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Certain To Win: The Strategy Of John Boyd, Applied To Business
Advance reviews of Certain to Win Certain to Win [Sun Tzu´s prognosis for generals who follow his advice] develops the strategy of the late US Air Force Colonel John R. Boyd for the world of business. Robert Coram's monumental biography, Boyd, the Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War , rekindled interest in this obscure pilot and documented his influence on military matters ranging from the design of the F-15 and F-16 fighters to the planning for Operation Desert Storm to the execution of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Unfortunately Boyd's written legacy, consisting of a single paper and a four-set cycle of briefings, addresses strategy only in war. [All Boyd´s briefings are available on Defense and the National Interest .] Boyd and Business Boyd did study business. He read everything he could find on the Toyota Production System and came to consider it as an implementation of ideas similar to his own. He took business into account when he formulated the final version of his "OODA loop" and in his last major briefing, Conceptual Spiral , on science and technology. He read and commented on early versions of this manuscript, but he never wrote on how business could operate more profitably by using his ideas. Other writers and business strategists have taken up the challenge, introducing Boyd's concepts and suggesting applications to business. Keith Hammonds, in the magazine Fast Company , George Stalk and Tom Hout in Competing Against Time , and Tom Peters most recently in Re-imagine! have described the OODA loop and its effects on competitors. They made significan
187 pages, Hardcover
First published June 24, 2004
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About the author
Chet Richards
7 books13 followersChet Richards was a close associate of the late US Air Force Colonel John R. Boyd from the mid-1970s until Boyd s death in 1997. Boyd had asked him to review the mathematical portions of his first civilian paper, Destruction and Creation, and this led to a collaboration that eventually included applications to the business world.
Chet Richards career began at the Pentagon in 1971, and has included employment with Northrop, the professional services company CACI in Washington DC, and Lockheed. A consultant since 1999, he maintains his practice in strategy for business, marketing, and communications through Tarkenton & Addams, Inc., a public relations firm in Atlanta, GA.
Chet is the author of several publications all involving applications of Boyd s strategies. His most recent, A Swift, Elusive Sword, addresses how we can re-fashion the US Defense Department to defend ourselves against the types of non-traditional enemies we will likely face in the 21st Century. It was published by the Centers for Defense Information shortly before 9/11, has been translated into Russian, and is now in its second printing. He has lectured on this subject to commercial organizations in the US and abroad, including the US Army Command and Staff College and the Air War College, and is the only person to have delivered Boyd s Patterns of Conflict since Boyd s death.
Chet is also a retired colonel in the US Air Force Reserve, where he served for many years as the Reserve Air Attaché to Saudi Arabia. Prior to that, he was a reservist on the Air Staff in Washington, where he built computer models of fighter aircraft effectiveness. He was commissioned in 1969 through the Army ROTC program at the University of Mississippi.
Chet and his wife, Ginger, live in Atlanta, where, in addition to their work with Tarkenton & Addams, they build custom web sites to support the marketing communications needs of their clients. They also own and operate two sites devoted to John Boyd s strategic legacy, Defense and the National Interest (http://www.d-n-i.net) and Belisarius.com (http://www.belisarius.com.) They have two daughters who, as this is written, are both in graduate school in Georgia, and one very overweight cat.
(Barnes and Noble)
Chet Richards career began at the Pentagon in 1971, and has included employment with Northrop, the professional services company CACI in Washington DC, and Lockheed. A consultant since 1999, he maintains his practice in strategy for business, marketing, and communications through Tarkenton & Addams, Inc., a public relations firm in Atlanta, GA.
Chet is the author of several publications all involving applications of Boyd s strategies. His most recent, A Swift, Elusive Sword, addresses how we can re-fashion the US Defense Department to defend ourselves against the types of non-traditional enemies we will likely face in the 21st Century. It was published by the Centers for Defense Information shortly before 9/11, has been translated into Russian, and is now in its second printing. He has lectured on this subject to commercial organizations in the US and abroad, including the US Army Command and Staff College and the Air War College, and is the only person to have delivered Boyd s Patterns of Conflict since Boyd s death.
Chet is also a retired colonel in the US Air Force Reserve, where he served for many years as the Reserve Air Attaché to Saudi Arabia. Prior to that, he was a reservist on the Air Staff in Washington, where he built computer models of fighter aircraft effectiveness. He was commissioned in 1969 through the Army ROTC program at the University of Mississippi.
Chet and his wife, Ginger, live in Atlanta, where, in addition to their work with Tarkenton & Addams, they build custom web sites to support the marketing communications needs of their clients. They also own and operate two sites devoted to John Boyd s strategic legacy, Defense and the National Interest (http://www.d-n-i.net) and Belisarius.com (http://www.belisarius.com.) They have two daughters who, as this is written, are both in graduate school in Georgia, and one very overweight cat.
(Barnes and Noble)
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May 9, 2017
Books like this are written so rigorously that any review of them which does not attempt a summary of their ideas seems to indicate a lack of understanding on the reader’s part. I suppose this is the type of prose you’d expect out of a Math Ph.D. who lectures at military academies.
Because I don’t want to come across as a complete airhead, I’ll bite the summary muffin. Fighter pilot John Boyd came up with a revolutionary theory of warfare, the OODA loop, which was (in some sense) to Sun Tzu what Einstein was to Newton. Observe your environment, Orient yourself with analysis and contextualization, Decide on a plan or course of action, Act on the decision; this is the fundamental cycle of warfare and, under the game of war (which is decidedly not like chess), the side with faster OODA has a significant strategic edge that can render traditionally legible differentiation metrics (larger infantry, greater firepower) practically irrelevant.
The question then becomes: How does one accelerate OODA loops? By building organizational competence, for which Boyd uses the German Blitzkrieg as prototype. There are four components: Einheit, Fingerspitzengefühl, Auftragstaktik, and Schwerpunkt. Now I could simply quote Richards’ definitions on page 61, but this, again, would hint at indigestion, so I’ll give it my own try. Einheit is mutual trust, which is built by, among other things, going through experiences together (like frat house hazing) and being on the same ideological page, agreeing with the project or campaign vision; as one, as many. Fingerspitzengefühl is basically what psychologists call tacit knowledge, which is a sort of non-codified expertise developed through sustained experience; a violinist can teach you the principles of bridge movement, but she will never be able to transmit her “fingertip feeling,” can never instruct her student into producing her particular timbre. Auftragstaktik, the concept of the mission, is best defined in terms of its negation: micromanagement. An effective leader sets directives of whose subroutines he trusts his assigned subordinates to manage; he does not waste his (and their) time trying to manage the subroutines himself. Steve Jobs (Aaron Sorkin): “Musicians play their instruments. I play the orchestra.” Schwerpunkt is the center of gravity, which you can change with by shifting your weight around. Sting like a butterfly, float like a bee! Adaptation is the name of the game, not running sunk costs into the ground.
Better organizational competence means faster OODA loops, faster OODA enables blitzkrieg, “lightning war,” which disorients opponents by messing their models up. You become an unmappable territory—and then you win. Sounds nice. But the other half of the theory is to assume your opponents are just as smart as you, so having a fast OODA loop is no good in itself; it must be faster relative to your opponent’s; the greater the speed difference, the more compounded your strategic edge.
Why should you care about any of this? Well, consider this. The world is a confusing place—more confusing than ever. The winners aren’t so much those who understand it better, but those who are in control of creating the confusion—the so-to-speak fog of war—and thus understand the extent of which it is theirs. Exempli gratia: This short piece of fiction, written by one of Putin’s personal advisors (and which everyone should read), is basically an analog for contemporary Russian political philosophy. By understanding the mechanics of confusion, you can better Orient yourself to the psychic barrage of societal forces constantly eroding our sense of agency. What follows from this I’ll leave you to develop.
