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Hubris: The Tragedy of War in the Twentieth Century – An Acclaimed Analysis by Distinguished Historian Alistair Horne
The legendary historian and author of A Savage War of Peace and The Price of Glory distills a lifetime’s study to reflect on six critical battles that changed the course of the twentieth century.
Sir Alistair Horne has been a close observer of war and history for more than fifty years. In this wise and masterly work that he calls his “summa,” he revisits six battles of the past century and examines the strategies, leadership, preparation, and geopolitical goals of aggressors and defenders, to reveal the one trait that links them all: hubris.
In Greek tragedy, hubris is excessive human pride that challenges the gods and ultimately leads to downfall. From the Battle of Tsushima in the Russo-Japanese War to Hitler’s 1940 invasion of Moscow to MacArthur’s disastrous advance in Korea, Horne shows how each of these battles was won or lost due to excessive hubris on one side or the other. In a sweeping narrative written with his trademark erudition and wit, Horne provides a meticulously detailed analysis of the ground maneuvers employed by the opposing armies in each battle. He also explores the strategic and psychological mindset of the military leaders involved to demonstrate how a devastating combination of human ambition and arrogance led to overreach. Making clear the danger of hubris in warfare, his insights are deeply relevant and hold important lessons for civilian and military leaders navigating today’s complex global landscape.
A dramatic, colorful, stylishly written history, complete with a 16-page black-and-white photo insert and maps, Hubris is a brilliant and much-needed reflection on war from a master of his field.
Sir Alistair Horne has been a close observer of war and history for more than fifty years. In this wise and masterly work that he calls his “summa,” he revisits six battles of the past century and examines the strategies, leadership, preparation, and geopolitical goals of aggressors and defenders, to reveal the one trait that links them all: hubris.
In Greek tragedy, hubris is excessive human pride that challenges the gods and ultimately leads to downfall. From the Battle of Tsushima in the Russo-Japanese War to Hitler’s 1940 invasion of Moscow to MacArthur’s disastrous advance in Korea, Horne shows how each of these battles was won or lost due to excessive hubris on one side or the other. In a sweeping narrative written with his trademark erudition and wit, Horne provides a meticulously detailed analysis of the ground maneuvers employed by the opposing armies in each battle. He also explores the strategic and psychological mindset of the military leaders involved to demonstrate how a devastating combination of human ambition and arrogance led to overreach. Making clear the danger of hubris in warfare, his insights are deeply relevant and hold important lessons for civilian and military leaders navigating today’s complex global landscape.
A dramatic, colorful, stylishly written history, complete with a 16-page black-and-white photo insert and maps, Hubris is a brilliant and much-needed reflection on war from a master of his field.
400 pages, Hardcover
First published September 2, 2014
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About the author
Alistair Horne
89 books200 followersSir Alistair Allan Horne was an English journalist, biographer and historian of Europe, especially of 19th and 20th century France. He wrote more than 20 books on travel, history, and biography. He won the following awards: Hawthornden Prize, 1963, for The Price of Glory; Yorkshire Post Book of the Year Prize and Wolfson Literary Award, both 1978, both for A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962; French Légion d'Honneur, 1993, for work on French history;and Commander of the British Empire (CBE), 2003.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 88 reviews
June 1, 2019
Military historian Alistair Horne writes here about six 20th century conflicts that he argues are linked by the theme of “hubris”. For a British author he tackles this in a very non-Eurocentric way. Five of the conflicts are in the Asia/Pacific region and the other is the Battle of Moscow in 1941.
I wasn’t entirely convinced about the theme. I think any unsuccessful general could probably be accused of hubris after the event. I have a slight suspicion that the connecting theme was a device to justify a book about otherwise unconnected battles. Be that as it may, this was a decent read if you are interested in 20th century history. Alistair Horne writes in a lively style and even the better-known battles like Moscow and Midway are retold in dramatic fashion. One thing I hadn’t known before was that Stalin knew in advance of the Japanese plan to attack Pearl Harbor. He had been informed by his “superspy” Richard Sorge, but of course he didn’t pass the information on to the Americans.
The weakest chapter was the one on the Korean War, which was much too short for the subject and seems to have been included because MacArthur’s advance to the Yalu can fairly be described as a glaring example of hubris. I was also a little disappointed about the chapter on the Battle of Nomonhan (which the Russians and Mongolians call the Battle of Khalkhin Gol). This little-known conflict may have had a strategic significance well beyond its fame, since the Japanese suffered a crushing defeat which probably deterred them from a subsequent attack on the USSR during WWII. There was a lot in this chapter which was new to me, but I would say the re-telling of the battle is a little flat in comparison to some of the other chapters.
For me the chapters on Tsushima and Dien Bien Phu were probably the best. Although I knew the basic details the book provided me with a lot of new information. Something else I hadn’t known was that the Russo-Japanese War started with the Japanese launching a surprise attack on the Russian Fleet at anchor in Port Arthur, without a Declaration of War and whilst diplomatic negotiations were ongoing, almost identical circumstances to Pearl Harbor. At the time Japan and Britain were allies and “The Times” described the Japanese attack as “this dashing and courageous exploit”. As the author points out “These were hardly the words that would be used on the ‘Day of Infamy’ thirty-seven years later.” I suppose it all comes down to the old saying that Great Powers don’t have friends or enemies, only interests.
I wasn’t entirely convinced about the theme. I think any unsuccessful general could probably be accused of hubris after the event. I have a slight suspicion that the connecting theme was a device to justify a book about otherwise unconnected battles. Be that as it may, this was a decent read if you are interested in 20th century history. Alistair Horne writes in a lively style and even the better-known battles like Moscow and Midway are retold in dramatic fashion. One thing I hadn’t known before was that Stalin knew in advance of the Japanese plan to attack Pearl Harbor. He had been informed by his “superspy” Richard Sorge, but of course he didn’t pass the information on to the Americans.
The weakest chapter was the one on the Korean War, which was much too short for the subject and seems to have been included because MacArthur’s advance to the Yalu can fairly be described as a glaring example of hubris. I was also a little disappointed about the chapter on the Battle of Nomonhan (which the Russians and Mongolians call the Battle of Khalkhin Gol). This little-known conflict may have had a strategic significance well beyond its fame, since the Japanese suffered a crushing defeat which probably deterred them from a subsequent attack on the USSR during WWII. There was a lot in this chapter which was new to me, but I would say the re-telling of the battle is a little flat in comparison to some of the other chapters.
For me the chapters on Tsushima and Dien Bien Phu were probably the best. Although I knew the basic details the book provided me with a lot of new information. Something else I hadn’t known was that the Russo-Japanese War started with the Japanese launching a surprise attack on the Russian Fleet at anchor in Port Arthur, without a Declaration of War and whilst diplomatic negotiations were ongoing, almost identical circumstances to Pearl Harbor. At the time Japan and Britain were allies and “The Times” described the Japanese attack as “this dashing and courageous exploit”. As the author points out “These were hardly the words that would be used on the ‘Day of Infamy’ thirty-seven years later.” I suppose it all comes down to the old saying that Great Powers don’t have friends or enemies, only interests.
