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Tradecraft, Tactics, and Dirty Tricks: Russian Intelligence and Putin's Secret War
Step into the covert world of Russian espionage with this revealing insider’s account of how the Russian Intelligence Services (RIS) operate across the globe. Drawing on years of CIA field experience, Sean M. Wiswesser exposes the tactics, tradecraft, and mindset of the RIS—making this a must-read for anyone fascinated by spies, sabotage, and the high-stakes intelligence war between Russia and the West.
Unmask the shadowy world of Russian espionage with this riveting exploration of the Russian Intelligence Services (RIS) and their global clandestine operations. With decades of experience as a CIA operations officer, author Sean M. Wiswesser takes readers deep into the heart of Maskirovka—the Russian art of denial, deception, and manipulation. Using historical examples and firsthand accounts, this book reveals the tactics employed by the three main services of Russia’s intelligence apparatus: the SVR, GRU, and FSB. Learn about the RIS’ use of double agents, surveillance, and “street work,” honeytraps, sabotage, active measures, assassinations, the RIS roles in the Russo-Ukraine War, and much more.
Wiswesser’s unparalleled expertise comes from years of sitting across from Russian intelligence officers, operating overseas, and using their own methods against them. As a member of the CIA’s expert cadre in the Directorate of Operations, he worked closely with the U.S. intelligence community and foreign allies, gaining a unique perspective on the RIS’ global reach. Now, he shares that knowledge in a candid, plain-speaking style designed to inform and galvanize readers from all walks of life.
This book is more than an exposé—it’s a toolkit for understanding and countering the RIS’ manipulative tactics. Wiswesser breaks down ten key elements of their tradecraft, offering invaluable insights to intelligence professionals, academics, business leaders, NGO workers, and private citizens alike. With a deep grounding in Russian language, culture, and intelligence traditions, he provides readers with the context they need to grasp the RIS’ methods and motivations.
Written for the general reader, this compelling account combines expert analysis with real-world stories, making it both accessible and deeply informative. Whether you’re a practitioner in the field or simply curious about the world of espionage, the author’s narrative will open your eyes to the global threat posed by Russian intelligence and equip you with the knowledge to recognize and resist their tactics. Prepare to be captivated, informed, and empowered.
Unmask the shadowy world of Russian espionage with this riveting exploration of the Russian Intelligence Services (RIS) and their global clandestine operations. With decades of experience as a CIA operations officer, author Sean M. Wiswesser takes readers deep into the heart of Maskirovka—the Russian art of denial, deception, and manipulation. Using historical examples and firsthand accounts, this book reveals the tactics employed by the three main services of Russia’s intelligence apparatus: the SVR, GRU, and FSB. Learn about the RIS’ use of double agents, surveillance, and “street work,” honeytraps, sabotage, active measures, assassinations, the RIS roles in the Russo-Ukraine War, and much more.
Wiswesser’s unparalleled expertise comes from years of sitting across from Russian intelligence officers, operating overseas, and using their own methods against them. As a member of the CIA’s expert cadre in the Directorate of Operations, he worked closely with the U.S. intelligence community and foreign allies, gaining a unique perspective on the RIS’ global reach. Now, he shares that knowledge in a candid, plain-speaking style designed to inform and galvanize readers from all walks of life.
This book is more than an exposé—it’s a toolkit for understanding and countering the RIS’ manipulative tactics. Wiswesser breaks down ten key elements of their tradecraft, offering invaluable insights to intelligence professionals, academics, business leaders, NGO workers, and private citizens alike. With a deep grounding in Russian language, culture, and intelligence traditions, he provides readers with the context they need to grasp the RIS’ methods and motivations.
Written for the general reader, this compelling account combines expert analysis with real-world stories, making it both accessible and deeply informative. Whether you’re a practitioner in the field or simply curious about the world of espionage, the author’s narrative will open your eyes to the global threat posed by Russian intelligence and equip you with the knowledge to recognize and resist their tactics. Prepare to be captivated, informed, and empowered.