An unexpected learning, perhaps the most practical for me personally, regarded the extensibility of metaphors; Richards specifically points out, for example, the futility of transposing the Toyota Production System onto non-manufacturing industries, the myriad ways war—and war strategy—isn’t remotely like chess (popular comparison though it is), the differences between competition in business and competition in warfare and the subsequent (non)applicability of OODA loops in each scenario. As a poet I enjoy comparing everything to everything else, so it’s good for me to collect boxes inside of which to think.
Favorite Quotes
“Another reason economies are impossible to model involves the messy presence of human beings. Financially massive organizations warp the environment they inhabit much like the way gravitationally massive bodies warp space-time in physics: Normal rules do not apply to them.” [p.45]
“[W]inning requires more than the promise of survival. It must offer an idea of such power and appeal that people will, at times, neglect their other responsibilities and work nights and weekends and extend trips to make it happen.” [p.75]
“Strategy, then, includes selecting the view of the future we want, creating devices to harmonize all the plans and actions designed to achieve that future, and on relatively rare occasions, shifting to an alternate future.” [p.83]
“For many years, Germany has built Fingerspitzengefühl through an extensive apprenticeship program that involves practically everybody from baker to banker. On the blue collar side, the program culminates in the creation of a final sample product, a true ‘masterpiece.’” [p.112]
On Auftragstaktik: “[Robert] Noyce wanted [his employees] to keep internalizing the company’s goals and to provide their own motivations, just as they had during the start-up phase. If they did that, they would have the capacity to make their own decisions.” [p.119] (cf. my other book review)
“If you achieved a 97% chance of winning a fight, which would be spectacular against people who train just as hard as you do, your odds of surviving 25 fights is less than 50%. Musashi won 60 duels, so clearly he was not thinking of taking that kind of risk. He wanted no risk at all.” [p.154]
“Studies of innovation reveal that practically everything new consists of bits and pieces of other concepts, often from fields that appeared to be unrelated, that somebody had the genius to reassemble to form something new and exciting.” [p.159]
“The most accurate indicator that you are starting to do maneuver conflict is that long established tradeoffs get broken. For example, in the TPS, it was the tradeoff between quality and cost (older systems could improve quality only by more inspections or more expensive components, both of which increased costs). In maneuver warfare, it was primarily the trade between control from the top and initiative from the bottom (in earlier forms of warfare, more control meant less initiative).” [p.169]
---
Minus the star because, all in all, it wasn’t that engaging.
Because I don’t want to come across as a complete airhead, I’ll bite the summary muffin. Fighter pilot John Boyd came up with a revolutionary theory of warfare, the OODA loop, which was (in some sense) to Sun Tzu what Einstein was to Newton. Observe your environment, Orient yourself with analysis and contextualization, Decide on a plan or course of action, Act on the decision; this is the fundamental cycle of warfare and, under the game of war (which is decidedly not like chess), the side with faster OODA has a significant strategic edge that can render traditionally legible differentiation metrics (larger infantry, greater firepower) practically irrelevant.
The question then becomes: How does one accelerate OODA loops? By building organizational competence, for which Boyd uses the German Blitzkrieg as prototype. There are four components: Einheit, Fingerspitzengefühl, Auftragstaktik, and Schwerpunkt. Now I could simply quote Richards’ definitions on page 61, but this, again, would hint at indigestion, so I’ll give it my own try. Einheit is mutual trust, which is built by, among other things, going through experiences together (like frat house hazing) and being on the same ideological page, agreeing with the project or campaign vision; as one, as many. Fingerspitzengefühl is basically what psychologists call tacit knowledge, which is a sort of non-codified expertise developed through sustained experience; a violinist can teach you the principles of bridge movement, but she will never be able to transmit her “fingertip feeling,” can never instruct her student into producing her particular timbre. Auftragstaktik, the concept of the mission, is best defined in terms of its negation: micromanagement. An effective leader sets directives of whose subroutines he trusts his assigned subordinates to manage; he does not waste his (and their) time trying to manage the subroutines himself. Steve Jobs (Aaron Sorkin): “Musicians play their instruments. I play the orchestra.” Schwerpunkt is the center of gravity, which you can change with by shifting your weight around. Sting like a butterfly, float like a bee! Adaptation is the name of the game, not running sunk costs into the ground.
Better organizational competence means faster OODA loops, faster OODA enables blitzkrieg, “lightning war,” which disorients opponents by messing their models up. You become an unmappable territory—and then you win. Sounds nice. But the other half of the theory is to assume your opponents are just as smart as you, so having a fast OODA loop is no good in itself; it must be faster relative to your opponent’s; the greater the speed difference, the more compounded your strategic edge.
Why should you care about any of this? Well, consider this. The world is a confusing place—more confusing than ever. The winners aren’t so much those who understand it better, but those who are in control of creating the confusion—the so-to-speak fog of war—and thus understand the extent of which it is theirs. Exempli gratia: This short piece of fiction, written by one of Putin’s personal advisors (and which everyone should read), is basically an analog for contemporary Russian political philosophy. By understanding the mechanics of confusion, you can better Orient yourself to the psychic barrage of societal forces constantly eroding our sense of agency. What follows from this I’ll leave you to develop.
An unexpected learning, perhaps the most practical for me personally, regarded the extensibility of metaphors; Richards specifically points out, for example, the futility of transposing the Toyota Production System onto non-manufacturing industries, the myriad ways war—and war strategy—isn’t remotely like chess (popular comparison though it is), the differences between competition in business and competition in warfare and the subsequent (non)applicability of OODA loops in each scenario. As a poet I enjoy comparing everything to everything else, so it’s good for me to collect boxes inside of which to think.
Favorite Quotes
“Another reason economies are impossible to model involves the messy presence of human beings. Financially massive organizations warp the environment they inhabit much like the way gravitationally massive bodies warp space-time in physics: Normal rules do not apply to them.” [p.45]
“[W]inning requires more than the promise of survival. It must offer an idea of such power and appeal that people will, at times, neglect their other responsibilities and work nights and weekends and extend trips to make it happen.” [p.75]
“Strategy, then, includes selecting the view of the future we want, creating devices to harmonize all the plans and actions designed to achieve that future, and on relatively rare occasions, shifting to an alternate future.” [p.83]
“For many years, Germany has built Fingerspitzengefühl through an extensive apprenticeship program that involves practically everybody from baker to banker. On the blue collar side, the program culminates in the creation of a final sample product, a true ‘masterpiece.’” [p.112]
On Auftragstaktik: “[Robert] Noyce wanted [his employees] to keep internalizing the company’s goals and to provide their own motivations, just as they had during the start-up phase. If they did that, they would have the capacity to make their own decisions.” [p.119] (cf. my other book review)
“If you achieved a 97% chance of winning a fight, which would be spectacular against people who train just as hard as you do, your odds of surviving 25 fights is less than 50%. Musashi won 60 duels, so clearly he was not thinking of taking that kind of risk. He wanted no risk at all.” [p.154]
“Studies of innovation reveal that practically everything new consists of bits and pieces of other concepts, often from fields that appeared to be unrelated, that somebody had the genius to reassemble to form something new and exciting.” [p.159]
“The most accurate indicator that you are starting to do maneuver conflict is that long established tradeoffs get broken. For example, in the TPS, it was the tradeoff between quality and cost (older systems could improve quality only by more inspections or more expensive components, both of which increased costs). In maneuver warfare, it was primarily the trade between control from the top and initiative from the bottom (in earlier forms of warfare, more control meant less initiative).” [p.169]
---
Minus the star because, all in all, it wasn’t that engaging.