January 5, 2016
This is presumably Alistair Horne's last work, and it's a solid end to a life of journalism and research in military affairs. Horne, as always, is an engaging writer and grand storyteller. The book is an odd sort of project, though. It's really just 6 battles/wars that he had never written much about in the past and wanted to in his old age. He covers Tsushima, Khalkin-Gol, Moscow, Midway, the Korean War, and Dien Bien Phu. Scholars won't find a lot to chew on here, but military buffs will really enjoy his accounts of these campaigns. In particular, Horne does a great job explaining the rise and fall of Japan . By far the best (and longest) of his sections in this book are on Tsushima and Khalkin-Gol, two underrated and largely unknown battles that had immense effects on 20th century history and the Second World War in particular.
The thesis of the book is loose, inexact, but still interesting. He faults leaders in each of these battles for their decisions made under the fog of hubris. Of course, there's so much that goes into winning or losing that Horne can't just boil everything down to hubris. Much of the hubris has to do with leaders: Russia's assumption that they could sail around the world and beat Japan in 1904-1905; the Kwantung Army's underestimation of Soviet tank units in Mongolia; Yamamoto's multi-objective plans in the Pacific that spread his forces too thin; Hitler's various forms of hubris during Barbarossa, French underestimation and disdain for the Viet Minh, and, well, Macarthur. A common theme here is the victory disease: people and societies who are on a roll tend to become less cognizant of their own fallibility and weaknesses, and they are more likely to bite off more than they can chew as a result. Racial prejudice also played a major role in virtually all of these cases. The peripeteia (or downfall of the hubristic protagonist) in each of these cases was deeply costly, in many cases setting the stage for the virtual destruction of societies. A final interesting point by
This book only covers 6 battles, and only in the 21st century. Horne's epilogue covers the transformation of Israel's attitudes after the Six Days' War and the formation of their own victory disease. I would have loved a separate chapter on this. But, like most history, it should impress a sense of humility in its readers. Far from the can-do spirit, a lifetime of studying conflict has convinced Horne that human beings almost cannot look at themselves and their rivals objectively, and that our inherent flaws make war, the most perilous human enterprise, very likely to blow back in our faces. For any person or nation to convince themselves that they are exempt from these foibles is to cover up their historical rear-view mirrors and drive blindly into the fog of war.
The thesis of the book is loose, inexact, but still interesting. He faults leaders in each of these battles for their decisions made under the fog of hubris. Of course, there's so much that goes into winning or losing that Horne can't just boil everything down to hubris. Much of the hubris has to do with leaders: Russia's assumption that they could sail around the world and beat Japan in 1904-1905; the Kwantung Army's underestimation of Soviet tank units in Mongolia; Yamamoto's multi-objective plans in the Pacific that spread his forces too thin; Hitler's various forms of hubris during Barbarossa, French underestimation and disdain for the Viet Minh, and, well, Macarthur. A common theme here is the victory disease: people and societies who are on a roll tend to become less cognizant of their own fallibility and weaknesses, and they are more likely to bite off more than they can chew as a result. Racial prejudice also played a major role in virtually all of these cases. The peripeteia (or downfall of the hubristic protagonist) in each of these cases was deeply costly, in many cases setting the stage for the virtual destruction of societies. A final interesting point by
This book only covers 6 battles, and only in the 21st century. Horne's epilogue covers the transformation of Israel's attitudes after the Six Days' War and the formation of their own victory disease. I would have loved a separate chapter on this. But, like most history, it should impress a sense of humility in its readers. Far from the can-do spirit, a lifetime of studying conflict has convinced Horne that human beings almost cannot look at themselves and their rivals objectively, and that our inherent flaws make war, the most perilous human enterprise, very likely to blow back in our faces. For any person or nation to convince themselves that they are exempt from these foibles is to cover up their historical rear-view mirrors and drive blindly into the fog of war.
October 8, 2016
Hubris – The Tragedy of War in the Twentieth Century
Sir Alistair Horne, renowned historian, author, teacher and mentor, has published Hubris his view of the twentieth century through six battles that changed the course of the twentieth century and help to define the world in which we live.
While some may complain that he has selected only 6 battles in what was a very bloody twentieth century, I am sure Sir Alistair would remind people that the 20th century had plenty of wars in every decade, and if he were to attempt to write about them all, rather than a readable book we would get an unreadable encyclopaedia. Yes, his choices are subjective, but then so is any choice of subject historians choose to write on, but with his chosen battles there is objectivity.
As professor Niall Ferguson has already stated about this book is that ‘Hubris is his title and his leitmotif – more precisely, the overconfidence that so often leads to military disaster. All six battles in this book highlight this, the hubris of the leadership is what led them to disaster, and Hitler’s attempt to capture Moscow in 1941 encapsulates this.
What we get is a sensible and sobering read about battles in the first fifty years of the twentieth century, and what we get is a sharp insight, observation and comment from Horne. He explains why he chose these six battles and the first fifty years, as he considers them the bloodiest of the century. If he were to continue longer then the book would no longer be readable as it currently is.
This book is designed as well as those with an academic interest in the wars of the twentieth century, but the general reader, those that which to gain some insight of historical battles. So what we get is a detailed analysis of the manoeuvres of the combatant armies in each battle, the strategies used and the leadership. He also explains the geopolitical goals of the aggressors and those being attacked. What comes through is that in each of these battles there was a devastating combination of ambition and arrogance that led to the overreach. In other words, the hubris that brought their plans crashing to the ground.
This an interesting book, especially for the general reader who wants to understand more about how, why and how some of the biggest battles came about, and how the victors were often those that had been attacked. This is one of the most readable accounts on a subject that is not often considered, the hubris of the leadership.
Sir Alistair Horne, renowned historian, author, teacher and mentor, has published Hubris his view of the twentieth century through six battles that changed the course of the twentieth century and help to define the world in which we live.
While some may complain that he has selected only 6 battles in what was a very bloody twentieth century, I am sure Sir Alistair would remind people that the 20th century had plenty of wars in every decade, and if he were to attempt to write about them all, rather than a readable book we would get an unreadable encyclopaedia. Yes, his choices are subjective, but then so is any choice of subject historians choose to write on, but with his chosen battles there is objectivity.
As professor Niall Ferguson has already stated about this book is that ‘Hubris is his title and his leitmotif – more precisely, the overconfidence that so often leads to military disaster. All six battles in this book highlight this, the hubris of the leadership is what led them to disaster, and Hitler’s attempt to capture Moscow in 1941 encapsulates this.
What we get is a sensible and sobering read about battles in the first fifty years of the twentieth century, and what we get is a sharp insight, observation and comment from Horne. He explains why he chose these six battles and the first fifty years, as he considers them the bloodiest of the century. If he were to continue longer then the book would no longer be readable as it currently is.
This book is designed as well as those with an academic interest in the wars of the twentieth century, but the general reader, those that which to gain some insight of historical battles. So what we get is a detailed analysis of the manoeuvres of the combatant armies in each battle, the strategies used and the leadership. He also explains the geopolitical goals of the aggressors and those being attacked. What comes through is that in each of these battles there was a devastating combination of ambition and arrogance that led to the overreach. In other words, the hubris that brought their plans crashing to the ground.
This an interesting book, especially for the general reader who wants to understand more about how, why and how some of the biggest battles came about, and how the victors were often those that had been attacked. This is one of the most readable accounts on a subject that is not often considered, the hubris of the leadership.
December 24, 2015
Horne presents some intense and engaging depictions of battles throughout the 20th century and I enjoyed learning about encounters I knew little about. At the same time, the stories never come together as a coherent book. Rather than carrying the thread of hubris throughout, this feels more like a collection of essays about wars Horne finds interesting. I would have felt better about all of this if it were the latter. But as it claims to be the former, I have to be a bit more critical due to the shortcomings of the author's intended project.
July 29, 2022
3.5 Stars.
This is the second book by Alistair Horne that I have read, the first being the Price of Glory. I found the earlier parts of this book, the areas related to the Russo-Japanese war and the battle of Khalkin Gol to be most informative.
Once the author got into the Korean War and then The French war in Indochina the authors political leanings came out in reactionary ways that are hard to reckon with the history being discussed. How can one argue that the Viet Minh were in the wrong to fight for independence against a violent Colonial oppressor? How can you fairly castigate the north Koreans after just acknowledging that North Korea was bombed more heavily than Japan or North Vietnam. The country was, under the auspices of the United Nations leveled. Bombed into the stone age and yet Horne notes the South became an "economic miracle." Fancy that I wonder what else occurred or didn't occur in the South. Essentially a fun read but his anti-communist reactionary views were tiresome and nonsensical.
This is the second book by Alistair Horne that I have read, the first being the Price of Glory. I found the earlier parts of this book, the areas related to the Russo-Japanese war and the battle of Khalkin Gol to be most informative.
Once the author got into the Korean War and then The French war in Indochina the authors political leanings came out in reactionary ways that are hard to reckon with the history being discussed. How can one argue that the Viet Minh were in the wrong to fight for independence against a violent Colonial oppressor? How can you fairly castigate the north Koreans after just acknowledging that North Korea was bombed more heavily than Japan or North Vietnam. The country was, under the auspices of the United Nations leveled. Bombed into the stone age and yet Horne notes the South became an "economic miracle." Fancy that I wonder what else occurred or didn't occur in the South. Essentially a fun read but his anti-communist reactionary views were tiresome and nonsensical.
February 12, 2018
I got this book for $6, and at that price point I'd probably rate this higher - but as a book, I wasn't that fussed. Hubris covers six conflicts, three in detail and three very briefly.
The first is Tsushima, the Japanese defeat of Russia in a large naval battle in the Tsushima Strait, a battle I'd heard of but never learned about - this was good, nice and detailed and interesting.
The second is the Battle of Nomonhan, a slapfight between Russia and Japan in north-western Manchuria just prior to the outbreak of WWII, which was the main cause for Japan "going south" (into the Pacific and eventually America) rather than trying their hand at conquering Russia. This was interesting, but quite brief.
The third is the Battle of Moscow, another battle I've heard about but never learned about, in favour of it's more popular brother the Battle of Stalingrad. Very interesting, very detailed. Good stuff.
Fourth, the Battle of Midway - another battle I've heard a ton about but never knew anything about. Quite detailed, interesting and neat.
The fifth and sixth barely deserve to be in the book - Horne gives an incredibly brief overview of the Korean War, in less than 30 pages - and then the battle of Dien Bien Phu, a battle I've now read two 500+ page books on, so his 25 pages worth of coverage he saw fit to give it didn't really impress me very much.
I hope this book wasn't an indicator for Horne's ability in general, as I have A Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954-1962 to read of his - but for $6, hell, it wasn't bad.
The first is Tsushima, the Japanese defeat of Russia in a large naval battle in the Tsushima Strait, a battle I'd heard of but never learned about - this was good, nice and detailed and interesting.
The second is the Battle of Nomonhan, a slapfight between Russia and Japan in north-western Manchuria just prior to the outbreak of WWII, which was the main cause for Japan "going south" (into the Pacific and eventually America) rather than trying their hand at conquering Russia. This was interesting, but quite brief.
The third is the Battle of Moscow, another battle I've heard about but never learned about, in favour of it's more popular brother the Battle of Stalingrad. Very interesting, very detailed. Good stuff.
Fourth, the Battle of Midway - another battle I've heard a ton about but never knew anything about. Quite detailed, interesting and neat.
The fifth and sixth barely deserve to be in the book - Horne gives an incredibly brief overview of the Korean War, in less than 30 pages - and then the battle of Dien Bien Phu, a battle I've now read two 500+ page books on, so his 25 pages worth of coverage he saw fit to give it didn't really impress me very much.
I hope this book wasn't an indicator for Horne's ability in general, as I have A Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954-1962 to read of his - but for $6, hell, it wasn't bad.
November 23, 2015
Fascinating and with the touch of a master storyteller's hand, if there's one history I will recommend this Christmas season, it will be Alistair Horne's Hubris: the Tragedy of War in the Twentieth Century. Interesting and accessible, Horne's approach is a narrative that doesn't merely tell a story, but also examines hubris in the tides of battle. It is well researched, cites relevant sources and histories, and is persuasive, not to mention thoroughly engaging to read.
Beginning with the Russo-Japanese War of 1905 and ending with the last battle of the First Indochina War (the second being our Vietnam War), Dien Bien Phu, all of the battles that Horne examines fall roughly in the first half of the twentieth century, and with the exception of the Battle of the Straights of Tsushima, the final of the Russo-Japanese War, are all closely grouped around a period extending from 1939 to 1954. I'm sure there are plenty of histories that include each of the battles, but it was fascinating to view them through the lens of a nation or leader acting on hubris and taking his force beyond their capabilities.
In Tsushima, we see the last battle between battleships, the last time a battleship was sunk by force of cannons. With its fleet in the Pacific scattered by the Japanese, Russia sent its Baltic Fleet around the Horn of Africa, across the Indian Ocean, and north to bolster defenses on the Korean peninsula. With building drama and suspense, Horne tells the story of the opposing admirals, each with dramatically different personalities and management styles. Here are the vivid colors of a final engagement equal in decisiveness to the English and French meeting at Trafalgar under Lord Nelson.