288 pages, Hardcover
First published April 21, 2026
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Displaying 1 - 11 of 11 reviews
May 22, 2026
(The English review is placed beneath the Russian one)
Эта книга будет чуть лучше «Russia's Hybrid Warfare Offensive Against the West», однако, по сути, это всё та же мешанина из любопытных фактов, новостных историй по типу убийства Литвиненко и покушения на Скрепалей. Другими словами, эта книга не предлагает главного – глубокого исследования работы российских спецслужб. Более точно: книга просто суммирует всю ту информацию, что есть в открытом доступе, не предлагая при этом никакого собственного анализа. Это означает, что если читатель уже знаком с базовой или основной информацией о российских спецслужбах, он или она не найдут в этой книге ничего нового и интересного для себя. Я даже выскажу мысль, что читать книги об отдельных кейсах, как например книга «A Very Expensive Poison: The Assassination of Alexander Litvinenko and Putin's War with the West», в которой детально описывается, как российские спецслужбы убивали Литвиненко, намного интересней, чем читать такую вот книгу, которая является, как я отметил выше, сборником разной информации.
Да, в книге проскальзывают интересные моменты, но все они очень поверхностные и по сути самоочевидные или взяты из книг, написанных в эпоху существования Советского Союза, как например нижеследующее умозаключение автора.
The FSB employs various scenarios to position their agents or cooptees— reporting sources either paid or coerced—with proximity to foreigners. The initial approach often appears innocuous, such as a contact made at a conference or business meeting. However, certain recurring patterns emerge in FSB operations. A common tactic involves exploiting fear of extortion by the “Russian mafia” to manipulate foreign businesspeople into working for or reporting to the FSB. This may also involve the use of “swallows”—prostitutes hired by the service to entrap foreigners.
Another frequent approach takes place within Russian universities and research institutes. Every department interacting with foreigners in these institutions typically includes FSB agents who report back to the DKRO, the main counterintelligence arm of the FSB, or other UFSB regional handlers. Their primary task is to assess international students, identifying those who might be recruitable and to determine whether they are future government employees, current officials, or suspected intelligence officers.
<…>
All Russian scientific institutes as well as government institutions, whatever the size, will have at least one security officer, called an “OB” or offitser bezopasnosti in Russian. The OB is in charge of monitoring foreign contacts and reporting such instances to the FSB
Одна из глав посвящена очень узкой теме – коммуникации между шпионами. Автор детально разбирает, как осуществляется такая коммуникация между агентами ГРУ/СВР. Как мне кажется, эта информация слишком специфическая и мне, как обычному читателю, было всё это не интересно читать.
3. Dead Drop Loaded: If it is a Residency-to-Agent exchange, the SVR or GRU officer conducts their MP to ensure they are free of surveillance. The Russian intelligence officer then “loads” the Residency’s package of materials (money, instructions, technical gear, etc.) at the dead drop (tainik) site. RIS officers are trained to use trash bags or other insulators to double-wrap their packages of money or materials.
Проблема неконкретности текста, т.е. поверхности сказанного особо заметно и поэтому мне постоянно хотелось, чтобы автор был в том или ином вопросе более конкретен и не ограничивался лишь общими рассуждениями из серии «шпионы занимаются шпионажем», ведь это и так понятно даже не специалисту и для этого вовсе не нужно читать специализированные книги, такие как эта, к примеру.
In today’s SVR, Directorate NTR (formerly Directorate T) is responsible for collecting scientific and technological intelligence and targeting government and private/commercial science institutes and centers of learning abroad. Line X officers are the embassy-based representatives of SVR Directorate NTR, and they are responsible for collecting science and technology intelligence abroad.
<…>
The GRU Military-Technical Commission and other GRU officers deploy undercover abroad to assist. They are placed in organizations like Rostech and Rosoboronexport. Both are Russian arms exporters that operate globally, but they are also always on the watch to acquire, steal, or purchase foreign military technology.
В книге есть интересный момент, когда автор высказывает собственное мнение о том, почему путинская Россия демонстративно убивает своих оппонентов. В принципе, эта идея довольно здравая, частично пересекающаяся с моей идеей о причинах вторжения Путина в Украину в феврале 2022 года.
Many former intelligence veterans and other commentators have pointed out that it is certainly plausible that Putin does want all the world to know it was his decision and his guys that carried out these attempts against Litvinenko successfully, against Skripal and Navalny unsuccessfully, and finally against Navalny in prison to put an end to unfinished business and kill him.