May 12, 2017
I've been a devotee of Boyd and the OODA Loop as a key strategic concept for a while, the basic premise that by executing "asymmetric fast transients", a fighter can create a fog of ambiguity and fear, blind and disorient their enemy, and ultimately disorient, disable, and kill their foe, even if they are notably weaker and smaller on paper. The broadest principle, that we are in a struggle to survive, and the ability to adapt without losing your essence is the only permanent strategy, made immediate and intuitive sense.
What did not make sense was the application to civilian life, at least until such time as someone hands me command of a Marine Expeditionary Unit. Dr. Richards makes a brave attempt to translate Boyd's briefings into the language of management consulting. As such this is "applied" book, next to the Osinga's book of intellectual theory and Coram's biography (with the caveat that I haven't yet read Hammond's The Mind of War.)
The first, and fundamental step is to think about and apply the Four German Words.
1. Einheit: Mutual trust, unity, and cohesion
2. Fingerspitzengefuhl: Intuitive feel, especially for complex and potentially chaotic situations
3. Auftragstaktik: Mission, generally considered as a contract between superior and subordinate
4. Schwerpunkt: Any concept that provides focus and direction to the operation
By doing so, you create an organization that is resilient and flexible, that is capable of spotting and exploiting opportunities at all level and following through on good ideas without unnecessary friction. The two hardest parts are Einheit, mutual trust, because so much managerial bullshit actually destroys it--I think conventional wisdom is that demoralized drones are easier to manage, even if they produce worse results. Schwerpunkt, the concept that energizes and drives the organization, is also somewhat opaque in application. Richards corrects this in the second to last chapter, where he introduce cheng, the obvious approach (quality, value, performance) with ch'i, the quality of delight or wonder that separates a mundane business from the best performing ones.
That is not to say that is a perfect book. It is somewhat repetitive, and maneuver warfare concepts are ultimately military in origin. Is disorienting the enemy and dazzling customers truly the same thing? Some of the hardest questions go unanswered, like crafting a schwerpunkt from imperfect information about a field, or how to pick which 25%-40% of your managerial staff to cut in this process of becoming Boydian. Richards is also hung up on Toyota as the ideal manufacturing system and Southwest as the ideal airline (caveat: I greatly prefer to fly Southwest whenever I have a choice). But I think Richards is right in saying that the first law of competition is that you cannot be measurably smarter or harder-working than the people you're going up against, and that the only way to be certain to win is to be more agile, to find asymmetric advantages wherever you can.
What did not make sense was the application to civilian life, at least until such time as someone hands me command of a Marine Expeditionary Unit. Dr. Richards makes a brave attempt to translate Boyd's briefings into the language of management consulting. As such this is "applied" book, next to the Osinga's book of intellectual theory and Coram's biography (with the caveat that I haven't yet read Hammond's The Mind of War.)
The first, and fundamental step is to think about and apply the Four German Words.
1. Einheit: Mutual trust, unity, and cohesion
2. Fingerspitzengefuhl: Intuitive feel, especially for complex and potentially chaotic situations
3. Auftragstaktik: Mission, generally considered as a contract between superior and subordinate
4. Schwerpunkt: Any concept that provides focus and direction to the operation
By doing so, you create an organization that is resilient and flexible, that is capable of spotting and exploiting opportunities at all level and following through on good ideas without unnecessary friction. The two hardest parts are Einheit, mutual trust, because so much managerial bullshit actually destroys it--I think conventional wisdom is that demoralized drones are easier to manage, even if they produce worse results. Schwerpunkt, the concept that energizes and drives the organization, is also somewhat opaque in application. Richards corrects this in the second to last chapter, where he introduce cheng, the obvious approach (quality, value, performance) with ch'i, the quality of delight or wonder that separates a mundane business from the best performing ones.
That is not to say that is a perfect book. It is somewhat repetitive, and maneuver warfare concepts are ultimately military in origin. Is disorienting the enemy and dazzling customers truly the same thing? Some of the hardest questions go unanswered, like crafting a schwerpunkt from imperfect information about a field, or how to pick which 25%-40% of your managerial staff to cut in this process of becoming Boydian. Richards is also hung up on Toyota as the ideal manufacturing system and Southwest as the ideal airline (caveat: I greatly prefer to fly Southwest whenever I have a choice). But I think Richards is right in saying that the first law of competition is that you cannot be measurably smarter or harder-working than the people you're going up against, and that the only way to be certain to win is to be more agile, to find asymmetric advantages wherever you can.
January 17, 2019
Подходы знаменитого американского военного летчика и консультанта Пентагона, переработанные для применения в бизнесе. Система основана на сплаве древнекитайских, японских и немецких принципов ведения войны и системе менеджмента Тойоты. Работа Бойда хорошо дополняет топовые книги по разработке стратегии.
November 6, 2020
Oodles on OODA!
In this fascinating book, Chet Richards offers his interpretation of military strategist John Boyd’s lessons from war, business, and everyday life.
Richard introduces Boyd’s philosophy of conflict, for which he uses the term “maneuver conflict.” Boyd’s primary device for accomplishing this is a strategy of “time-based competition.” His advice for any competitive activity is to keep one’s orientation well matched to the real world during times of ambiguity, confusion, and rapid change, when the natural tendency is to become disoriented. The key is to take advantage of “asymmetric fast transients,” changes which are hopefully lesser for you than for your competition, hence (my term) leverage.
Though Richards often intermixes them, I’ve divided his comments into the following three topic areas.
WAR
In this area, Richards introduces Boyd’s famous OODA Loop (Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act. Boyd’s strategy provides ways to keep one’s own orientation intact, while taking active measures to destroy that of the opponent. Doing this within standard military doctrine is called “maintaining the initiative." Richards believes that the Army considers initiative practically an object of worship. By trying to maintain the initiative, one seeks to impose menacing dilemmas in which events happen unexpectedly and faster than the enemy can keep up with them. The author posits that intentionally doing this is tantamount to having a strategy. However, slightly problematic for me is that the author insists that a strategy is not a plan, but something more complicated and valuable. Whether or not the author succeeds in convincing you of this, I guess is up to you. However, 4WIW, here is John Boyd’s definition of strategy: “Strategy is a mental tapestry of changing intentions for harmonizing and focusing our efforts as a basis for realizing some aim or purpose in an unfolding and often unforeseen world of many bewildering events and many contending interests.”
Blitzkrieg
One of the areas that most fascinated Boyd was Germany’s Blitzkrieg. Here the German strategy was not so much to cope with chaos, but to cause and then exploit it, and it is this cascading of panic and chaos that accounts for Germany's “string of luck.”
“The German organizational climate encouraged people to act, and to take the initiative, even during the terror and chaos of war. Within this climate, the principles of mutual trust and intuitive competence make much of implicit communication, as opposed to detailed, written instructions.”
LIFE
Muhammad Ali, the great Olympic and professional boxer, described his strategy, which the author believes similar to Boyd’s, as “float like a butterfly, sting like a bee,” meaning be unpredictable to confound your opponent before striking him.
BUSINESS
Observe reality; do not kill truth messengers.
Since what you’re looking for is mismatches (my terms, leverage and/or arbitrage), a general rule is that bad news is the only kind that will do you any good. To thrive in any form of maneuver conflict, seek out and find data that don’t fit with your current worldview and do it while there is still time. Otherwise the world will change—or more likely your opponent will change it for you—and you will find yourself disoriented and in the position of playing catch-up. You will have lost the initiative, which is dangerous in any conflict.
Strategy isn’t beating the competition, it’s serving the customer’s real needs.
“Encourage initiative at all levels—in particular, an execute-and-communicate (‘shoot and scoot’) mindset rather than one of ask-and-wait.”
“Prepare a culture that is certain to win.”
What makes it and what kills it, e.g., micromanagement.
Note: Richards spends most of his business commentary referring to the Toyota Production System (TPS), which has an emphasis on reducing the time between order and delivery. It will be up to the reader to decide how valuable the major emphasis on just one company is.
