“[H]undreds of shadowy heads [were] bobbing up and down, coming over the crest of the hill...They acted like they were drunk or on drugs. They came over the hill screaming and shrieking. Their shrill screams went right through my head. I was absolutely terrified. They had already outflanked our company, and now they were coming to finish us off. In the middle of this terrifying battle, I heard a very confident calm voice inside my head say, ‘squeeze the trigger.’ I instantly calmed down, took careful aim at one of the charging Germans...and squeezed the trigger. He flung his arms over his head and fell down...At this moment I was a veteran combat soldier...”
- Henry F. Martin, Co. L, 424th Infantry Regiment, at the Battle of the Bulge, December 16, 1944
The Battle of the Bulge is one of the most famous (and oddly-named) battles in the history of the United States Army. When you think of U.S. participation in the European Theater of Operations, chances are you are imagining one of two things: Omaha Beach or the Bulge. So much of the Bulge has achieved iconic status: the snow and cold and contrapuntal Yuletide setting; the early confusion and retreats, marked by small bands of intrepid soldiers banding together in forlorn delaying actions; the confusion sown by English-speaking German troops dressed as Americans; the American general replying “Nuts” when asked to surrender; and Patton’s cavalry charge as the climax.
For all these reasons, the Battle of the Bulge has been the subject of countless books, documentaries, and movies (including several episodes of the wildly-successful miniseries Band of Brothers).
The Bulge, though, has significance beyond its contributions to U.S. military lore. The Western Front of the Second World War is often seen as the undercard to the larger clashes between Germany and the Soviet Union. But the Bulge – which took place mainly in Belgium – is one of the few western battles comparable to the Eastern Front in terms of divisions involved and casualties inflicted. It provides a certain legitimacy to the efforts of the western Allies, whose labors are often deprecated in comparison to those of the U.S.S.R. The battle also marked the last bloody gasp of Nazi Germany, and it ended in utter failure, chewing up troops that would have better served Germany in the east.
This was a big, complicated engagement, filled with countless small unit actions, and gilded with all manner of myth. To that end, Peter Caddick-Adam’s Snow and Steel is a perfect match. It is a big book devoted to making sense of the complexities and piercing the myths and romances with a hard look at the evidence. More than that, Caddick-Adams does it all with infectious exuberance for his chosen subject.
Snow and Steel starts with a thorough analysis of German aims and preparations. It takes you all the way back to 1940 and the attack through the Ardennes that helped topple France. In doing so, Caddick-Adams discusses the state of German Army in 1944, especially its poor mechanization, fuel shortages, and reliance on horsepower (as in, the power of actual horses). This kind of armaments analysis is helpful, because the common notion (perpetuated by mistaken eyewitnesses) of the Bulge is that it was all Nazi Tiger IIs versus overmatched U.S. Shermans.
In discussing the lead-up to the Ardennes counteroffensive, Caddick-Adams also presents a sharp psychological portrait of Hitler as a strategic buffoon. His plan was for his forces to capture Antwerp, despite the unfeasibility of such a task, and despite the fact that there wasn’t much of a plan with what to do with the port city if captured. Hitler was also tactically bereft, refusing any and all tweaks to his overly-ambitious plot that might have made for a successful gambit. As Caddick-Adams shows, Hitler was always a gambler, relying on the unfortunate responses of his enemies to cover up for his illogic and stupidity. By 1944, his nonsensical decisions were finally catching up with him. (Of interest: Caddick-Adams suggests that the Ardennes counteroffensive may also have been a means of shoring up Hitler’s domestic position, in response to the July 20th plot to assassinate him).
Allied shock and surprise in the face of the German counteroffensive has always been one of the major themes of the Battle of the Bulge. After all, it was the early successes of this sudden attack – which punched a salient into the American front lines – that gives the battle its name.
At the time the Germans launched their assault against Omar Bradley’s 12th Army Group on December 16, 1944, many on the Allied side thought that the Germans were spent. The Normandy invasion had been successful; the Battle for France had been won; all that was left, it seemed, was the mopping up. Then, seemingly without warning, there were panzers plunging through the mist and fog, right into the squishy center of the American lines.
Caddick-Adams engages in a lengthy and reasoned discussion of Allied intelligence failures. Like the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, there were a lot of warning signs, but because various intelligence units did not communicate with each other, it was like the blind men and the elephant. No one connected all the fragments into a single picture.
(While Caddick-Adams takes Bradley to task, he is surprisingly complimentary towards Dwight Eisenhower, who he says quickly saw the danger and took actions to turn the German thrust into a potential Cannae, complete with a double-envelopment).
The Battle of the Bulge was a wide-ranging battle, taking place over the course of many weeks. (Some historians don’t mark the endpoint until February 1945). It is thus to Caddick-Adams’ credit that he keeps you oriented to date, time, and place, in order to maintain some semblance of order in a disordered battle.
This is not to say that Snow and Steel is a buttoned-up book, because it’s not. Actually, it is rather shaggy at times, full of trivia-filled digressions, where one topic suddenly opens a whole host of others. For instance, in the chapter on the Malmedy Massacre (where Peiper’s 1st Panzer Division murdered nearly 100 American P.O.W.s), Caddick-Adams takes the opportunity to survey war crimes committed by both the Germans and the Allies. Other diversions include the use of methamphetamine by German soldiers, the stories of Romans and Barbarians who battled over the same ground, and numerous cameos by an all-star cast of supporting characters, such as actor David Niven and writers Ernest Hemingway and Kurt Vonnegut.
Caddick-Adams propensity to go off topic is a sign of his enthusiasm. In a way, it seems like he has been waiting his whole life to write this, and he peppers the narrative with anecdotes from his many excursions to the battlefield. It is fair to say he goes on too long. Once the battle is over, he keeps writing, all the way to the end of World War II, and on into the Cold War. Still, when the author is having a good time, the reader is having a good time, and I didn't mind it too much, even when Caddick-Adams was delivering a movie review of the 1965 cinematic disaster that was Robert Shaw in The Battle of the Bulge.
Perhaps the only real flaw in Snow and Steel is in the battle descriptions themselves, which tend to lack much flair, tactility, or really good first-person accounts. In other words, Caddick-Adams does not really take the opportunity to build a good set piece. Typically, this would represent a rather significant demerit. Everything else is so good, though, that I could hardly bring myself to care. I came to think of it almost as one of those deliberate imperfections that artists sometimes work into their projects, as an act of humility.
Snow and Steel is an achievement that it will appeal to all types of interested readers: from WWII newcomers to experts; from those who thought the Battle of the Bulge referred to a losing struggle for their waistlines to those who have a portrait of Charles B. MacDonald hanging over the fireplace.
There will never be a final word on such a famous and dramatic battle. That said, it is fair to say that Snow and Steel is the now the standard.