple: both Yeltsin and Putin met negligible resistance to these actions, and their costs were much lower than the benefits they gained afterward.
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Thus, after firing on the parliament, Yeltsin was able to impose the constitution, which granted him a wide array of powers, and Putin was able to impose de facto presidential appointment of regional governors irrespective of popular vote, because neither other actors nor any institutions were able to prevent them from doing so.
You know what I found in those words? The answer to the question of why most Russians didn't come out to protest when Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022. Here, it is the answer. If even, in such "free and liberal" days, Russians remained silent when Putin committed a state crime, how can we expect them to dare to take to the streets in an absolute dictatorship? Of course, it all started under Yeltsin, not Putin. The author correctly points out that in Russia, you can shoot the parliament and then poison a hundred people with poison gas, as happened in Nord-Ost, and nothing will happen to such a ruler. In normal countries, such a president would not only be impeached, but he would be imprisoned for a crime against his people, but in Russia, it is okay to kill its citizens. Of course, this is not about bloody Putin but that all sectors of society remained silent. They were silent when charred eighteen-year-old soldiers were brought back from Chechnya, where Yeltsin had sent them, and they were silent when their parliament was shot by tanks. They were silent when they were gassed in Nord-Ost and when tanks fired on a school with children in it in Beslan. If the Russians turned a blind eye to their own children and their own citizens, how can we expect them to understand the Ukrainian tragedy? Of course, not all Russians are so insensitive, but the author is talking about the necessary number of people who can break the system and build democracy instead of dictatorship. The author is not talking about ordinary people but about the elites (politically, economically, culturally, and militarily). Here, they all remained silent. As the author of the book "WE. Our Time Outside Time" has shown, the Russian intelligentsia even cooperated with the authoritarian Russian government, thinking to change it from within.
Democracy was not eliminated completely from their political agenda but served as a smokescreen for the project of authoritarian regime building: rather, democratic elements were deliberately and successfully utilized for antidemocratic purposes.
In fact, this is the facade that the Marquis de Custine wrote about. A democratic facade instead of real democracy and instead of democratic institutions. Do you want the most vivid example? According to the constitution, Putin cannot become president after 2024 because the constitution prohibits the same person from becoming president of the Russian Federation twice in a row. Everyone knows this, just as they know that changing the constitution does not nullify Putin's presidential term. So why doesn't the constitutional court prohibit Putin from running for president? Because the Russian constitution, or even more broadly, Russian legislation, is a facade, an illusion that has nothing to do with reality. This is how Russia lives with an illegitimate "president" Putin, who will soon become a real usurper. And it's not my words - it's what the Constitution says. The same constitution that has been in place throughout Putin's reign. If he had removed that line from the constitution before his two terms, then he could at least theoretically be president after 2024, but he ruled Russia with that very constitution, which limited his rule to two consecutive terms. So, the author is right in saying that democracy in Russia, including elections, is a facade, a smokescreen.
The pattern of relationships between the state and major business leaders developed on a similar carrot-and-stick model; the Kremlin rewarded its loyalists and threatened those who claimed autonomy. The presidential administration reasserted control over the management of major state-controlled companies (first and foremost, Gazprom), while the prosecutors and the police were able to target anyone for tax evasion, violations of law during the process of privatization, and the like.
As you understand, no one will make investments in such conditions, i.e., in a situation where the owner of a large business can be taken away from the business at any moment and put in jail. Perhaps this is what will undermine Putin's Russia in its attempt to build an economy independent of the outside world because, as many economists point out, Russia is still operating on industrial equipment inherited from Soviet times. This gives hope that, at some point, it will all come crashing down (just like in the movie "The Fool"). Unfortunately, it may come with heavy civilian casualties. But that is the reality. A country that does not invest in the future will lose the competitive race with other countries. Before the 20th century, such countries were absorbed (occupied) by other, more competitive countries. Today, such countries simply fall into poverty and hopelessness. Igor Lipsits speaks about something similar.
Despite the difference in means, the goals of Putin and his associates were nearly the same as those of Vito Corleone and his clan (namely, maximizing their own power and wealth), and it is no wonder that Putin’s approach to building his winning coalition also shared some similarities to the actions of The Godfather’s characters. In both cases, the power of the dominant actor was based upon personal cronyism and patronage, and multiple clients had no room for maneuvers; there were no alternative patrons and no opportunities for collective action against “the boss.”
This is what many authors who write about the current Russian-Ukrainian military conflict do not realize, by saying that it supposedly started because of NATO's eastward expansion. It started to justify Putin's continued stay in power. The mafia does not and cannot have a position on the NATO issue. All the mafia cares about is money. The gangster 90s created Putin and his friends in the cooperative "Lake" and it is this policy that we can observe looking at the current Russia.
November 14, 2016
Read for a class
April 22, 2022
A very interesting book which offers an in depth analysis of the Post Soviet Russian regime, explaining how we ended up in the dramatic situation we know today.
September 25, 2024
boring as hell + informative
May 11, 2025
Read for class!
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