GENERAL
Shape the ‘battlefield rather than beat the competition.” Improve capacity for independent action, to survive on own terms, generally at the expense of the competitors. Above all, stay flexible!
The company that best delivers value wins.
“People climb out of warm, safe foxholes, after all, to face bullets because they won’t abandon their comrades. It would be hard to imagine a more powerful social force, and equally hard to understand how companies which do not cultivate it can hope to compete. In the end, character counts, as John Bogle, founder and recently retired chairman of the Vanguard Group entitled a compilation of memos he had written to employees over the years. Trust, as Bogle notes, has to start at the top of the organization. Then at every level, leaders must make it clear that mutual trust is the cardinal corporate virtue. They do this by their actions: honor their own commitments and remove those who do not, no matter how good their numbers.”
BOTTOM-LINE
For your own organization and life, CHARACTER COUNTS! To win against adversaries, quickly and continuously present them with dilemmas that short-circuit their reasoning and render them unable to act effectively.
Bottom, bottom-line about the book: As a fellow author, I highly recommended this book for any student of strategy.
In this fascinating book, Chet Richards offers his interpretation of military strategist John Boyd’s lessons from war, business, and everyday life.
Richard introduces Boyd’s philosophy of conflict, for which he uses the term “maneuver conflict.” Boyd’s primary device for accomplishing this is a strategy of “time-based competition.” His advice for any competitive activity is to keep one’s orientation well matched to the real world during times of ambiguity, confusion, and rapid change, when the natural tendency is to become disoriented. The key is to take advantage of “asymmetric fast transients,” changes which are hopefully lesser for you than for your competition, hence (my term) leverage.
Though Richards often intermixes them, I’ve divided his comments into the following three topic areas.
WAR
In this area, Richards introduces Boyd’s famous OODA Loop (Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act. Boyd’s strategy provides ways to keep one’s own orientation intact, while taking active measures to destroy that of the opponent. Doing this within standard military doctrine is called “maintaining the initiative." Richards believes that the Army considers initiative practically an object of worship. By trying to maintain the initiative, one seeks to impose menacing dilemmas in which events happen unexpectedly and faster than the enemy can keep up with them. The author posits that intentionally doing this is tantamount to having a strategy. However, slightly problematic for me is that the author insists that a strategy is not a plan, but something more complicated and valuable. Whether or not the author succeeds in convincing you of this, I guess is up to you. However, 4WIW, here is John Boyd’s definition of strategy: “Strategy is a mental tapestry of changing intentions for harmonizing and focusing our efforts as a basis for realizing some aim or purpose in an unfolding and often unforeseen world of many bewildering events and many contending interests.”
Blitzkrieg
One of the areas that most fascinated Boyd was Germany’s Blitzkrieg. Here the German strategy was not so much to cope with chaos, but to cause and then exploit it, and it is this cascading of panic and chaos that accounts for Germany's “string of luck.”
“The German organizational climate encouraged people to act, and to take the initiative, even during the terror and chaos of war. Within this climate, the principles of mutual trust and intuitive competence make much of implicit communication, as opposed to detailed, written instructions.”
LIFE
Muhammad Ali, the great Olympic and professional boxer, described his strategy, which the author believes similar to Boyd’s, as “float like a butterfly, sting like a bee,” meaning be unpredictable to confound your opponent before striking him.
BUSINESS
Observe reality; do not kill truth messengers.
Since what you’re looking for is mismatches (my terms, leverage and/or arbitrage), a general rule is that bad news is the only kind that will do you any good. To thrive in any form of maneuver conflict, seek out and find data that don’t fit with your current worldview and do it while there is still time. Otherwise the world will change—or more likely your opponent will change it for you—and you will find yourself disoriented and in the position of playing catch-up. You will have lost the initiative, which is dangerous in any conflict.
Strategy isn’t beating the competition, it’s serving the customer’s real needs.
“Encourage initiative at all levels—in particular, an execute-and-communicate (‘shoot and scoot’) mindset rather than one of ask-and-wait.”
“Prepare a culture that is certain to win.”
What makes it and what kills it, e.g., micromanagement.
Note: Richards spends most of his business commentary referring to the Toyota Production System (TPS), which has an emphasis on reducing the time between order and delivery. It will be up to the reader to decide how valuable the major emphasis on just one company is.
GENERAL
Shape the ‘battlefield rather than beat the competition.” Improve capacity for independent action, to survive on own terms, generally at the expense of the competitors. Above all, stay flexible!
The company that best delivers value wins.
“People climb out of warm, safe foxholes, after all, to face bullets because they won’t abandon their comrades. It would be hard to imagine a more powerful social force, and equally hard to understand how companies which do not cultivate it can hope to compete. In the end, character counts, as John Bogle, founder and recently retired chairman of the Vanguard Group entitled a compilation of memos he had written to employees over the years. Trust, as Bogle notes, has to start at the top of the organization. Then at every level, leaders must make it clear that mutual trust is the cardinal corporate virtue. They do this by their actions: honor their own commitments and remove those who do not, no matter how good their numbers.”
BOTTOM-LINE
For your own organization and life, CHARACTER COUNTS! To win against adversaries, quickly and continuously present them with dilemmas that short-circuit their reasoning and render them unable to act effectively.
Bottom, bottom-line about the book: As a fellow author, I highly recommended this book for any student of strategy.
April 19, 2020
I had high hopes for this book, after reading up on Boyd and the original sources for his ideas.
Sadly, Richard’s book is useful only as an introduction to the core principles of Boyd’s work — at least, the bits that may be applied to other fields. The chapters 1 through 3 are acceptable. But 4 to 7 are a bit of a joke. Each should only be skimmed for the primary ideas (chapter 7 in particular is a list of follow-up books to read, the most important of which is probably Competing Against Time, which happens to be Tim Cook’s favourite book).
Give this a skim, but don’t expect too much.
Sadly, Richard’s book is useful only as an introduction to the core principles of Boyd’s work — at least, the bits that may be applied to other fields. The chapters 1 through 3 are acceptable. But 4 to 7 are a bit of a joke. Each should only be skimmed for the primary ideas (chapter 7 in particular is a list of follow-up books to read, the most important of which is probably Competing Against Time, which happens to be Tim Cook’s favourite book).
Give this a skim, but don’t expect too much.
January 3, 2015
A clear translation of Boyd's ideas to the world of business. I appreciate the author's insistence on the importance of practice and fostering culture. As a "reluctant entrepreneur" I am attracted to running a business in a Boyd-like fashion because it calls for a hands-on, creative approach.
September 14, 2019
How do you review a whole book in a few words?
Allow me one approach. To highlight a nugget that changed my vantage point. Via a personal story (or two)... by highlighting just one of the chapters. Each chapter is worthy, it just happens that this chapter immediately triggered a "reset" in thoughts about lay offs after breakfast one morning...
Chapter III
Certain to Win by Chet Richards
Colonel John Boyd is reported to have extracted four significant factors from his study of the Blitzkrieg, and called it creating "an organizational climate for operational success:"
1. Einheit: Mutual trust, unity, and cohesion
2. Fingerspitzengefuhl: Intuitive feel, especially for complex and potentially chaotic situations
3. Auftragstaktik: Mission, generally considered as a contract between superior and subordinate
4. Schwerpunkt: Any concept that provides focus and direction to the operation
Those that have studied the Toyota Production System (TPS also known as Lean Manufacturing) in any depth have reported the cultural aspect of Lean that is extremely difficult to duplicate. Especially in the West where we have more concern about the next quarter's numbers than building victory upon victory towards a long term vision of success. One of the reasons I have been so interested to see what Bob Nardelli is going to do at Chrysler LLC (now a privately held firm). But I digress...
