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Foundations for Metasemantics
Metasemantics studies the foundations of meaning, asking what makes it the case that certain words have the meanings that they do. But what makes metasemantic theories true? This question has been all but ignored in philosophy of language. In this book, Cohnitz and Haukioja address this issue and argue that just as in metasemantics, both internalist and externalist answers are available for this foundational question.
The authors introduce and defend meta-internalism, arguing that the foundations of reference and meaning are anchored in the individual dispositions and psychological states of language users, offering an alternative to meta-externalist views that would appeal to broader community-based or otherwise external factors. Meta-internalism is, moreover, compatible with semantic externalism as usually understood, and provides an explanation of why externalism is true. Through a critical examination of prominent theories and thought experiments, the book explores fundamental issues like reference failure, conceptual engineering, and the metaphysical implications of reference, as well as the methodology of theories of reference.
With its focus on the foundations of metasemantics, the book provides a fresh and empirically informed perspective on one of the core questions in the philosophy of language. Foundations for Metasemantics is essential reading for philosophers, scholars, and students seeking to understand the underlying principles that support our theories of meaning and reference.
The authors introduce and defend meta-internalism, arguing that the foundations of reference and meaning are anchored in the individual dispositions and psychological states of language users, offering an alternative to meta-externalist views that would appeal to broader community-based or otherwise external factors. Meta-internalism is, moreover, compatible with semantic externalism as usually understood, and provides an explanation of why externalism is true. Through a critical examination of prominent theories and thought experiments, the book explores fundamental issues like reference failure, conceptual engineering, and the metaphysical implications of reference, as well as the methodology of theories of reference.
With its focus on the foundations of metasemantics, the book provides a fresh and empirically informed perspective on one of the core questions in the philosophy of language. Foundations for Metasemantics is essential reading for philosophers, scholars, and students seeking to understand the underlying principles that support our theories of meaning and reference.
200 pages, Kindle Edition
Published July 2, 2025
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Displaying 1 - 1 of 1 review
April 28, 2026
4.5 stars. Overall a great book, though there are some minor caveats.
Cohnitz and Haukioja provide us with a clear and overall well-argued treatment of meta-metasemantics - a topic which has not really been discussed explicitly in the previous literature (at least to my knowledge). Nevertheless, I am somewhat doubtful whether it really deserves full five stars: While the book is quite illuminating in the way it makes sense of the foundations of metasemantics, the view defended in the book (meta-internalism) is not particularly extraordinary or controversial, and that makes it easier to defend. The way they describe their version of meta-internalism is intuitively quite plausible, but maybe that also means it's a little less exciting than if they had advocated for a highly unorthodox view. A related point is that, even though Cohnitz and Haukioja are arguably the first to discuss meta-metasemantics in such a thorough manner, most of their points have clear precursors in the previous literature. It's like Cohnitz and Haukioja provide us with a missing puzzle piece that finally lets us see the entire picture more clearly, rather than providing us with an entirely new picture. The second issue is that they didn't really go into much detail on how their view (first-order externalism paired with meta-internalism) addresses arguments that have been given in favor of first-order internalism (e.g., by D. Chalmers and by G. Segal). But of course, those are only minor quibbles.
Given its mere 6 citations on google scholar as of late April 2026, Foundations for Metasemantics should definitely be read more widely than it currently is. And I say that as someone who disagrees with the overall view presented in the book (as I have (first-order) internalist leanings myself).
Cohnitz and Haukioja provide us with a clear and overall well-argued treatment of meta-metasemantics - a topic which has not really been discussed explicitly in the previous literature (at least to my knowledge). Nevertheless, I am somewhat doubtful whether it really deserves full five stars: While the book is quite illuminating in the way it makes sense of the foundations of metasemantics, the view defended in the book (meta-internalism) is not particularly extraordinary or controversial, and that makes it easier to defend. The way they describe their version of meta-internalism is intuitively quite plausible, but maybe that also means it's a little less exciting than if they had advocated for a highly unorthodox view. A related point is that, even though Cohnitz and Haukioja are arguably the first to discuss meta-metasemantics in such a thorough manner, most of their points have clear precursors in the previous literature. It's like Cohnitz and Haukioja provide us with a missing puzzle piece that finally lets us see the entire picture more clearly, rather than providing us with an entirely new picture. The second issue is that they didn't really go into much detail on how their view (first-order externalism paired with meta-internalism) addresses arguments that have been given in favor of first-order internalism (e.g., by D. Chalmers and by G. Segal). But of course, those are only minor quibbles.
Given its mere 6 citations on google scholar as of late April 2026, Foundations for Metasemantics should definitely be read more widely than it currently is. And I say that as someone who disagrees with the overall view presented in the book (as I have (first-order) internalist leanings myself).
Displaying 1 - 1 of 1 review