<…>
The question is, why not do a better job of hiding the RIS hand or trying to conceal it at all?
<…>
As Ben Macintyre points out, Putin can’t afford to be seen as anything but brutal.
<…>
But the idea remains the same: a theatrical, symbolic act of state-sponsored homicide to send a warning to other would-be opponents, cow the Russian populace, and stun the world with its brazen brutality, all suffused with just enough mystery for a shrugging Kremlin denial.”
Тем не менее, ближе к концу, книга меня неприятно поразила своей стереотипностью, клише. Такое чувство, что автор знаком с русскими исключительно по анекдотам.
One of my strangest recollections of this was sitting down to eat with a RIO during a clandestine meeting, and I could tell he was agitated. This was early in my operational experience with Russians (I don’t want to specify the timeframe or location to protect him), so I was puzzled what made him so nervous. I offered him more food. He wasn’t satisfied. I asked him if the temperature was OK in the room, but he was still not happy. Finally, I offered him the minibar to see if he wanted some vodka. That hit the spot, as he quickly answered me, “Well, as the saying goes, we can’t have soup without vodka, can we?”
<…>
This is a critical point in dealing with Russians, and RIOs in particular: drinking alcohol (usually vodka, but not exclusively) is a part of their culture, and for IOs, it is embedded into their very fiber.
Такое чувство, что если русский не пьёт водку на завтрак, на обед и на ужин, значит это не настоящий русский, так же как если у американца нет ковбойских ботинок, и он/она не умеет ездить на лошади и стрелять из кольта «от бедра», значит он ненастоящий американец. Понятно. Вот как после таких заявлений можно всерьёз относиться к этой книге и к этому автору?
While current and longtime minister Sergey Lavrov appears to be trusted by Putin to some degree, as witnessed by his sheer longevity in office, there has been reporting to suggest he is not trusted completely by the president. According to some reporting on the Ukrainian invasion in February 2022, Lavrov did not know of the attack until possibly the final days or even hours before the attack.
Ещё одно очень странное заявление. Почему автор настолько уверен, что Лавров ничего не знал о готовящемся вторжении? Мне вот кажется, что он всё знал, ибо очень давно работает с Путиным и является крайне лояльным к нему человеком.
В общем, странная получилась книга, неоднозначная и очень поверхностная. Как такового анализа в книге нет.
This book is slightly better than "Russia's Hybrid Warfare Offensive Against the West", but, in essence, it is still the same hodgepodge of curious facts and news stories, such as the Litvinenko murder and the Skripal poisoning. In other words, this book fails to deliver the main thing—an in-depth investigation into the workings of Russian intelligence agencies. More accurately: the book simply compiles all the information available in the public domain, without offering any analysis of its own. This means that if the reader is already familiar with the basic or fundamental information about Russian intelligence agencies, he or she will find nothing new or interesting in this book. I would even go so far as to suggest that reading books about specific cases—such as *A Very Expensive Poison: The Assassination of Alexander Litvinenko and Putin’s War with the West,” which describes in detail how the Russian intelligence services killed Litvinenko, is far more interesting than reading a book like this one, which, as I noted above, is a collection of various pieces of information.
Yes, there are some interesting points in the book, but they are all very superficial and, in essence, self-evident or taken from books written during the Soviet era, such as the following conclusion by the author.
The FSB employs various scenarios to position their agents or cooptees— reporting sources either paid or coerced—with proximity to foreigners. The initial approach often appears innocuous, such as a contact made at a conference or business meeting. However, certain recurring patterns emerge in FSB operations. A common tactic involves exploiting fear of extortion by the “Russian mafia” to manipulate foreign businesspeople into working for or reporting to the FSB. This may also involve the use of “swallows”—prostitutes hired by the service to entrap foreigners.
Another frequent approach takes place within Russian universities and research institutes. Every department interacting with foreigners in these institutions typically includes FSB agents who report back to the DKRO, the main counterintelligence arm of the FSB, or other UFSB regional handlers. Their primary task is to assess international students, identifying those who might be recruitable and to determine whether they are future government employees, current officials, or suspected intelligence officers.
