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Trial by Water: Indus Basin and India–Pakistan Relations | History and Future of the Indus Waters Treaty | Geopolitics, Conflict & Cooperation Over Shared Rivers in South Asia
In 1947, the Indian subcontinent was partitioned, and Pakistan was born. A shared heritage, a composite culture and centuries-old bonds between people, all seemed to vanish overnight. Nowhere was this rupture more profound than in the Indus Basin—once a unified lifeline of the region, now fragmented by sovereign borders, its rivers flowing through two nations immediately at odds with each other.
The Indus Waters Treaty was signed in 1960, proving that even bitter adversaries could cooperate over shared resources. Yet, it never brought lasting peace. The treaty was suspended by India in April 2025 as a punitive measure in the wake of the Pahalgam terror attack, and its future remains shrouded in uncertainty. Can it still endure and adapt? Perhaps the time has come for a new arrangement—one that is not just inevitable but essential.
This book traces the turbulent history of the Indus Basin and examines how the Indus Waters Treaty has been shaped by the region’s ever-evolving political dynamics. It explores the role of key leaders on both sides, as well as external pressures, in shaping and reshaping one of the world’s most critical transboundary water agreements.
The Indus Basin has been a witness to conflict, compromise and survival. And if you seek to understand the true nature of India–Pakistan relations, start with the rivers that bind them. Trial by Water leads us in that direction.
The Indus Waters Treaty was signed in 1960, proving that even bitter adversaries could cooperate over shared resources. Yet, it never brought lasting peace. The treaty was suspended by India in April 2025 as a punitive measure in the wake of the Pahalgam terror attack, and its future remains shrouded in uncertainty. Can it still endure and adapt? Perhaps the time has come for a new arrangement—one that is not just inevitable but essential.
This book traces the turbulent history of the Indus Basin and examines how the Indus Waters Treaty has been shaped by the region’s ever-evolving political dynamics. It explores the role of key leaders on both sides, as well as external pressures, in shaping and reshaping one of the world’s most critical transboundary water agreements.
The Indus Basin has been a witness to conflict, compromise and survival. And if you seek to understand the true nature of India–Pakistan relations, start with the rivers that bind them. Trial by Water leads us in that direction.
332 pages, Kindle Edition
Published July 31, 2025
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October 22, 2025
Uttam Kumar Sinha's 'Trial by Water - Indus Basin and India-Pakistan Relations' is a timely treatise following the Government of India's decision to place the Indus Water Treaty in abeyance following the deadly Pahalgam Attack in April 2025. The treaty that was brokered by the "Good Offices" of the World Bank had stood the test of time and was operational even during the 1965, 1971 and the Kargil clashes, but the Government of India couldn't tarry with the Pakistan-sponsored across the border insurgency and halted the treaty invoking the Article XII(3) yet again to place it under abeyance. Sinha ends the book with a characteristic hope,
"The IWT was born in the era of high tension, under the shadow of post-partition rivalries. Today, history appears to circle back. Then, as now, the Indus Basin becomes a stage where engineering, politics, and power converge, with stairs higher than ever. The actors may have changed, but the script is uncannily familiar"
Under the current scenario, Article VIII, the mechanism that allowed for the Permanent Indus Commission (PIC), has ceased its annual meetings, a crucial platform and an annual ritual, to exchange technicalities and address any disputations between the two countries. Post the Pahalgam Attack, the Treaty is now subject to duress, which India claims will help it to fast-track it's developmental projects on the Jhelum and Chenab rivers that were crawling to a halt, thanks to the Treaty's various entanglements. This has the potential to change the geopolitical landscape of the area, even going as far as fracturing the Indus Basin and resulting in a new theatre of tensed relations, way more serious than when the country was partitioned or even when the Treaty came into being 65 years ago. The IWT was markedly different in that it missed an exit clause, thereby binding the parties to an indefinite obligations unless modified by a duly ratified treaty, the so called Provision of the Article XII(3). This, though was rectified in others treaties, especially the one signed between India and Bangladesh in 1996, the one that came to be known as the Ganga Treaty. Though, Pakistan has invoked the Article IX, which calls for the Settlement of Differences and Disputes a few times to stall the Indian Infrastructural projects on the western rivers, by creating a sustained narrative of water vulnerability as a lower riparian state, it has only frustrated the Indians. India, which has strongly maintained no third-party meditation, however was open to three nomination of the neutral expert as appointed by the World Bank. A second such appointment came in the form of Michael Leno in January 2025, to adjudicate the technical differences over the Kishanganga and Ratle projects that India was building. Rather than Pakistan's insistence that the Court of Arbitration be approached, Leno's ruling, of in favour of India could unlock J&K's optimal storage capacity. Then Pahalgam happened...
