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China's Weaponization of Trade: Resistance Through Collective Resilience

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In recent years, China and the United States have each turned economic interdependence into an instrument of coercion, using their dominant positions in international trade to push states and firms to comply with their political goals. What is distinctive about this form of economic pressure, and how can other countries fight back?

This groundbreaking book explores the weaponization of economic interdependence and its implications for the international order through a wealth of new and original data on China’s economic statecraft. Victor D. Cha, Ellen Kim, and Andy Lim examine how and in what ways the United States and China have deployed economic coercion, focusing on China’s extensive use of this tactic over the past three decades. They analyze a vast data set that includes more than 600 cases of China’s economic bullying of states, companies, and individuals in North America, Asia, and Europe. Cha, Kim, and Lim propose a multilateral strategy of “collective resilience” to counter intimidation, showing how targeted states can band together, leverage trading relationships, and threaten retaliation.

Synthesizing new insights from unique trade data with international security expertise, this timely book sheds new light on how China exercises economic power―and it provides a playbook to deter bullies and rebalance the global order.

408 pages, Paperback

Published January 20, 2026

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Victor Cha

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165 reviews6 followers
November 9, 2025
Cha, Kim, and Lim seek to expound on the practice of "the weaponization of economic interdependence" and its implications "on the rules-based liberal international order." (pp 4-5) They define weaponisation of interdependence as exploiting economic leverage to pursue a noneconomic, political objective. Such economic coercion can be done even by less powerful state actions, by virtue of their "occupying a critical node or hub in any network." For example, during World War II, Canada leveraged its controls on copper exports to the United States, making clear that such exports could be used to fill munitions contracts only for allied countries (p 11). This weaponisation is also not limited to China – the United States has levied sanctions against Iran since the 1979 revolution and against Cuba, has a history of economic coercion against China, and most recently, Trump used tariffs in early 2025 against Mexico and Canada (both linked to fentanyl flows and illegal immigration) (p 13). However, the authors submit that there is a difference with China's economic coercion: 1) While the United States' acts of economic coercion are usually formal, with the government being clear about the sanction it is applying and for what reason, China's acts are "usually opaque", and "are not formally announced in terms of target or purpose." (p 13); 2) The United States usually has a legal justification for action (eg. executive order or act of Congress), while Chinese economic coercion "is rarely based on any legal and legitimate authority", and "are carried out in naked self-interest without any further need for justification." Such informality also allows China to deny any responsibility and avoid World Trade Organization ("WTO") adjudication (p 14); 3) The United States' "actions are usually to counter or punish some violation of U.S. law or international norm, whereas China's are pursued largely for narrow and parochial reasons."(p 15) The authors also opine that China's predation is to achieve a slate of political objectives such as opposition to Taiwan independence and acceptance that Taiwan is part of China, acceptance of China's sovereign actions over populations in Tibet and Xinjiang, and respect for China's territorial claims (p 24). The broader goal is to "achieve what scholars have called the third dimension of power by shaping how states view their own interests", i.e. the creation of "an environment of self-censorship" where its actions "set a precedent for others to anticipate, respect, and defer in advance to Chinese interests in all of their future actions." (p 29) China's economic coercion follows a "minimax" strategy, designed to "minimize costs for China while maximizing those for the target." For example, when China imposed sanctions on Norway over the awarding of the Nobel Prize to a dissident (Liu Xiaobo), "China could have blocked all seafood imports from Norway, but that would have incurred a cost for China, since some of these products are processed in China for reexport. Instead, it sanctioned only salmon, which had a huge cost for Norway but little cost for China." (p 95)

In response to this, some countries have tried various strategies such as diversifying trade patterns and decoupling their supply chains from China, but the authors opine that this still runs against the maintenance of the international trading order. Cha, Kim, and Lim thus put forward a "theory of collective resilience", which is designed to deter acts of economic coercion (p 69) and "tries to elicit a nonaction from China (no economic predation) with nonaction (the threat of certain retaliation)." (p 71). The authors posit that states can "band together and practice an Article 5-type collective economic deterrence strategy by promising retaliation should China act against any one of the alliance members." (p 70) The target items which would form part of this strategy must meet two criteria: 1) The item must have some strategic value, i.e. "a critical intermediary or end-product good, or a luxury good" (pp 75-76); and 2) The good must have low substitutability, i.e. "a lack of alternative suppliers." (p 77)

The main issue with such a strategy is the need for "the political will to commit to a collective stance[,] even if it means they will incur costs for doing so." (p 88) In this regard, the authors highlight three determinants of reciprocity: 1) Previous pattern of positive interaction; 2) Common interests in supporting a liberal, open, and nondiscriminatory trading order; and 3) Belief in the integrity of the WTO as a regulatory body to ensure fair trade (p 90). Members of the group have to be conscious of the "club benefits" from joining the group and not breaking the rules, including not "dealing with the Chinese economic behemoth on their own", no longer having to self-censor, not having to decouple from China to be free of economic coercion, and "allows each member to act like a "shaper" rather than a "taker" in the global trading order." (pp 91-92) While Beijing "would almost certainly look for the weakest link in the chain", the larger powers would have to reassure the smaller powers in the group, eg. by providing early and tangible signs of commitment to underwrite the coalition, and/or by "invest[ing] in a collective fund to compensate smaller members for losses or offer alternative export or import markets to divert trade" (p 93) The authors suggest building this group around the G7 as "The members share common values and have identified their own self-interest with preserving the rules-based order", "place positive value on membership", and "all G7 governments or their companies have been victims of China's economic coercion, which creates a tangible motivation for them" (p 104).

The authors end the book by pressing home the high stakes underlying China's economic coercion, and they argue that "While the United States is arguably the most prominent offender at the time of this writing in the first half of 2025, China is the worst offender dating back for decades. Unlike others, China's weaponization of trade has no legal or normative basis, is informal and discriminatory in nature, and is noncompliant with WTO rules. These practices not only degrade trust in the global trade environment bur also threaten the liberal political order." (p 150) Still, Cha, Kim, and Lim recognise that there is a shift in behaviour and rhetoric with Trump's second presidency – "Trump is pulling four pages from the China coercion playbook": Using trade weaponisation as a tool of diplomacy, being unapologetic about it, relying on the theory that "America needs the world less than the world needs it", and maximising leverage by cutting deals bilaterally rather than in groups (pp 165-166). Almost like a reflection, China "is taking page from the American playbook of trade weaponization", framing its export controls on gallium, germanium and graphite in July and October 2023 "in terms of national security and nonproliferation", and framing its export control on rare earth extracts targeting the United States on April 2025 (in retaliation for Trumps' tariffs) "in terms of national security and nonproliferation" (pp 166-167).

Brief thoughts
Cha, Kim, and Lim support their arguments extensively with trade data, both in arguing that China weaponises trade and in exploring which goods should be the subject of their proposed strategy of collective resistance. While I am convinced by their thesis (and their proposed solution), I am not fully convinced that Chinese behaviour is a behemoth of a threat that major players in the world have to band together against, especially given, as pointed out by the authors at the end of the book, how nations have shifted their behaviour and rhetoric in recent years, almost as if the United States and China are switching positions. I think it thus remains to be seen what is the best course forward for maintenance of the liberal international trading order. The authors are situated in the United States, so I suppose it is natural that they will write from that perspective. Still, a recommended read for an introduction to this geopolitical issue, a potential solution to it, and an insight into how a more typical US administration (compared to the present; this review was written in 2025) would view China and the international economic order.
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