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An Intimate War: An Oral History of the Helmand Conflict, 1978-2012
An Intimate War tells the story of the last thirty-four years of conflict in Helmand Province, Afghani- stan as seen through the eyes of the Helmandis. In the West, this period is often defined through different lenses - the Soviet intervention, the civil war, the Taliban, and the post-2001 nation-building era. Yet, as experienced by local inhabitants, the Helmand conflict is a perennial one, involving the same individuals, families and groups, and driven by the same arguments over land, water and power. This book - based on both military and re- search experience in Helmand and 150 inter- views in Pashto - offers a very different view of Helmand from those in the media. It demonstrates how outsiders have most often misunderstood the ongoing struggle in Helmand and how, in doing so, they have exacerbated the conflict, perpetuated it and made it more violent - precisely the opposite of what was intended when their interventions were launched. Mike Martin's oral history of Helmand under- scores the absolute imperative of understanding the highly local, personal, and non-ideological nature of internal conflict in much of the 'third' world.
419 pages, Kindle Edition
First published January 1, 2014
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Displaying 1 - 12 of 12 reviews
November 2, 2016
This is an exceptional book for anyone who wants to understand what has happened in Afghanistan, particularly after the British army took over Helmand province in 2006 as part of ISAF's mission. Mike Martin, a former officer during that mission, argues that because he spoke Pashto and had significant interaction with local residents, he was able to understand the human terrain in that province better than the senior British military and political leaders did. The picture that emerges damns the British experience there because of the misunderstandings that drove British strategy. The book is derived from Martin's PhD. thesis and because of that, as well as the complex social systems that he thoroughly describes, is often difficult to read; but it reveals an extraordinarily complex social system that I assume is unique to Helmand. in this, the opposition to Western influence is not the Taliban but instead comes from tribal politics, drug trade, warlord forces, and struggles for political influence under the Karzai government. In the end, Martin convincingly argues that "Westerners do not understand the conflict and are continually manipulated by the Helmandis. This was true in almost ever aspect of ISAF counterinsurgency." This is a necessary book for anyone interested the Western military intervention in Afghanistan or for any future counterinsurgency role in this part of the world.
June 24, 2014
Probably the most important book you are likely to read with regard to Afghanistan and essential for Brits to read. (OOHHhhhhh.... but its all so confusing and thers all these tribes and tribes and tribes and they all have names you can't pronounce that are all like each other and does it matter anyway and anyway its all about bin Laden anyway and isn't he dead? But yeah I support the troops yeah support the 'eroes is what I say. 'elp for 'eroes. bring 'em all 'ome I mean what are dey aaahhttt there anyway for I mean its MY taxes is what is paying for it like, innit).
yep I thought so. Of course it won't be read by all the people that need to read it. One just hopes that a few of the people that OUGHT TO HAVE READ IT before trying to suppress it DO in fact read it and learn a few lessons for the future.
Mike Martin has written this account of Afghanistan which is a complete and utter indictment of British and American policy and a bright mirror to show the utter stupidity of marching into a conflict and country they have very little understanding of, and from the cultural basis of the West, very little hope of understanding the complexities of Afghan and Helmandi society. You have to read it to begin to understand those complexities of kinship and ties and drug money and cultivation in a land where water and family are the most precious things going. Where tribe and kin are MUCH MUCH more important than the idea of COUNTRY. Where the Western-perceived set idea of the Taliban as an insurrectionary fighting force like an army is completely at odds with what can be understood to be occurring on the ground, if the conflict is viewed through the eyes of a Helmandi.
By the time I reached the end I felt like asking why on earth we were supporting Karzai and the Afghan government which appears to have as much legitimacy in Afghanistan as the Taliban, who by their nature and definition are in fact the very villagers of Helmand that the British and American forces have been sent in to protect and secure.If you can't even converse or understand a language how can you even hope to understand the complexities let alone the nuances of a society in which all boundaries and allegiances are grey and fuzzy.
There are wheels within wheels within wheels in this book. As a Helmandi says to Martin "You know a lot about Helmand, Sahib Mike, but what you know is about 1% of what actually is happening."