Uttam Kumar Sinha's book is divided into two sections, viz. Land and Water; and Diplomacy and War. The first of these sets the historical background of the Indus Basin and the ultimate signing of the Indus Water Treaty. The then Prime Minister, Jawahar Lal Nehru saw this development as a stabilizing gesture, an act of magnanimity that might anchor regional peace. This stance of Nehru was challenged intensively by the Parliament raising serious doubts about the financial burdens on India, despite unresolved financial claims from Pakistan. Nehru's world view resting on idealism would continue to come under fire, be it by Pakistani aggression in Kutch, or 1965 or 1971. Modi, on the contrary saw the Treaty in unfavorable light, and had always shown an inclination to exit it as a strategic intent based on security calculus. Pakistan, on the other hand had never been triumphant about the IWT, always playing the victim card, and despite near total benefactor of the western rivers of Indus, Jhelum and Chenab, discoursed a strong narrative of a downstream victim, time and again trying to stall the Indian projects under the clauses approved by the Treaty. Let us deal with the nuances -
Throughout the 1950s, Pakistan maintained a resolute focus on the three eastern rivers, Ravi, Beas and Sutlej, while claiming exclusive rights on the western rivers Indus, Jhelum and Chenab. Pakistan sought uninterrupted flow from the eastern rivers to feed its vast canal system. India, on the other hand took to Basin-Wide Planning, advocating for the flow through all six rivers. This had is parallel in Radcliffe's proposal for a joint venture of the canal network during the boundary commission's cartography of Punjab at the time of partition, which was summarily rejected by both Nehru and Jinnah. The 50s negotiations were brokered by the World Bank, when it proposed the allocation of the eastern waters to India and the western waters to Pakistan, but for a small amount from the Jhelum to be utilised by India. While India accepted the proposal, Pakistan showed its displeasure with the view that giving the eastern waters to India would be politically suicidal, and economically taxing as it had connecting through the canal network and idea of moving excess waters from the western rivers to the eastern waters, thus helping it assuage the depletion in the water levels during the winter months and compensating for the Rabi season. Pakistan also batted for the construction of storage facilities augmenting its link canals. The World Bank accepted this position in 1956 and agreed to incorporate storage capacities in the replacement works. But, the financial unease between India and Pakistan on the sharing of costs for little to stamp the treaty and the negotiations broke down. Eugene Black, the them President of the World Bank then took to bilateral discussions with both the countries to support the matter out. But a political upheaval in Pakistan has already occurred by them, when the civilian democratic system was replaced by Ayub Khan's military dictatorship.
The 50s was also marked by clashes, most notably the Husseiniwala Headworks clash in 1956. Husseiniwala was given to Pakistan when the boundary was drawn in 1947. The place known for its enamelware and saltpetre is historically important and has a memorial to Bhagat Singh. The clash focused on the complexity of natural features like rivers forming the boundary, a stand that India resolutely held on to. Pakistan, meanwhile left no stone unturned to portray itself as Asia's 'brave little Belgium', a reference to Belgium's courageous resistance against Germany in WW1, in its position vis-a-vis India's belligerance.
The negotiations couldn't have been reached without the role played by BK Nehru, Jawaharlal's nephew, who had spent a few years as Indian representative at the World Bank and later as the consular commissioner at the Indian Embassy. Nehru had established a strong rapport with Eugene Black. After his return from Washington DC, he was appointed the Secretary to the Department of Economic Affairs in 1957. In his memoirs, BK Nehru days,
"... Gulhati had estimated INR 75 crore as the cost, but both the bank and the Paks wanted more... The task of negotiating the amount of compensation was handed over to me. The Finance Minister's instructions were that I could agree to INR 100 cr. The negotiations took place between Iliff and myself at Black's suite in Ashoka Hotel... Finding that my stand was that we would pay no more than the cost of the works, which was much less than what the world bank was asking. He said that if we wanted peace, we had better up figure. I said that this meant that the Bank had no case. What it was really doing was blackmailing us, who wanted peace to keep the real aggressors quiet."