Chet Richards states that it is "no accident" that mutual trust heads this list. It is also the biggest reason that I and most other Constraints Management gurus are so opposed to lay offs. For me, two reasons are core: first, lay offs send the wrong message. They say, "You are not worthy."
At breakfast last week, the conversation at the next table was about the slow down in the local economy. One gentleman commented that he was gearing up for the "I can do my job and Fred's job, whereas Fred can only do his job." How sad. Competition not against other companies in the marketplace, but for one another's job!
The concept of trust within the firm goes right out the window!
Second, lay offs costs thousands if not tens of thousands of dollars in waste. Anti-Lean to the max! As I have mentioned before, Jesse Jackson is right when he says that America cannot afford to throw people away!
Several times in Certain to Win, Richards explains a concept that I had not given enough thought: there are people in your organization that do not belong. Even if your payroll is four people! Before studying this book at length, I would have made this statement to all the employees of any company that I might purchase or lead as interim CEO:
"There will be no layoffs. Period."
Today, I would state it differently. "There will be no layoffs. However, there are people on the payroll that do not belong here. During the next 30 days, I will identify who you are and out place you, or, your attitude will make a sharp 180 degree turn and you will become a positive force to advance the mission of this company."
In order to create an agile force in the marketplace, trust is required.
FYI: Our collective trust has been broken by Wall Street.
Wanted: Leaders to restore that trust.
Allow me one approach. To highlight a nugget that changed my vantage point. Via a personal story (or two)... by highlighting just one of the chapters. Each chapter is worthy, it just happens that this chapter immediately triggered a "reset" in thoughts about lay offs after breakfast one morning...
Chapter III
Certain to Win by Chet Richards
Colonel John Boyd is reported to have extracted four significant factors from his study of the Blitzkrieg, and called it creating "an organizational climate for operational success:"
1. Einheit: Mutual trust, unity, and cohesion
2. Fingerspitzengefuhl: Intuitive feel, especially for complex and potentially chaotic situations
3. Auftragstaktik: Mission, generally considered as a contract between superior and subordinate
4. Schwerpunkt: Any concept that provides focus and direction to the operation
Those that have studied the Toyota Production System (TPS also known as Lean Manufacturing) in any depth have reported the cultural aspect of Lean that is extremely difficult to duplicate. Especially in the West where we have more concern about the next quarter's numbers than building victory upon victory towards a long term vision of success. One of the reasons I have been so interested to see what Bob Nardelli is going to do at Chrysler LLC (now a privately held firm). But I digress...
Chet Richards states that it is "no accident" that mutual trust heads this list. It is also the biggest reason that I and most other Constraints Management gurus are so opposed to lay offs. For me, two reasons are core: first, lay offs send the wrong message. They say, "You are not worthy."
At breakfast last week, the conversation at the next table was about the slow down in the local economy. One gentleman commented that he was gearing up for the "I can do my job and Fred's job, whereas Fred can only do his job." How sad. Competition not against other companies in the marketplace, but for one another's job!
The concept of trust within the firm goes right out the window!
Second, lay offs costs thousands if not tens of thousands of dollars in waste. Anti-Lean to the max! As I have mentioned before, Jesse Jackson is right when he says that America cannot afford to throw people away!
Several times in Certain to Win, Richards explains a concept that I had not given enough thought: there are people in your organization that do not belong. Even if your payroll is four people! Before studying this book at length, I would have made this statement to all the employees of any company that I might purchase or lead as interim CEO:
"There will be no layoffs. Period."
Today, I would state it differently. "There will be no layoffs. However, there are people on the payroll that do not belong here. During the next 30 days, I will identify who you are and out place you, or, your attitude will make a sharp 180 degree turn and you will become a positive force to advance the mission of this company."
In order to create an agile force in the marketplace, trust is required.
FYI: Our collective trust has been broken by Wall Street.
Wanted: Leaders to restore that trust.
August 1, 2017
This was kind of a lame book. I'd estimate only about 25% of it represents useful or original ideas with another 50% shamelessly cribbed wholesale from The Art of WarThe Art of War and Toyota Production System: Beyond large-scale production and the remainder made up of repetition and cruft (as many other reviewers note). I'm re-inspired to read about the Toyota Production system and to re-read The Art of War, but I mostly want the hours I spent reading this back. It would be 10x more valuable if it were 10x shorter.
The "Applied to Business" part seems poorly bolted on to a book that feels like it wants to be primarily about military strategy. I understand that the examples are meant to be general and I can easily see the analogies, but the token attempts to cater to a business-minded audience that are included just sucked. Just plain sucked. We need more specific case studies demonstrating the general principles in action. The examples that we do get are also just odd: Written in 2004, we're told IBM is doing a stellar job... OK, sure, whatever you say. Basically, I assumed the book was written in the '90s given some of the things Richards was saying. I'm also going to call bullshit on the cherry-picked examples. This method has a 100% success rate? Everyone who's ever attempted to implement it did so without any hiccups or problems and they're all doing awesome now? Mmkay. All-in-all, given the author's credentials, I expected more.
Lastly, I could have done without the peppering of Orientalism. For a book written in the 00's it needed to not.
The "Applied to Business" part seems poorly bolted on to a book that feels like it wants to be primarily about military strategy. I understand that the examples are meant to be general and I can easily see the analogies, but the token attempts to cater to a business-minded audience that are included just sucked. Just plain sucked. We need more specific case studies demonstrating the general principles in action. The examples that we do get are also just odd: Written in 2004, we're told IBM is doing a stellar job... OK, sure, whatever you say. Basically, I assumed the book was written in the '90s given some of the things Richards was saying. I'm also going to call bullshit on the cherry-picked examples. This method has a 100% success rate? Everyone who's ever attempted to implement it did so without any hiccups or problems and they're all doing awesome now? Mmkay. All-in-all, given the author's credentials, I expected more.
Lastly, I could have done without the peppering of Orientalism. For a book written in the 00's it needed to not.
February 20, 2021
As a summary on John Boyd’s synthesis on the operational factors that correlate to victory in warfare, and those principles extended to the domains of business operations, this book is truly excellent. After reading Robert Coram’s biography “Boyd: The Fighter PIlot Who Changed the Art of War”, one will be ready to tackle this text. However, for those who were looking for something more, specifically a detailed treatment on either Boyd’s cybernetic theory of OODA loops, or his Energy-Maneuver (EM) Theory on fighter airframe design/performance, they will be disappointed with this text. Yet, this book serves at the very least, an extended preface for further readings on either of those topics, and it provides enough content for those who do not wish to go so deep, but want to see what value Boyd’s ideas might have for either management science, or the as a framework to study warfare in the historical context.
With respect to those two topics, “Certain to Win” provides an interesting analysis of the Blitzkrieg, and why it worked via the OODA loop concept, as well as how that same OODA loop concept can be applied to business strategy. With respect to warfare, the author has a good quick overview of the various attempts to “quantify” the factors of victory at the tactical level. This is roughly consistent with the notion of “net assessments”, and is a fairly old concept in operations within this domain, he goes through the usual “accounting-like” theories that were attempted to this effect, as well as more “sophisticated” approaches like the Lanchester model” of field engagement. These quasi-simulation approaches are not treated in great technical detail, but enough detail is provided for one to reconstruct or get the gist of the mechanism.
Richards essentially approaches the topic as a data analyst. Both the survey of previous analytic approaches as well as a quick survey of the outcomes of various battles (with different “independent variables” like force size, technology etc.) he is able to dismiss a few potential explanations for victory in battle, and it is through this deconstruction that Richards starts to construct the eventual solution, tying it perfectly with Boyd’s own OODA loop. The long-and-short of it is that victory goes to the side that has a shorter decision-to-action cycle, and has that cycle tightly connected to an adaptive process. Within the purview of historical war, especially within the late industrial era warfare, Richards explains how Boyd demonstrated how the Germans had a superior attained and developed a superior cycle vis-a-vis it’s adversaries. These are summarized in 4 phrases Einheit, Fingerspitzengefühl, Auftragstaktik, and Schwerpunkt.