<…>
All Russian scientific institutes as well as government institutions, whatever the size, will have at least one security officer, called an “OB” or offitser bezopasnosti in Russian. The OB is in charge of monitoring foreign contacts and reporting such instances to the FSB
One of the chapters is devoted to a very narrow topic—communication between spies. The author examines in detail how such communication takes place between GRU/SVR agents. In my opinion, this information is too specialized, and as an ordinary reader, I found it all rather uninteresting to read.
3. Dead Drop Loaded: If it is a Residency-to-Agent exchange, the SVR or GRU officer conducts their MP to ensure they are free of surveillance. The Russian intelligence officer then “loads” the Residency’s package of materials (money, instructions, technical gear, etc.) at the dead drop (tainik) site. RIS officers are trained to use trash bags or other insulators to double-wrap their packages of money or materials.
The problem with the text’s vagueness—that is, its superficiality—is particularly noticeable, and so I constantly found myself wishing the author would be more specific on various issues and not limit himself to generalizations along the lines of “spies engage in espionage,” since that is obvious even to a non-specialist and doesn’t require reading specialized books like this one, for example.
In today’s SVR, Directorate NTR (formerly Directorate T) is responsible for collecting scientific and technological intelligence and targeting government and private/commercial science institutes and centers of learning abroad. Line X officers are the embassy-based representatives of SVR Directorate NTR, and they are responsible for collecting science and technology intelligence abroad.
<…>
The GRU Military-Technical Commission and other GRU officers deploy undercover abroad to assist. They are placed in organizations like Rostech and Rosoboronexport. Both are Russian arms exporters that operate globally, but they are also always on the watch to acquire, steal, or purchase foreign military technology.
There is an interesting point in the book where the author shares his own view on why Putin’s Russia so blatantly kills its opponents. In principle, this idea is quite sound and partly overlaps with my own view on the reasons behind Putin’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
Many former intelligence veterans and other commentators have pointed out that it is certainly plausible that Putin does want all the world to know it was his decision and his guys that carried out these attempts against Litvinenko successfully, against Skripal and Navalny unsuccessfully, and finally against Navalny in prison to put an end to unfinished business and kill him.
<…>
The question is, why not do a better job of hiding the RIS hand or trying to conceal it at all?
<…>
As Ben Macintyre points out, Putin can’t afford to be seen as anything but brutal.
<…>
But the idea remains the same: a theatrical, symbolic act of state-sponsored homicide to send a warning to other would-be opponents, cow the Russian populace, and stun the world with its brazen brutality, all suffused with just enough mystery for a shrugging Kremlin denial.”
However, toward the end, the book struck me as unpleasantly full of stereotypes and clichés. It feels as though the author knows Russians only through jokes.
One of my strangest recollections of this was sitting down to eat with a RIO during a clandestine meeting, and I could tell he was agitated. This was early in my operational experience with Russians (I don’t want to specify the timeframe or location to protect him), so I was puzzled what made him so nervous. I offered him more food. He wasn’t satisfied. I asked him if the temperature was OK in the room, but he was still not happy. Finally, I offered him the minibar to see if he wanted some vodka. That hit the spot, as he quickly answered me, “Well, as the saying goes, we can’t have soup without vodka, can we?”
<…>
This is a critical point in dealing with Russians, and RIOs in particular: drinking alcohol (usually vodka, but not exclusively) is a part of their culture, and for IOs, it is embedded into their very fiber.
It feels like if a Russian doesn’t drink vodka for breakfast, lunch, and dinner, then he or she isn’t a real Russian—just as if an American doesn’t own cowboy boots, can’t ride a horse, and can’t draw a Colt “from the hip,” then he or she isn’t a real American. I see. How can anyone take this book and this author seriously after statements like that?
While current and longtime minister Sergey Lavrov appears to be trusted by Putin to some degree, as witnessed by his sheer longevity in office, there has been reporting to suggest he is not trusted completely by the president. According to some reporting on the Ukrainian invasion in February 2022, Lavrov did not know of the attack until possibly the final days or even hours before the attack.
Another very strange claim. Why is the author so certain that Lavrov knew nothing about the impending invasion? It seems to me that he knew everything, since he has been working with Putin for a very long time and is extremely loyal to him.
All in all, it’s a strange book—ambiguous and very superficial. There is no real analysis in the book.
