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Fiasco: The Break-out of the German Battleships
Operation Cerberus was the name given to major naval operation during WWII in which a German Kriegsmarine fleet consisting of Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Prinz Eugen, supported by a number of smaller ships sailed from Brest, France to their home bases in Germany via the English Channel. On 2/11/42, the ships left Brest at 21.15 & escaped detection for more than twelve hours, approaching the Straits of Dover without check. Despite British attacks by the Royal Air Force, the Fleet Air Arm & Coastal Artillery, by 2/13 all the ships had completed their transit. The action has entered history as the "Channel Dash". Illustrated with a map of the English channel & the North Sea & eight pages of black & white photos.
247 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1970
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Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews
December 15, 2017
After being holed up in the port of Brest in occupied France for several months, under Hitler’s insistence, two of the German navy’s biggest ships, The Scharnhorst and The Gneisenau with the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen broke out and made the daring journey up the English channel to the relative safety of the German North Sea harbours.
This is a fascinating book on many levels. The German plan was audacious, on the face of it almost mad. It shows how valuable capital ships were perceived to be at the time, but also what a liability they were. Their operational paramountcy was increasingly questioned throughout the war, yet they were so prestigious and centrally important that much would be lost, on the British side, to try eliminate them. The book episode shows their weakness: the escape could be made only with the support of an air umbrella of 250 Luftwaffe planes and numerous destroyers, eboats and minesweepers.
British intelligence had relatively accurately forecast the planned escape of the ships, having a good idea of the date they might leave. This was despite thorough efforts by the Germans to conceal their intentions: most of those involved in the operation had little idea it was to occur until the boats were underway. Despite the British having accurately surmised what the Germans would do – they had been regularly bombing the battle-cruisers in Brest for several months, though without huge results – when the time came their response was woefully inadequate. Why, is what Potter details in this book.
It was a mixture of bad luck, poor communication, and dreadful performance that led the battleships to escape. Bad weather prevented routine aerial patrols from spotting the ships underway, and poor planning meant that when they were spotted, the British pilots either failed to see the significance or obeyed a code of radio silence that gave the Germans a valuable head start. When the facts became impossible to deny, the response was weak. A small squadron of Swordfish torpedo bombers, flimsy and slow bi-planes, lacking adequate fighter support was shot out of the sky. Many Beauforts fitted with torpedoes failed to find their targets, many were not told what their targets were. An assortment of motor torpedo boats were sent out to intercept, but were aggressively pushed back by the tightly-held German eboat screen. A flotilla of destroyers met a similar fate. And the ramshackle guns which protected Dover had all the effectiveness of a pea shooter in a gale.
Most of the damage that the three major German ships suffered was due to mines that had been laid previously and not successfully removed. Losses were minimal. Their success was down to strict planning that was rigorously adhered to. The operation was kept under wraps within the navy, British radar was effectively flummoxed, the Luftwaffe gave the support it promised, and the sailors fought tenaciously against the successive attacks. It was a moral victory for Hitler, the plan to liberate the vessels was largely his brain-child and he stuck steadfast to it, against the protestations of many of his admirals.
The British were weak, un-coordinated, blasé and arrogant. Despite the obvious gallantry of the fighting men, their efforts were largely in vain, and it would have been better if nothing had been done at all. The escapade raises the question, one which the author also poses, of the potential success of Operation Sea Lion, the Nazi invasion of Britain, given that the UK was so lacking in firepower. Potter suggests it may well have been a success. Perhaps one reason it was not pursued is tangentially answered in the book: part of why Hitler wanted his battle fleet back in the North Sea was because he thought that occupied Norway would be invaded by the British. Occupying a land mass over the sea was one thing, successfully supplying and defending it was altogether another.
One wonders why, against such poor odds, the British even bothered trying to assault the ships. The subsequent operations of Scharnhorst and Gneisenau show they were not really instrumental in future conflicts. The answer must lie in their symbolic value and the sheer affront of them cruising up England’s home strait. Perhaps if the British had held back and coordinated a more concerted attack after the Germans had passed through Dover, around the Dutch islands, and brought their own high seas fleet into action, the result would have been different. But they were unprepared and the response was piecemeal.
Soon after, the blame game started. Everyone wanted answers but didn’t want to accept those that they received. Many British sailors and airmen lost their lives unnecessarily. Yet neither was the German operation of much value and there is an argument that better use would have been made of the ships disrupting Allied convoys. In all, the word chosen by the author to describe the events from the British point of view – fiasco – is singularly apt in judgement. His accomplishment in building an exciting, balanced narrative of the events is exemplary.
This is a fascinating book on many levels. The German plan was audacious, on the face of it almost mad. It shows how valuable capital ships were perceived to be at the time, but also what a liability they were. Their operational paramountcy was increasingly questioned throughout the war, yet they were so prestigious and centrally important that much would be lost, on the British side, to try eliminate them. The book episode shows their weakness: the escape could be made only with the support of an air umbrella of 250 Luftwaffe planes and numerous destroyers, eboats and minesweepers.