In essence, Boyd’s analysis was that Wehrmacht training as the sub-division level was superior, and endowed individual soldiers, squad leaders, all the way up to the division a kind of “intuition” that afforded the units that made up a force to take initiative and adapt to local conditions without being explicitly told how/what to do during an engagement or during deployment. The reason why this is important is that command becomes more abstracted the higher up the organizational chain one goes, and thus, the fidelity of information must also decrease, as each level of command abstracts away more and more detail. If a force is dependent on a General to determine action, the force may be ill-adapted to meet realities on the ground in fast-moving situations (which are often critical points during war). Thus, lower level initiatives are key lest your adversary exploit inaction to penetrate your lines, turn your flank, or deploy a greater mass of force in a particular area before your local force can adapt and counter.
Lower level German leadership were trained to act on local information, and were trusted by “contract” from their commanding officers to take action when needed, so long as those actions were congruent to the overall plans of the division/corps/force etc. This congruence with higher level objectives was key to early German success. As other texts, like Zetterling’s “Blitzkrieg : From the Ground Up” suggest, German High Command (OKW) during the war was not always very competent, and it’s fairly clear that the German political leadership were even less competent.
Richard’s shows in several examples during the invasion of France, how Boyd’s synthesis provides a cohesive and penetrating explanation for the nature of Germany’s victory during the first battle of the Ardennes Forest. After this historical tour, Richards goes through how such principles can be applied to business, as well as more definitions at the operational level, including the differentiation of plans with strategy. Since the text was written in the late 90s/early 2000s, much of the business cases revolve around the initial Japanese firm successes at defeating their American counterparts within the automobile industry. Much of the commentary here intersects somewhat with Six Sigma, TQM, and the works of Denning and other mid/late 20th century industrial engineers.
I found this section to be relatively less informative as the material is mostly consistent with those analyses, and offers relatively little new insights from the OODA-loop from this standpoint. Boyd’s analysis here is more a reformulation vs. a completely novel approach. Richards emphasises the importance of a strong internal culture, and in this respect, I think the book is valuable as much of the modern “change management” practitioners seem like shallow parrots when they speak on this dimension. It’s clear many of these people don’t have much of a functional understanding on how “culture” can really be harnessed to increase operational effectiveness.
There’s some material towards the end on the practical concerns of implementation and testing/validating a new organizational/operational system predicated on Boyd’s teaching. This will probably have no value for those interested in Boyd’s work proper, but is decent fodder for consultants. Overall, the book is good, it’s a quick read. For those interested in Boyd, this is definitely a good “chaser” to Coram, and maybe it will provide better understanding on Boyd’s ideas, as Coram doesn’t really focus too much on that front. It also goes well with recent books within the military history domain that focuses on the German way of war in WW2, especially those who want a critical analysis of the Blitzkrieg concept. Highly recommended.
With respect to those two topics, “Certain to Win” provides an interesting analysis of the Blitzkrieg, and why it worked via the OODA loop concept, as well as how that same OODA loop concept can be applied to business strategy. With respect to warfare, the author has a good quick overview of the various attempts to “quantify” the factors of victory at the tactical level. This is roughly consistent with the notion of “net assessments”, and is a fairly old concept in operations within this domain, he goes through the usual “accounting-like” theories that were attempted to this effect, as well as more “sophisticated” approaches like the Lanchester model” of field engagement. These quasi-simulation approaches are not treated in great technical detail, but enough detail is provided for one to reconstruct or get the gist of the mechanism.
Richards essentially approaches the topic as a data analyst. Both the survey of previous analytic approaches as well as a quick survey of the outcomes of various battles (with different “independent variables” like force size, technology etc.) he is able to dismiss a few potential explanations for victory in battle, and it is through this deconstruction that Richards starts to construct the eventual solution, tying it perfectly with Boyd’s own OODA loop. The long-and-short of it is that victory goes to the side that has a shorter decision-to-action cycle, and has that cycle tightly connected to an adaptive process. Within the purview of historical war, especially within the late industrial era warfare, Richards explains how Boyd demonstrated how the Germans had a superior attained and developed a superior cycle vis-a-vis it’s adversaries. These are summarized in 4 phrases Einheit, Fingerspitzengefühl, Auftragstaktik, and Schwerpunkt.
In essence, Boyd’s analysis was that Wehrmacht training as the sub-division level was superior, and endowed individual soldiers, squad leaders, all the way up to the division a kind of “intuition” that afforded the units that made up a force to take initiative and adapt to local conditions without being explicitly told how/what to do during an engagement or during deployment. The reason why this is important is that command becomes more abstracted the higher up the organizational chain one goes, and thus, the fidelity of information must also decrease, as each level of command abstracts away more and more detail. If a force is dependent on a General to determine action, the force may be ill-adapted to meet realities on the ground in fast-moving situations (which are often critical points during war). Thus, lower level initiatives are key lest your adversary exploit inaction to penetrate your lines, turn your flank, or deploy a greater mass of force in a particular area before your local force can adapt and counter.
Lower level German leadership were trained to act on local information, and were trusted by “contract” from their commanding officers to take action when needed, so long as those actions were congruent to the overall plans of the division/corps/force etc. This congruence with higher level objectives was key to early German success. As other texts, like Zetterling’s “Blitzkrieg : From the Ground Up” suggest, German High Command (OKW) during the war was not always very competent, and it’s fairly clear that the German political leadership were even less competent.
Richard’s shows in several examples during the invasion of France, how Boyd’s synthesis provides a cohesive and penetrating explanation for the nature of Germany’s victory during the first battle of the Ardennes Forest. After this historical tour, Richards goes through how such principles can be applied to business, as well as more definitions at the operational level, including the differentiation of plans with strategy. Since the text was written in the late 90s/early 2000s, much of the business cases revolve around the initial Japanese firm successes at defeating their American counterparts within the automobile industry. Much of the commentary here intersects somewhat with Six Sigma, TQM, and the works of Denning and other mid/late 20th century industrial engineers.
I found this section to be relatively less informative as the material is mostly consistent with those analyses, and offers relatively little new insights from the OODA-loop from this standpoint. Boyd’s analysis here is more a reformulation vs. a completely novel approach. Richards emphasises the importance of a strong internal culture, and in this respect, I think the book is valuable as much of the modern “change management” practitioners seem like shallow parrots when they speak on this dimension. It’s clear many of these people don’t have much of a functional understanding on how “culture” can really be harnessed to increase operational effectiveness.
There’s some material towards the end on the practical concerns of implementation and testing/validating a new organizational/operational system predicated on Boyd’s teaching. This will probably have no value for those interested in Boyd’s work proper, but is decent fodder for consultants. Overall, the book is good, it’s a quick read. For those interested in Boyd, this is definitely a good “chaser” to Coram, and maybe it will provide better understanding on Boyd’s ideas, as Coram doesn’t really focus too much on that front. It also goes well with recent books within the military history domain that focuses on the German way of war in WW2, especially those who want a critical analysis of the Blitzkrieg concept. Highly recommended.
July 27, 2020
Pretty good!
May 11, 2019
This is a book about concepts by John Boyd, a US Air Force colonel. More of a thinker than a doer, he fought in the Korean War without firing a single shot. That said, he laid out much of the foundation to the modern US air force theory and practice, having inspired the F-16 programme and developed Energy-Manoeuvrability theory which became critical for the design of modern aircraft. Personally, Boyd was known as "The Mad Major" for the intensity of his passions, as "Genghis John" for his confrontational style of interpersonal discussion, and as the "Ghetto Colonel" for his spartan lifestyle. So even though we are not talking about an Alexander-the-Great-level figure, it seems like a good idea to listen to what he has to say.