This infuriated Black. But BK Nehru did not budge and finally a sum much lower was accepted by the Bank. BK Nehru said that he saved Morarji Desai, the then Finance Minister a substantial sum.
Finally after a series of arduous negotiations lasting nine years, the Treaty was signed between Jawaharlal Nehru and Ayub Khan in Karachi in September 1960. Seen as one of the most successful international treaties, it has survived frequent tensions, including conflict, and has provided a framework for irrigation and hydropower development for more than half a century. Former U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower described it as "one bright spot ... in a very depressing world picture that we see so often."
In the words of Niranjan Gulhati, the Honorary President of the International Commission on Drainage and Irrigation, the intensity of the negotiations expressed one of the most exquisite, baffling, delightful, frustrating, exfoliating, fatiguing, intriguing experiences known to man.
The Treaty sets out a mechanism for cooperation and information exchange between the two countries regarding their use of the rivers, known as the Permanent Indus Commission, which has a Commissioner from each country. The Treaty also sets forth distinct procedures to handle issues which may arise: “questions” are handled by the Commission; “differences” are to be resolved by a Neutral Expert; and “disputes” are to be referred to an ad hoc arbitral tribunal called the “Court of Arbitration.”
As a signatory to the Treaty, the World Bank’s role is limited and procedural. In particular, its role in relation to “differences” and “disputes” is limited to the designation of individuals to fulfill certain roles in the context of Neutral Expert or Court of Arbitration proceedings when requested by either or both of the Parties. The Treaty does not empower the World Bank to decide whether one procedure should take precedence over the other. The World Bank sought to fulfill its procedural obligations with respect to both the Court of Arbitration and the Neutral Expert. At the same time, the World Bank actively encouraged both countries to agree amicably on a mechanism to address the issues.
Meanwhile, the distribution of waters between India and Pakistan faced opposition from another quarter. When Sheikh Abdullah, the ‘frenemy’ of Nehru, was finally released in 1964, he held that the people of the state had been deprived of ‘their natural share’ at the expense of both India and Pakistan. Sinha points out that the first resolution in favour of abrogation of the treaty actually came from the unanimous resolution of the J&K Assembly in 2002, and again in 2016. Thus, all the three Abdullahs – Sheikh Mohammed, Farooq and Omar – have argued that India’s position on IWT was restrictive towards J&K. Incidentally, this perception was shared even by the Congress leadership of East Punjab!
The second part of the book deals with India's fraught relations with Pakistan, including a detailed narrative of the clashes in Kutch, followed by the 1965 war, in which no clear victor emerged and then the liberation war of Bangladesh in 1971. The period also marked India's ambiguous positions as regards the US and the Soviets. The Chinese entry makers it all the more interesting from the geopolitical point of view. Lal Bahadur Shastri, who was mistakenly undermined by Ayub Khan had to change his perspective on the Indians in the wake of Shastri's unfortunate passing away in Tashkent, where he had gone for meeting Ayub Khan and signing the truce. It must be noted that when Shastri's body was wrapped in the tricolour, Ayub Khan was one who learnt his shoulder to carry the deceased leader to the airplane.
This thoroughly researched book by the Senior Fellow at the Manohar Parikkar Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis is quite literally a treasure trove of intricacies that led to the enactment of the Indus Water Treaty, and is an absolutely compelling read portraying how water has catalysed the estrangement between the two countries, not only historically, but in more serious gravity at present with a lot of uncertainty surrounding the abeyance of the same.
"The IWT was born in the era of high tension, under the shadow of post-partition rivalries. Today, history appears to circle back. Then, as now, the Indus Basin becomes a stage where engineering, politics, and power converge, with stairs higher than ever. The actors may have changed, but the script is uncannily familiar"
Under the current scenario, Article VIII, the mechanism that allowed for the Permanent Indus Commission (PIC), has ceased its annual meetings, a crucial platform and an annual ritual, to exchange technicalities and address any disputations between the two countries. Post the Pahalgam Attack, the Treaty is now subject to duress, which India claims will help it to fast-track it's developmental projects on the Jhelum and Chenab rivers that were crawling to a halt, thanks to the Treaty's various entanglements. This has the potential to change the geopolitical landscape of the area, even going as far as fracturing the Indus Basin and resulting in a new theatre of tensed relations, way more serious than when the country was partitioned or even when the Treaty came into being 65 years ago. The IWT was markedly different in that it missed an exit clause, thereby binding the parties to an indefinite obligations unless modified by a duly ratified treaty, the so called Provision of the Article XII(3). This, though was rectified in others treaties, especially the one signed between India and Bangladesh in 1996, the one that came to be known as the Ganga Treaty. Though, Pakistan has invoked the Article IX, which calls for the Settlement of Differences and Disputes a few times to stall the Indian Infrastructural projects on the western rivers, by creating a sustained narrative of water vulnerability as a lower riparian state, it has only frustrated the Indians. India, which has strongly maintained no third-party meditation, however was open to three nomination of the neutral expert as appointed by the World Bank. A second such appointment came in the form of Michael Leno in January 2025, to adjudicate the technical differences over the Kishanganga and Ratle projects that India was building. Rather than Pakistan's insistence that the Court of Arbitration be approached, Leno's ruling, of in favour of India could unlock J&K's optimal storage capacity. Then Pahalgam happened...
Uttam Kumar Sinha's book is divided into two sections, viz. Land and Water; and Diplomacy and War. The first of these sets the historical background of the Indus Basin and the ultimate signing of the Indus Water Treaty. The then Prime Minister, Jawahar Lal Nehru saw this development as a stabilizing gesture, an act of magnanimity that might anchor regional peace. This stance of Nehru was challenged intensively by the Parliament raising serious doubts about the financial burdens on India, despite unresolved financial claims from Pakistan. Nehru's world view resting on idealism would continue to come under fire, be it by Pakistani aggression in Kutch, or 1965 or 1971. Modi, on the contrary saw the Treaty in unfavorable light, and had always shown an inclination to exit it as a strategic intent based on security calculus. Pakistan, on the other hand had never been triumphant about the IWT, always playing the victim card, and despite near total benefactor of the western rivers of Indus, Jhelum and Chenab, discoursed a strong narrative of a downstream victim, time and again trying to stall the Indian projects under the clauses approved by the Treaty. Let us deal with the nuances -
Throughout the 1950s, Pakistan maintained a resolute focus on the three eastern rivers, Ravi, Beas and Sutlej, while claiming exclusive rights on the western rivers Indus, Jhelum and Chenab. Pakistan sought uninterrupted flow from the eastern rivers to feed its vast canal system. India, on the other hand took to Basin-Wide Planning, advocating for the flow through all six rivers. This had is parallel in Radcliffe's proposal for a joint venture of the canal network during the boundary commission's cartography of Punjab at the time of partition, which was summarily rejected by both Nehru and Jinnah. The 50s negotiations were brokered by the World Bank, when it proposed the allocation of the eastern waters to India and the western waters to Pakistan, but for a small amount from the Jhelum to be utilised by India. While India accepted the proposal, Pakistan showed its displeasure with the view that giving the eastern waters to India would be politically suicidal, and economically taxing as it had connecting through the canal network and idea of moving excess waters from the western rivers to the eastern waters, thus helping it assuage the depletion in the water levels during the winter months and compensating for the Rabi season. Pakistan also batted for the construction of storage facilities augmenting its link canals. The World Bank accepted this position in 1956 and agreed to incorporate storage capacities in the replacement works. But, the financial unease between India and Pakistan on the sharing of costs for little to stamp the treaty and the negotiations broke down. Eugene Black, the them President of the World Bank then took to bilateral discussions with both the countries to support the matter out. But a political upheaval in Pakistan has already occurred by them, when the civilian democratic system was replaced by Ayub Khan's military dictatorship.
The 50s was also marked by clashes, most notably the Husseiniwala Headworks clash in 1956. Husseiniwala was given to Pakistan when the boundary was drawn in 1947. The place known for its enamelware and saltpetre is historically important and has a memorial to Bhagat Singh. The clash focused on the complexity of natural features like rivers forming the boundary, a stand that India resolutely held on to. Pakistan, meanwhile left no stone unturned to portray itself as Asia's 'brave little Belgium', a reference to Belgium's courageous resistance against Germany in WW1, in its position vis-a-vis India's belligerance.
The negotiations couldn't have been reached without the role played by BK Nehru, Jawaharlal's nephew, who had spent a few years as Indian representative at the World Bank and later as the consular commissioner at the Indian Embassy. Nehru had established a strong rapport with Eugene Black. After his return from Washington DC, he was appointed the Secretary to the Department of Economic Affairs in 1957. In his memoirs, BK Nehru days,
"... Gulhati had estimated INR 75 crore as the cost, but both the bank and the Paks wanted more... The task of negotiating the amount of compensation was handed over to me. The Finance Minister's instructions were that I could agree to INR 100 cr. The negotiations took place between Iliff and myself at Black's suite in Ashoka Hotel... Finding that my stand was that we would pay no more than the cost of the works, which was much less than what the world bank was asking. He said that if we wanted peace, we had better up figure. I said that this meant that the Bank had no case. What it was really doing was blackmailing us, who wanted peace to keep the real aggressors quiet."
This infuriated Black. But BK Nehru did not budge and finally a sum much lower was accepted by the Bank. BK Nehru said that he saved Morarji Desai, the then Finance Minister a substantial sum.
Finally after a series of arduous negotiations lasting nine years, the Treaty was signed between Jawaharlal Nehru and Ayub Khan in Karachi in September 1960. Seen as one of the most successful international treaties, it has survived frequent tensions, including conflict, and has provided a framework for irrigation and hydropower development for more than half a century. Former U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower described it as "one bright spot ... in a very depressing world picture that we see so often."
In the words of Niranjan Gulhati, the Honorary President of the International Commission on Drainage and Irrigation, the intensity of the negotiations expressed one of the most exquisite, baffling, delightful, frustrating, exfoliating, fatiguing, intriguing experiences known to man.
The Treaty sets out a mechanism for cooperation and information exchange between the two countries regarding their use of the rivers, known as the Permanent Indus Commission, which has a Commissioner from each country. The Treaty also sets forth distinct procedures to handle issues which may arise: “questions” are handled by the Commission; “differences” are to be resolved by a Neutral Expert; and “disputes” are to be referred to an ad hoc arbitral tribunal called the “Court of Arbitration.”
As a signatory to the Treaty, the World Bank’s role is limited and procedural. In particular, its role in relation to “differences” and “disputes” is limited to the designation of individuals to fulfill certain roles in the context of Neutral Expert or Court of Arbitration proceedings when requested by either or both of the Parties. The Treaty does not empower the World Bank to decide whether one procedure should take precedence over the other. The World Bank sought to fulfill its procedural obligations with respect to both the Court of Arbitration and the Neutral Expert. At the same time, the World Bank actively encouraged both countries to agree amicably on a mechanism to address the issues.
Meanwhile, the distribution of waters between India and Pakistan faced opposition from another quarter. When Sheikh Abdullah, the ‘frenemy’ of Nehru, was finally released in 1964, he held that the people of the state had been deprived of ‘their natural share’ at the expense of both India and Pakistan. Sinha points out that the first resolution in favour of abrogation of the treaty actually came from the unanimous resolution of the J&K Assembly in 2002, and again in 2016. Thus, all the three Abdullahs – Sheikh Mohammed, Farooq and Omar – have argued that India’s position on IWT was restrictive towards J&K. Incidentally, this perception was shared even by the Congress leadership of East Punjab!
The second part of the book deals with India's fraught relations with Pakistan, including a detailed narrative of the clashes in Kutch, followed by the 1965 war, in which no clear victor emerged and then the liberation war of Bangladesh in 1971. The period also marked India's ambiguous positions as regards the US and the Soviets. The Chinese entry makers it all the more interesting from the geopolitical point of view. Lal Bahadur Shastri, who was mistakenly undermined by Ayub Khan had to change his perspective on the Indians in the wake of Shastri's unfortunate passing away in Tashkent, where he had gone for meeting Ayub Khan and signing the truce. It must be noted that when Shastri's body was wrapped in the tricolour, Ayub Khan was one who learnt his shoulder to carry the deceased leader to the airplane.
This thoroughly researched book by the Senior Fellow at the Manohar Parikkar Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis is quite literally a treasure trove of intricacies that led to the enactment of the Indus Water Treaty, and is an absolutely compelling read portraying how water has catalysed the estrangement between the two countries, not only historically, but in more serious gravity at present with a lot of uncertainty surrounding the abeyance of the same.
February 13, 2026
I picked up Trial by Water because I wanted to understand how something as simple as a river can shape the lives and politics of millions. From the start the book promised to look at the Indus Basin not just as geography but as a living link between India and Pakistan, and that idea pulled me in.
What the book covers
Uttam Kumar Sinha takes you through the history of the Indus rivers and the story of the Indus Waters Treaty in a way that feels like a guided walk. He explains how the rivers were divided after Partition, how the treaty came into being, and how politics, leadership and outside actors affected the water-sharing story. The scope is big but the focus stays clear: rivers, law, politics and the people who depend on water.
How the author explains complex stuff
Sinha breaks down technical and legal parts without making them boring. When he writes about technical details — like river management, allocations, or the role of institutions — he ties them back to real moments in history and the choices leaders made. That made the complicated bits easy to follow for me.
The storytelling and structure
The book moves between history, policy and human consequences. Each chapter felt purposeful: one moment I was reading about treaties and negotiations, the next moment I was thinking about farmers, irrigation and daily life linked to those decisions. The chapters build on each other so the whole picture becomes clearer as you go.
Why this book stayed with me
What stayed with me most is the sense that rivers are more than water — they are memory, politics and survival. Sinha shows that decisions about water are also decisions about trust, security and cooperation. After reading it I found myself looking at the map of the Indus with new curiosity.
Who I think should read it
If you care about South Asia, environment, policy or history, this book is for you. You do not need to be a specialist. I felt it is written for anyone who wants a solid, grounded picture of why the Indus matters to both nations and to millions of people who live by the rivers.
Final thoughts
Reading Trial by Water felt like getting a long, clear conversation about a complicated subject. It informed me, it made me think, and it left me with a stronger sense of how rivers shape politics and everyday life. I finished the book feeling grateful for the way Sinha connects policy to people.
What the book covers
Uttam Kumar Sinha takes you through the history of the Indus rivers and the story of the Indus Waters Treaty in a way that feels like a guided walk. He explains how the rivers were divided after Partition, how the treaty came into being, and how politics, leadership and outside actors affected the water-sharing story. The scope is big but the focus stays clear: rivers, law, politics and the people who depend on water.
How the author explains complex stuff
Sinha breaks down technical and legal parts without making them boring. When he writes about technical details — like river management, allocations, or the role of institutions — he ties them back to real moments in history and the choices leaders made. That made the complicated bits easy to follow for me.
The storytelling and structure
The book moves between history, policy and human consequences. Each chapter felt purposeful: one moment I was reading about treaties and negotiations, the next moment I was thinking about farmers, irrigation and daily life linked to those decisions. The chapters build on each other so the whole picture becomes clearer as you go.
Why this book stayed with me
What stayed with me most is the sense that rivers are more than water — they are memory, politics and survival. Sinha shows that decisions about water are also decisions about trust, security and cooperation. After reading it I found myself looking at the map of the Indus with new curiosity.
Who I think should read it
If you care about South Asia, environment, policy or history, this book is for you. You do not need to be a specialist. I felt it is written for anyone who wants a solid, grounded picture of why the Indus matters to both nations and to millions of people who live by the rivers.
Final thoughts
Reading Trial by Water felt like getting a long, clear conversation about a complicated subject. It informed me, it made me think, and it left me with a stronger sense of how rivers shape politics and everyday life. I finished the book feeling grateful for the way Sinha connects policy to people.
October 3, 2025
Excellent and exceptional book. It makes history come alive—engaging, accessible, and deeply interesting. The narrative flows effortlessly, blending rigorous research with vivid storytelling, ensuring that even complex historical themes feel relatable and compelling
January 15, 2026
A very good read, with details of the India-Paki conflicts never covered before.
November 6, 2025
quite colored with one-sided representation, but understandable given the nationality of the author. would love to read/hear other end of the story
Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews