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Doomed to Succeed: The U.S.-Israel Relationship from Truman to Obama
Winner of the National Jewish Book Award 's Gerrard and Ella Berman Memorial Award in History .
A necessary and unprecedented account of America's changing relationship with Israel
When it comes to Israel, U.S. policy has always emphasized the unbreakable bond between the two countries and our ironclad commitment to Israel's security. Today our ties to Israel are close―so close that when there are differences, they tend to make the news. But it was not always this way.
Dennis Ross has been a direct participant in shaping U.S. policy toward the Middle East, and Israel specifically, for nearly thirty years. He served in senior roles, including as Bill Clinton's envoy for Arab-Israeli peace, and was an active player in the debates over how Israel fit into the region and what should guide our policies. In Doomed to Succeed , he takes us through every administration from Truman to Obama, throwing into dramatic relief each president's attitudes toward Israel and the region, the often tumultuous debates between key advisers, and the events that drove the policies and at times led to a shift in approach.
Ross points out how rarely lessons were learned and how distancing the United States from Israel in the Eisenhower, Nixon, Bush, and Obama administrations never yielded any benefits and why that lesson has never been learned. Doomed to Succeed offers compelling advice for how to understand the priorities of Arab leaders and how future administrations might best shape U.S. policy in that light.
A necessary and unprecedented account of America's changing relationship with Israel
When it comes to Israel, U.S. policy has always emphasized the unbreakable bond between the two countries and our ironclad commitment to Israel's security. Today our ties to Israel are close―so close that when there are differences, they tend to make the news. But it was not always this way.
Dennis Ross has been a direct participant in shaping U.S. policy toward the Middle East, and Israel specifically, for nearly thirty years. He served in senior roles, including as Bill Clinton's envoy for Arab-Israeli peace, and was an active player in the debates over how Israel fit into the region and what should guide our policies. In Doomed to Succeed , he takes us through every administration from Truman to Obama, throwing into dramatic relief each president's attitudes toward Israel and the region, the often tumultuous debates between key advisers, and the events that drove the policies and at times led to a shift in approach.
Ross points out how rarely lessons were learned and how distancing the United States from Israel in the Eisenhower, Nixon, Bush, and Obama administrations never yielded any benefits and why that lesson has never been learned. Doomed to Succeed offers compelling advice for how to understand the priorities of Arab leaders and how future administrations might best shape U.S. policy in that light.
496 pages, Hardcover
First published October 13, 2015
85 people are currently reading
809 people want to read
About the author
Dennis Ross
28 books21 followersDennis Ross, Middle East envoy for George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton, is now a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Foreign Affairs called his first book, The Missing Peace, a major contribution to the diplomatic history of the twentieth century. (from the publisher's website)"
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 45 reviews
November 21, 2015
This is an absolutely fascinating book so packed with information I could hardly put it down. Dennis Ross has served as one of the United States Middle Eastern policy makers through four recent administrations. Ross states this is not a history of Arab-Israeli peace efforts but rather a discussion of the evolution of Israeli-American diplomatic relations. Ross discusses the relationship with each president starting with Truman’s recognition of Israel just eleven minutes after its Declaration of Statehood in 1948.
Ross enumerates the number of factors leading to a strengthening of the ties during the Cold War. The author also covers the problems for the U.S. regarding the Israel-Arab hostilities mostly “The Palestinian Question.” Ross discusses each of the key people including the America’s own Machiavelli, Henry Kissinger. The author also investigates the relationship of Israel’s prime ministers along with the United States presidents. I found it most interesting to learn how the various Presidents interacted with their Secretary of State’s; some presented the big picture of what they wanted to achieve and left the Secretary of State on their own to implement, others like Obama controlled everything from the White House and the Secretary of State was just an errand boy. I found a comment made by Ross most interesting and it triggered me to do a literature search to verify the comment. The comment is the Palestinians have never initiated a peace offering in all these years.
The book is well researched and also provides eyewitness accounts of the history it analyses. The author writes clearly and elucidates the complexities of the United States-Israel relationship and also the larger picture of the Middle East. The book is thoughtful and even handed in covering the material. The book is fairly long at almost 500 pages or 19 audio hours. I read this as an audiobook downloaded from Audible. Michael Kramer did a good job narrating the book.
Ross enumerates the number of factors leading to a strengthening of the ties during the Cold War. The author also covers the problems for the U.S. regarding the Israel-Arab hostilities mostly “The Palestinian Question.” Ross discusses each of the key people including the America’s own Machiavelli, Henry Kissinger. The author also investigates the relationship of Israel’s prime ministers along with the United States presidents. I found it most interesting to learn how the various Presidents interacted with their Secretary of State’s; some presented the big picture of what they wanted to achieve and left the Secretary of State on their own to implement, others like Obama controlled everything from the White House and the Secretary of State was just an errand boy. I found a comment made by Ross most interesting and it triggered me to do a literature search to verify the comment. The comment is the Palestinians have never initiated a peace offering in all these years.
The book is well researched and also provides eyewitness accounts of the history it analyses. The author writes clearly and elucidates the complexities of the United States-Israel relationship and also the larger picture of the Middle East. The book is thoughtful and even handed in covering the material. The book is fairly long at almost 500 pages or 19 audio hours. I read this as an audiobook downloaded from Audible. Michael Kramer did a good job narrating the book.
here-i-halted-unfinished-so-far
February 14, 2016Some notes on what I'd like to remember from what I read in this book.
The author says Israelis and Palestinians compete to score points rather than act responsibly; Netanyahu is not Rabin; provocation is often the name of the game. The US can't change that for Israel. Palestinians capitalize politically on their victimhood status.
The Arab awakening, or, anyway, the changes that began in spring 2011 were not driven by issues having to do with Palestinians.
Wrong assumptions: That if the US distances from Israel, relationships with the Arabs and the American position in the region will improve, that it is costly in terms of that position for the US to be close to Israel, and that resolution of the Israeli/Palestine conflict would resolve the problems of the entire region.
You don't hear pundits making the last of those assumptions as often as they once did.
As to the first two assumptions, each of which seems to me to be one side of the same coin, they are incorrect for the reason that the various countries of the region are taking care of their own interests. The Palestinians become a political consideration for them even while leaders are focused on the needs of their own countries. "The historical record demonstrates that Arab relations with the United States are guided by their priorities, not ours."
In fact for the US not to stand by agreements increases the perception that it's not going to do so for the Arab countries either.
The author isn't saying Palestinians don't matter. In fact he says a lot and with a lot of nuance. These brief notes are just for my memory after I return this book to the library.
He says those negotiators who pressure Israel to take more steps or a first step because, in their estimation, it's got the power, must pay attention to what Palestinians say they're going to do, as well. If the Palestinians are given a pass, and their doing so is ignored, then, given the negotiator's perspective, he/she will again put pressure on Israel to make yet another move--and under the circumstances could expect to encounter resistance.
Assigning a negotiator who, due to his perception, expects continual steps with nothing in return, would also result in resistance.
Surprises from Israel aren't appreciated.
Ross contends that each administration has thought it had a whole new picture or that the world had fundamentally changed, and that the prior administration had had failed miserably to understand or handle foreign policy correctly, and this applies to the Middle East as well as everywhere else. He's quoting a historian (Stephen Sestanovich) here. This sounded like generations; each new generation thinks something like that.
The author contends that when one administration is perceived by the last as having drawn too close, the next has allowed more distance. He documents the the evolution of this history; that's the essence of this book: the documentation and quotations. He documents what happened to show the assumptions about the efficacy of those moves were incorrect, and that's the gist of it.
The author says Israelis and Palestinians compete to score points rather than act responsibly; Netanyahu is not Rabin; provocation is often the name of the game. The US can't change that for Israel. Palestinians capitalize politically on their victimhood status.
The Arab awakening, or, anyway, the changes that began in spring 2011 were not driven by issues having to do with Palestinians.
Wrong assumptions: That if the US distances from Israel, relationships with the Arabs and the American position in the region will improve, that it is costly in terms of that position for the US to be close to Israel, and that resolution of the Israeli/Palestine conflict would resolve the problems of the entire region.
You don't hear pundits making the last of those assumptions as often as they once did.
As to the first two assumptions, each of which seems to me to be one side of the same coin, they are incorrect for the reason that the various countries of the region are taking care of their own interests. The Palestinians become a political consideration for them even while leaders are focused on the needs of their own countries. "The historical record demonstrates that Arab relations with the United States are guided by their priorities, not ours."
In fact for the US not to stand by agreements increases the perception that it's not going to do so for the Arab countries either.
The author isn't saying Palestinians don't matter. In fact he says a lot and with a lot of nuance. These brief notes are just for my memory after I return this book to the library.
He says those negotiators who pressure Israel to take more steps or a first step because, in their estimation, it's got the power, must pay attention to what Palestinians say they're going to do, as well. If the Palestinians are given a pass, and their doing so is ignored, then, given the negotiator's perspective, he/she will again put pressure on Israel to make yet another move--and under the circumstances could expect to encounter resistance.
Assigning a negotiator who, due to his perception, expects continual steps with nothing in return, would also result in resistance.
Surprises from Israel aren't appreciated.
Ross contends that each administration has thought it had a whole new picture or that the world had fundamentally changed, and that the prior administration had had failed miserably to understand or handle foreign policy correctly, and this applies to the Middle East as well as everywhere else. He's quoting a historian (Stephen Sestanovich) here. This sounded like generations; each new generation thinks something like that.
The author contends that when one administration is perceived by the last as having drawn too close, the next has allowed more distance. He documents the the evolution of this history; that's the essence of this book: the documentation and quotations. He documents what happened to show the assumptions about the efficacy of those moves were incorrect, and that's the gist of it.
September 16, 2016
This book has a simple Textbook format, and takes the reader from Truman's policy progressing year by year to the now. This describes the back and forth frustrations of America's relations to Israel. The later half of the book also includes Ross' involvement as early as the Nixon Administration, and has been extremely enlightening. Though at times this book really angered me. He's pictured on the right, so more of you can understand who this guy is.
My questions:
1. I still have not puzzled out on the 'why' for Israel demanding the particular piece of land that their state sits on. Logistically, why? Wasn't enslavement by the Egyptians and the Holocaust enough punishment? I don't understand why a people would want to inhabit a land surrounded by a race/religion that says the Jews must die? (setting aside that Israel claims that it is their Holy Land. The problem is that the religion of Islam also claims the same thing. There has to be a bigger reason of why that place.) It's like throwing a match in a powder keg. Result is that it won't end well.
2. Instead of providing arms for any of these countries, why haven't we provided aid in agriculture, irrigation, and cattle only? Don't give them guns when they are to sorry to work a plow, because they would rather kill people while screaming their zealotry . If food is the problem teach them how to grow it. 'Teach a man to fish and all that rot.'
3. Another thing I just do not understand. Is; why the Jews? Persecution has happened numerous times to their race over the course of history. I understand that it happened, but not the WHY it happened. Does it really boil down to religion? Or is it only politics? Their genetic make-up? Charles Dickens?
My opinions(pertaining to the book, but not limited to only the book):
*stepping up on my soapbox.*
1.Put some serious thoughts into Hydro-Electric cars. It would dampen our dependence on Saudi Oil. (I mean come on; Back to the Future's time machine ran off of Garbage. Why the hell do we not have this tech already?!
IT'S 2016! Put my Tax dollars into the Science to make it happen! Chop! Chop!)
2. Stop Arming Foreign Countries. Period! (There are many countries in severe debt to the U.S. Time to start writing some bills with interest. I have to pay my own bills! Why not those who bought the arms to begin with?) Also nuclear power or weapons; is just a bad idea. (You don't hand a loaded pistol to a toddler, so why allow a dictatorship that availability?) Solar and wind are a costly option, but everyone will live if accidents happen.
The Chernobyl disaster and Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster are examples to keep in mind. America also needs to evaluate their dependence on it as well. If the democratic party wants to scream about the environment then I want more project updates to these causes with quarterly progress reports. On what was done and scientific read outs of how the project it has benefited the environment from projects completion.
3. The United States is not a charity organization, and every single disaster relief has yet to be returned in good faith. Time for some type of Quid-pro-Quo and stop throwing away my tax dollars! I didn't see Chinese offering fiscal aid when Hurricane Katrina tore it's way through Louisiana or any monetary loans by what was once the Ottoman Empire, to the relief of Winter Storm Sandy victims. Though every Tsunami or Major Earthquake to hit Asia or the Middle-East; the U.S. is just throwing money at them. Same with every other act of God to hit any other country. It isn't America's responsibility to act as Big Brother or Big Banker!
4. Legalize all Drugs, Regulate them, Distribute & Tax them (Addiction is a medical condition. If the addict makes the decision that they want to quit. They should not have to be scarred of losing their job or family due to state institution policies by going to Rehab. Besides, think of all the revenue it could generate. If an addict doesn't want to quit then we should leave it for the gods to sort out. They are going to use whether drugs are illegal or not. At least make sure that they have clean needles and paraphernalia; so they won't spread disease.) This in turn will empty out our prison systems, and leave plenty of rooms for the people who should be in. Like rapists, frauds, child support dodgers, murderers, pedophile psychos, and corrupt politicians. Another positive outcome would be the change in job disqualification, but at the same time will anger the entire black market. (Someone much smarter than myself can sort out that nightmare. I wouldn't know where to start.)
This guy has a pretty convincing argument.
https://onechance1life.wordpress.com/...
5. Improve the medical availability in: physical, rehabilitation, and mental ailments. Revisit the regulations on holistic medicine practice. Lot's of ailments can be curbed with specific diets. This has had a lot of progress in the fight against Cancer. (At the same time, put a leash on the pharmaceutical companies, and reevaluate EVERY licensed Dr. that has been writing to many prescriptions. Honestly with all of the Eagle Eye and fusion centers' shit going on you(government)
can't pull one over on citizens by turning a blind eye to what's going on.) Also the insurance companies need to be addressed. Premiums are ridiculous!
6. Since I have to pee in a cup to get a job. I think it's only fair that whoever applying for welfare for five kids that only sits, drinks booze, takes pills, and watches the Reality TV channel(just an example) all day every day; should have to do the same. STOP TREATING YOUR KIDS LIKE CHECKS!
Then individual states should regulate the Child support laws and rates after proven paternity testing(it's kind of hard denying maternity). Make it one flat fair rate due to the child's age with a re-evaluation appointment every year. (Children grow and so do their needs, but make sure their needs are being met. i.e. food, shelter, clothing, health, and education. RECEIPTS! KEEPING YOUR RECEIPTS IS THE EASIEST WAY TO PROVE YOU'RE DOING YOUR END RIGHT! JUST AN OBSERVATION!) Stop incarcerating people because they are one month late due to being laid off from their job. A year without payment, then yes, incarceration is acceptable. No effort to find a job for a year shows that the person doesn't WANT to take responsibility for their children, and SHOULD BE ADVISED TO sign 100% percent of custody to the parent suing for custody; resulting in ending child support. Making the suing parent get a job.
END THE BABY DADDY, DRAMA MAMA $H1T!
7. Eliminate the Math Common Core education system. It's holding back the children who excel. (I end up being the one teaching my children 'how I learned it.' My son, boy wonder that he is, understands both ways. While my daughter doesn't get math until I show her the 'old way' Don't fix something that isn't broken to begin with!) In it's place start requiring: art, etiquette, and survival classes.
8. With many of the natural disasters that are happening due to floods and wildfires, I'm confounded by the lack of coverage and failure that our government has promised to provide. If it was such a bad idea to continue the Keystone project why not use the material and remaining funding to reroute water from known flood areas to areas in drought? Re-purpose the design to use that water for irrigation purposes across many states, and farmers of the areas would drop food and cattle prices if crops yield excess. Plants need water to GROW! This is basics of the basics in Agriculture and Economics. This would also subvert natural disasters such as Hurricane Katrina and Torrential Flooding of Louisiana in 2016. You have a chart for it, so why not make it happen?
9.Last but not least; GET OUT THERE AND VOTE PEOPLE!
My questions:
1. I still have not puzzled out on the 'why' for Israel demanding the particular piece of land that their state sits on. Logistically, why? Wasn't enslavement by the Egyptians and the Holocaust enough punishment? I don't understand why a people would want to inhabit a land surrounded by a race/religion that says the Jews must die? (setting aside that Israel claims that it is their Holy Land. The problem is that the religion of Islam also claims the same thing. There has to be a bigger reason of why that place.) It's like throwing a match in a powder keg. Result is that it won't end well.
2. Instead of providing arms for any of these countries, why haven't we provided aid in agriculture, irrigation, and cattle only? Don't give them guns when they are to sorry to work a plow, because they would rather kill people while screaming their zealotry . If food is the problem teach them how to grow it. 'Teach a man to fish and all that rot.'
3. Another thing I just do not understand. Is; why the Jews? Persecution has happened numerous times to their race over the course of history. I understand that it happened, but not the WHY it happened. Does it really boil down to religion? Or is it only politics? Their genetic make-up? Charles Dickens?
My opinions(pertaining to the book, but not limited to only the book):
*stepping up on my soapbox.*
1.Put some serious thoughts into Hydro-Electric cars. It would dampen our dependence on Saudi Oil. (I mean come on; Back to the Future's time machine ran off of Garbage. Why the hell do we not have this tech already?!
IT'S 2016! Put my Tax dollars into the Science to make it happen! Chop! Chop!)
2. Stop Arming Foreign Countries. Period! (There are many countries in severe debt to the U.S. Time to start writing some bills with interest. I have to pay my own bills! Why not those who bought the arms to begin with?) Also nuclear power or weapons; is just a bad idea. (You don't hand a loaded pistol to a toddler, so why allow a dictatorship that availability?) Solar and wind are a costly option, but everyone will live if accidents happen.
The Chernobyl disaster and Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster are examples to keep in mind. America also needs to evaluate their dependence on it as well. If the democratic party wants to scream about the environment then I want more project updates to these causes with quarterly progress reports. On what was done and scientific read outs of how the project it has benefited the environment from projects completion.3. The United States is not a charity organization, and every single disaster relief has yet to be returned in good faith. Time for some type of Quid-pro-Quo and stop throwing away my tax dollars! I didn't see Chinese offering fiscal aid when Hurricane Katrina tore it's way through Louisiana or any monetary loans by what was once the Ottoman Empire, to the relief of Winter Storm Sandy victims. Though every Tsunami or Major Earthquake to hit Asia or the Middle-East; the U.S. is just throwing money at them. Same with every other act of God to hit any other country. It isn't America's responsibility to act as Big Brother or Big Banker!
4. Legalize all Drugs, Regulate them, Distribute & Tax them (Addiction is a medical condition. If the addict makes the decision that they want to quit. They should not have to be scarred of losing their job or family due to state institution policies by going to Rehab. Besides, think of all the revenue it could generate. If an addict doesn't want to quit then we should leave it for the gods to sort out. They are going to use whether drugs are illegal or not. At least make sure that they have clean needles and paraphernalia; so they won't spread disease.) This in turn will empty out our prison systems, and leave plenty of rooms for the people who should be in. Like rapists, frauds, child support dodgers, murderers, pedophile psychos, and corrupt politicians. Another positive outcome would be the change in job disqualification, but at the same time will anger the entire black market. (Someone much smarter than myself can sort out that nightmare. I wouldn't know where to start.)
This guy has a pretty convincing argument.
https://onechance1life.wordpress.com/...
5. Improve the medical availability in: physical, rehabilitation, and mental ailments. Revisit the regulations on holistic medicine practice. Lot's of ailments can be curbed with specific diets. This has had a lot of progress in the fight against Cancer. (At the same time, put a leash on the pharmaceutical companies, and reevaluate EVERY licensed Dr. that has been writing to many prescriptions. Honestly with all of the Eagle Eye and fusion centers' shit going on you(government)
can't pull one over on citizens by turning a blind eye to what's going on.) Also the insurance companies need to be addressed. Premiums are ridiculous! 6. Since I have to pee in a cup to get a job. I think it's only fair that whoever applying for welfare for five kids that only sits, drinks booze, takes pills, and watches the Reality TV channel(just an example) all day every day; should have to do the same. STOP TREATING YOUR KIDS LIKE CHECKS!
Then individual states should regulate the Child support laws and rates after proven paternity testing(it's kind of hard denying maternity). Make it one flat fair rate due to the child's age with a re-evaluation appointment every year. (Children grow and so do their needs, but make sure their needs are being met. i.e. food, shelter, clothing, health, and education. RECEIPTS! KEEPING YOUR RECEIPTS IS THE EASIEST WAY TO PROVE YOU'RE DOING YOUR END RIGHT! JUST AN OBSERVATION!) Stop incarcerating people because they are one month late due to being laid off from their job. A year without payment, then yes, incarceration is acceptable. No effort to find a job for a year shows that the person doesn't WANT to take responsibility for their children, and SHOULD BE ADVISED TO sign 100% percent of custody to the parent suing for custody; resulting in ending child support. Making the suing parent get a job.
END THE BABY DADDY, DRAMA MAMA $H1T!
7. Eliminate the Math Common Core education system. It's holding back the children who excel. (I end up being the one teaching my children 'how I learned it.' My son, boy wonder that he is, understands both ways. While my daughter doesn't get math until I show her the 'old way' Don't fix something that isn't broken to begin with!) In it's place start requiring: art, etiquette, and survival classes.
8. With many of the natural disasters that are happening due to floods and wildfires, I'm confounded by the lack of coverage and failure that our government has promised to provide. If it was such a bad idea to continue the Keystone project why not use the material and remaining funding to reroute water from known flood areas to areas in drought? Re-purpose the design to use that water for irrigation purposes across many states, and farmers of the areas would drop food and cattle prices if crops yield excess. Plants need water to GROW! This is basics of the basics in Agriculture and Economics. This would also subvert natural disasters such as Hurricane Katrina and Torrential Flooding of Louisiana in 2016. You have a chart for it, so why not make it happen?
9.Last but not least; GET OUT THERE AND VOTE PEOPLE!
January 6, 2016
This book, despite my discomfort with some of the views Mr. Ross articulates, is a valuable contribution to the literature of US-Israel relations, and compellingly written. I was fascinated to learn, for instance, that there has always been considerable disagreement within the US administration on dealing with Israeli governments. This is refreshing to know, given what has always seemed to be a steadfast, support Israel no matter what approach by the US. It holds out hope that a future administration will change this approach – which has achieved nothing over 50 years, except of course to provide untold billions in US support for Israel.
Mr. Ross’s core thesis is that, despite the views of many in successive US administrations (including some presidents) that it is not good for the US to be seen as supportive of Israel because that will lose it friends in the Arab/Muslim world, the governments of those countries have in fact done little to bear out such concerns. There is therefore no harm in the US continuing to support Israel and it should do so (so Mr. Ross holds) regardless of Israel’s failure to stop building settlements in the West Bank, continuing to impose an occupation on the Palestinians and taking few, if any, steps towards a permanent peace with the Palestinians and allowing them to form a State.
It is apparent from Mr. Ross’s book – especially the chapters in which he recounts his own involvement in US administrations – that if changing this situation means putting pressure on Israel, then he would be opposed. At one point he refers to criticism of his role that appeared in an article by Laura Rozen in Politico: “[Ross] seems to be far more sensitive to Netanyahu’s coalition politics than to U.S. interests.” While Mr. Ross denies this, the statement is in fact reflective of the book where he recounts his own role.
All Israeli governments appear to have a tenuous hold on power and are beholden to extreme elements that make it difficult, if not impossible, for those governments to implement changes that the world is increasingly demanding. The US enables Israel’s behavior and unless it withdraws that support, there is little chance of change. While Mr. Ross is apparently in favour of an end to the occupation and the formation of a Palestinian state, he opposes putting pressure on Israeli governments to make it happen – certainly not if that involves action on the world stage that might be seen as joining with the Europeans and others who in his words want to “delegitimize” Israel – the label he seemingly applies to anyone who criticizes Israeli actions and which would include the boycott, divestment and sanctions movement (“BDS”) which does not seek to “delegitimize” Israel any more than similar movements sought to “delegitimize” South Africa during the 1980s.
The early chapters of the book, dealing with administrations from Eisenhower through Reagan are a fascinating recounting of the evolution of the US-Israel relationship – fascinating to learn that it was not always as it is now, and might have been very different if Truman for instance had followed his initial inclinations. It is when Mr. Ross becomes personally involved and we learn of his efforts at influencing administrations (not always successful), that the book takes an uncomfortable turn. Mr. Ross is apparently an intimate of many in the upper echelons of Israeli power. He describes hanging out in “Bibi’s” office while the Israeli PM is on the phone with Obama. He tries to calm him down after the call by explaining what the president really meant to say (it would be interested to get Obama’s view on that). He expresses anger at Obama’s pointing out that Israeli settlements are illegal under international law (which they are) because this will upset the Israelis. When mentioning the attack on the Mavi Marmara by Israeli commandos he states, misleadingly, that people on the ship were armed. Some were, with chair legs and anything they could find to hand on board – but not the sort of arms carried by elite members of the world’s fourth largest military. And they were, after all, only protecting themselves against boarding on the high seas by a bunch of murderous pirates. And he lauds Israel’s attempts to reduce civilian casualties during the latest onslaught on Gaza (where over 2300 people including over 350 children were killed), noting that the US military is learning valuable lessons from the Israeli military.
What is missing from the book is any explanation for why the US continues to support Israel so strongly. Israel might have been a strategic asset during the Cold War, but not now. Even if Mr. Ross is correct that US support for Israel has little or no negative impact on the attitude of Arab states (and surely he refers to their (mostly) totalitarian governments, not the men and women in the street), there is no explanation for the massive support the US continues to provide Israel. The explanation is two-fold. One reason is the massive profits made by the US arms industry in selling weaponry and support systems to Israel. The other is the power of the domestic Israel lobby led by AIPAC. While there are allusions to the power of the lobby, and mention that loss of the New York Jewish vote was a significant factor in George H.W. Bush’s election loss (following a mistaken anti-Israel vote in the UNSC by the US), a reader unfamiliar with US politics would not realize just how significant a role this lobby plays – akin to that played by the NRA in blocking any attempts to pass laws implementing much needed gun control. The interested reader is referred to “The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy”, by John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt (2008).
Mr. Ross’s core thesis is that, despite the views of many in successive US administrations (including some presidents) that it is not good for the US to be seen as supportive of Israel because that will lose it friends in the Arab/Muslim world, the governments of those countries have in fact done little to bear out such concerns. There is therefore no harm in the US continuing to support Israel and it should do so (so Mr. Ross holds) regardless of Israel’s failure to stop building settlements in the West Bank, continuing to impose an occupation on the Palestinians and taking few, if any, steps towards a permanent peace with the Palestinians and allowing them to form a State.
It is apparent from Mr. Ross’s book – especially the chapters in which he recounts his own involvement in US administrations – that if changing this situation means putting pressure on Israel, then he would be opposed. At one point he refers to criticism of his role that appeared in an article by Laura Rozen in Politico: “[Ross] seems to be far more sensitive to Netanyahu’s coalition politics than to U.S. interests.” While Mr. Ross denies this, the statement is in fact reflective of the book where he recounts his own role.
All Israeli governments appear to have a tenuous hold on power and are beholden to extreme elements that make it difficult, if not impossible, for those governments to implement changes that the world is increasingly demanding. The US enables Israel’s behavior and unless it withdraws that support, there is little chance of change. While Mr. Ross is apparently in favour of an end to the occupation and the formation of a Palestinian state, he opposes putting pressure on Israeli governments to make it happen – certainly not if that involves action on the world stage that might be seen as joining with the Europeans and others who in his words want to “delegitimize” Israel – the label he seemingly applies to anyone who criticizes Israeli actions and which would include the boycott, divestment and sanctions movement (“BDS”) which does not seek to “delegitimize” Israel any more than similar movements sought to “delegitimize” South Africa during the 1980s.
The early chapters of the book, dealing with administrations from Eisenhower through Reagan are a fascinating recounting of the evolution of the US-Israel relationship – fascinating to learn that it was not always as it is now, and might have been very different if Truman for instance had followed his initial inclinations. It is when Mr. Ross becomes personally involved and we learn of his efforts at influencing administrations (not always successful), that the book takes an uncomfortable turn. Mr. Ross is apparently an intimate of many in the upper echelons of Israeli power. He describes hanging out in “Bibi’s” office while the Israeli PM is on the phone with Obama. He tries to calm him down after the call by explaining what the president really meant to say (it would be interested to get Obama’s view on that). He expresses anger at Obama’s pointing out that Israeli settlements are illegal under international law (which they are) because this will upset the Israelis. When mentioning the attack on the Mavi Marmara by Israeli commandos he states, misleadingly, that people on the ship were armed. Some were, with chair legs and anything they could find to hand on board – but not the sort of arms carried by elite members of the world’s fourth largest military. And they were, after all, only protecting themselves against boarding on the high seas by a bunch of murderous pirates. And he lauds Israel’s attempts to reduce civilian casualties during the latest onslaught on Gaza (where over 2300 people including over 350 children were killed), noting that the US military is learning valuable lessons from the Israeli military.
What is missing from the book is any explanation for why the US continues to support Israel so strongly. Israel might have been a strategic asset during the Cold War, but not now. Even if Mr. Ross is correct that US support for Israel has little or no negative impact on the attitude of Arab states (and surely he refers to their (mostly) totalitarian governments, not the men and women in the street), there is no explanation for the massive support the US continues to provide Israel. The explanation is two-fold. One reason is the massive profits made by the US arms industry in selling weaponry and support systems to Israel. The other is the power of the domestic Israel lobby led by AIPAC. While there are allusions to the power of the lobby, and mention that loss of the New York Jewish vote was a significant factor in George H.W. Bush’s election loss (following a mistaken anti-Israel vote in the UNSC by the US), a reader unfamiliar with US politics would not realize just how significant a role this lobby plays – akin to that played by the NRA in blocking any attempts to pass laws implementing much needed gun control. The interested reader is referred to “The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy”, by John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt (2008).
November 22, 2024
This is a very good, behind-the-scenes look at how various US presidential administrations (in the US State Department) have managed to their relationship with Israel and with Arab states since 1948. It goes into the reasoning behind each president’s actions. It is very informative and has changed the way I view how our presidents interact with Israel and other Middle East nations.
May 8, 2016
Dennis Ross, the insider’s insider when it comes to Arab-Israeli negotiations, has written an amalgam of history, analysis, and memoir in the wonderfully titled Doomed to Succeed, which rigorously traces the roller-coaster ride of the U.S.-Israel relationship from Truman to Obama.
Ross, who has held key negotiating roles in every administration from Reagan on, weaves three separate themes: a very specific strategic argument about peace negotiations; a detailed narrative of official U.S.-Israeli relations from 1947 to the present; and a close-up account of what actually goes on in the negotiating rooms when leaders from the U.S. and the Middle East gather. (It’s not always pretty, but don’t look for intimate gossip or dishing; Ross is too sober a commentator to indulge in such matters. He does note that just about every American president has exploded in frustration at one time or another during negotiations.)
In an arena where polemics is a blood sport, Ross is refreshingly fair, uninterested in scoring easy debating points or indulging in false outrage. This is diplomatic prose at its best, even if it sometimes lacks bite.
Ross’s central argument: the tactic of “distancing” the U.S. from Israel to gain leverage with the Arabs is invariably counter-productive and misperceives the Middle East reality, which is that countries like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan will always place their safety and security needs ahead of their support for the Palestinians. The historical evidence he cites makes this point almost unassailable. American officials constantly worried that support for Israel would cost the country politically or economically. It rarely did, for the simple reason that Arab nations calibrated their relations with the U.S. first, before responding to Palestinian interests. (The 1973 oil embargo might be one exception.)
If there is a weakness in Ross’s argument, it is what he leaves out. Just as distancing from Israel didn’t strengthen our position in the Arab world, then standing shoulder-to-shoulder with Israel – “with no daylight” – doesn’t necessarily motivate Israel to support U.S. peace initiatives.
After all, Jimmy Carter had a notoriously difficult relationship with Menachem Begin and often expressed strongly negative views about Israeli policy. Yet Camp David stands as an enduring diplomatic monument on an otherwise bleak political landscape. The reason: Egypt’s Anwar Sadat, who may have been a fallible politician, was still someone willing to take genuine risks for peace. Without such a partner, U.S. policy, no matter how inventive or patient, cannot succeed. Later, President Clinton found such partners in Israeli leaders Yitzhak Rabin and Ehud Barak, but Yasser Arafat proved unwilling to reach an agreement. As Ross observes, Arafat couldn’t end the conflict because it defined him.
Ross reminds us that today’s close strategic alliance with Israel was hardly the norm. Truman, for example, recognized the new state of Israel over the vehement objections of his senior advisors, including Secretary of State George Marshall. Eisenhower maintained a chilly relationship with Israel, one that turned confrontational over the Sinai invasion in 1956. (Although Eisenhower forced Britain, France, and Israel out of the Suez Canal and Sinai, his actions hardly helped us with Egypt’s Nasser, who had his own anti-Western nationalist agenda.)
The U.S. first sold weapons directly to Israel under the Kennedy Administration, but the close strategic partnership we see today really dates from the Reagan years. (Again, the security elements of the partnership succeeded, but Reagan could no more achieve a peace agreement than Bush 41, following the Gulf War, when U.S. power and prestige were at their height.
Ross concludes with an typically judicious assessment of the Obama years. Obama has been a true friend of Israel, he argues, and the security relationship has deepened significantly during his presidency. At the same time, Obama fell into the trap of “distancing” from Israel – on issues such as settlements that have bedeviled so many other presidents – without gaining commensurate leverage from the Palestinian side. He cites Obama’s observation that Benjamin Netanyahu was too strong and Mahmoud Abbas too weak to make peace.
Ross, operating within a largely diplomatic cocoon, doesn’t really tackle the massive political shifts that have occurred in recent decades, notably the failure of the Arab Spring, the agony of Syria – and perhaps most significantly – a conservative Netanyahu government more focused on expanding settlements and security walls than finding a genuine two-state solution.
Even if the Palestinian conflict ended, Ross concludes, “The lesson here is that with key Arab friends of the United States, there will be a floor below which they will not allow the relationship to go, and a ceiling above which it cannot rise.”
As for the beleaguered “peace process?” Perhaps we’ll have to wait for another generation to produce a new Sadat or Rabin – leaders willing to make the great leap to a lasting peace. I hope Dennis Ross will be in the room when that happens.
Ross, who has held key negotiating roles in every administration from Reagan on, weaves three separate themes: a very specific strategic argument about peace negotiations; a detailed narrative of official U.S.-Israeli relations from 1947 to the present; and a close-up account of what actually goes on in the negotiating rooms when leaders from the U.S. and the Middle East gather. (It’s not always pretty, but don’t look for intimate gossip or dishing; Ross is too sober a commentator to indulge in such matters. He does note that just about every American president has exploded in frustration at one time or another during negotiations.)
In an arena where polemics is a blood sport, Ross is refreshingly fair, uninterested in scoring easy debating points or indulging in false outrage. This is diplomatic prose at its best, even if it sometimes lacks bite.
Ross’s central argument: the tactic of “distancing” the U.S. from Israel to gain leverage with the Arabs is invariably counter-productive and misperceives the Middle East reality, which is that countries like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan will always place their safety and security needs ahead of their support for the Palestinians. The historical evidence he cites makes this point almost unassailable. American officials constantly worried that support for Israel would cost the country politically or economically. It rarely did, for the simple reason that Arab nations calibrated their relations with the U.S. first, before responding to Palestinian interests. (The 1973 oil embargo might be one exception.)
If there is a weakness in Ross’s argument, it is what he leaves out. Just as distancing from Israel didn’t strengthen our position in the Arab world, then standing shoulder-to-shoulder with Israel – “with no daylight” – doesn’t necessarily motivate Israel to support U.S. peace initiatives.
After all, Jimmy Carter had a notoriously difficult relationship with Menachem Begin and often expressed strongly negative views about Israeli policy. Yet Camp David stands as an enduring diplomatic monument on an otherwise bleak political landscape. The reason: Egypt’s Anwar Sadat, who may have been a fallible politician, was still someone willing to take genuine risks for peace. Without such a partner, U.S. policy, no matter how inventive or patient, cannot succeed. Later, President Clinton found such partners in Israeli leaders Yitzhak Rabin and Ehud Barak, but Yasser Arafat proved unwilling to reach an agreement. As Ross observes, Arafat couldn’t end the conflict because it defined him.
Ross reminds us that today’s close strategic alliance with Israel was hardly the norm. Truman, for example, recognized the new state of Israel over the vehement objections of his senior advisors, including Secretary of State George Marshall. Eisenhower maintained a chilly relationship with Israel, one that turned confrontational over the Sinai invasion in 1956. (Although Eisenhower forced Britain, France, and Israel out of the Suez Canal and Sinai, his actions hardly helped us with Egypt’s Nasser, who had his own anti-Western nationalist agenda.)
The U.S. first sold weapons directly to Israel under the Kennedy Administration, but the close strategic partnership we see today really dates from the Reagan years. (Again, the security elements of the partnership succeeded, but Reagan could no more achieve a peace agreement than Bush 41, following the Gulf War, when U.S. power and prestige were at their height.
Ross concludes with an typically judicious assessment of the Obama years. Obama has been a true friend of Israel, he argues, and the security relationship has deepened significantly during his presidency. At the same time, Obama fell into the trap of “distancing” from Israel – on issues such as settlements that have bedeviled so many other presidents – without gaining commensurate leverage from the Palestinian side. He cites Obama’s observation that Benjamin Netanyahu was too strong and Mahmoud Abbas too weak to make peace.
Ross, operating within a largely diplomatic cocoon, doesn’t really tackle the massive political shifts that have occurred in recent decades, notably the failure of the Arab Spring, the agony of Syria – and perhaps most significantly – a conservative Netanyahu government more focused on expanding settlements and security walls than finding a genuine two-state solution.
Even if the Palestinian conflict ended, Ross concludes, “The lesson here is that with key Arab friends of the United States, there will be a floor below which they will not allow the relationship to go, and a ceiling above which it cannot rise.”
As for the beleaguered “peace process?” Perhaps we’ll have to wait for another generation to produce a new Sadat or Rabin – leaders willing to make the great leap to a lasting peace. I hope Dennis Ross will be in the room when that happens.
February 19, 2016
Dennis Ross provides an interesting take on how all the U.S. Presidents dealt with the State of Israel, from Harry Truman and the founding of the Jewish State in 1948, all the way through to Barack Obama. It's fair to say that all U.S. Presidents have been supportive of Israel to a greater or lesser degree. One of the points made by the author is that the Presidents generally sought to strike some sort of balance in the region, between support for Israel and support for the Arab states, some more successfully than others. Some, like G.W. Bush, for example, tended to be more supportive of Israel's security issues and distrustful of Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, while others, such as Barack Obama, tried harder to strike a more balanced approach between Israel and the Arab world.
Ross also makes a point that U.S. Presidents shouldn’t be too concerned that outright support for Israel (whether through arms sales, monetary loans, or preventing condemnation of Israel in the United Nations) might harm U.S. interests in the Arab world. He supports this through examples in which the U.S. aided Israel, but the Arab nations did not react aggressively against the U.S., as several of the presidential advisors had feared. That said, I seem to remember oil embargos and oil price hikes in the past which make me question Ross's feeling in that regard. Ross also seemed to feel that the Palestinian issue (e.g., the need for a homeland for the Palestinians and the question of Palestinian refugees) isn't as significant a source of anti-Israel / anti-American feelings in the Arab world as many seem to think. That's quite a different impression as I have had, and I have to think that Ross, being Jewish and I believe also a co-founder of AIPAC (a powerful Jewish lobby in the U.S.), might not see things quite as impartially as he might want to believe.
Another interesting aspect is how each U.S. president has condemned, argued against, criticized, or threatened Israel against building further settlements in the West Bank and Jerusalem, and how each was rebuffed and ignored by the various Israeli leaders. Continued settlement buildings have been identified as an obstacle to peace, and makes a two-state solution next to impossible. Israeli leaders have, at times, indicated a willingness to halt settlement building, and a willingness to work toward a Palestinian state. However, as settlement buildings continue, this seems to be a fading dream. I'm reminded of Netanyahu's quote during his most recent election campaign (even though he later backtracked from the statement), that "... there will never be a Palestinian State" as long as he was in power.
Another tidbit I found interesting in the book was, when Ross detailed each President's dealings with the Middle East, in only one case do I remember him speaking about the influence of any Vice President. As many would guess, that was Dick Cheney in George W. Bush's presidency. Many have discussed Cheney as being the most powerful and influential Vice Presidents ever, and while not an intended focus of the book, the prominance of this one Vice President seems to support this view.
I enjoyed the descriptions Ross provides of the issues and decisions the last dozen U.S. Presidents had to make regarding Israeli / Middle East events over the past 50 years. My main regret is the lack of a clearer historical link to the most significant events in Israeli / Mid East history during each of the presidential terms, and not adding a little more about how each of those events and wars also impacted U.S. policies.
The final feeling I was left with is that the relations between Israel and the U.S. are not always smooth and easy. Both countries have interests and needs, and often they may and do clash. Unfortunately, based on seeing the interactions between the U.S. and Israeli leaders as outlined in this book, the likelihood of smoother relations next year, with a new President and the same Israeli Prime Minister, probably won't be much different than now, no matter which Party wins the U.S. Presidential election.
Ross also makes a point that U.S. Presidents shouldn’t be too concerned that outright support for Israel (whether through arms sales, monetary loans, or preventing condemnation of Israel in the United Nations) might harm U.S. interests in the Arab world. He supports this through examples in which the U.S. aided Israel, but the Arab nations did not react aggressively against the U.S., as several of the presidential advisors had feared. That said, I seem to remember oil embargos and oil price hikes in the past which make me question Ross's feeling in that regard. Ross also seemed to feel that the Palestinian issue (e.g., the need for a homeland for the Palestinians and the question of Palestinian refugees) isn't as significant a source of anti-Israel / anti-American feelings in the Arab world as many seem to think. That's quite a different impression as I have had, and I have to think that Ross, being Jewish and I believe also a co-founder of AIPAC (a powerful Jewish lobby in the U.S.), might not see things quite as impartially as he might want to believe.
Another interesting aspect is how each U.S. president has condemned, argued against, criticized, or threatened Israel against building further settlements in the West Bank and Jerusalem, and how each was rebuffed and ignored by the various Israeli leaders. Continued settlement buildings have been identified as an obstacle to peace, and makes a two-state solution next to impossible. Israeli leaders have, at times, indicated a willingness to halt settlement building, and a willingness to work toward a Palestinian state. However, as settlement buildings continue, this seems to be a fading dream. I'm reminded of Netanyahu's quote during his most recent election campaign (even though he later backtracked from the statement), that "... there will never be a Palestinian State" as long as he was in power.
Another tidbit I found interesting in the book was, when Ross detailed each President's dealings with the Middle East, in only one case do I remember him speaking about the influence of any Vice President. As many would guess, that was Dick Cheney in George W. Bush's presidency. Many have discussed Cheney as being the most powerful and influential Vice Presidents ever, and while not an intended focus of the book, the prominance of this one Vice President seems to support this view.
I enjoyed the descriptions Ross provides of the issues and decisions the last dozen U.S. Presidents had to make regarding Israeli / Middle East events over the past 50 years. My main regret is the lack of a clearer historical link to the most significant events in Israeli / Mid East history during each of the presidential terms, and not adding a little more about how each of those events and wars also impacted U.S. policies.
The final feeling I was left with is that the relations between Israel and the U.S. are not always smooth and easy. Both countries have interests and needs, and often they may and do clash. Unfortunately, based on seeing the interactions between the U.S. and Israeli leaders as outlined in this book, the likelihood of smoother relations next year, with a new President and the same Israeli Prime Minister, probably won't be much different than now, no matter which Party wins the U.S. Presidential election.
April 17, 2017
I found Ross's book a fascinating, comprehensive account, well organized, impartial look at a very complicated, misunderstood international situation. The best part is Dennis Ross has been an insider participant from the beginning.
November 25, 2023
Chapters
1. The Evolution of U.S. Policy Toward Israel
2. The Eisenhower Administration and the Pursuit of Arab Allies
3. The Kennedy Administration: Breaking Taboos and Pursuing a New Balance
4. Lyndon Baines Johnson: Emotional Ties but Constrained by Vietnam
5. Nixon and Ford: Dysfunction, War, and Interim Agreements
6. The Carter Presidency: The Pursuit of Peace and Constant Tension with Israel
7. The Reagan Administration and the Policy of Duality
8. George H. W. Bush and Israel: Discord and Responsiveness
9. The Clinton Administration and Israel: Strategic Partners for Peace
10. Bush 43: Terror, Partnership, and Bureaucratic Divisions
11. Obama and Israel: Support for Security, Little Chemistry, and Constant Challenges
12. Lessons from the Past and Implications for the Future
Review
Dennis Ross worked for or adviced presidents from Carter to Obama. Advising them on the Middle East and making sure they understood the Middle East and how every leader there was thinking about the world. Seemingly even modern leaders like Obama are totally clueless about geopolitics and just make emotional plans without considering all the factors. Obama would just say nearly anti-Israel stuff in talks without really picking his words carefully. And guys like Ross have to then rebuild relationships picking the right words to say exactly the same. And that's an issue for ALL presidents here. They all came out so hard against Israel that the relationship always started out on the wrong foot with Israel not trusting the leadership in USA.
The book starts from when modern Israel as a fully Jewish state was created. Right away all the Muslim countries around it got together trying to wipe it out. From the start USA was not keen on helping Israel as it could create a bad image in countries like Saudi Arabia that supplied USA with the energy they needed to compete with USSR. Meanwhile USSR gave tons of weapons to Syria and other nations that tried to wipe out Israel. USA felt they couldn't help out. Slowly over many presidents the relationship improved as it was clear Israel would survive and dominate despite communism and Islam working together against them. Plus most other nations in the Middle East supported terrorists at some points. Up until Reagan it seems like presidents were a bit against Israel. It was a country you stayed away from as they had no oil. The author does claim that the Middle East really doesn't care about Israel as such. It's just one of 100 different things they think about. But it's not a key factor as it's external and not crucial to keep power. Saudi Arabia did stop selling oil to the West making prices skyrocket. But soon they did found out they needed US weapons and needed the income to protect themselves from Shia Islam like Iran. USA supporting Israel never harmed relationships with other countries because of this. They soon found out that they needed USA and needed a strong USA that would react fast and attack fast in the Middle East to keep things stable. If someone acted up other nations would beg USA to teach them a lesson fast. And only if USA didn't react did they lose faith in USA as it created an unstable Middle East. How much USA helped Israel a given year didn't change a thing. USA sending rockets to Israel was seen as not important as it was not really a propaganda topic. You need photos for propaganda and the amount of some weapon systems sent to Israel is not really marketable this way to attack Israel in the media.
I would say even Obama is not fully keen on Israel. There are a lot of anti-Israel people in the White House. And they fear-monger about how talking to Israel may create a ton of enemies and make Muslims hate USA. Especially the progressive Jimmy Carter seemed unfriendly to Israel as it really did seem like he felt it was a too dominant a force in an area he saw as Arab. Nixon too didn't care much about Israel, but it just felt like he didn't need it. So all these presidents loosely talked to the country. They needed a stable partner in the Middle East and Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia were all unstable or supported terror groups. So Israel kinda became the friend US had to accept even though all presidents were against this development. The presidents were also against the slow annexation of the West Bank. That was a full no-go from The White House. Yet Israel continued on which was seen as perplexing and unexplainable. How come Israel didn't do what The White House told them? And after terror attacks Israel would strike back full force with multiple Arab organizations and terror groups then claiming Israel killed civilians. It didn't matter if some photos were fake. The PR was horrible for USA. It was only after 9/11 that Bush finally understood what Israel was doing. And only there did USA slowly start to understand the big counter-strikes after each terror attack. And the connection to Israel became friendly. Yet still to this day USA calls for Israel to pull out from the West Bank. Even though it would create some security risk. They just need to keep saying this to appease other Muslim nations. Or, as the author says, they really don't as such. And furthermore Israel doesn't trust USA to help them at all times as they know USA is more eager to please the oil nations and furthermore see Israel as weak. Israel is seen as Western and any strike or annexation is perplexing to USA. So much so that presidents directly criticise it because that's "allowed" when the country is Western. It is seen as a great affront to democracy and anti-imperialism that all US presidents seem to support.
The whole book is neutral as can be for this sort of topic. The author himself negotiated closely with Israeli and Arab leaders. If he was only pro one side then the other side would just not want to negotiate with him. Or they could spot his unfriendliness. It seems like he had good and neutral relationships with all sides and especially liked the left-wing leaders in Israel ready to give away territory. For US presidents it was ALWAYS expected Israel would give away the West Bank and it was always the very first ask. And Israel never said yes outright to negotiations as they feared USA would just ask for more if given a small nod. Instead it went the other way. USA has started to accept that Israel will remain a country no matter if they get help of not, they may understand some Israel claims to the West Bank, and understand why Israel needs to use force in the Middle East too and that USA cannot be the only such power there. But it depends on the president. No president here is pro-Israel as such and many other workers in the White House are anti-Israel as they see it as an imperial power with no oil or power. But there is a new way to understand Israel now. And maybe at some point there will be a greater friendship. USA even started to give Israel intelligence at one point.
What seemingly happens here is what all US presidents need a fast PR win in the Middle East when they get elected. And you can't really negotiate much with fascist states. So asking the democratic Israel to create a new country in the West Bank seems easier. So all presidents push for this making Israel mistrust them. A few big critical speeches and plenty of visits to the Middle East while trying to ignore Israel. With Muslim countries not really caring while Israel is becoming impatient and distrustful. This mistake is made by every single president again and again even after these advisers, who have done this many times before, warn them not to do it. Bush did this. Obama too. Even modern presidents don't understand Israel or what works.
And you need the right US president and the right Israeli leader at the same time wanting the same thing - to create Palestine. And with the few years each president needs to rebuild a relationship by countering the first years of mistakes there is never an overlap of leader in each country. At times the leader in Israel just sees it as negative PR. At other times the leader is anti-imperialist and ready, but with the White House not pushing as hard those few years as they are either just starting to recreate a connection or are a few years into their government and finally understood that pushing Israel hard does nothing for PR in the Muslim world. So it's an endless limbo of stupidity from USA and distrust from Israel. But it works and will keep working - changing nothing. USA will try to appease Muslims by always being a tad unfriendly towards Israel. At least in the media. And then try to act like it never happened while trying to make Israel do something for them. And it never works.
Good audiobook reader. Good and clear book. A tad dry, but that's expected. You will learn a ton about USA and a bit about Israel and the Middle East.
1. The Evolution of U.S. Policy Toward Israel
2. The Eisenhower Administration and the Pursuit of Arab Allies
3. The Kennedy Administration: Breaking Taboos and Pursuing a New Balance
4. Lyndon Baines Johnson: Emotional Ties but Constrained by Vietnam
5. Nixon and Ford: Dysfunction, War, and Interim Agreements
6. The Carter Presidency: The Pursuit of Peace and Constant Tension with Israel
7. The Reagan Administration and the Policy of Duality
8. George H. W. Bush and Israel: Discord and Responsiveness
9. The Clinton Administration and Israel: Strategic Partners for Peace
10. Bush 43: Terror, Partnership, and Bureaucratic Divisions
11. Obama and Israel: Support for Security, Little Chemistry, and Constant Challenges
12. Lessons from the Past and Implications for the Future
Review
Dennis Ross worked for or adviced presidents from Carter to Obama. Advising them on the Middle East and making sure they understood the Middle East and how every leader there was thinking about the world. Seemingly even modern leaders like Obama are totally clueless about geopolitics and just make emotional plans without considering all the factors. Obama would just say nearly anti-Israel stuff in talks without really picking his words carefully. And guys like Ross have to then rebuild relationships picking the right words to say exactly the same. And that's an issue for ALL presidents here. They all came out so hard against Israel that the relationship always started out on the wrong foot with Israel not trusting the leadership in USA.
The book starts from when modern Israel as a fully Jewish state was created. Right away all the Muslim countries around it got together trying to wipe it out. From the start USA was not keen on helping Israel as it could create a bad image in countries like Saudi Arabia that supplied USA with the energy they needed to compete with USSR. Meanwhile USSR gave tons of weapons to Syria and other nations that tried to wipe out Israel. USA felt they couldn't help out. Slowly over many presidents the relationship improved as it was clear Israel would survive and dominate despite communism and Islam working together against them. Plus most other nations in the Middle East supported terrorists at some points. Up until Reagan it seems like presidents were a bit against Israel. It was a country you stayed away from as they had no oil. The author does claim that the Middle East really doesn't care about Israel as such. It's just one of 100 different things they think about. But it's not a key factor as it's external and not crucial to keep power. Saudi Arabia did stop selling oil to the West making prices skyrocket. But soon they did found out they needed US weapons and needed the income to protect themselves from Shia Islam like Iran. USA supporting Israel never harmed relationships with other countries because of this. They soon found out that they needed USA and needed a strong USA that would react fast and attack fast in the Middle East to keep things stable. If someone acted up other nations would beg USA to teach them a lesson fast. And only if USA didn't react did they lose faith in USA as it created an unstable Middle East. How much USA helped Israel a given year didn't change a thing. USA sending rockets to Israel was seen as not important as it was not really a propaganda topic. You need photos for propaganda and the amount of some weapon systems sent to Israel is not really marketable this way to attack Israel in the media.
I would say even Obama is not fully keen on Israel. There are a lot of anti-Israel people in the White House. And they fear-monger about how talking to Israel may create a ton of enemies and make Muslims hate USA. Especially the progressive Jimmy Carter seemed unfriendly to Israel as it really did seem like he felt it was a too dominant a force in an area he saw as Arab. Nixon too didn't care much about Israel, but it just felt like he didn't need it. So all these presidents loosely talked to the country. They needed a stable partner in the Middle East and Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia were all unstable or supported terror groups. So Israel kinda became the friend US had to accept even though all presidents were against this development. The presidents were also against the slow annexation of the West Bank. That was a full no-go from The White House. Yet Israel continued on which was seen as perplexing and unexplainable. How come Israel didn't do what The White House told them? And after terror attacks Israel would strike back full force with multiple Arab organizations and terror groups then claiming Israel killed civilians. It didn't matter if some photos were fake. The PR was horrible for USA. It was only after 9/11 that Bush finally understood what Israel was doing. And only there did USA slowly start to understand the big counter-strikes after each terror attack. And the connection to Israel became friendly. Yet still to this day USA calls for Israel to pull out from the West Bank. Even though it would create some security risk. They just need to keep saying this to appease other Muslim nations. Or, as the author says, they really don't as such. And furthermore Israel doesn't trust USA to help them at all times as they know USA is more eager to please the oil nations and furthermore see Israel as weak. Israel is seen as Western and any strike or annexation is perplexing to USA. So much so that presidents directly criticise it because that's "allowed" when the country is Western. It is seen as a great affront to democracy and anti-imperialism that all US presidents seem to support.
The whole book is neutral as can be for this sort of topic. The author himself negotiated closely with Israeli and Arab leaders. If he was only pro one side then the other side would just not want to negotiate with him. Or they could spot his unfriendliness. It seems like he had good and neutral relationships with all sides and especially liked the left-wing leaders in Israel ready to give away territory. For US presidents it was ALWAYS expected Israel would give away the West Bank and it was always the very first ask. And Israel never said yes outright to negotiations as they feared USA would just ask for more if given a small nod. Instead it went the other way. USA has started to accept that Israel will remain a country no matter if they get help of not, they may understand some Israel claims to the West Bank, and understand why Israel needs to use force in the Middle East too and that USA cannot be the only such power there. But it depends on the president. No president here is pro-Israel as such and many other workers in the White House are anti-Israel as they see it as an imperial power with no oil or power. But there is a new way to understand Israel now. And maybe at some point there will be a greater friendship. USA even started to give Israel intelligence at one point.
What seemingly happens here is what all US presidents need a fast PR win in the Middle East when they get elected. And you can't really negotiate much with fascist states. So asking the democratic Israel to create a new country in the West Bank seems easier. So all presidents push for this making Israel mistrust them. A few big critical speeches and plenty of visits to the Middle East while trying to ignore Israel. With Muslim countries not really caring while Israel is becoming impatient and distrustful. This mistake is made by every single president again and again even after these advisers, who have done this many times before, warn them not to do it. Bush did this. Obama too. Even modern presidents don't understand Israel or what works.
And you need the right US president and the right Israeli leader at the same time wanting the same thing - to create Palestine. And with the few years each president needs to rebuild a relationship by countering the first years of mistakes there is never an overlap of leader in each country. At times the leader in Israel just sees it as negative PR. At other times the leader is anti-imperialist and ready, but with the White House not pushing as hard those few years as they are either just starting to recreate a connection or are a few years into their government and finally understood that pushing Israel hard does nothing for PR in the Muslim world. So it's an endless limbo of stupidity from USA and distrust from Israel. But it works and will keep working - changing nothing. USA will try to appease Muslims by always being a tad unfriendly towards Israel. At least in the media. And then try to act like it never happened while trying to make Israel do something for them. And it never works.
Good audiobook reader. Good and clear book. A tad dry, but that's expected. You will learn a ton about USA and a bit about Israel and the Middle East.
May 2, 2016
This is an exhaustive account of the United States' relationship with Israel since that nation's founding in 1948. It is, thankfully, a surprisingly positive history. I say "surprisingly" because each president seems to enter the Oval Office focused on a "reset" with Israel, which usually includes less public support of the Israelis and more outreach toward Arab nations. However, as each president tackles the situation, he realizes the need Israel has for our support and the utter duplicity of the surrounding countries (Ross even claims that Obama is quite supportive of Israel in private). This realization leads to closer ties, more financial and military support, etc. Thus a relationship that seems "doomed" in fact has become quite successful. The question arises, of course, of whether this will continue.
Will it? I'd be more optimistic if Hillary Clinton got elected than I would Donald Trump, to be honest. Heck, her "hawkish" foreign policy is more appealing all the way around. Although Trump will nuke ISIS (yeah right), so maybe he'll spare some ordnance for the West Bank as well (bad idea, by the way, Donald J., if you happen to be reading this).
There are a lot of other points I could bring out from this book, such as that most Arab countries don't mind a strong and secure Israel (it's better than the alternative); Palestinian "refugees" as actually Jordanians that Jordan refuses to patriate (considering they've lived there 70 years); Arafat was as awful as he seemed at the time; etc. The most interesting question has to do with Iran and their true intents and progress toward that intentions, but that was a topic by and large not raised in this book. I am tempted to believe that their threats toward Israel are mere bluster, but I'm not sure that's a temptation the Israelis can afford to indulge.
Will it? I'd be more optimistic if Hillary Clinton got elected than I would Donald Trump, to be honest. Heck, her "hawkish" foreign policy is more appealing all the way around. Although Trump will nuke ISIS (yeah right), so maybe he'll spare some ordnance for the West Bank as well (bad idea, by the way, Donald J., if you happen to be reading this).
There are a lot of other points I could bring out from this book, such as that most Arab countries don't mind a strong and secure Israel (it's better than the alternative); Palestinian "refugees" as actually Jordanians that Jordan refuses to patriate (considering they've lived there 70 years); Arafat was as awful as he seemed at the time; etc. The most interesting question has to do with Iran and their true intents and progress toward that intentions, but that was a topic by and large not raised in this book. I am tempted to believe that their threats toward Israel are mere bluster, but I'm not sure that's a temptation the Israelis can afford to indulge.
January 5, 2017
I read "Doomed to Succeed" at the perfect time. Since Obama decided not to veto the recent UN resolution, many people have been wondering about the future of the Israeli-American relationship. Ross's book is informative and instructive, chronicling different presidents approaches to Israel and why they succeed or failed in the relationship. The three major takeaways from the book for me were:
1. Israeli-US relations do not harm US-Arab relations.
2. Close but honest relations between the two nations and their leaders works best.
3. Bill Clinton was awesome in his peacemaking efforts.
I'm wondering if Ross will ever revisit this book to add chapters as the relationship progresses, because I would be very interested in his take on future administrations. I have a feeling I will read this book again, and I intend to read Ross's other books on Israel as well.
1. Israeli-US relations do not harm US-Arab relations.
2. Close but honest relations between the two nations and their leaders works best.
3. Bill Clinton was awesome in his peacemaking efforts.
I'm wondering if Ross will ever revisit this book to add chapters as the relationship progresses, because I would be very interested in his take on future administrations. I have a feeling I will read this book again, and I intend to read Ross's other books on Israel as well.
Read
November 10, 2015Over the last four decades, Dennis Ross has spent his time serving five presidents and watching the Middle East roil. Now he has penned a bird’s-eye view of the relationship between the United States and Israel that also sounds like an audition to become Hillary Clinton’s secretary of state. Dryly written but with a clear thesis, Doomed to Succeed captures in detail the ups-and-downs between Washington and Jerusalem. It provides firsthand insight into the players who have molded the policies of both countries for nearly 40 years and is worth the read.
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May 4, 2017
For those who like politics and relate themselves to Israel, this book is a very good read.
The author does have a biased opinion toward Israel, in a messy and chaotic Middle East foreign affairs. It brings incredible insight on the President's and their aid's standing. It terms of Israel relations, it goes to great lengths to show that many that stood beside several of the presidents didn't have the proper experience nor candor to do the job right. Some showed themselves not being up to the task, pretty incompetent to say the least.
Very insightful reading.
The author does have a biased opinion toward Israel, in a messy and chaotic Middle East foreign affairs. It brings incredible insight on the President's and their aid's standing. It terms of Israel relations, it goes to great lengths to show that many that stood beside several of the presidents didn't have the proper experience nor candor to do the job right. Some showed themselves not being up to the task, pretty incompetent to say the least.
Very insightful reading.
December 29, 2015
Dennis Ross is a thoughtful expert on the Middle East. Unfortunately Doomed To Succeed is less so. The U.S. misunderstands Israel but rarely the reverse. Ross soft pedals Netanyahu's disastrous politics. Disappointing.
August 5, 2025
Despite an interesting topic, the book is significantly undermined by its dry, reportorial style. Instead of offering a clear view of larger historical dynamics, the author often immerses the reader in endless details – diplomatic transcripts, arms deal technicalities, meeting-by-meeting accounts. Ross is a career diplomat who served under administrations from both parties but is a registered Democrat, with ties to various Jewish organizations. The book, which is partly a memoir, focuses on U.S.-Israel relationship through the lenses of major decision-makers in presidential administration, and their foreign counterparts. Less attention is given to various ideological divisions within American politics or the way the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is framed in the media and public discourse.
Most American presidents showed reluctance toward engaging with Israel, regarding it as a peripheral issue compared to their larger global agendas. Even those privately sympathetic to Jews often ended up taking a more reserved approach due to realpolitik calculations and particular circumstances they faced. Israel was primarily an ideological ally, whereas the alliance with the Arabs had material benefits. Arab countries not only supplied oil but were also much larger and held control over critical geopolitical corridors. During the Cold war, the U.S. was constantly worried that any dissatisfaction might push the Arabs toward the Soviet Union, and that overt support for Israel could irreparably harm broader regional relationships. By contrast, the Arabs and Soviets generally showed little restraint in their actions, making risky moves and adopting maximal positions. Early relationship with Israel was largely one-sided – the Israelis provided valuable intelligence to the Americans, who for a long time were reluctant even to sell them weapons.
Ross argues that the State Department’s traditional Arabist approach was misguided, as experience repeatedly showed that Arab leaders were far more flexible on Israel than their public stance implied. Just as Israel is only one of many foreign policy issues for Americans, so too is Palestine only one issue among many for the Arabs. Also, they are just as dependent on American backing as the U.S. was on Middle Eastern oil. American diplomats often underestimated inter-Arab rivalries and failed to exploit them to their advantage. The Israelis, for their part, had to balance their ties with the U.S. against what they saw as existential threats. They began to see American aid as burdensome, accompanied by pressure to adopt positions that paved the way for further concessions. Their secretive and unilateral decision-making regularly angered the Americans, who saw it as contrary to their interests, straining the relationship.
The book offers some interesting insights and debunks common misconceptions about the U.S.-Israel relationship. However, it’s not a particularly engaging read. It’s best suited for readers with a solid grasp of the subject who are interested in behind-the-scenes details and insider perspectives. It’s not ideal for those looking for a general historical overview.
Most American presidents showed reluctance toward engaging with Israel, regarding it as a peripheral issue compared to their larger global agendas. Even those privately sympathetic to Jews often ended up taking a more reserved approach due to realpolitik calculations and particular circumstances they faced. Israel was primarily an ideological ally, whereas the alliance with the Arabs had material benefits. Arab countries not only supplied oil but were also much larger and held control over critical geopolitical corridors. During the Cold war, the U.S. was constantly worried that any dissatisfaction might push the Arabs toward the Soviet Union, and that overt support for Israel could irreparably harm broader regional relationships. By contrast, the Arabs and Soviets generally showed little restraint in their actions, making risky moves and adopting maximal positions. Early relationship with Israel was largely one-sided – the Israelis provided valuable intelligence to the Americans, who for a long time were reluctant even to sell them weapons.
Ross argues that the State Department’s traditional Arabist approach was misguided, as experience repeatedly showed that Arab leaders were far more flexible on Israel than their public stance implied. Just as Israel is only one of many foreign policy issues for Americans, so too is Palestine only one issue among many for the Arabs. Also, they are just as dependent on American backing as the U.S. was on Middle Eastern oil. American diplomats often underestimated inter-Arab rivalries and failed to exploit them to their advantage. The Israelis, for their part, had to balance their ties with the U.S. against what they saw as existential threats. They began to see American aid as burdensome, accompanied by pressure to adopt positions that paved the way for further concessions. Their secretive and unilateral decision-making regularly angered the Americans, who saw it as contrary to their interests, straining the relationship.
The book offers some interesting insights and debunks common misconceptions about the U.S.-Israel relationship. However, it’s not a particularly engaging read. It’s best suited for readers with a solid grasp of the subject who are interested in behind-the-scenes details and insider perspectives. It’s not ideal for those looking for a general historical overview.
April 1, 2022
Dennis Ross gives us an insider’s view of U.S. relations with Israel through successive administrations, from Truman through Obama. Ross is decidedly pro-Israel, and has worked with many of the Presidents during this era, including Reagan, Bush, Clinton and Obama. Throughout these administrations, the Arabists in the State Departments felt the need to become close with Moslem rulers due to oil, to counter Soviet influence, and to provide strategic military bases. These same pundits felt that Israel could offer nothing in terms of cost-benefit and could only sour our relations with the Arabs. Consequently, they felt the U.S. needed to distance itself from Israel and promote Israeli-Palestinian peace proposals in which Israel was asked cede land and not get much in return. Some in the administration were so anti-Israel, notably Casper Weinberger and Susan Rice, were so anti-Israel it bordered on the antisemitic. To be fair, some Israeli Prime Ministers were difficult to work with, especially Yitzchak Shamir and Benjamin Netanyahu.
Ross repeatedly points out the fallacy of these arguments. The Arabs are still a tribal society; there is no such thing as Arab unity. Each country is primarily concerned with its own welfare and security. Palestinian rights are an afterthought. This was proven time and again when the U.S. sold Israel military equipment or cooperated with it in other ways with no ill effect on U.S.-Arab relations. This became crystal clear under Trump, our most pro-Israel and anti-Palestinian President. The Arab States were more focused on Iran, ISIS and the destabilizing effects of the Arab Spring.
Ross, being and insider and a diplomat, tends to whitewash over the errors in judgement of certain Presidents. For instance, Ross presents Netanyahu speaking before Congress at the invitation of John Boehner as partisan politics – not because the Iran nuclear deal (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) was an existential threat to Israel. During the Arab Spring, Obama sided with the “democratic” Arab street rather than proven allies. This led to wholesale instability throughout the Middle East and the Benghazi disaster where our ambassador and three others were murdered.
Overall, the book is well-written, engaging, insightful and full of behind-the-scene details only Ross could provide. While Ross tends to blow his own horn, he is to be commended for his notable achievements in the U.S.-Israel dialogue over four decades.
Ross repeatedly points out the fallacy of these arguments. The Arabs are still a tribal society; there is no such thing as Arab unity. Each country is primarily concerned with its own welfare and security. Palestinian rights are an afterthought. This was proven time and again when the U.S. sold Israel military equipment or cooperated with it in other ways with no ill effect on U.S.-Arab relations. This became crystal clear under Trump, our most pro-Israel and anti-Palestinian President. The Arab States were more focused on Iran, ISIS and the destabilizing effects of the Arab Spring.
Ross, being and insider and a diplomat, tends to whitewash over the errors in judgement of certain Presidents. For instance, Ross presents Netanyahu speaking before Congress at the invitation of John Boehner as partisan politics – not because the Iran nuclear deal (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) was an existential threat to Israel. During the Arab Spring, Obama sided with the “democratic” Arab street rather than proven allies. This led to wholesale instability throughout the Middle East and the Benghazi disaster where our ambassador and three others were murdered.
Overall, the book is well-written, engaging, insightful and full of behind-the-scene details only Ross could provide. While Ross tends to blow his own horn, he is to be commended for his notable achievements in the U.S.-Israel dialogue over four decades.
May 16, 2025
Dennis Ross is a highly respected Middle East expert who has worked for every Democratic and Republican President from Carter to Obama. The book jacket has testimonials from various famous Presidential appointees from these administrations (Madeline Albright, George Schultz, etc) attesting to the respect Ross commands across the aisle.
In this book, he takes the reader on a journey from Israel's founding to the present, describing how every US Administration dealt with Israel directly and in terms of its overall Mideast policy. Each President from Truman to Obama gets their own chapter, with Ross's increasingly personal role in the proceedings coming into play from Carter onward.
With that in mind, this book was not only an excellent description of the history of US relations, but I would also say it is an essential primer on the subject. It's also an excellent book on how the give and take and negotiation of diplomacy really works.
Ross puts you in the place of each President as they balance Arab and Israeli interests while also battling the competing views in their own administration. Ross contends that history has shown that most Arab countries are not as troubled by Israeli policies or its existence as one might think. They are more interested in their own prosperity and security. As we get into recent Presidents, Ross draws on his own experience (laid out in his book The Missing Peace, which I will also read) with the Israeli/Palestinian peace process to show how close we have come (especially during the waning days of the Clinton administration) and obstacles that remain. At different times, you can find yourself frustrated with all of the parties (the US, Israel, Palestinians) but this book will help the reader understand where everyone is coming from. Though it is 10 years old, the issues are obviously still relevant today. As i write this, President Trump is in Saudi Arabia and many of the same issues discussed by Ross are today's headlines.
Finally, this is just a great, highly readable history book on the modern Presidential administrations.
For all of these reasons, I highly recommend this book to understand how different Presidents have approached the US role toward Israel and lessons for the future.
In this book, he takes the reader on a journey from Israel's founding to the present, describing how every US Administration dealt with Israel directly and in terms of its overall Mideast policy. Each President from Truman to Obama gets their own chapter, with Ross's increasingly personal role in the proceedings coming into play from Carter onward.
With that in mind, this book was not only an excellent description of the history of US relations, but I would also say it is an essential primer on the subject. It's also an excellent book on how the give and take and negotiation of diplomacy really works.
Ross puts you in the place of each President as they balance Arab and Israeli interests while also battling the competing views in their own administration. Ross contends that history has shown that most Arab countries are not as troubled by Israeli policies or its existence as one might think. They are more interested in their own prosperity and security. As we get into recent Presidents, Ross draws on his own experience (laid out in his book The Missing Peace, which I will also read) with the Israeli/Palestinian peace process to show how close we have come (especially during the waning days of the Clinton administration) and obstacles that remain. At different times, you can find yourself frustrated with all of the parties (the US, Israel, Palestinians) but this book will help the reader understand where everyone is coming from. Though it is 10 years old, the issues are obviously still relevant today. As i write this, President Trump is in Saudi Arabia and many of the same issues discussed by Ross are today's headlines.
Finally, this is just a great, highly readable history book on the modern Presidential administrations.
For all of these reasons, I highly recommend this book to understand how different Presidents have approached the US role toward Israel and lessons for the future.
November 12, 2025
Dennis Ross has spent most of his adult life advising American presidents and policy makers about the Middle East. He worked in the State Department or the White House during the administrations of both George Bushes,Bill Clinton, and Barack Obama. During countless meetings with American foreign policy planners and endless negotiations with Israel and Arab countries, Ross comes to his own conclusions about our recurring failure to negotiate peace in the Middle East. First, America has based its Middle East policy on the belief that peace in Palestine predicates peace with the Arabs. Second, peace in Palestine is only possible if we distance ourselves from the Jewish state in order to show the Arabs that we are “even-handed”.
Ross sees these as false narrative.
He believes that the American dealings with Israel are not linked to peace in the Middle East. The Arab countries would like to see an independent Palestine, but they are first and foremost concerned with their own security-internally and vis a vis their neighbors. Procuring American arms is much more important to them than who rules Palestine.
Ross gives example after example of this, until, frankly, it becomes boring. But isn’t that his point? Each American administration, from Truman to Obama has used the same mindsets and strategies that haven’t worked since 1949. Our basic assumptions are wrong, says Ross, and until we rectify that, the quagmire in the Middle East will never end.
Ross sees these as false narrative.
He believes that the American dealings with Israel are not linked to peace in the Middle East. The Arab countries would like to see an independent Palestine, but they are first and foremost concerned with their own security-internally and vis a vis their neighbors. Procuring American arms is much more important to them than who rules Palestine.
Ross gives example after example of this, until, frankly, it becomes boring. But isn’t that his point? Each American administration, from Truman to Obama has used the same mindsets and strategies that haven’t worked since 1949. Our basic assumptions are wrong, says Ross, and until we rectify that, the quagmire in the Middle East will never end.
July 7, 2018
Amb. Dennis Ross one of the authorities on the region after serving in four American administrations (Reagan, Bush, Clinton, Obama). He carefully and intellectually dissects every administration from Truman to Obama, focusing on core assumptions made by each president and how they affected US foreign policy and our relationship with Israel. This organization is both clear and informative because it allows for readers to see the bigger trends in the past 80 years among all the gritty details of the Arab-Israeli conflict. I am attending an intensive seminar with the Amb currently, and his expertise is incredible. If you are looking for a book portal into the Arab-Israeli conflict, I highly recommend this novel.
March 14, 2022
Interesting insights into the private thoughts and comments of these presidents with regard to Israel, Palestinians, Arabs and the Middle East. My takeaway from this book is that Israel has made the right decision all along to trust no one, depend on no one and to hold their cards close to their chest. I thought that Bush 43's comment, that "every time European leaders talk about Israel, they just sound anti-Semitic" is very telling.
December 27, 2020
A very thorough analysis of the history of the US-Israeli relationship. Definitely pro-Israel (he doesn’t really speak negatively about the country at all, including condemning settlements). It should be duly noted that the author himself is Jewish, so naturally he comes in with that perspective & bias.
October 17, 2017
Excellent book.
Illustrated how each Administration from Truman to Obama failed to find a way to broker peace between Israel and the Palestinians.
This book proves that peace will not happen unless the Palestinians want peace.
Illustrated how each Administration from Truman to Obama failed to find a way to broker peace between Israel and the Palestinians.
This book proves that peace will not happen unless the Palestinians want peace.
December 3, 2023
REading this during the current war and it explains much and is very middle and not doing the blame game well except clearly Netanyahu is and has been wrong headed and led to much of the animous happening now.
May 23, 2017
Very insightful!
Great lesson on the relationship with Israel and the Middle East through the administrations. Thank you for sharing your insight and expertise!
Great lesson on the relationship with Israel and the Middle East through the administrations. Thank you for sharing your insight and expertise!
March 19, 2018
Pretty good. I especially enjoyed Ross's discussion of Obama's transformation from Israel skeptic to supporter.
March 26, 2018
Another great book by Ambassador Ross. Instructive for the times in which we live.
April 21, 2018
Was fairly boring and repetitive. I am sure there is lots of good insight in here but I don't feel as though I garnered a better understanding of the relationship.
May 30, 2019
A must read for anyone interested in US-Israeli relations over the decade. Dennis Ross knows his stuff and how to tell a tale.
October 31, 2015
Ross's central contentions here are that the United States' diplomacy has been guided in large part by a fear of angering Arab states that only came to fruition once in the oil embargo of 1979. Ross is a diplomat so I think he might be confusing what might make Arab states' governments angry at us and what might make their populations angry, as though the latter were irrelevant. Indeed, quite often they were. You see this issue play out all the time in Latin America. We want to please our allies, but sometimes those allies are ghastly dictators who are so unpopular that if they ever lose power, their replacements will hate us just for having supported the past bad guy. But I'm not at all convinced that it would matter if we didn't. As much as we aren't often punished for being Pro-Israel, we are never rewarded for distancing from it.
Ross makes the case that we've come closer to peace when we've had administrations that made Israel feel comfortable and backs it up. He also backs up the claim about a lack of retaliation against us for backing Israel up. But aside from not convincing me that relying on this too much wouldn't have caused Arab states we've supported to lose power,
The second major point is that the Israeli/Palestinian conflict won't solve the entire situation in the Middle East all at once. Anyone who believes this needs to read more. In fact, it probably won't even make life all that much better on the Palestinians, at least not at first. It's hardly a top concern for people living in worse situations elsewhere, except in propaganda. That's not to say it doesn't resonate, but America's presence in the region will resonate the same way even after that.
Ross makes the case that we've come closer to peace when we've had administrations that made Israel feel comfortable and backs it up. He also backs up the claim about a lack of retaliation against us for backing Israel up. But aside from not convincing me that relying on this too much wouldn't have caused Arab states we've supported to lose power,
The second major point is that the Israeli/Palestinian conflict won't solve the entire situation in the Middle East all at once. Anyone who believes this needs to read more. In fact, it probably won't even make life all that much better on the Palestinians, at least not at first. It's hardly a top concern for people living in worse situations elsewhere, except in propaganda. That's not to say it doesn't resonate, but America's presence in the region will resonate the same way even after that.
December 2, 2016
Dennis Ross has had an amazing career across multiple American administrations. His view seems to have remained consistent, and at odds with the view from much of the State Department. He has always been skeptical about the degree to which Arab states, especially those friendly to us, are put off by the US relationship with Israel. Over and over again, he shows that even when the US moves closer to Israel, the Arab states do not move away from us. Conversely, no matter how tough we are on Israel, the Arab states rarely give any recognition of the fact or reward such a posture on our part.
From Dennis Ross's vantage point, the Israelis are tough and difficult to deal with. Each president has had to create his own relationship with Israeli Prime Ministers - left, right and center. It is interesting to note how often an American president has developed a special concern and affinity for Israel, favoring the Jewish state over the objections of the state department bureaucrats, and how presidents have had to balance their feelings for Israel against the State Department leadership and the affinities of the American public and congress for the Jewish state.
This book is an exhausting and well referenced report on more than 60 years of American diplomacy towards the Middle East. While the author skips over or touches only lightly major events that are outside of the Arab Israeli conflict, like the Iran-Iraq war or the Arab Spring, he gives the reader an in depth view of exchanges between the US and Israel on strategic issues large and small. The book adds color and depth to Israel's continuing struggle for survival and prosperity. For this American, who has lived most of those 60 plus years with Israel, it provides valuable and important insights and background material.
From Dennis Ross's vantage point, the Israelis are tough and difficult to deal with. Each president has had to create his own relationship with Israeli Prime Ministers - left, right and center. It is interesting to note how often an American president has developed a special concern and affinity for Israel, favoring the Jewish state over the objections of the state department bureaucrats, and how presidents have had to balance their feelings for Israel against the State Department leadership and the affinities of the American public and congress for the Jewish state.
This book is an exhausting and well referenced report on more than 60 years of American diplomacy towards the Middle East. While the author skips over or touches only lightly major events that are outside of the Arab Israeli conflict, like the Iran-Iraq war or the Arab Spring, he gives the reader an in depth view of exchanges between the US and Israel on strategic issues large and small. The book adds color and depth to Israel's continuing struggle for survival and prosperity. For this American, who has lived most of those 60 plus years with Israel, it provides valuable and important insights and background material.
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