Japan and Russia are also the opposing forces in Horne's second battle, over thirty years later at Nomonhan inside of Mongolia. It is Gregory Zhukov's first major step on the world stage, and it will bring him to Stalin's attention as Zhukov first executes the maneuvers that he will later use against the Germans during Operation Barbarossa during the invasion of Russia.
It is during this invasion that we see Stalin stand in shocked silence at the news that Germans have invaded the Fatherland, despite repeated warnings not only from military leaders but from spies abroad. In what will become the largest battle in history and a turning point in the war, Hitler will extend himself too far to attempt to capture Moscow and, like Napoleon before him, be defeated by poor planning and the Russian winter.
The fourth engagement is the Battle of Midway, early in the United States' involvement in World War II, and interestingly, it is the third that involves the Japanese.
Last is a combination of General McArthur in Korea and the French in Indochina (Vietnam). I've recently read The Generals, by Thomas Ricks, which overlaps the Korea war therein, but this was the first account I've read about Dien Bien Phu.
In each battle, Horne does more than just lay out the battle lines and order of battle. He steps back and sketches out relevant previous history leading up to it, providing context and color to the personalities behind the facts, dates, and troop movements. I found the writing absolutely fascinating, and I would definitely consider reading other books by Horne.
Beginning with the Russo-Japanese War of 1905 and ending with the last battle of the First Indochina War (the second being our Vietnam War), Dien Bien Phu, all of the battles that Horne examines fall roughly in the first half of the twentieth century, and with the exception of the Battle of the Straights of Tsushima, the final of the Russo-Japanese War, are all closely grouped around a period extending from 1939 to 1954. I'm sure there are plenty of histories that include each of the battles, but it was fascinating to view them through the lens of a nation or leader acting on hubris and taking his force beyond their capabilities.
In Tsushima, we see the last battle between battleships, the last time a battleship was sunk by force of cannons. With its fleet in the Pacific scattered by the Japanese, Russia sent its Baltic Fleet around the Horn of Africa, across the Indian Ocean, and north to bolster defenses on the Korean peninsula. With building drama and suspense, Horne tells the story of the opposing admirals, each with dramatically different personalities and management styles. Here are the vivid colors of a final engagement equal in decisiveness to the English and French meeting at Trafalgar under Lord Nelson.
Japan and Russia are also the opposing forces in Horne's second battle, over thirty years later at Nomonhan inside of Mongolia. It is Gregory Zhukov's first major step on the world stage, and it will bring him to Stalin's attention as Zhukov first executes the maneuvers that he will later use against the Germans during Operation Barbarossa during the invasion of Russia.
It is during this invasion that we see Stalin stand in shocked silence at the news that Germans have invaded the Fatherland, despite repeated warnings not only from military leaders but from spies abroad. In what will become the largest battle in history and a turning point in the war, Hitler will extend himself too far to attempt to capture Moscow and, like Napoleon before him, be defeated by poor planning and the Russian winter.
The fourth engagement is the Battle of Midway, early in the United States' involvement in World War II, and interestingly, it is the third that involves the Japanese.
Last is a combination of General McArthur in Korea and the French in Indochina (Vietnam). I've recently read The Generals, by Thomas Ricks, which overlaps the Korea war therein, but this was the first account I've read about Dien Bien Phu.
In each battle, Horne does more than just lay out the battle lines and order of battle. He steps back and sketches out relevant previous history leading up to it, providing context and color to the personalities behind the facts, dates, and troop movements. I found the writing absolutely fascinating, and I would definitely consider reading other books by Horne.
November 23, 2015
So, the author clearly knows his stuff - the book seems factual and well-informed. I was bothered throughout, though, because there are absolutely no citations. Some, but not all, of the many direct quotes that he uses are attributed, but never directly cited, and he includes a Select Bibliography at the end of the book, which is at least divided by chapter to give the reader some idea of how the sources connect. I would find this more forgivable in a Pop-History book, but honestly the writing feels too dry to appeal to most of that audience.
*According to FTC regulations I certify that I received this book for free through the Goodreads First-Reads program.*
*According to FTC regulations I certify that I received this book for free through the Goodreads First-Reads program.*
December 17, 2015
Thought-provoking - too much of military history is about dates, places, machines, logistics, and what went right/wrong but not why. This is about the titular psychological failing and its devastating impact on the lives of millions.
The author had to choose from enough examples from the 20th century to fill an encyclopedia, and chose well - where he did cover well-known events, he looked at aspects that haven't been as well documented as the rest of the picture.
This should be required reading in officer training everywhere.
The author had to choose from enough examples from the 20th century to fill an encyclopedia, and chose well - where he did cover well-known events, he looked at aspects that haven't been as well documented as the rest of the picture.
This should be required reading in officer training everywhere.
January 6, 2016
Excellent book for anyone interested in military history as a field of study. Also a very strong overview of critical moments and the decision-making within the major conflicts of the 20th Century.
August 9, 2021
I've read a few books written by Alistair Horne, and enjoyed them all. I enjoyed this one too, as it is well written and informative, but I must state that I found the premise of the book a little thin. Horne, in his introduction to Hubris, states his aim to be to show how that state of over-confidence can lead to disaster, and how, often after a great victory, hubris creeps in and infects (Horne likens it to a virus) the body politic and the body military and leads to inevitable downfall.
To illustrate his point he chooses key battles from the first half of the Twentieth Century, Tsushima, Nomonhan, Moscow, Midway, MacArthur in Korea, and the battle of Dien Bien Phu. His contention is that in each case it was hubris that led to defeat, and that victory could lead to the development of hubris in the winners. This theory is fairly self-evident to any serious student of military history, and Horne does not add significantly to thinking in this area in my opinion.
Nevertheless, he does show the links between Japan's victory in 1905 and their over-confidence in Mongolia in 1939 and at Midway in 1942. America's crushing of Japan can be argued to have instilled a sense of inevitability to the United States and MacArthur's view that the Korean War would lead to a speedy victory; and the similar racist views of the French (as well as their internecine bickering and arrogance) led them to grievously underestimate the Viet Minh and General Giap.
Although Horne only touches on them, to me two other themes loom large in this book - racism, and ruthlessness. Much of the hubris shown by the Russians, Germans, Americans and French was engendered by their racist view of their opponents. European commanders - and political leaders for that matter - had a very dim view of their Asian brothers. What is fascinating to see is how these views remained unchanged, despite all the evidence to the contrary. Japan in particular suffered from European scorn, despite destroying the Russian Fleet in 1905 and conquering Manchuria and Korea after that. This meant little to the Americans and British who continued to see the Japanese and other Asians as less than human.