You really should buy and read this. Its a stunning book from someone that knew that the shades were gradually falling from his eyes as he took part with a force that were trying to fight the unfightable and just beginning to realise that they had been duped but with no way of knowing how to change their ways other than to get out.
yep I thought so. Of course it won't be read by all the people that need to read it. One just hopes that a few of the people that OUGHT TO HAVE READ IT before trying to suppress it DO in fact read it and learn a few lessons for the future.
Mike Martin has written this account of Afghanistan which is a complete and utter indictment of British and American policy and a bright mirror to show the utter stupidity of marching into a conflict and country they have very little understanding of, and from the cultural basis of the West, very little hope of understanding the complexities of Afghan and Helmandi society. You have to read it to begin to understand those complexities of kinship and ties and drug money and cultivation in a land where water and family are the most precious things going. Where tribe and kin are MUCH MUCH more important than the idea of COUNTRY. Where the Western-perceived set idea of the Taliban as an insurrectionary fighting force like an army is completely at odds with what can be understood to be occurring on the ground, if the conflict is viewed through the eyes of a Helmandi.
By the time I reached the end I felt like asking why on earth we were supporting Karzai and the Afghan government which appears to have as much legitimacy in Afghanistan as the Taliban, who by their nature and definition are in fact the very villagers of Helmand that the British and American forces have been sent in to protect and secure.If you can't even converse or understand a language how can you even hope to understand the complexities let alone the nuances of a society in which all boundaries and allegiances are grey and fuzzy.
There are wheels within wheels within wheels in this book. As a Helmandi says to Martin "You know a lot about Helmand, Sahib Mike, but what you know is about 1% of what actually is happening."
You really should buy and read this. Its a stunning book from someone that knew that the shades were gradually falling from his eyes as he took part with a force that were trying to fight the unfightable and just beginning to realise that they had been duped but with no way of knowing how to change their ways other than to get out.
September 11, 2016
This might be the best book on the Afghan war.
February 12, 2016
4 star analysis. 2.5 star style. If you can get through the first three chapters, then you'll finish the book. The endless list of names and political / powerbroker rivalries of Helmand are nearly impossible to follow without "intimate" knowledge and accompanying visuals (of which there are few). But, Mike Martin's conclusions are fundamental to understanding why we are where we are... now with Helmand security. Every military or political leader should read his conclusion. The collective failure of US and British (as well as Soviets, ISI/Pakistan, and GIRoA) to understand the local dynamics of rivalry and competition over land/water/drugs/power in Helmand have consistently led to both manipulation of external forces/influences as well as serious and negative unintended consequences. This phenomena of misunderstanding and vulnerability to manipulation due to lack of understanding of complex foreign societies is a common "human terrain" problem that is not unique to Afghanistan. See Kilcullen's Accidental Guerilla and Emile Simpson's War From The Ground Up. The US military would do well to head Mike Martin's warning of the importance of organizing and preparing future missions to understand "the local politics - its actors, groups, narratives, feuds and alliances."
April 30, 2014
An amazingly well-researched, in depth analysis of the British War in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, which the Ministry of Defense tried to ban. Shows in jaw-dropping detail how British forces in Helmand completely misunderstood and misjudged the enemy they were fighting, and actually made things worse. And all this from a former Territorial Army officer who was commissioned to write the book by the Army, and had to resign his commission when the MoD tried to block publication! An absolute must-read for anyone who wants to know what has been going on in Afghanistan, not only since 2006, but right back to the Soviet Occupation and beyond.
March 17, 2024
"Most people who think about Helmand develop mental problems, because the politics are so strange and complicated." -- ex-jihadi commander, Nad-e Ali. (i.e. A guy from Helmand)
"Mike-sahib, you know a lot [about Helmand], but it is about one percent [of what is going on]," a Helmandi who knew the author well.
This book, first published in 2012 and updated in 2014, is so very excellent. It's an oral history of 35+ years of conflict in Helmand in which the British, then the Soviets, then the Americans & British (again) fail to truly understand the conflict they've inserted themselves into. Having never understood the conflict, outsiders get manipulated by local interests, easily, so easily.
"...Helmandi actors and factions have exploited the black of detailed knowledge of Helmandi politics (and doggedness in sticking to their own official narratives) displayed by outsiders, to manipulate them into funding their continuing conflict."
As an oral history, this book gets deep in the weeds. But whose family has been feuding with whose for a generation matters, as does who got what land at what point and who got what plush contract or office or access. At the same time I found it very readable, a good effort at organizing into coherence something that is fundamentally chaotic and complicated -- without dismissing that complexity.
Recommended for: absolute must for anyone trying to sort out "what went wrong " in Afghanistan. Fans of wild anecdotes.
"Mike-sahib, you know a lot [about Helmand], but it is about one percent [of what is going on]," a Helmandi who knew the author well.
This book, first published in 2012 and updated in 2014, is so very excellent. It's an oral history of 35+ years of conflict in Helmand in which the British, then the Soviets, then the Americans & British (again) fail to truly understand the conflict they've inserted themselves into. Having never understood the conflict, outsiders get manipulated by local interests, easily, so easily.
"...Helmandi actors and factions have exploited the black of detailed knowledge of Helmandi politics (and doggedness in sticking to their own official narratives) displayed by outsiders, to manipulate them into funding their continuing conflict."
As an oral history, this book gets deep in the weeds. But whose family has been feuding with whose for a generation matters, as does who got what land at what point and who got what plush contract or office or access. At the same time I found it very readable, a good effort at organizing into coherence something that is fundamentally chaotic and complicated -- without dismissing that complexity.
Recommended for: absolute must for anyone trying to sort out "what went wrong " in Afghanistan. Fans of wild anecdotes.
December 11, 2015
As 2014 drew to a close James Meek reviewed four recently published books about the most recent of Britain’s engagements in Afghanistan, entitling his essay in the London Review of Books, ‘Worse than a Defeat’. The last of British forces withdrew from Helmand two months earlier after 8 years of fighting in that province. Fighting who? The Taliban?
NCOs in 3 PARA were not embarrassed to tell Meek, in Helmand as a journalist in 2006, that the people attacking them were local Helmandis. By the time of his visit the British mission was one of self-protection. Meek devotes more than a third of his long article to the thesis of Mike Martin, expounded in his book 'An Intimate War', that the British forces were engaged in a counter-insurgency while their Helmandi opponents had a very different understanding of the same conflict. Martin had been in and out of Helmand, in and out of uniform, as a British officer and then a ‘cultural adviser’ and latterly as a scholar for his study of the conflict. He was a Pashto speaker and his work put him in touch with numerous Helmandi players. The study was generated by his own personal observations which were at odds, as he put it, with the ‘insurgency narrative’ and was commissioned by the UK’s Ministry of Defence. However because it was too critical the MOD sought to block publication. Martin says he was forced to resign and publish.
The book is redolent of its academic predecessor, his PhD thesis. His sources were almost all Helmandi actors in the conflict whom he interviewed, and he references everything. Appendices cover 110 pages. With a plethora of characters and the highly complex political situation in Helmand this is not a casual or easy read. It is a serious book born of solid research and personal experience. And it’s convincing in its argument that over 35 years Helmandi individuals, clans and tribes were in conflict with each other and manipulated outside players, be they Russian, American, British, Pakistani or the Taliban leadership in Quetta. These outsiders never understood the conflict the way the Helmandis did, the latter referring to it as ‘pshe-pshe’ which Martin translates as ‘civil war’. They happily exploited the outsiders ‘lack of detailed knowledge of Helmandi politics’ and this made the conflict worse as the Helmandis were able to leverage external resources to their own ends.
Martin notes that his perspective ‘presents an idiosyncratic viewpoint’ but he supports this with strong evidence. He emphasizes the complexity of the political terrain juxtaposed against a more simplistic framework to which the NATO forces adhered. Pushtun society is founded on a balance of power between tribe, state and mosque which is forever in flux. There is an ongoing process of ‘fission and fusion’ – cousin fights cousin, tribe fights tribe and both unite against the outsider. The British have been hated in Helmand since the last century when the locals beat them at Maiwand. British forces followed an official narrative supporting the ‘government’ against the ‘taliban’ and treated aberrations that didn’t fit the framework as just that, aberrations. But for Martin these were central to the conflict, they were the dynamic that needed to be understood. In the words of one UK official, ‘we had to support the governor … because he was the governor’. Going along with the official narrative was psychologically necessary and Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles, a formerUK ambassador to Afghanistan, admitted ‘I allowed myself to be self-deceived’. Had the NATO forces in Helmand had a true understanding of what was going on then they might have thought of leaving. The British found themselves in conflict with large sections of the local population who were resisting them as an outside power, and although foreign jihadis joined the locals, including those directed by the Taliban leadership in Quetta, it was really locals they were fighting.
One of the strangest features of the conflict was the Helmandi belief that the British were supporting and fighting on the side of the Taliban. Work that one out! A rumour. Another aberration. This was Helmand. Martin sees his book as a start to a wider understanding of what is going on in Afghanistan. His study begins in 1978 but not much has changed in the country since Lord Roberts was there 135 years ago. Of course the words of Lord Roberts have been quoted as apposite today, before and after the current conflict: ‘We must not be afraid of Afghanistan and would profit by letting it be the master of its own fate. Maybe it is not the most attractive solution for us, but I feel that I am right in asserting that the less they are able to see us, the less they are likely to hate us… we will have a much greater chance of getting the Afghans on our side if we abstain from any interference in their internal affairs whatsoever’.
When the British forces went into Helmand the Minister of Defence, John Reid, said ‘UK forces might not have to fire a single shot’. Now they’ve left, rather more than ‘a single shot’ later. Looking over press reports about that final exit in October 2014 the Taliban are still the enemy and the word ‘defeat’ is not in evidence. David Cameron announced ‘mission accomplished’ and the Afghan National Army have now taken over. I doubt Meek’s article resonated strongly with the general public. Although Martin’s book has been endorsed by some notable individuals, he may have to wait before his thesis is trumpeted as the best researched assessment of the conflict. I used to think that history would tell but I’m more circumspect now. If the other works reviewed by Meek are a guide though, Martin’s book should become generally recognized for what it is, a brave and successful challenge to the accepted narrative.
NCOs in 3 PARA were not embarrassed to tell Meek, in Helmand as a journalist in 2006, that the people attacking them were local Helmandis. By the time of his visit the British mission was one of self-protection. Meek devotes more than a third of his long article to the thesis of Mike Martin, expounded in his book 'An Intimate War', that the British forces were engaged in a counter-insurgency while their Helmandi opponents had a very different understanding of the same conflict. Martin had been in and out of Helmand, in and out of uniform, as a British officer and then a ‘cultural adviser’ and latterly as a scholar for his study of the conflict. He was a Pashto speaker and his work put him in touch with numerous Helmandi players. The study was generated by his own personal observations which were at odds, as he put it, with the ‘insurgency narrative’ and was commissioned by the UK’s Ministry of Defence. However because it was too critical the MOD sought to block publication. Martin says he was forced to resign and publish.
The book is redolent of its academic predecessor, his PhD thesis. His sources were almost all Helmandi actors in the conflict whom he interviewed, and he references everything. Appendices cover 110 pages. With a plethora of characters and the highly complex political situation in Helmand this is not a casual or easy read. It is a serious book born of solid research and personal experience. And it’s convincing in its argument that over 35 years Helmandi individuals, clans and tribes were in conflict with each other and manipulated outside players, be they Russian, American, British, Pakistani or the Taliban leadership in Quetta. These outsiders never understood the conflict the way the Helmandis did, the latter referring to it as ‘pshe-pshe’ which Martin translates as ‘civil war’. They happily exploited the outsiders ‘lack of detailed knowledge of Helmandi politics’ and this made the conflict worse as the Helmandis were able to leverage external resources to their own ends.
Martin notes that his perspective ‘presents an idiosyncratic viewpoint’ but he supports this with strong evidence. He emphasizes the complexity of the political terrain juxtaposed against a more simplistic framework to which the NATO forces adhered. Pushtun society is founded on a balance of power between tribe, state and mosque which is forever in flux. There is an ongoing process of ‘fission and fusion’ – cousin fights cousin, tribe fights tribe and both unite against the outsider. The British have been hated in Helmand since the last century when the locals beat them at Maiwand. British forces followed an official narrative supporting the ‘government’ against the ‘taliban’ and treated aberrations that didn’t fit the framework as just that, aberrations. But for Martin these were central to the conflict, they were the dynamic that needed to be understood. In the words of one UK official, ‘we had to support the governor … because he was the governor’. Going along with the official narrative was psychologically necessary and Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles, a formerUK ambassador to Afghanistan, admitted ‘I allowed myself to be self-deceived’. Had the NATO forces in Helmand had a true understanding of what was going on then they might have thought of leaving. The British found themselves in conflict with large sections of the local population who were resisting them as an outside power, and although foreign jihadis joined the locals, including those directed by the Taliban leadership in Quetta, it was really locals they were fighting.
One of the strangest features of the conflict was the Helmandi belief that the British were supporting and fighting on the side of the Taliban. Work that one out! A rumour. Another aberration. This was Helmand. Martin sees his book as a start to a wider understanding of what is going on in Afghanistan. His study begins in 1978 but not much has changed in the country since Lord Roberts was there 135 years ago. Of course the words of Lord Roberts have been quoted as apposite today, before and after the current conflict: ‘We must not be afraid of Afghanistan and would profit by letting it be the master of its own fate. Maybe it is not the most attractive solution for us, but I feel that I am right in asserting that the less they are able to see us, the less they are likely to hate us… we will have a much greater chance of getting the Afghans on our side if we abstain from any interference in their internal affairs whatsoever’.
When the British forces went into Helmand the Minister of Defence, John Reid, said ‘UK forces might not have to fire a single shot’. Now they’ve left, rather more than ‘a single shot’ later. Looking over press reports about that final exit in October 2014 the Taliban are still the enemy and the word ‘defeat’ is not in evidence. David Cameron announced ‘mission accomplished’ and the Afghan National Army have now taken over. I doubt Meek’s article resonated strongly with the general public. Although Martin’s book has been endorsed by some notable individuals, he may have to wait before his thesis is trumpeted as the best researched assessment of the conflict. I used to think that history would tell but I’m more circumspect now. If the other works reviewed by Meek are a guide though, Martin’s book should become generally recognized for what it is, a brave and successful challenge to the accepted narrative.
January 6, 2020
This book is slightly hard to follow due to the volume of places, people and dates. That makes it easy for the reader to get ‘lost’ within the text, and as a whole the reading experience is a bit ‘dry’. Having said that, this book offers a meticulous deep dive into the conflict which is often painted as a ‘good guy’ vs ‘bad guy’ skirmish, with the reality being far more complex and distant.
January 7, 2021
thesissennnn
January 29, 2015
An exceptional piece of research, and a must read for all who consider human terrain in their work, especially in warzones.
The only drawbacks:
The first half of the book feels very much like getting water boarded with place/tribe/clan/family/individuals' names. The author does try to mitigate against this with cross referencing and re-iteration, however if you (like me!) struggle with names, it can become very confusing very quickly, which ironically i think is the point!
The author falls into the trap of using indulgent academic vocabulary. I know and understand why such vocab is used, however for such a relevant book it can alienate a wide cross section of its target audience; i would love to use excerpts of this book for discussion in training, however i know i would spend a lot of time acting like a dictionary and explaining ubiquitous latin phrases...
The only drawbacks:
The first half of the book feels very much like getting water boarded with place/tribe/clan/family/individuals' names. The author does try to mitigate against this with cross referencing and re-iteration, however if you (like me!) struggle with names, it can become very confusing very quickly, which ironically i think is the point!
The author falls into the trap of using indulgent academic vocabulary. I know and understand why such vocab is used, however for such a relevant book it can alienate a wide cross section of its target audience; i would love to use excerpts of this book for discussion in training, however i know i would spend a lot of time acting like a dictionary and explaining ubiquitous latin phrases...
June 4, 2015
Fascinating and eye-opening, this account sheds light on the largely darkened ordeals in Afghanistan (esp. Helmand). Despite the account being only "one per cent" of everything, it seemed incredibly thorough. I feel like I can intelligently contribute to discussions about Western presence in Afghanistan now.
August 24, 2016
one less star only because my brain broke trying to read through this dense and rich of history of war through helmandi eyes.
Displaying 1 - 12 of 12 reviews