The main notion of the book is that the reality is chaotic, complex and unpredictable, therefore it’s impossible to come up with a plan for the future. Instead, strategy is a way to respond quickly to a changing situation, bearing in mind the ultimate objectives that have to be achieved.
The book contains three main frameworks to illustrate how it’s done. The first is the example of Blitzkrieg, where agile German forces quickly defeated numerically superior French at the start of World War II. Chet Richards (the author) lays out the following characteristics of Blitzkrieg:
* Einheit: Mutual trust, unity, cohesion
* Fingerspitzengefühl: Intuitive feel, especially for complex and potentially chaotic situations
* Auftragstaktik: Mission, generally considered as a contract between superior and subordinate; you can challenge the contract, but once you agree to it, you should stick to it
* Schwerpunkt: Any concept that provides focus and direction to the operation
These allowed the Nazi forces to quickly and effectively respond to unfamiliar and chaotic situations. In other words, they meant that the Germans employed quick and well-coordinated “OODA loops” - and these OODA loops are the cornerstone of the book and of Boyd’s military strategy. They are:
* Observation: the collection of data by means of the senses
* Orientation: the analysis and synthesis of data to form one's current mental perspective
* Decision: the determination of a course of action based on one's current mental perspective
* Action: the physical playing-out of decisions
Recipe for success is following each step in order and doing it more quickly than the opponent.
The last framework in the book is borrowed from the old Sun Tzu and mandates the use of cheng as well as chi, where:
* Cheng - orthodox, expected, measurable
* Chi - surprising, irregular, sometimes even magical
Both are mutually generative and reinforcing. One can't exist without the other - if you only fight with chi, then it becomes cheng. If you only cheng, you’re predictable by definition. Thus, one should engage with the cheng, win with the chi. It’s like ying-yang - there should be an element of one in the other.
This is all great food for thought. Having played Call of Duty and Counter Strike, I hereby confirm that combat is chaotic. Business can be chaotic too, and there are plenty of examples of agile companies beating sleepy incumbents.
What the book lacks in is actually bringing the concepts to live. Chet Richards, the author, was a close colleague of Boyd and lectured at military universities, but his record as a business person is thin. The examples that he keeps labouring - Toyota Production System and Southwest Airlines - are basic, monotonous and not even very relevant to the concepts he’s describing. He sounds quite naive about business in general and doesn’t do a great job at translating learnings from the military to business.
Is the book worth reading? If you’re into strategy, you should take a look. It casts a different perspective on the much-covered concept of agility and even Lean Methodology. The only issue is that you will have to do the homework yourself if you want to translate the frameworks to real-life business situations. Or you can just follow Richards’ “practical advice” at the end of the book - “If you’re not former military, join the Marine Corps”.
The main notion of the book is that the reality is chaotic, complex and unpredictable, therefore it’s impossible to come up with a plan for the future. Instead, strategy is a way to respond quickly to a changing situation, bearing in mind the ultimate objectives that have to be achieved.
The book contains three main frameworks to illustrate how it’s done. The first is the example of Blitzkrieg, where agile German forces quickly defeated numerically superior French at the start of World War II. Chet Richards (the author) lays out the following characteristics of Blitzkrieg:
* Einheit: Mutual trust, unity, cohesion
* Fingerspitzengefühl: Intuitive feel, especially for complex and potentially chaotic situations
* Auftragstaktik: Mission, generally considered as a contract between superior and subordinate; you can challenge the contract, but once you agree to it, you should stick to it
* Schwerpunkt: Any concept that provides focus and direction to the operation
These allowed the Nazi forces to quickly and effectively respond to unfamiliar and chaotic situations. In other words, they meant that the Germans employed quick and well-coordinated “OODA loops” - and these OODA loops are the cornerstone of the book and of Boyd’s military strategy. They are:
* Observation: the collection of data by means of the senses
* Orientation: the analysis and synthesis of data to form one's current mental perspective
* Decision: the determination of a course of action based on one's current mental perspective
* Action: the physical playing-out of decisions
Recipe for success is following each step in order and doing it more quickly than the opponent.
The last framework in the book is borrowed from the old Sun Tzu and mandates the use of cheng as well as chi, where:
* Cheng - orthodox, expected, measurable
* Chi - surprising, irregular, sometimes even magical
Both are mutually generative and reinforcing. One can't exist without the other - if you only fight with chi, then it becomes cheng. If you only cheng, you’re predictable by definition. Thus, one should engage with the cheng, win with the chi. It’s like ying-yang - there should be an element of one in the other.
This is all great food for thought. Having played Call of Duty and Counter Strike, I hereby confirm that combat is chaotic. Business can be chaotic too, and there are plenty of examples of agile companies beating sleepy incumbents.
What the book lacks in is actually bringing the concepts to live. Chet Richards, the author, was a close colleague of Boyd and lectured at military universities, but his record as a business person is thin. The examples that he keeps labouring - Toyota Production System and Southwest Airlines - are basic, monotonous and not even very relevant to the concepts he’s describing. He sounds quite naive about business in general and doesn’t do a great job at translating learnings from the military to business.
Is the book worth reading? If you’re into strategy, you should take a look. It casts a different perspective on the much-covered concept of agility and even Lean Methodology. The only issue is that you will have to do the homework yourself if you want to translate the frameworks to real-life business situations. Or you can just follow Richards’ “practical advice” at the end of the book - “If you’re not former military, join the Marine Corps”.
July 1, 2019
This book was very disappointing for me. My hope was to get more insight into John Boyds OODA Loop. What I got was a superficial explanation of maneuver warfare and some references to Sun Tzu (The art of War) and Miyamoto Musashi (The book of five Rings) intermingled with the Toyota Production System (TPS).
The book started quite interesting with "Auftragstaktik" or, in english, maneuver warfare. Since I am German with some knowledge about it, I found the new perspective with the explanation of "Einheit", "Schwerpunkt" and "Fingerspitzengefühl" (unity, emphasis and intuition/flair - as I would translate these terms) very intriguing. Still a bit superficial, but with the hope there is more do come later on.
This was chapters I - III. With chapter IV things started to become a bit weird in my eyes. Chet Richards seemed to squeeze business issues into the OODA Loop that are (in my opinion) not suitable at all for it. He missed most of the points (all that did not fit into the OODA Loop) of "Auftragstaktik". Even the TPS is associated with th OODA Loop - a very strange thought in my eyes. The well known Kano Model (without mentioning it by name) for product development had to serve as an example for maneuver warfare in business as well.
At the end, there was almost no value delivered by the book for me. You can spend your time on better books with more depth.
The book started quite interesting with "Auftragstaktik" or, in english, maneuver warfare. Since I am German with some knowledge about it, I found the new perspective with the explanation of "Einheit", "Schwerpunkt" and "Fingerspitzengefühl" (unity, emphasis and intuition/flair - as I would translate these terms) very intriguing. Still a bit superficial, but with the hope there is more do come later on.
This was chapters I - III. With chapter IV things started to become a bit weird in my eyes. Chet Richards seemed to squeeze business issues into the OODA Loop that are (in my opinion) not suitable at all for it. He missed most of the points (all that did not fit into the OODA Loop) of "Auftragstaktik". Even the TPS is associated with th OODA Loop - a very strange thought in my eyes. The well known Kano Model (without mentioning it by name) for product development had to serve as an example for maneuver warfare in business as well.
At the end, there was almost no value delivered by the book for me. You can spend your time on better books with more depth.
February 29, 2020
Richards is, as far as I can discern, the only Boyd acolyte who extended Boyd directly to competition beyond warfare. This is an excellent summary of Boyd, and at times, Boyd's editing shines through in beautiful clarity.