This racism led directly to their hubris when facing the "Asian hordes", as did their lack of understanding of the ruthlessness of their foes. Both MacArthur, and the various French leaders in Indochina (the revolving door of French military leadership at the time surely didn't help their cause) looked at their opponents through their own eyes. They failed to understand that the North Koreans, Vietnamese and Chinese were prepared to sustain much greater casualties than their Western counterparts could bear, and, although they may not have had the latest technology, they had a greater will.
No-one was more ruthless than Stalin. Unlike his Western "comrades" of World War Two, he had no racist limits to his thinking, so when Japanese troops encroached on his Mongolian border, he threw in his best troops, his best tanks, and Zhukov, his best general. In fact, when it came to the battle of Nomonhan, it was the Japanese who underestimated their Slavic opponents - not racially, but ideologically. Stalin smashed them, as he eventually smashed Hitler. Hitler's hubris came from his victory in France, and his racially inspired theories that led him to think that the Russians were less than human. Stalin was prepared to not only destroy his country to deny it to Hitler, but send millions of his countrymen and women to their deaths to stop him.
While Hitler was just as ruthless than Stalin, he didn't have as many men to sacrifice, and so lost.
As always, Horne writes smoothly and well - Tsushima is fading into history, and Nomonhan has always been obscure, so to re-read the narratives of those battles is pleasing. Horne provides good context for those battles and the others he discusses. He uses his narrative flair to take the reader right into the history of each battle, but his theoretical strength is less gripping; at times the hubris angle seems tacked on, or an afterthought to his racing narrative history.
So, what to make of this book? As narrative history it's gripping, as a theoretical work less so. I note that some of this book first appeared in the Military History Quarterly, and that makes sense to me, as I think the issue with this book is the lack of connexion throughout the book. It seems that Horne may have thought of these episodes separately and tacked them together. Perhaps I'm doing him a dis-service but, for me, this book was less than I hoped for given how it was marketed, but still was a good read.
Check out my other reviews at http://aviewoverthebell.blogspot.com.au/
To illustrate his point he chooses key battles from the first half of the Twentieth Century, Tsushima, Nomonhan, Moscow, Midway, MacArthur in Korea, and the battle of Dien Bien Phu. His contention is that in each case it was hubris that led to defeat, and that victory could lead to the development of hubris in the winners. This theory is fairly self-evident to any serious student of military history, and Horne does not add significantly to thinking in this area in my opinion.
Nevertheless, he does show the links between Japan's victory in 1905 and their over-confidence in Mongolia in 1939 and at Midway in 1942. America's crushing of Japan can be argued to have instilled a sense of inevitability to the United States and MacArthur's view that the Korean War would lead to a speedy victory; and the similar racist views of the French (as well as their internecine bickering and arrogance) led them to grievously underestimate the Viet Minh and General Giap.
Although Horne only touches on them, to me two other themes loom large in this book - racism, and ruthlessness. Much of the hubris shown by the Russians, Germans, Americans and French was engendered by their racist view of their opponents. European commanders - and political leaders for that matter - had a very dim view of their Asian brothers. What is fascinating to see is how these views remained unchanged, despite all the evidence to the contrary. Japan in particular suffered from European scorn, despite destroying the Russian Fleet in 1905 and conquering Manchuria and Korea after that. This meant little to the Americans and British who continued to see the Japanese and other Asians as less than human.
This racism led directly to their hubris when facing the "Asian hordes", as did their lack of understanding of the ruthlessness of their foes. Both MacArthur, and the various French leaders in Indochina (the revolving door of French military leadership at the time surely didn't help their cause) looked at their opponents through their own eyes. They failed to understand that the North Koreans, Vietnamese and Chinese were prepared to sustain much greater casualties than their Western counterparts could bear, and, although they may not have had the latest technology, they had a greater will.
No-one was more ruthless than Stalin. Unlike his Western "comrades" of World War Two, he had no racist limits to his thinking, so when Japanese troops encroached on his Mongolian border, he threw in his best troops, his best tanks, and Zhukov, his best general. In fact, when it came to the battle of Nomonhan, it was the Japanese who underestimated their Slavic opponents - not racially, but ideologically. Stalin smashed them, as he eventually smashed Hitler. Hitler's hubris came from his victory in France, and his racially inspired theories that led him to think that the Russians were less than human. Stalin was prepared to not only destroy his country to deny it to Hitler, but send millions of his countrymen and women to their deaths to stop him.
While Hitler was just as ruthless than Stalin, he didn't have as many men to sacrifice, and so lost.
As always, Horne writes smoothly and well - Tsushima is fading into history, and Nomonhan has always been obscure, so to re-read the narratives of those battles is pleasing. Horne provides good context for those battles and the others he discusses. He uses his narrative flair to take the reader right into the history of each battle, but his theoretical strength is less gripping; at times the hubris angle seems tacked on, or an afterthought to his racing narrative history.
So, what to make of this book? As narrative history it's gripping, as a theoretical work less so. I note that some of this book first appeared in the Military History Quarterly, and that makes sense to me, as I think the issue with this book is the lack of connexion throughout the book. It seems that Horne may have thought of these episodes separately and tacked them together. Perhaps I'm doing him a dis-service but, for me, this book was less than I hoped for given how it was marketed, but still was a good read.
Check out my other reviews at http://aviewoverthebell.blogspot.com.au/
July 4, 2025
Score rounded up, as, apparently, sir Alistair fell prey to a certain amount of hubris himself and decided to dash off one more book, because what could go wrong? ...and then some things did. Sometimes the turn of phrase is definitely less than stellar (as when Horne writes that Soviet POWs had to be "repatriated by force"), some factual errors have sneaked in, ranging from irritating (mistranslation of Fedor von Bock's nickname) to idiotic (claim that Desert Storm was strictly limited to liberation of Kuwait). The book itself is misproportioned, the Russo-Japanese war is presented in far greater detail than all the other conflicts described. All in all, I don't regret the time spent with this volume, but that's not exactly a major achievement, not really.
August 18, 2017
As pop history, this isn't bad: a variety-pak of (mostly) lesser-known great battles of the first half of the 20th century, tied together by common characters and a unifying concept: that hubris, especially in the immediate wake of victory, represents the hinge by which the pendulum of geopolitical fortune swings back to humble the powerful.
But as serious history, this book is a joke. Much of the writing is embarrassingly purple prose, citations are rare (sometimes even anonymous) and endnotes nonexistent, and the author regularly engages in unsubstantiatable speculations about individuals' motivations and historic "what-if" counterfactual scenarios to an extent unbecoming an accomplished historian like Horne.
In short, considered as an entry-level introductory survey of some of the lesser-known but pivotal battles of the 20th century, this book is useful and interesting enough. However, it should not be treated as anything more than that.
But as serious history, this book is a joke. Much of the writing is embarrassingly purple prose, citations are rare (sometimes even anonymous) and endnotes nonexistent, and the author regularly engages in unsubstantiatable speculations about individuals' motivations and historic "what-if" counterfactual scenarios to an extent unbecoming an accomplished historian like Horne.