Эта книга будет чуть лучше «Russia's Hybrid Warfare Offensive Against the West», однако, по сути, это всё та же мешанина из любопытных фактов, новостных историй по типу убийства Литвиненко и покушения на Скрепалей. Другими словами, эта книга не предлагает главного – глубокого исследования работы российских спецслужб. Более точно: книга просто суммирует всю ту информацию, что есть в открытом доступе, не предлагая при этом никакого собственного анализа. Это означает, что если читатель уже знаком с базовой или основной информацией о российских спецслужбах, он или она не найдут в этой книге ничего нового и интересного для себя. Я даже выскажу мысль, что читать книги об отдельных кейсах, как например книга «A Very Expensive Poison: The Assassination of Alexander Litvinenko and Putin's War with the West», в которой детально описывается, как российские спецслужбы убивали Литвиненко, намного интересней, чем читать такую вот книгу, которая является, как я отметил выше, сборником разной информации.
Да, в книге проскальзывают интересные моменты, но все они очень поверхностные и по сути самоочевидные или взяты из книг, написанных в эпоху существования Советского Союза, как например нижеследующее умозаключение автора.
The FSB employs various scenarios to position their agents or cooptees— reporting sources either paid or coerced—with proximity to foreigners. The initial approach often appears innocuous, such as a contact made at a conference or business meeting. However, certain recurring patterns emerge in FSB operations. A common tactic involves exploiting fear of extortion by the “Russian mafia” to manipulate foreign businesspeople into working for or reporting to the FSB. This may also involve the use of “swallows”—prostitutes hired by the service to entrap foreigners.
Another frequent approach takes place within Russian universities and research institutes. Every department interacting with foreigners in these institutions typically includes FSB agents who report back to the DKRO, the main counterintelligence arm of the FSB, or other UFSB regional handlers. Their primary task is to assess international students, identifying those who might be recruitable and to determine whether they are future government employees, current officials, or suspected intelligence officers.
<…>
All Russian scientific institutes as well as government institutions, whatever the size, will have at least one security officer, called an “OB” or offitser bezopasnosti in Russian. The OB is in charge of monitoring foreign contacts and reporting such instances to the FSB
Одна из глав посвящена очень узкой теме – коммуникации между шпионами. Автор детально разбирает, как осуществляется такая коммуникация между агентами ГРУ/СВР. Как мне кажется, эта информация слишком специфическая и мне, как обычному читателю, было всё это не интересно читать.
3. Dead Drop Loaded: If it is a Residency-to-Agent exchange, the SVR or GRU officer conducts their MP to ensure they are free of surveillance. The Russian intelligence officer then “loads” the Residency’s package of materials (money, instructions, technical gear, etc.) at the dead drop (tainik) site. RIS officers are trained to use trash bags or other insulators to double-wrap their packages of money or materials.
Проблема неконкретности текста, т.е. поверхности сказанного особо заметно и поэтому мне постоянно хотелось, чтобы автор был в том или ином вопросе более конкретен и не ограничивался лишь общими рассуждениями из серии «шпионы занимаются шпионажем», ведь это и так понятно даже не специалисту и для этого вовсе не нужно читать специализированные книги, такие как эта, к примеру.
In today’s SVR, Directorate NTR (formerly Directorate T) is responsible for collecting scientific and technological intelligence and targeting government and private/commercial science institutes and centers of learning abroad. Line X officers are the embassy-based representatives of SVR Directorate NTR, and they are responsible for collecting science and technology intelligence abroad.
<…>
The GRU Military-Technical Commission and other GRU officers deploy undercover abroad to assist. They are placed in organizations like Rostech and Rosoboronexport. Both are Russian arms exporters that operate globally, but they are also always on the watch to acquire, steal, or purchase foreign military technology.
В книге есть интересный момент, когда автор высказывает собственное мнение о том, почему путинская Россия демонстративно убивает своих оппонентов. В принципе, эта идея довольно здравая, частично пересекающаяся с моей идеей о причинах вторжения Путина в Украину в феврале 2022 года.
Many former intelligence veterans and other commentators have pointed out that it is certainly plausible that Putin does want all the world to know it was his decision and his guys that carried out these attempts against Litvinenko successfully, against Skripal and Navalny unsuccessfully, and finally against Navalny in prison to put an end to unfinished business and kill him.