Maneuver conflict theory is the apex of strategic thought as far as I've found. This book applies maneuver conflict to business. It primarily cites Toyota (the Production System), but also Dell, Southwest Airlines, and some other companies as examples of applications of maneuver-esque theory.
This is a short book because Richards can explain Boyd and maneuver warfare easily. It's an easily understood concept. The hard part is practicing, making this book like The Book Of Five Rings in its ratio of instruction, to instruction to practice.
And, you must practice. The art of creating market conditions where you are certain to win is not trivial. It demands, like all arts, deep practice, and the creation of fingertip-feel. But Richards will help you get there. This is a great entry into the Boyd canon, and a must read for anyone who wants to understand not just business, but strategy.
Maneuver conflict theory is the apex of strategic thought as far as I've found. This book applies maneuver conflict to business. It primarily cites Toyota (the Production System), but also Dell, Southwest Airlines, and some other companies as examples of applications of maneuver-esque theory.
This is a short book because Richards can explain Boyd and maneuver warfare easily. It's an easily understood concept. The hard part is practicing, making this book like The Book Of Five Rings in its ratio of instruction, to instruction to practice.
And, you must practice. The art of creating market conditions where you are certain to win is not trivial. It demands, like all arts, deep practice, and the creation of fingertip-feel. But Richards will help you get there. This is a great entry into the Boyd canon, and a must read for anyone who wants to understand not just business, but strategy.
December 10, 2017
The Good: Gets across the idea of ‘tight ooda loops’, and the success factors behind the blitzkrieg, and the power of fast movement & decision making.
The Bad: Once he gets past these ideas, the latter half of the book falls apart in an attempt to shoehorn in references to many barely related books. Would have been better if he’d just finished earlier. Also, he seems to adulate Boyd to the point where he’s not critical of his ideas, taking them as gospel. He plays loose with data/facts in relation to this (An example: he cites a handful of military conflicts in which strategy allowed a smaller force to win, thus concluding that strategy & speed are more important than, say, size of forces or technological superiority. However, he doesn’t say whether, for example, there were 900 other conflicts in the same time period in which brute force won. So a reader not carefully sniffing at his argument may miss this).
Anyhow, my nitpicks aside, it was an OK read, but not top of my list of biz/strategy books.
March 4, 2020
Zen and other oriental philosophies talk at great lengths about intuitive knowledge, but they also stress that it comes through years of experience and self discipline. Boyd applies lessons of military strategy and classic texts, such as Sun Tzu’s Art of War, to business in a compelling and implementable way. For example he describes Ch’i and Cheng as the art of misdirection, particularly apropos in today’s environment of disinformation. Cheng is “the standard” approach, whereas Ch’i is the pursuit of the wow, the surprise, the magic. Boyd says you need to do both. Strategy is keeping the competition off balance while also leading both you and the customer into new ways of conceiving the product or service. The way to find the way is applying principles of maneuver warfare: what wins is aggressive reconnaissance. You need to be out ahead, scouting the strategy, and then capitalizing on asymmetries. Mutual trust throughout the ranks and especially among leadership is key. You want to project to others that you know what they are capable of and trust them to do it if they say they’re going to do it. They need to trust you not to order them to do something they can’t do or endanger them for anything other than a critically strategic reason.
May 29, 2018
I've enjoyed reading anything Boyd related I can get my hands on. As a business professional, this was easily the most directly impacting work I've read. What I find very interesting about this book is that I'm not sure how I would've received the information within had it been my first exposure to OODA loops and asymmetric strategies.
I'd strongly recommend this book, but read it in conjunction with other analyses of John Boyd's briefings. This doesn't do the underlying theories justice in itself, but does provide a capstone layer of practical action that is wildly useful and insightful for the professional reader.
I'd strongly recommend this book, but read it in conjunction with other analyses of John Boyd's briefings. This doesn't do the underlying theories justice in itself, but does provide a capstone layer of practical action that is wildly useful and insightful for the professional reader.
December 1, 2019
3.5 rounded up. There were several pages that I dog-eared that I felt had really solid, actionable advice that I hadn’t heard elsewhere (or that I hadn’t heard phrased in a way that connected as well). I also have already referenced this book at work and have started trying to make actionable steps to improve my team environment based on the principles of maneuver strategy.
All that said, the writing style overall didn’t connect with me (business books rarely do) and it felt very repetitive in certain sections. If I read the phrase “increasing OODA loop speed” one more time....
All that said, the writing style overall didn’t connect with me (business books rarely do) and it felt very repetitive in certain sections. If I read the phrase “increasing OODA loop speed” one more time....
March 14, 2020
Concise, easy and fun to read, much better than any summary of Boyd's ideas you will find on the web. The advice in the book seems useful and explanations from both warfare and business perspectives help understand the core ideas better. And it has a great list of references: this is not the book I would have expected to cite "A New Kind Of Science" (which came out only 2 years before this book by the way!).
November 19, 2023
I went into this hoping to learn more about maneuver warfare and John Boyd's OODA loop, which I was already somewhat familiar with. And while the information was valuable, this wasn't written in a way that was particularly engaging for me. If you're looking for history behind the ideas, you may enjoy this. If you're looking for a distilled version of the concepts, a blog post or ChatGPT may serve you better.
June 12, 2017
Wish I'd read this when I was first introduced to OODA.
Read it and learn why empowering boots-on-ground actors beats top down decision making, and how you can harness that advantage in a business context by emulating the principles of Blitzkreig tactics.
And once you've read it, share those principles with everyone you work with.
Read it and learn why empowering boots-on-ground actors beats top down decision making, and how you can harness that advantage in a business context by emulating the principles of Blitzkreig tactics.
And once you've read it, share those principles with everyone you work with.
May 8, 2019
The core tactical idea of a tight operating loop (quickly reorienting to new information, quicker than your opponent), plus clear objectives, can be applied in so many contexts. This book is an overview and introduction, not a how-to, so don't expect specific advice.
June 21, 2019
Excellent addition to Boyd's work and has long been on my To Read list. I was hoping for more examples, and more tactics, even though Chet himself talks about how blindly applying tactics is not the way to go. Will add notes later.
December 8, 2019
Good overview of some of John Boyd's main contributions to the science of strategy. The author also does well to combine these learnings with similar approaches from others such as Sun Tzu and Von Clausewitz. Some of the learnings seem more applicable to military strategy than business though and the book would have been better with more detailed business case studies.
March 26, 2020
Certain to win is a book of how to master a war. Master agility and you can outpace your strongest competitor if they are not agile enough. Muster chaos and take advantage of the unpredictable situation by staying one step of your foe. Really war-like book in business as well as gaming.
April 21, 2023
Very good informative book. Only reason it’s not 5 stars is it does get a bit repetitive. I did appreciate all the various steps for action that the book lays out and think it’s what the cliche sales/business strategy books strive to be informationally.
June 5, 2025
more than reacting quickly to conditions , maneuver conflict creates chaos in adversary and builds your own morale, changing conditions themselves
Surprising amount of discussion of culture and intuition
Also complexity science
Surprising amount of discussion of culture and intuition
Also complexity science
October 10, 2025
You don’t need to read the whole book but the core concept of the ooda loop is good and if you can get past the whole MIC of it all the examples do a good job of sticking that core concept into your brain
July 11, 2017
OODA is for more than fighter pilots!
Excellent and accessible treatment of the OODA loop to modern business. How to stay agile and forge your own way in the market.
Excellent and accessible treatment of the OODA loop to modern business. How to stay agile and forge your own way in the market.
July 24, 2017
Boyd is a first rate mind.
This book has no fluff. Highly recommended.
This book has no fluff. Highly recommended.
March 13, 2018
I've read Boyd before and some Ribbonfarm stuff, so these weren't new ideas to me. But they're more digestible here.
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