In short, considered as an entry-level introductory survey of some of the lesser-known but pivotal battles of the 20th century, this book is useful and interesting enough. However, it should not be treated as anything more than that.
May 31, 2016
Noted historian Horne has written a well researched and documented account of 6 military engagements less well known to lay readers. He ties these battles together as representative of hubris, the extreme arrogance to which military and national leader succumb, leading to foolhardy and risky engagements with the enemy. The reader is provided a rare glimpse into the psychology of war on a strategic level, the results of failing to examine the lessons of history, and the self aggrandizement of leaders. Each contributes to poor decisions. The consequent defeats are career ending for the leaders, but worse, result in the deaths of countless men and women. Highly recommended for readers who like their history well researched, beautifully relayed, and relevant to current events.
February 13, 2021
Not really a thematic portrait of hubris, just a selection of lesser-known conflicts in the 20th centuries and a brief examination of them. The author discusses the Russo-Japan war, German invasion of Russia, Midway, the Korean War, and the siege of Dien Ben Phu. With the exception of the Russo-Japan war none of the conflicts have been particularly ignored by historians.
The book works as a primer on those conflicts and most especially their connections through some revisionist speculation by the author. I thought his insights were interesting but not particularly compelling.
Worth reading if you like the author's other works of military history but ultimately doesn't really add much to scholarship or understanding in my opinion.
The book works as a primer on those conflicts and most especially their connections through some revisionist speculation by the author. I thought his insights were interesting but not particularly compelling.
Worth reading if you like the author's other works of military history but ultimately doesn't really add much to scholarship or understanding in my opinion.
September 10, 2019
Very enjoyable web of tales from war history, woven together around the theme of hubris. I'd have to agree with a lot of the other reviewers that the hubris theme seems tenuous at times but it doesn't really take away from the stories anyway. The story of the Russian voyage around the world and battle of Tsushima was amazing. Each story is explored from multiple dimensions, including technological, personal/emotional, political, etc. I'm not exactly a war or history buff but would recommend this book to other readers like me.
December 30, 2019
Hubris is a disease
We all have experienced that feeling at one time or another: that feeling that our plans will always go perfectly and that no defeat will mar our future. It is a disastrous disease on an individual level and a catastrophic one when it involves nations and armies. Through a few examples taken from contemporary history (Tsushima, Nomonhan, Midway, Moscow, Dien Bien Phu and the Korean War), the author takes us on a cautionary tale about the evils of hubris and its consequences. Very well written and eye-opening.
We all have experienced that feeling at one time or another: that feeling that our plans will always go perfectly and that no defeat will mar our future. It is a disastrous disease on an individual level and a catastrophic one when it involves nations and armies. Through a few examples taken from contemporary history (Tsushima, Nomonhan, Midway, Moscow, Dien Bien Phu and the Korean War), the author takes us on a cautionary tale about the evils of hubris and its consequences. Very well written and eye-opening.
December 6, 2019
Very readable summary and analysis of the wars fought by Japan in the Twentieth Century, plus the 20th century battles for Moscow, Dien Bien Phu, and Seoul Korea. Those who lost these battles (Japan, Germany, France, and USA) lost them because of their "hubris" --their belief in invincibility. One wonders whether Horne's thesis is a tautology. Aren't all wars a result of hubris, at least on the part of one if not all the participants?
August 1, 2016
This was a well-written, interesting book on some of the significant but obscure wars of the 20th century.
January 20, 2025
Highlight(yellow) - CHAPTER 3 Into Manchuria > Page 57 · Location 1138
At Port Arthur, this first, most terrible battle of the twentieth century where so many thousands had died, the fighting did indeed seem like the ugliest harbinger of the horrors that would soon begin in Europe: at Verdun, on the Somme, in Galicia, on the Piave. But, taking place as it did in this far-off corner of the globe, only a few would see it, and even fewer would note its awful significance, its warnings of what heavy artillery, the Maxim machine gun, the bolt-action rifle, the land mine, barbed wire, and a determined defense could do to humanity.
Highlight(yellow) - CHAPTER 6 Peace > Page 120 · Location 2018
My own policy is perfectly simple, though I have not the slightest idea whether I can get my own country to follow it. I wish to see the United States treat the Japanese in a spirit of all possible courtesy and generosity and justice. . . . If we show that we regard the Japanese as an inferior and alien race, and try to treat them as we have treated the Chinese; and if at the same time we fail to keep our navy at the highest point of efficiency and size—then we shall invite disaster.
Highlight(yellow) - CHAPTER 8 Zhukov, Sorge, Tsuji > Page 152 · Location 2480
As Alvin D. Coox puts it in his impressive study, “No one expected the Russians to become heavily involved in the Nomonhan fighting. . . . It is undeniable that Japanese underestimation of the Red Army aggravated the shortage of hard facts.”
Highlight(yellow) - CHAPTER 10 General Summer > Page 197 · Location 3076
The following June brought Hitler’s stunning blitzkrieg in France: the most powerful army in the west destroyed in six weeks at a cost in German lives not much higher than Zhukov’s losses at that one small confrontation in Mongolia. Stalin was astounded and appalled, almost taking the French defeat as a personal affront. To Khrushchev he exclaimed, “How could they allow Hitler to defeat them, to crush them?” It upset all his calculations, which were predicated on a repeat of the costly and long, drawn-out trench war stalemate of 1914–18. Stalin had hoped the fighting would leave Germany so debilitated that it would be years before it could risk unleashing a war on the Soviet Union.
Highlight(yellow) - CHAPTER 11 General Winter > Page 233 · Location 3609
Moscow was now safe, and the Germans had been dealt their first major defeat of the Second World War. The myth of the invincible blitzkrieg had been shattered. It also provided a most important boost for Soviet morale. Hitler now had to prepare for a prolonged struggle. Operation Barbarossa had failed, stalled on the approaches to Moscow.
Highlight(yellow) - CHAPTER 12 The Kido Butai > Page 244 · Location 3714
As previously noted, even the highly respectable Smithsonian Institution in Washington, DC, came out with such unscientific remarks as “Japanese skulls are 2,000 years less developed than ours.” As Dower notes, “the end results of racial thinking on both sides were virtually identical—being hierarchy, arrogance, viciousness, atrocity and death.”
Highlight(yellow) - CHAPTER 14 The American Caesar > Page 306 · Location 4595
In Tokyo, the departure of the revered Caesar from his Dai-Ichi headquarters was received with dismay. Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida declared that MacArthur had been “looked upon by all our people with the profoundest veneration and affection. I have no words to convey the regret of our nation to see him leave.”
At Port Arthur, this first, most terrible battle of the twentieth century where so many thousands had died, the fighting did indeed seem like the ugliest harbinger of the horrors that would soon begin in Europe: at Verdun, on the Somme, in Galicia, on the Piave. But, taking place as it did in this far-off corner of the globe, only a few would see it, and even fewer would note its awful significance, its warnings of what heavy artillery, the Maxim machine gun, the bolt-action rifle, the land mine, barbed wire, and a determined defense could do to humanity.
Highlight(yellow) - CHAPTER 6 Peace > Page 120 · Location 2018
My own policy is perfectly simple, though I have not the slightest idea whether I can get my own country to follow it. I wish to see the United States treat the Japanese in a spirit of all possible courtesy and generosity and justice. . . . If we show that we regard the Japanese as an inferior and alien race, and try to treat them as we have treated the Chinese; and if at the same time we fail to keep our navy at the highest point of efficiency and size—then we shall invite disaster.
Highlight(yellow) - CHAPTER 8 Zhukov, Sorge, Tsuji > Page 152 · Location 2480
As Alvin D. Coox puts it in his impressive study, “No one expected the Russians to become heavily involved in the Nomonhan fighting. . . . It is undeniable that Japanese underestimation of the Red Army aggravated the shortage of hard facts.”
Highlight(yellow) - CHAPTER 10 General Summer > Page 197 · Location 3076
The following June brought Hitler’s stunning blitzkrieg in France: the most powerful army in the west destroyed in six weeks at a cost in German lives not much higher than Zhukov’s losses at that one small confrontation in Mongolia. Stalin was astounded and appalled, almost taking the French defeat as a personal affront. To Khrushchev he exclaimed, “How could they allow Hitler to defeat them, to crush them?” It upset all his calculations, which were predicated on a repeat of the costly and long, drawn-out trench war stalemate of 1914–18. Stalin had hoped the fighting would leave Germany so debilitated that it would be years before it could risk unleashing a war on the Soviet Union.
Highlight(yellow) - CHAPTER 11 General Winter > Page 233 · Location 3609
Moscow was now safe, and the Germans had been dealt their first major defeat of the Second World War. The myth of the invincible blitzkrieg had been shattered. It also provided a most important boost for Soviet morale. Hitler now had to prepare for a prolonged struggle. Operation Barbarossa had failed, stalled on the approaches to Moscow.
Highlight(yellow) - CHAPTER 12 The Kido Butai > Page 244 · Location 3714
As previously noted, even the highly respectable Smithsonian Institution in Washington, DC, came out with such unscientific remarks as “Japanese skulls are 2,000 years less developed than ours.” As Dower notes, “the end results of racial thinking on both sides were virtually identical—being hierarchy, arrogance, viciousness, atrocity and death.”
Highlight(yellow) - CHAPTER 14 The American Caesar > Page 306 · Location 4595
In Tokyo, the departure of the revered Caesar from his Dai-Ichi headquarters was received with dismay. Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida declared that MacArthur had been “looked upon by all our people with the profoundest veneration and affection. I have no words to convey the regret of our nation to see him leave.”
December 10, 2018
An odd case where the book really needed to be a lot longer to justify its central thesis.
The central thesis of teh book is that Hubris has been the central factor behind 20th Century warfare starting from Japan & Russia at the turn of the century all the way through to WW2 and up to Dien Bien Phu.
While its very well written and makes a strong case for this in the early Chapters of Japan vs. Russia, it loses steam after that. This is as your almost halfway through the book when you realize that only one central thread has been addressed (Japan through WW1 & 2). That leaves WW2 Germany vs. Russia, Korea and Vietnam to be resolved in the balance - all of which are meaty topics. WW2 Germany then takes up almost half of the balance meaning the closer we get to the post WW2 period the less time there is. I found the chapters on Korea and Vietnam (And literally they are only Chapters) to be therefore inadequate.
This is a shame as I think there is an interesting story there that really would make the case with the Hubris disease shifting onto the US across the Korea and Vietnam conflicts (Let alone if one was to drive a through-line to Afghanistan and Iraq).
Still I can't say I didn't enjoy it (Which I did immensely) and if my only complaint is that I wish there was more of this then that a good complaint to have.
The central thesis of teh book is that Hubris has been the central factor behind 20th Century warfare starting from Japan & Russia at the turn of the century all the way through to WW2 and up to Dien Bien Phu.
While its very well written and makes a strong case for this in the early Chapters of Japan vs. Russia, it loses steam after that. This is as your almost halfway through the book when you realize that only one central thread has been addressed (Japan through WW1 & 2). That leaves WW2 Germany vs. Russia, Korea and Vietnam to be resolved in the balance - all of which are meaty topics. WW2 Germany then takes up almost half of the balance meaning the closer we get to the post WW2 period the less time there is. I found the chapters on Korea and Vietnam (And literally they are only Chapters) to be therefore inadequate.
This is a shame as I think there is an interesting story there that really would make the case with the Hubris disease shifting onto the US across the Korea and Vietnam conflicts (Let alone if one was to drive a through-line to Afghanistan and Iraq).
Still I can't say I didn't enjoy it (Which I did immensely) and if my only complaint is that I wish there was more of this then that a good complaint to have.
September 18, 2017
The best part of this book was that it covered pieces of 20th Century military history that I knew almost nothing about. While I consider myself an aficionado of military history, my knowledge is mostly limited to WWI and WWII in Europe. So Moscow in 1941 was the only chapter I really knew about. It was quite enlightening to see how the Russian victory at Nomomhan over the Japanese in 1939 prepared them to take on Hitler before Moscow. And enlightening to see how undeclared Japanese aggression in 1905 cleared the way for Pearl Harbor 36 years later.
The notion of Hubris is an interesting one to bring to bear in Horne's examination of the echoes of military history. Nevertheless it felt as though it was selectively used. There are defeats that can certainly be attributed to hubris, but it sometimes felt the concept was being stretched to make the point. Surely there are equally important defeats in which it plays no part--e.g., the German defeat in France in 1944, the English defeats in North Africa in 1941. So I thought the title was a bit of oversell. But I liked the selection of topics in the book, and I like Horne as a military historian, who passed away this spring at the age of 91.
The notion of Hubris is an interesting one to bring to bear in Horne's examination of the echoes of military history. Nevertheless it felt as though it was selectively used. There are defeats that can certainly be attributed to hubris, but it sometimes felt the concept was being stretched to make the point. Surely there are equally important defeats in which it plays no part--e.g., the German defeat in France in 1944, the English defeats in North Africa in 1941. So I thought the title was a bit of oversell. But I liked the selection of topics in the book, and I like Horne as a military historian, who passed away this spring at the age of 91.
March 21, 2022
A reasonable reframing of well-known clashes. The author is clearly keen on the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, which is perhaps the one conflict dealt with here, that doesn't get that much attention. He clearly did his reading too, and his style of concise, to the point and lively. The problem is not really the stark view he presents on Togo, Yamamoto, Zhukov, Hitler, or the French generals of the Indochina War. Rather, it is that they could have used a lot more character. There's much more to each figure, then what comes across, and that would have been important to adequately frame the basic theme of hybris that the book is built around.
We also don't get to learn that much about the institutional/societal/incidental-personal causes and mechanisms of that basic concept, aside from a few cursory comments on the frantic pace of Japanese modernization during the Meiji-era, or the utter atmosphere of fear in the Soviet Union.
The battles themselves are well summarized, but there is nothing here that one cannot find in any specialized book or sometimes even in a general treatment.
In all, the book is not bad, but is not outstanding in any way either.
We also don't get to learn that much about the institutional/societal/incidental-personal causes and mechanisms of that basic concept, aside from a few cursory comments on the frantic pace of Japanese modernization during the Meiji-era, or the utter atmosphere of fear in the Soviet Union.
The battles themselves are well summarized, but there is nothing here that one cannot find in any specialized book or sometimes even in a general treatment.
In all, the book is not bad, but is not outstanding in any way either.
May 1, 2022
Eminent historian Alistair Horne studies what he considers the 6 most pivotal battles of the 20th century with an eye toward how hubris and arrogance impacted the outcome. In this work he uses leadership, contextual history, preparation, and protagonist goals as the lenses and focus of what ultimately led to their battle hubris. These battles that ultimately led to downfall include the likes of the Battle of Tsushima and Russo-Japanese Wars, as well as the Japanese and Nazi’s (ala Hitler’s) attitudes and contributory factors, as well as Douglas MacArthur’s hubris in Korea. Through detailed analysis driven by dramatic narrative, Horne takes us into the minds of the decision makers, relating how their calculations led them down a path where they either won or lost. The insights Horne brings to the table should make military leaders pause briefly, about their own capabilities, but to political leaders, too, the lesson should be that using diplomacy is still the best first instrument of power to come out of the quiver. An excellent read!
January 13, 2021
So true:
During the Russo-Japanese naval encounter... “In both incidents the element of surprise was achieved in that war had not been declared and diplomatic negotiations were still under way. As Commander Fuchida, the dashing leader of the attacking squadrons at Pearl Harbor, exclaimed in amazement: “Have these Americans never heard of Port Arthur?” But, to the dismay of us historians, our leaders tend not to read history, or, worse, they pay no attention to its lessons. Yet it does seem extraordinary that, in 1941 with tensions rising between the United States and Japan, Franklin Delano Roosevelt did not seem aware of the dangerous precedents; after all, he himself had been assistant secretary of the navy in the First World War, only a decade after the attack on Port Arthur, and was well read in history.”
Excerpt From: Alistair Horne. “Hubris.” Apple Books.
During the Russo-Japanese naval encounter... “In both incidents the element of surprise was achieved in that war had not been declared and diplomatic negotiations were still under way. As Commander Fuchida, the dashing leader of the attacking squadrons at Pearl Harbor, exclaimed in amazement: “Have these Americans never heard of Port Arthur?” But, to the dismay of us historians, our leaders tend not to read history, or, worse, they pay no attention to its lessons. Yet it does seem extraordinary that, in 1941 with tensions rising between the United States and Japan, Franklin Delano Roosevelt did not seem aware of the dangerous precedents; after all, he himself had been assistant secretary of the navy in the First World War, only a decade after the attack on Port Arthur, and was well read in history.”
Excerpt From: Alistair Horne. “Hubris.” Apple Books.
July 7, 2017
Alistair Horne makes the compelling case that all humans are susceptible to hubris and are most infected by it after achieving unparalleled success; however, his most important lesson is humans never seem to learn from the hubris that has lead others to disaster. A strong sense of destiny and an air of superiority go along with this fatal flaw. Horne provides multiple examples of individuals and nations which believe their recent success makes them unique in history and proves they will proceed to continuous success no matter the odds.
Key takeaways in simple terms:
1. We never learn from the mistakes of others.
2. A strong belief in destiny and innate superiority lead successful individuals to underestimate the difficulties they face.
Key takeaways in simple terms:
1. We never learn from the mistakes of others.
2. A strong belief in destiny and innate superiority lead successful individuals to underestimate the difficulties they face.
May 22, 2018
A re-organization of historical facts to support the author's notion that wars are not won, but rather, they are lost by the Hubris of the losers. There are some disputable ideas put forth by Mr. Alister Horne, notably that the Korean War was started at the instigation of Stalin. There is in fact much evidence that Stalin warned the leader of North Korea that he "should not come looking for Soviet troop support when he (Kim Il-sung) would get his teeth kicked in". In the end, it was the Chinese army that crossed the Yalu River bordering North Korea like a human tsunami.
In the words of another target of Mr. Horne's ire, President Truman, "there is nothing new under the sun except the history you have not learned". There is precious little in this book that we have not seen before.
In the words of another target of Mr. Horne's ire, President Truman, "there is nothing new under the sun except the history you have not learned". There is precious little in this book that we have not seen before.
June 11, 2018
Another wonderful title by my favorite historical writer. While sometimes I feel Sir Horne loses sight of the theme of his book, that of man's hubris and rash decisions based thereon, it still ends up being another informative, poetic, and fascinating read. Covering the Sino-Japanese War, the Russian-Japanese War, World War I, World War II, French Indochina, the Korean War, and even Vietnam, Sir Horne talks about underestimation of one's opponent, and the dehumanizing attitude of major powers to their perceived lessors, based on race, technology, and old grudges, and how that attitude contributed to great losses of life in those conflicts. Great read for any interested in 20th Century history. I learned a great deal about Japan and its conflicts that I knew nothing about previously.
January 31, 2018
Horne traces the trait hubris, excessive human pride that leads to tragedy, in six battles during the 20th century. Battles that changed world history and effected millions. Starting with the Battle of Tsushima in the Russo-Japanese War and covering up to France's Vietnam disgrace, Horne shows how each battle was won or lost due to excessive hubris on the part of it's participants.
Why I started this book: On the new Professional Reading List for the army and I hadn't even heard of several of these battles.
Why I finished it: Long flight home, gave me plenty of time to listen... plus it was very interesting.
Why I started this book: On the new Professional Reading List for the army and I hadn't even heard of several of these battles.
Why I finished it: Long flight home, gave me plenty of time to listen... plus it was very interesting.
August 25, 2020
Purchase Hubris here for just $8!
Noted historian Sir Alistair Horne takes six decisive battles in the first half of the 20th century and demonstrates how ambition and arrogance led to the deaths of countless men and women. Reveals valuable lessons in the strategic psychology of war and the tragic consequences of excessive human pride.
Herman - The Book Grocer
Noted historian Sir Alistair Horne takes six decisive battles in the first half of the 20th century and demonstrates how ambition and arrogance led to the deaths of countless men and women. Reveals valuable lessons in the strategic psychology of war and the tragic consequences of excessive human pride.
Herman - The Book Grocer
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