<…>
The question is, why not do a better job of hiding the RIS hand or trying to conceal it at all?
<…>
As Ben Macintyre points out, Putin can’t afford to be seen as anything but brutal.
<…>
But the idea remains the same: a theatrical, symbolic act of state-sponsored homicide to send a warning to other would-be opponents, cow the Russian populace, and stun the world with its brazen brutality, all suffused with just enough mystery for a shrugging Kremlin denial.”
Тем не менее, ближе к концу, книга меня неприятно поразила своей стереотипностью, клише. Такое чувство, что автор знаком с русскими исключительно по анекдотам.
One of my strangest recollections of this was sitting down to eat with a RIO during a clandestine meeting, and I could tell he was agitated. This was early in my operational experience with Russians (I don’t want to specify the timeframe or location to protect him), so I was puzzled what made him so nervous. I offered him more food. He wasn’t satisfied. I asked him if the temperature was OK in the room, but he was still not happy. Finally, I offered him the minibar to see if he wanted some vodka. That hit the spot, as he quickly answered me, “Well, as the saying goes, we can’t have soup without vodka, can we?”
<…>
This is a critical point in dealing with Russians, and RIOs in particular: drinking alcohol (usually vodka, but not exclusively) is a part of their culture, and for IOs, it is embedded into their very fiber.
Такое чувство, что если русский не пьёт водку на завтрак, на обед и на ужин, значит это не настоящий русский, так же как если у американца нет ковбойских ботинок, и он/она не умеет ездить на лошади и стрелять из кольта «от бедра», значит он ненастоящий американец. Понятно. Вот как после таких заявлений можно всерьёз относиться к этой книге и к этому автору?
While current and longtime minister Sergey Lavrov appears to be trusted by Putin to some degree, as witnessed by his sheer longevity in office, there has been reporting to suggest he is not trusted completely by the president. According to some reporting on the Ukrainian invasion in February 2022, Lavrov did not know of the attack until possibly the final days or even hours before the attack.
Ещё одно очень странное заявление. Почему автор настолько уверен, что Лавров ничего не знал о готовящемся вторжении? Мне вот кажется, что он всё знал, ибо очень давно работает с Путиным и является крайне лояльным к нему человеком.
В общем, странная получилась книга, неоднозначная и очень поверхностная. Как такового анализа в книге нет.
This book is slightly better than "Russia's Hybrid Warfare Offensive Against the West", but, in essence, it is still the same hodgepodge of curious facts and news stories, such as the Litvinenko murder and the Skripal poisoning. In other words, this book fails to deliver the main thing—an in-depth investigation into the workings of Russian intelligence agencies. More accurately: the book simply compiles all the information available in the public domain, without offering any analysis of its own. This means that if the reader is already familiar with the basic or fundamental information about Russian intelligence agencies, he or she will find nothing new or interesting in this book. I would even go so far as to suggest that reading books about specific cases—such as *A Very Expensive Poison: The Assassination of Alexander Litvinenko and Putin’s War with the West,” which describes in detail how the Russian intelligence services killed Litvinenko, is far more interesting than reading a book like this one, which, as I noted above, is a collection of various pieces of information.
Yes, there are some interesting points in the book, but they are all very superficial and, in essence, self-evident or taken from books written during the Soviet era, such as the following conclusion by the author.
The FSB employs various scenarios to position their agents or cooptees— reporting sources either paid or coerced—with proximity to foreigners. The initial approach often appears innocuous, such as a contact made at a conference or business meeting. However, certain recurring patterns emerge in FSB operations. A common tactic involves exploiting fear of extortion by the “Russian mafia” to manipulate foreign businesspeople into working for or reporting to the FSB. This may also involve the use of “swallows”—prostitutes hired by the service to entrap foreigners.
Another frequent approach takes place within Russian universities and research institutes. Every department interacting with foreigners in these institutions typically includes FSB agents who report back to the DKRO, the main counterintelligence arm of the FSB, or other UFSB regional handlers. Their primary task is to assess international students, identifying those who might be recruitable and to determine whether they are future government employees, current officials, or suspected intelligence officers.
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All Russian scientific institutes as well as government institutions, whatever the size, will have at least one security officer, called an “OB” or offitser bezopasnosti in Russian. The OB is in charge of monitoring foreign contacts and reporting such instances to the FSB
One of the chapters is devoted to a very narrow topic—communication between spies. The author examines in detail how such communication takes place between GRU/SVR agents. In my opinion, this information is too specialized, and as an ordinary reader, I found it all rather uninteresting to read.
3. Dead Drop Loaded: If it is a Residency-to-Agent exchange, the SVR or GRU officer conducts their MP to ensure they are free of surveillance. The Russian intelligence officer then “loads” the Residency’s package of materials (money, instructions, technical gear, etc.) at the dead drop (tainik) site. RIS officers are trained to use trash bags or other insulators to double-wrap their packages of money or materials.
The problem with the text’s vagueness—that is, its superficiality—is particularly noticeable, and so I constantly found myself wishing the author would be more specific on various issues and not limit himself to generalizations along the lines of “spies engage in espionage,” since that is obvious even to a non-specialist and doesn’t require reading specialized books like this one, for example.
In today’s SVR, Directorate NTR (formerly Directorate T) is responsible for collecting scientific and technological intelligence and targeting government and private/commercial science institutes and centers of learning abroad. Line X officers are the embassy-based representatives of SVR Directorate NTR, and they are responsible for collecting science and technology intelligence abroad.
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The GRU Military-Technical Commission and other GRU officers deploy undercover abroad to assist. They are placed in organizations like Rostech and Rosoboronexport. Both are Russian arms exporters that operate globally, but they are also always on the watch to acquire, steal, or purchase foreign military technology.
There is an interesting point in the book where the author shares his own view on why Putin’s Russia so blatantly kills its opponents. In principle, this idea is quite sound and partly overlaps with my own view on the reasons behind Putin’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
Many former intelligence veterans and other commentators have pointed out that it is certainly plausible that Putin does want all the world to know it was his decision and his guys that carried out these attempts against Litvinenko successfully, against Skripal and Navalny unsuccessfully, and finally against Navalny in prison to put an end to unfinished business and kill him.
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The question is, why not do a better job of hiding the RIS hand or trying to conceal it at all?
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As Ben Macintyre points out, Putin can’t afford to be seen as anything but brutal.
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But the idea remains the same: a theatrical, symbolic act of state-sponsored homicide to send a warning to other would-be opponents, cow the Russian populace, and stun the world with its brazen brutality, all suffused with just enough mystery for a shrugging Kremlin denial.”
However, toward the end, the book struck me as unpleasantly full of stereotypes and clichés. It feels as though the author knows Russians only through jokes.
One of my strangest recollections of this was sitting down to eat with a RIO during a clandestine meeting, and I could tell he was agitated. This was early in my operational experience with Russians (I don’t want to specify the timeframe or location to protect him), so I was puzzled what made him so nervous. I offered him more food. He wasn’t satisfied. I asked him if the temperature was OK in the room, but he was still not happy. Finally, I offered him the minibar to see if he wanted some vodka. That hit the spot, as he quickly answered me, “Well, as the saying goes, we can’t have soup without vodka, can we?”
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This is a critical point in dealing with Russians, and RIOs in particular: drinking alcohol (usually vodka, but not exclusively) is a part of their culture, and for IOs, it is embedded into their very fiber.
It feels like if a Russian doesn’t drink vodka for breakfast, lunch, and dinner, then he or she isn’t a real Russian—just as if an American doesn’t own cowboy boots, can’t ride a horse, and can’t draw a Colt “from the hip,” then he or she isn’t a real American. I see. How can anyone take this book and this author seriously after statements like that?
While current and longtime minister Sergey Lavrov appears to be trusted by Putin to some degree, as witnessed by his sheer longevity in office, there has been reporting to suggest he is not trusted completely by the president. According to some reporting on the Ukrainian invasion in February 2022, Lavrov did not know of the attack until possibly the final days or even hours before the attack.
Another very strange claim. Why is the author so certain that Lavrov knew nothing about the impending invasion? It seems to me that he knew everything, since he has been working with Putin for a very long time and is extremely loyal to him.
All in all, it’s a strange book—ambiguous and very superficial. There is no real analysis in the book.
June 24, 2026
This has been a great book so far. As someone who is just starting to dive deeper into the world of intelligence and U.S.-Russia competition, I’ve found it to be a comprehensive and accessible look at how Russia approaches intelligence. The book does a strong job of making the topic understandable and removing some of the initial mystery surrounding Russian intelligence operations.
I also appreciated how the author shows that Russian intelligence can be dangerous and effective, while also being reckless and flawed at times. It was especially interesting to see how the book connects Cold War-era tactics and intelligence practices to the modern Russia-Ukraine conflict.
Overall, this is a really good read for anyone interested in intelligence, Russian strategy, or U.S.-Russia competition.
I also appreciated how the author shows that Russian intelligence can be dangerous and effective, while also being reckless and flawed at times. It was especially interesting to see how the book connects Cold War-era tactics and intelligence practices to the modern Russia-Ukraine conflict.
Overall, this is a really good read for anyone interested in intelligence, Russian strategy, or U.S.-Russia competition.
June 27, 2026
Sean Wiswesser’s book on Putin’s secret war against the West is an important and even essential read. He lays out the stunning information war Russia has expanded in recent years in an overt attempt to undermine our democracy. Wiswesser helps us understand so we can fight back! David S.
June 27, 2026
THE DEFINITIVE BOOK ON RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE:
Sean distills decades of hard-target intelligence collection into an easily understandable book. He goes well beyond the usual ‘No shit, there I was…’ war stories and delivers practical knowledge that regular citizens can actually use.
This book is relevant for everyone from tech startup founders and international business travelers to social media sleuths, investigative journalists , expats, and newly elected politicians. It’s also required reading if you consider yourself a student of history, a follower of international affairs, an espionage enthusiast, a Russophile, a military strategist, or someone who just wants a damn good read👍🏼🙏🏼!
Sean distills decades of hard-target intelligence collection into an easily understandable book. He goes well beyond the usual ‘No shit, there I was…’ war stories and delivers practical knowledge that regular citizens can actually use.
This book is relevant for everyone from tech startup founders and international business travelers to social media sleuths, investigative journalists , expats, and newly elected politicians. It’s also required reading if you consider yourself a student of history, a follower of international affairs, an espionage enthusiast, a Russophile, a military strategist, or someone who just wants a damn good read👍🏼🙏🏼!
May 23, 2026
Tradecraft, Tactics, and Dirty Tricks delivers an engaging and highly informative exploration of Russian intelligence operations and modern espionage. Drawing on decades of CIA experience, Sean M. Wiswesser examines the methods, mindset, and global reach of the SVR, GRU, and FSB, offering readers valuable insight into deception, surveillance, sabotage, and hybrid warfare. Combining firsthand expertise with accessible analysis, the book provides a timely look at the evolving landscape of international intelligence and geopolitical conflict.
June 26, 2026
This is a great read. Sean Wiswesser does a masterful job of mixing high-level academic research and knowledge with expert-level operational experience to paint an authoritative and comprehensive picture of the Russian Intelligence Services. His analysis of Putin’s actions and motivations is also first rate.
June 25, 2026
Tradecraft, Tactics, and Dirty Tricks is an engaging look inside the world of Russian intelligence and the methods the Kremlin uses to advance its interests. The book does a great job explaining influence operations in a way that is accessible without sacrificing depth. It's an excellent read for anyone interested in intelligence or modern national security.
June 26, 2026
Absolutely fantastic, a must read. This is an insightful account of methods and tradecraft used by the Russian Intelligence Services (RIS), based on many years of experience by the author. The book is an honest and grounded contribution to intelligence literature, a must read for security and business professionals, academics and those in the wider intelligence enterprise.
June 25, 2026
An incredible read. Such an important piece for anyone interested in international affairs, the intelligence community, politics, or just passionate about their country.
Beautifully and meticulously written. I HIGHLY recommend this book!!
Beautifully and meticulously written. I HIGHLY recommend this book!!
June 28, 2026
A very intersting book and unique because the author does nit inly describe tradecraft and dirty tricks of espionage but also add anecdotes and refers to actual Russian terminology. It is full of insight and makes it easier to understand Russian Intelligence Services and their legacy./Peter
June 26, 2026
The author did a really hard job to make it interesting for a wide audience to learn about a dangerous enemy and treat it seriously. Highly relevant.
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