British intelligence had relatively accurately forecast the planned escape of the ships, having a good idea of the date they might leave. This was despite thorough efforts by the Germans to conceal their intentions: most of those involved in the operation had little idea it was to occur until the boats were underway. Despite the British having accurately surmised what the Germans would do – they had been regularly bombing the battle-cruisers in Brest for several months, though without huge results – when the time came their response was woefully inadequate. Why, is what Potter details in this book.
It was a mixture of bad luck, poor communication, and dreadful performance that led the battleships to escape. Bad weather prevented routine aerial patrols from spotting the ships underway, and poor planning meant that when they were spotted, the British pilots either failed to see the significance or obeyed a code of radio silence that gave the Germans a valuable head start. When the facts became impossible to deny, the response was weak. A small squadron of Swordfish torpedo bombers, flimsy and slow bi-planes, lacking adequate fighter support was shot out of the sky. Many Beauforts fitted with torpedoes failed to find their targets, many were not told what their targets were. An assortment of motor torpedo boats were sent out to intercept, but were aggressively pushed back by the tightly-held German eboat screen. A flotilla of destroyers met a similar fate. And the ramshackle guns which protected Dover had all the effectiveness of a pea shooter in a gale.
Most of the damage that the three major German ships suffered was due to mines that had been laid previously and not successfully removed. Losses were minimal. Their success was down to strict planning that was rigorously adhered to. The operation was kept under wraps within the navy, British radar was effectively flummoxed, the Luftwaffe gave the support it promised, and the sailors fought tenaciously against the successive attacks. It was a moral victory for Hitler, the plan to liberate the vessels was largely his brain-child and he stuck steadfast to it, against the protestations of many of his admirals.
The British were weak, un-coordinated, blasé and arrogant. Despite the obvious gallantry of the fighting men, their efforts were largely in vain, and it would have been better if nothing had been done at all. The escapade raises the question, one which the author also poses, of the potential success of Operation Sea Lion, the Nazi invasion of Britain, given that the UK was so lacking in firepower. Potter suggests it may well have been a success. Perhaps one reason it was not pursued is tangentially answered in the book: part of why Hitler wanted his battle fleet back in the North Sea was because he thought that occupied Norway would be invaded by the British. Occupying a land mass over the sea was one thing, successfully supplying and defending it was altogether another.
One wonders why, against such poor odds, the British even bothered trying to assault the ships. The subsequent operations of Scharnhorst and Gneisenau show they were not really instrumental in future conflicts. The answer must lie in their symbolic value and the sheer affront of them cruising up England’s home strait. Perhaps if the British had held back and coordinated a more concerted attack after the Germans had passed through Dover, around the Dutch islands, and brought their own high seas fleet into action, the result would have been different. But they were unprepared and the response was piecemeal.
Soon after, the blame game started. Everyone wanted answers but didn’t want to accept those that they received. Many British sailors and airmen lost their lives unnecessarily. Yet neither was the German operation of much value and there is an argument that better use would have been made of the ships disrupting Allied convoys. In all, the word chosen by the author to describe the events from the British point of view – fiasco – is singularly apt in judgement. His accomplishment in building an exciting, balanced narrative of the events is exemplary.
April 11, 2015
A little-known but interesting work on an odd incident in WWII. Three German major ships, two battle-cruisers and one heavy cruiser, stationed in Brest in western France, seemed to be vulnerable there (although well-placed for further commerce raiding). Berlin decided to call them to home waters in 1942 -- and they sailed up the English Channel and through the Dover Strait in broad daylight. "Fiasco" in the sense that the Royal Navy, the RAF and army coastal artillery failed to stop them, and it was a significant embarrassment for Churchill's government. Worth a read for those interested in WWII history, esp. the lesser-known campaigns, and for those interested in naval history.
May 13, 2021
This book is a work of nonfiction about the breakout of the German battleships Sharnhorst and Gneisenau along with the battlecruiser Prinz Eugen from the port of Brest, France via the English Channel to Wilhelmshaven, Germany in February of 1942. These capital ships were bottled up in Brest by the RAF and therefore unable to participate in commerce raiding in the Atlantic. The damage from arial bombardment often resulted in the ships being unable to sail for weeks at a time. Despite the German Admirals and Luftwaffe leader’s objections, Hitler ordered them back to Germany and he required them to use the English Channel as other options were even less practical. Hitler believed that the daylight passage through the Straits of Dover would so surprise the British that they would be unable to mount a successful assault to prevent the passage of these ships. Remarkably, Hitler was right. In what was truly an astounding “fiasco” of uncoordinated assaults, missed communication and lack of communication by the Royal Navy and the RAF, the ships made the two-day journey successfully. The only real damage to the Battleships was due to hitting mines and not due to the assaults by British forces. This book does a very through job of using official reports and diary entries from both sides in this event. The author also covers the British reaction to this missed opportunity and their cover-up of the incompetence of their leadership that was primarily responsible for this fiasco. The final irony of this combat, which cost many lives on the British side, is that the German capital ships never played any significant part in the remaining years of the war. The Allied Naval and Air Forces were just too strong for effective surface action by the German Navy.
March 2, 2017
An exciting narration of one few successful actions of the Kriegsmarine during WW 2.
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April 20, 2016If you're not familiar with the history of World War Two, there will be spoilers ahead.
A fast-paced true story from the 2nd World War detailing the German Operation Cerberus. On the coast of Occupied France, in the port city of Brest, two German pocket battleships, the Scharnhorst and the Gneisenau were joined by the heavy cruiser, Prinz Eugen which survived the sinking of the Bismarck by the British Royal Navy and the Naval Air Arm earlier in 1941.
After the cancellation of Operation Sea Lion, the proposed German invasion of Great Britain, Hitler and his cronies were growing concerned about a possible British invasion of Norway. Der Fuhrer ordered the Kriegsmarine to sail the ships to Wilhelmshaven. The ships would be safer in a German port than one in occupied territory under the bitter, observant eyes of French nationals. And easier to defend from daily air attacks by the RAF. From there, they'd be deployed to the coast of Norway.
Hitler decided the best course would be through the English Channel which was heavily mined. In addition, Dover is only twenty miles from Calais. In fact, on a clear day, the legendary White Cliffs can be seen from the French shore.
The belief was this was a safer choice than going around the British Isles and exposing the flotilla to the massed British fleet at Scapa Flow.
Leaving port after sunset on February 11, 1942, the flotilla of the 2 capitol ships, the heavy cruiser and a screen of destroyers and E-boats proceeded towards the Strait of Dover. The plan was to pass through in the early afternoon under an umbrella of Luftwaffe fighters with full jamming on the British coastal radar installations.
Thanks to that, and a lot of bungling by the British Navy, Coastal Command and the RAF, the ships made it through relatively unscathed. Both battleships were damaged by mines late in the run along the Dutch coast but were able to steam into German ports.
The story is told from both the German and British sides with eyewitnesses relating their experiences supplemented by combat diaries and reports from both sides of the war. While not as engrossing as Stephen Ambrose, Cornelius Ryan or Studs Turkel, the book had me swept up in the story - even knowing the outcome.
A fast-paced true story from the 2nd World War detailing the German Operation Cerberus. On the coast of Occupied France, in the port city of Brest, two German pocket battleships, the Scharnhorst and the Gneisenau were joined by the heavy cruiser, Prinz Eugen which survived the sinking of the Bismarck by the British Royal Navy and the Naval Air Arm earlier in 1941.
After the cancellation of Operation Sea Lion, the proposed German invasion of Great Britain, Hitler and his cronies were growing concerned about a possible British invasion of Norway. Der Fuhrer ordered the Kriegsmarine to sail the ships to Wilhelmshaven. The ships would be safer in a German port than one in occupied territory under the bitter, observant eyes of French nationals. And easier to defend from daily air attacks by the RAF. From there, they'd be deployed to the coast of Norway.
Hitler decided the best course would be through the English Channel which was heavily mined. In addition, Dover is only twenty miles from Calais. In fact, on a clear day, the legendary White Cliffs can be seen from the French shore.
The belief was this was a safer choice than going around the British Isles and exposing the flotilla to the massed British fleet at Scapa Flow.
Leaving port after sunset on February 11, 1942, the flotilla of the 2 capitol ships, the heavy cruiser and a screen of destroyers and E-boats proceeded towards the Strait of Dover. The plan was to pass through in the early afternoon under an umbrella of Luftwaffe fighters with full jamming on the British coastal radar installations.
Thanks to that, and a lot of bungling by the British Navy, Coastal Command and the RAF, the ships made it through relatively unscathed. Both battleships were damaged by mines late in the run along the Dutch coast but were able to steam into German ports.
The story is told from both the German and British sides with eyewitnesses relating their experiences supplemented by combat diaries and reports from both sides of the war. While not as engrossing as Stephen Ambrose, Cornelius Ryan or Studs Turkel, the book had me swept up in the story - even knowing the outcome.
April 20, 2012
Some incidents happens as they suppose to be; series of events creates a whole affect. German ship's breakthrough is one of the greatly designed and coordinated action by German navy in the history of world war II. A great German planning mixed with failure of in-coordination between British armed units, created one of the greatest naval operation.
The air superiority and coverage of coastal naval units of British forces, was unable to create any big obstacle for German battle ships. This is undeniable to say that the German military leadership was superior to other enemy countries. It was the fate of Germany to see defeat. A simple and basic planning had defied all advanced instruments and cluster of military installations. John dean has poured joy of fiction in this book.
The air superiority and coverage of coastal naval units of British forces, was unable to create any big obstacle for German battle ships. This is undeniable to say that the German military leadership was superior to other enemy countries. It was the fate of Germany to see defeat. A simple and basic planning had defied all advanced instruments and cluster of military installations. John dean has poured joy of fiction in this book.
Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews