On the top of my stack this week is Lt. Gen. Robert Caslen's 𝙏𝙝𝙚 𝙄𝙢𝙥𝙤𝙨𝙨𝙞𝙗𝙡𝙚 𝙈𝙞𝙨𝙨𝙞𝙤𝙣, which details the challenges - and opportunities - faced by the Office of Security Cooperation - Iraq (OSC-I) in the aftermath of the withdrawal of coalition forces at the end of 2011.
Want to know what it's like to stand up a security cooperation mission without a status of forces agreement (SOFA)? That's Step 1 in that impossible mission. Start with an approved end strength of 157 military personnel and add the strategic objectives intended for a stay-behind force of 10,000.
From there, the challenges only grow. Finally in charge, the State Department isn't too keen on any suggestion of added influence from Defense. Sectarianism? Every damn day. The rise of ISIS? That's just the icing on the cake.
We were fortunate to have Lt. Gen. Robert Caslen at the helm. Not only could he see the light at the end of the tunnel, he possessed the dogged determination to get us there. Of all the senior leaders I worked for during my time in uniform, none of them bulldogged their way to the objective in quite the same way. There was no quitting. There was no taking a knee. No matter how many times you take a punch to the face, you get up and keep fighting.
Not only is 𝙏𝙝𝙚 𝙄𝙢𝙥𝙤𝙨𝙨𝙞𝙗𝙡𝙚 𝙈𝙞𝙨𝙨𝙞𝙤𝙣 a phenomenal read - at times, it was like being there all over again - it's informative. Winning the peace is no small task, and that's really what we were trying to do. 𝙏𝙝𝙚 𝙄𝙢𝙥𝙤𝙨𝙨𝙞𝙗𝙡𝙚 𝙈𝙞𝙨𝙨𝙞𝙤𝙣 is a primer in winning the peace, detailing just how difficult it can be to do so.
It's not just about foreign military sales and drinking beer on the sly at the British Embassy (guilty); if you want a lasting peace, it's a holistic effort that weaves together every aspect of manning, equipping, and training.
As you read, you'll see the number 157 come up a few times. For good reason.
LTG (Ret.) Robert L. Caslen, Jr. provides a first-hand account of how the United States terminated the eight-year war in Iraq and almost lost the resulting peace. Using a chronological approach and a forthright narrative, he describes the numerous challenges he and his team faced in the fluid environment of Iraq and offers twelve strategic lessons learned. What makes his story so remarkable is the revealing look at how well-meaning decisions, with a goal of bringing the troops home by the end of 2011, had unintended consequences and set the conditions for the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) to take root. The Impossible Mission is not just a whirlwind account of the end of the Iraq war; rather, it is a descriptive explanation of one of the most overlooked and least studied aspects of war—war termination and the transition to peace. Simply put, reading this book is a must for all strategic planners, on both sides of the Potomac, as well as those serious about influencing interagency policy.